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    "judges": [
      "Judges McCULLOUGH and ELMORE concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. STEVEN DIXON PRENTICE"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "MARTIN, Chief Judge.\nDefendant appeals from his convictions of first-degree rape, two counts of first-degree sexual offense, and one count of taking indecent liberties with a minor. Defendant argues that video tape evidence of him committing the sexual acts complained of was not properly authenticated and that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the charges under section 15A-761 of the North Carolina General Statutes, the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. We find no error by the trial court.\nThe pertinent factual and procedural history of the instant case is as follows: On 7 August 2001, defendant pled guilty to federal child pornography charges in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina and was sentenced to 210 months in prison. After sentencing, defendant was transferred as a federal prisoner to the Orange County jail, pursuant to a housing agreement between the United States government and Orange County. On 27 August 2001, the grand jury returned state indictments against defendant. The Orange County sheriff served defendant with an order for arrest on 28 August 2001. The following day, defendant appeared in state court, where he was informed of the charges against him and appointed an attorney. He was then returned to the Orange County jail and federal custody.\nOn 10 September 2001, federal authorities transported defendant from the Orange County jail to a federal prison in Kentucky. On 28 May 2003 the State prepared a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequen- dum to secure defendant\u2019s presence in state court, and defendant was transferred to state custody pursuant to that writ on 15 July 2003. Defendant remained in state custody through his trial, which ended 28 October 2003.\nThe State\u2019s evidence at trial tended to show that defendant was the subject of a child pornography distribution investigation by the United States Postal Inspector. Defendant responded to an electronic mail (\u201ce-mail\u201d) offering a video tape entitled \u201cNumber Fourteen, Teen Sex.\u201d Agents from the State Bureau of Investigation (\u201cSBI\u201d) and postal inspectors subsequently searched defendant\u2019s residence, where the inspectors discovered several video tapes secured within a safe.\nAn SBI agent involved on the case, Mike Smith (\u201cAgent Smith\u201d), reviewed one of the video tapes and attempted to identify the persons depicted in it. The video tape showed a grown male, later identified as defendant, and a pre-pubescent female engaged in various sexual acts, including digital and penile penetration of the girl\u2019s vagina by defendant. Agent Smith testified he took still photographs made from the video tape to several of defendant\u2019s close acquaintances in an attempt to identify the young girl. Defendant\u2019s former girlfriend identified the girl as her daughter, K.H., and verified that the male in the video tape was defendant. K.H.\u2019s grandmother also identified K.H. as the girl in the photograph.\nK.H.\u2019s mother testified at trial that she and her two daughters moved in with defendant in October 1999. K.H. was two to three years old during the time she resided with defendant. K.H.\u2019s mother testified her daughter appeared to be three years old in the video tape. She identified a checked flannel shirt, worn by the girl in the video tape, as one belonging to K.H. She further stated the furnishings and decorations in the still photographs, taken from the video tape, appeared to be the same furnishings and decorations in defendant\u2019s bedroom at the time they were living there. According to KH.\u2019s mother, defendant also owned a camcorder and a tripod, which he had used to videotape the two of them having sexual intercourse in his bedroom. She stated she had no personal knowledge of whether defendant ever videotaped himself with K.H. and that she never observed defendant engage in any sexual activity with her daughter.\nThe State played the video tape at trial over defendant\u2019s objection. Defendant did not testify and presented no evidence. Upon review of the evidence, the jury found defendant guilty of all charges and he was sentenced on 28 October 2003 to a term of 384 to 470 months in prison. Defendant appeals.\nDefendant argues the trial court erred by admitting the video tape and still photographs taken from the video tape into evidence. He further contends the State violated the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. For the reasons stated herein, we find no error.\nA. Video Tape Evidence\nDefendant first contends the trial court erred in admitting the video tape seized from his residence, as well as still photographs taken from that video tape, as substantive evidence of the alleged crimes. Defendant argues the State failed to properly authenticate the video tape prior to its introduction into evidence. We do not agree.\nVideo tapes are admissible as substantive evidence as long as applicable evidentiary requirements are met. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8-97 (2003). Rule 901 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence requires \u201cauthentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility\u201d of evidence. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 901(a) (2003). The authentication or identification requirement is satisfied by \u201cevidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.\u201d Id. The General Assembly lists ten examples of authentication conforming with the rule, but is careful to note that the examples are \u201c [b]y way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation . . . .\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 901(b) (2003). Proper authentication of video tape evidence includes:\n(1) testimony that the motion picture or videotape fairly and accurately illustrates the events filmed (illustrative purposes); (2) proper testimony concerning the checking and operation of the video camera and the chain of evidence concerning the videotape; (3) testimony that the photographs introduced at trial were the same as those the witness had inspected immediately after processing (substantive purposes); or (4) testimony that the videotape had not been edited, and that the picture fairly and accurately recorded the actual appearance of the area photographed.\nState v. Cannon, 92 N.C. App. 246, 254, 374 S.E.2d 604, 608-09 (1988) (citations and internal quotations omitted), reversed on other grounds, 326 N.C. 37, 387 S.E.2d 450 (1990); see also State v. Mason, 144 N.C. App. 20, 26, 550 S.E.2d 10, 15 (2001) (noting there are \u201cthree significant areas of inquiry for a court reviewing the foundation for admissibility of a videotape: (1) whether the camera and taping system in question were properly maintained and were properly operating when the tape was made, (2) whether the videotape accurately presents the events depicted, and (3) whether there is an unbroken chain of custody\u201d); State v. Sibley, 140 N.C. App. 584, 586, 537 S.E.2d 835, 837-38 (2000) (same).\nWe also note that our Supreme Court, in addressing the admissibility of audiotapes, has stated that \u201c \u2018[u]nder Rule 901, testimony as to accuracy based on personal knowledge is all that is required to authenticate a tape recording, and a recording so authenticated is admissible if it was legally obtained and contains otherwise competent evidence.\u2019\u201d State v. Jones, 358 N.C. 330, 344-45, 595 S.E.2d 124, 134 (quoting State v. Stager, 329 N.C. 278, 317, 406 S.E.2d 876, 898 (1991)), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 160 L. Ed. 2d 500 (2004). Under this line of cases, any \u201cconflict in the evidence goes to the weight and credibility of the evidence not its admissibility.\u201d Stager, 329 N.C. at 317, 406 S.E.2d at 898.\nDefendant argues the State failed to introduce (1) sufficient evidence of an unbroken chain of custody; (2) testimony that the video tape accurately presents the events depicted; and (3) testimony that the video tape had not been altered. We disagree.\nAgent Smith testified he was present when postal inspectors discovered the video tape in question, which was a \u201cVHS-C\u201d type, along with other video tapes, in a safe in defendant\u2019s bedroom. The video tapes were photographed in the safe, and then removed by postal inspectors. The video tape remained in postal inspector custody until brought to Agent Smith by the postal inspector. Agent Smith recognized the video tape as being the same one seized from defendant\u2019s residence. The two reviewed the video tape at Agent Smith\u2019s office. Agent Smith then took all of the video tapes to the SBI\u2019s digital evidence laboratory, and he provided detailed testimony about the chain of custody of the video tape at the SBI. Agent Smith then maintained custody of the video tape until trial.\nAgent Smith further testified that the room depicted in the video tape shown to the jury was identical to the master bedroom in defendant\u2019s residence and that the man in the video tape was defendant. KH.\u2019s mother testified defendant owned a camcorder (the type of machine on which \u201cVHS-C\u201d tapes are recorded) and a tripod, which he had used to videotape them having sexual intercourse in the master bedroom of defendant\u2019s residence. She also identified the room depicted in the video tape as defendant\u2019s master bedroom and the man on the video tape as defendant. K.H.\u2019s mother identified the young girl on the video tape as K.H.\nThe testimony of Agent Smith establishes an unbroken chain of custody from the time the tape was found in defendant\u2019s residence. Further, there was ample testimony to establish the identities of defendant, the girl, and defendant\u2019s residence depicted on the video tape. There was also testimony to establish that defendant\u2019s camcorder was in working condition. Finally, there was sufficient evidence from the testimony regarding chain of custody to establish the video tape had not been edited or altered, and that the same video tape seized from defendant\u2019s residence was the same video tape reviewed by the jury. We conclude the trial court properly admitted the video tape and the photographs taken therefrom, and we overrule defendant\u2019s first assignment of error.\nB. Interstate Agreement on Detainers\nDefendant next contends the State violated the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (\u201cIAD\u201d) or unconstitutionally evaded the operation of that statute by arraigning defendant in Orange County District Court and returning defendant to federal custody without resolving his case. Specifically, defendant contends his charges should have been dismissed on the ground he was in federal custody when the State served him with the order for arrest. Defendant argues the order for arrest acted as a \u201cdetainer\u201d and brought him into the jurisdiction of the State such that his subsequent return to federal custody without trial violated the provisions of Article IV of the IAD. We disagree.\nThe IAD is a compact entered into by North Carolina, forty-eight other states, the United States government, and the District of Columbia, and establishes a procedure for resolution of one state\u2019s outstanding charges against a prisoner of another state or the United States. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-761 (2003) (codifying IAD); see also New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 111, 145 L. Ed. 2d 560, 564 (2000). For our purposes, Article IV of the agreement provides Orange County, North Carolina, as the \u201cjurisdiction in which an untried indictment ... is pending,\u201d a procedural mechanism to have a defendant brought from another jurisdiction where he is already serving a sentence: here, the federal government. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-761, art. IV(a).\nDefendant is correct in asserting that once the prisoner arrives in the jurisdiction of the receiving state (the state in which the charges are pending), trial on those charges must commence within 120 days. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-761, art. IV(c) (2003). Also, \u201c[i]f trial is not had on any indictment... prior to the prisoner\u2019s being returned to the original place of imprisonment... such indictment. . . shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-761, art. IV(e) (2003). The provisions of the IAD are triggered only, however, when a \u201cdetainer\u201d is filed with the sending state or institution by the receiving state. United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 343, 56 L. Ed. 2d 329, 336 (1978).\nAlthough no court has ever precisely determined what type of notice or request serves as a \u201cdetainer,\u201d thereby triggering the IAD, the United States Supreme Court has held that a federal writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is not a detainer for purposes of the IAD. Mauro, 436 U.S. at 361, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 347. The Court has also noted that \u201cthe Government need not proceed by way of the Agreement. ... It is only when the Government does file a detainer that it becomes bound by the Agreement\u2019s provisions.\u201d Id. at 364 n. 30, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 349 n. 30.\nHere, the State contends it never filed a detainer with any institution or sending state. It argues defendant was brought to appear for trial via a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, thus never triggering the IAD. Defendant does not dispute the writ, but argues that the state arrest warrant, served on defendant twenty-one months before he was brought to trial and while he was in federal custody, either was a \u201cdetainer\u201d or acted as one within the spirit of the IAD.\nA detainer has been explained as a \u201clegal order that requires a State in which an individual is currently imprisoned to hold that individual when he has finished serving his sentence so that he may be tried by a different State for a different crime.\u201d Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 148, 150 L. Ed. 2d 188, 192 (2001); see also Mauro, 436 U.S. at 359, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 346 (defining detainer as \u201c \u2018a notification filed with the institution in which a prisoner is serving a sentence, advising that he is wanted to face pending criminal charges in another jurisdiction\u2019 \u201d (internal citation omitted)).\nAlthough this Court has never considered the issue of whether an arrest warrant or order for arrest acts as a detainer, cases from other jurisdictions are instructive. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals construing Article III of the IAD has held that an arrest warrant serves as a detainer, and therefore triggers the provisions of the IAD, only if:\n1) it is based on an untried information, indictment, or complaint; 2) it is filed by a criminal justice agency; 3) it is filed directly with the facility where a prisoner is incarcerated; 4) it notifies prison officials that a prisoner is wanted to face pending charges; and 5) it asks the institution where the prisoner is incarcerated either to hold the prisoner at the conclusion the prisoner\u2019s sentence, or to notify agency officials when the prisoner\u2019s release is imminent.\nTucker v. U.S., 569 A.2d 162, 165 (D.C. App. 1990). In Tucker, detectives with the District of Columbia Police Department went to South Carolina to interview a defendant being held for trial on charges in South Carolina. As a courtesy to the officers in South Carolina, the District detectives took copies of the arrest warrants filed in D.C. against the defendant. Id. at 164-65. The defendant argued that leaving the arrest warrants with the South Carolina police, who actually forwarded them to the state corrections facility, acted as a detainer. The Tucker Court rejected that argument, instead adopting the criteria above. Id.\nLooking to the order for arrest used in this case, it appears only the first criteria from Tucker is met. Defendant did have an untried indictment pending in Orange County when he was served with the order while in federal custody. However, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the order for arrest was ever filed with the Federal Bureau of Prisons, or any institution. There is also nothing in the record to suggest that the State requested federal officials to hold defendant at the end of his federal sentence or notify it prior to defendant\u2019s release from federal custody. Accordingly, we do not construe \u201cdetainer\u201d to include the arrest warrant served on defendant in this case. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-761, art. IX (2003); Tucker, 569 A.2d at 165. The order for arrest served on defendant while in the Orange County jail was not a detainer, and the provisions of the IAD are not applicable to defendant. We overrule defendant\u2019s second assignment of error.\nIn conclusion, the order for arrest served on defendant while in the Orange County jail was not a detainer, and the provisions of the IAD are not applicable to defendant. Further, the trial court properly admitted a video tape depicting defendant engaged in the criminal act for which he was convicted. In the judgment of the trial court we therefore find\nNo error.\nJudges McCULLOUGH and ELMORE concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "MARTIN, Chief Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Amy C. Kunstling, for the State.",
      "Miles & Montgomery, by Mark Montgomery, for defendant-appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. STEVEN DIXON PRENTICE\nNo. COA04-764\n(Filed 7 June 2005)\n1. Evidence\u2014 videotape \u2014 still photographs from videotape\u2014 authentication\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree rape, double first-degree sexual offense, and taking indecent liberties with a minor case by admitting a videotape and still photographs taken from the videotape as substantive evidence of the alleged crimes, because: (1) an agent\u2019s testimony established an unbroken chain of custody from the time the tape was found in defendant\u2019s residence; (2) there was ample testimony to establish the identities of defendant, the minor child, and defendant\u2019s residence depicted on the videotape; (3) there was testimony that defendant\u2019s camcorder was in working condition; and (4) there was sufficient evidence from the testimony regarding chain of custody to establish the videotape had not been edited or altered, and that the videotape seized from defendant\u2019s residence was the same videotape reviewed by the jury.\n2. Arrest\u2014 Interstate Agreement on Detainers \u2014 detainer\nThe trial court did not violate the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (LAD) or unconstitutionally evade the operation of that statute by arraigning defendant in Orange County District Court and returning defendant to federal custody without resolving his first-degree rape, double first-degree sexual offense, and taking indecent liberties with a minor case, because \u201cdetainer\u201d does not include the arrest warrant served on defendant in this case when: (1) although defendant did have an untried indictment pending in Orange County when he was served with the order while in federal custody, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the order for arrest was ever filed with the Federal Bureau of Prisons or any institution; and (2) there is nothing in the record to suggest that the State requested federal officials to hold defendant at the end of his federal sentence or notify it prior to defendant\u2019s release from federal custody.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 28 October 2003 by Judge Ronald L. Stephens in Orange County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 February 2005.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Amy C. Kunstling, for the State.\nMiles & Montgomery, by Mark Montgomery, for defendant-appellant."
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