{ "id": 9006310, "name": "SHAWN M. REEVES, Petitioner v. YELLOW TRANSPORTATION, INC., and EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION OF NORTH CAROLINA, Respondents", "name_abbreviation": "Reeves v. Yellow Transportation, Inc.", "decision_date": "2005-06-07", "docket_number": "No. COA04-1140", "first_page": "610", "last_page": "618", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "170 N.C. App. 610" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "406 S.E.2d 609", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "612", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 N.C. App. 585", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522294 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "590", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/103/0585-01" ] }, { "cite": "437 S.E.2d 875", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "876", "parenthetical": "\"even if the findings of fact are not supported by the evidence, they are presumed to be correct if the petitioner fails to except\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 N.C. App. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521169 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "161", "parenthetical": "\"even if the findings of fact are not supported by the evidence, they are presumed to be correct if the petitioner fails to except\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/113/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 S.E.2d 113", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "240 N.C. 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8598826 ], "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "330" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/240/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 308", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309", "parenthetical": "quoting Beaver v. Paint Co., 240 N.C. 328, 330, 82 S.E.2d 113, 114 (1954)" }, { "page": "309" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 N.C. App. 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524502 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364", "parenthetical": "quoting Beaver v. Paint Co., 240 N.C. 328, 330, 82 S.E.2d 113, 114 (1954)" }, { "page": "364" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/57/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 S.E.2d 294", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "296" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 N.C. App. 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523409 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/81/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 S.E.2d 388", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "36 N.C. App. 255", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552718 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "256" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/36/0255-01" ] }, { "cite": "593 S.E.2d 97", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "101", "parenthetical": "quoting In re Enoch, 36 N.C. App. 255, 256, 243 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1978), and RECO Transportation, Inc. v. Employment Security Comm., 81 N.C. App. 415, 418, 344 S.E.2d 294, 296 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 N.C. App. 277", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8916839 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "281", "parenthetical": "quoting In re Enoch, 36 N.C. App. 255, 256, 243 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1978), and RECO Transportation, Inc. v. Employment Security Comm., 81 N.C. App. 415, 418, 344 S.E.2d 294, 296 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/163/0277-01" ] }, { "cite": "603 S.E.2d 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "831", "parenthetical": "because \"claimant made no exceptions to the ESC's findings in his petition for review nor did he allege any fraud or procedural irregularity\" he \"did not preserve those issues for review by the superior court and the court lacked jurisdiction to address them\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 N.C. App. 748", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8413987 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "751", "parenthetical": "because \"claimant made no exceptions to the ESC's findings in his petition for review nor did he allege any fraud or procedural irregularity\" he \"did not preserve those issues for review by the superior court and the court lacked jurisdiction to address them\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/166/0748-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 S.E.2d 222", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "223" }, { "page": "223" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 716", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793078 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "718" }, { "page": "718" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0716-01" ] }, { "cite": "350 S.E.2d 906", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 N.C. App. 495", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358911 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/83/0495-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 S.E.2d 111", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 N.C. App. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520808 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/60/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 S.E.2d 339", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340", "parenthetical": "dismissing as interlocutory an appeal from superior court order which remanded ESC order to ESC Commission" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 N.C. App. 662", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527929 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "663-64", "parenthetical": "dismissing as interlocutory an appeal from superior court order which remanded ESC order to ESC Commission" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/114/0662-01" ] }, { "cite": "561 S.E.2d 511", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "513", "parenthetical": "citing N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 54(b) [(2003)]" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. App. 475", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9129209 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "477", "parenthetical": "citing N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 54(b) [(2003)]" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/149/0475-01" ] }, { "cite": "545 S.E.2d 259", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 N.C. App. 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11433839 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/143/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 S.E.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1950, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 N.C. 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629801 ], "year": 1950, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/231/0354-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 770, "char_count": 18135, "ocr_confidence": 0.738, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.115162856034739e-08, "percentile": 0.5066569518145653 }, "sha256": "fcb25600a80054b8f6535e454872f26f48a71bb379d50a830517acd582d4f48b", "simhash": "1:a72d10e22c06a832", "word_count": 2907 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:44:47.676310+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUNTER and McCULLOUGH concur." ], "parties": [ "SHAWN M. REEVES, Petitioner v. YELLOW TRANSPORTATION, INC., and EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION OF NORTH CAROLINA, Respondents" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "LEVINSON, Judge.\nPetitioner (Shawn Reeves) appeals from two orders of the trial court that reviewed orders by respondent North Carolina Employment Security Commission (ESC). We dismiss in part and affirm in part.\nThe factual and procedural history of this case is summarized as follows: In April 2002 petitioner began working for respondent Yellow Transportation Inc., a shipping and transportation company, at its Morrisville, North Carolina shipping terminal. Petitioner\u2019s employment as a dock worker and city driver required him to load and unload freight, transport materials to specified destinations, and perform various other duties under Yellow Transportation\u2019s supervision. He was also required to record pertinent data, such as freight location or movement, or odometer readings.\nIn August and September of 2002, petitioner received several written warnings about errors or omissions in his work, including: (1) a written warning for failure to record an odometer reading; (2) a one day suspension for error in recording freight data; (3) a three day suspension for failure to load material in the proper place; and (4) a fourth warning, accompanied by a discharge letter, for failure to load certain freight as directed. Petitioner grieved each of these written warnings, and a meeting was conducted as provided by the collective bargaining agreement between Yellow Transportation and petitioner\u2019s union. The meeting resulted in an agreement that petitioner would serve a three day suspension and that Yellow Transportation would rescind a fifth warning alleging that petitioner had been involved in a preventable accident. Petitioner served the three day suspension in October 2002. On 7 February 2003 Yellow Transportation issued petitioner another discharge letter, this time for his failure to properly transfer bags of salt from a pallet to a storage trailer. On 17 February 2003 the company issued petitioner a third discharge letter for not sweeping out an empty trailer as he had been instructed. Petitioner grieved both discharges, which were reviewed by a committee that included representatives of petitioner\u2019s union and Yellow Transportation. This committee reduced the 17 February discharge to a warning, but sustained petitioner\u2019s 7 February 2003 discharge. Petitioner was discharged from his employment, and last worked for Yellow Transportation on 17 March 2003.\nAfter his discharge petitioner filed a claim with the North Carolina ESC, effective 9 February 2003, seeking unemployment insurance benefits (UID). Petitioner\u2019s claim for UI benefits was denied by an ESC adjudicator, pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 96-14(2) (2003), on the basis that he was discharged for misconduct. Petitioner appealed the adjudicator\u2019s decision, and his claim was heard by an ESC Appeals Referee. The Referee issued a decision finding petitioner was discharged for substantial fault not rising to the level of misconduct, and disqualifying petitioner from UI benefits for a period of four weeks. Petitioner appealed to the ESC, and in Docket 03(UI)6077 the ESC modified the decision of the Appeals Referee by disqualifying petitioner from benefits for nine weeks.\nPetitioner also filed another claim on 23 March 2003, and requested that it be made effective as of 16 March 2003. An Appeals Referee found petitioner was disqualified from receiving benefits for that week because he had not timely filed the claim. On appeal, the ESC in Docket 03(UI)7400 upheld this decision.\nPetitioner appealed both of the ESC\u2019s decisions to superior court. On 9 June 2004 the trial court issued an order in Docket 03(UI)7400, remanding the case to the Commission for entry of a new order. Regarding Docket 03(UI)6077, the trial court ruled that \u201cthe Employment Security Commission\u2019s Findings Of Fact were based upon competent evidence contained in the record; the Employment Security Commission properly applied the law to those facts; and that Decision No. 03(UI)6077 should be affirmed in its entirety.\u201d Petitioner appealed both of the trial court\u2019s orders to this Court.\nAppeal from Docket, 03041)7400\nAppeal from the trial court\u2019s review of an ESC decision is governed by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 96-15(i) (2003), which provides in relevant part that \u201cappeal may be taken from the judgment of the superior court, as provided in civil cases.\u201d In the instant case, we conclude that appeal from Docket 03(UI)7400 is not authorized by the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.\nAn order \u201cis either interlocutory or the final determination of the rights of the parties.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 54(a) (2003). \u201cThe distinction between the two was addressed in Veazey v. Durham, 231 N.C. 354, [361-62], 57 S.E.2d 377, [381] (1950), wherein the Court stated: A final judgment is one which disposes of the cause as to all the parties, leaving nothing to be judicially determined between them in the trial court. ... An interlocutory order is one made during the pendency of an action, which does not dispose of the case, but leaves it for further action by the trial court in order to settle and determine the entire controversy.\u2019\u201d Embler v. Embler, 143 N.C. App. 162, 164, 545 S.E.2d 259, 261 (2001).\nIn Docket 03(UI)7400, the trial court did not rule on the merits of petitioner\u2019s claim. Instead, the court found that the ESC\u2019s order in Docket 03(UI)7400 did not \u201caddress all of the relevant issues raised by the record\u201d and that the findings were incomplete and failed to set out the sequence of events regarding the timing and notification of petitioner\u2019s discharge. The court concluded that \u201cquestions raised by the record need to be addressed by the ESC in more specific Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law\u201d and remanded Docket 03(UI)7400 to the ESC for \u201cfurther Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.\u201d The order in Docket 03(UI)7400 is clearly interlocutory; it did not address the merits of petitioner\u2019s appeal, and it requires further action by the ESC.\nIn general, \u201cthere is no right to immediate appeal from an interlocutory order.\u201d Flitt v. Flitt, 149 N.C. App. 475, 477, 561 S.E.2d 511, 513 (2002) (citing N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 54(b) [(2003)]). However, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(d) (2003) permits immediate appeal from an interlocutory order that:\n(1) Affects a substantial right, or\n(2) In effect determines the action and prevents a judgment from which appeal might be taken, or\n(3) Discontinues the action, or\n(4) Grants or refuses a new trial[.]\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 l-277(a) (2003) also states, in pertinent part, that appeal \u201cmay be taken from every judicial order or determination of a judge of a superior or district court . . . which affects a substantial right[.]\u201d\nIn the case sub judice, we conclude the order in Docket 03(UI)7400 neither affects a substantial right, nor meets any other criteria for immediate appeal, and thus should be dismissed as interlocutory. See, e.g., State ex rel. Employment Sec. Comm. v. IATSE Local 574, 114 N.C. App. 662, 663-64, 442 S.E.2d 339, 340 (1994) (dismissing as interlocutory an appeal from superior court order which remanded ESC order to ESC Commission) (citing Blackwelder v. Dept. of Human Resources, 60 N.C. App. 331, 299 S.E.2d 111 (1983)). We also note that Facet Enterprises v. Deloatch, 83 N.C. App. 495, 350 S.E.2d 906 (1986), cited by petitioner, is a straightforward appeal from a final judgment, and does not involve remand by the trial court. Petitioner\u2019s appeal from Docket 03(UI)7400 is dismissed as interlocutory.\nAppeal from Docket. 03\u00cdUD6077 \u2014 Standard of Review\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 96-15 (2003) sets out \u201cthe standard procedure for claims for UI benefits, appeals within ESC-agency, and appeals from the ESC-agency final decision to Superior Court.\u201d Employment Security Commission v. Peace, 341 N.C. 716, 718, 462 S.E.2d 222, 223 (1995). The statute \u201cprovides that[:]\n(1) a decision will be made by an adjudicator, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 96-15(b)(2) [(2003)]; (2) the adjudicator\u2019s decision may be appealed to an appeals referee, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 96-15(c); (3) on ESC-agency\u2019s own motion, the Commission or a Deputy Commissioner may affirm, modify, or set aside the decision of the appeals referee, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 96-15(e); and (4) an appeal to the Superior Court is available after exhaustion of the remedies set out above, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 96-15(h).\nPeace, 341 N.C. at 718, 462 S.E.2d at 223.\nUnder N.C.G.S. \u00a7 96-15(h), a claimant\u2019s petition for superior court review of an ESC decision \u201cshall explicitly state what exceptions are taken to the decision or procedure of the Commission and what relief the petitioner seeks.\u201d Superior Court jurisdiction is limited to exceptions and issues set out in the petition. See Graves v. Culp, Inc., 166 N.C. App. 748, 751, 603 S.E.2d 829, 831 (2004) (because \u201cclaimant made no exceptions to the ESC\u2019s findings in his petition for review nor did he allege any fraud or procedural irregularity\u201d he \u201cdid not preserve those issues for review by the superior court and the court lacked jurisdiction to address them\u201d).\nIn reviewing a decision by the ESC, \u201c[t]he same standard of review applies in the superior court and in the appellate division: \u2018the findings [of fact] of the Commission, if there is any competent evidence to support them . . . shall be conclusive[.]\u2019... Accordingly, this Court, like the superior court, will only review a decision by the [ESC] to determine \u2018whether the facts found by the Commission are supported by competent evidence and, if so, whether the findings support the conclusions of law.\u2019 \u201d Davis v. Britax Child Safety, Inc., 163 N.C. App. 277, 281, 593 S.E.2d 97, 101 (2004) (quoting In re Enoch, 36 N.C. App. 255, 256, 243 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1978), and RECO Transportation, Inc. v. Employment Security Comm., 81 N.C. App. 415, 418, 344 S.E.2d 294, 296 (1986)). Moreover:\nEven when the findings are not supported by the evidence, however, \u2018where there is no exception taken to such findings, they are presumed to be supported by the evidence and are binding on appeal.\u2019 In the present case, the findings of fact were not challenged and, hence, are conclusive; the sole question on appeal therefore is whether the findings of fact support the Commission\u2019s conclusion that the claimant was disqualified for unemployment compensation.\nIn re Hagan v. Peden Steel Co., 57 N.C. App. 363, 364, 291 S.E.2d 308, 309 (1982) (quoting Beaver v. Paint Co., 240 N.C. 328, 330, 82 S.E.2d 113, 114 (1954)). See also, e.g., Fair v. St. Joseph\u2019s Hosp., 113 N.C. App. 159, 161, 437 S.E.2d 875, 876 (1993) (\u201ceven if the findings of fact are not supported by the evidence, they are presumed to be correct if the petitioner fails to except\u201d) (citing Hagan, 57 N.C. App. at 364, 291 S.E.2d at 309).\nPetitioner argues that the trial court erred by upholding the ESC\u2019s conclusions that (1) he was discharged for substantial fault, and that (2) reduction of the statutory period of disqualification was not justified by mitigating factors. We disagree.\nWe first consider petitioner\u2019s argument that the Commission erred by concluding that he had been discharged for substantial fault not amounting to misconduct. In this regard, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 96-14(2a) (2003) provides that:\nSubstantial fault is defined to include those acts or omissions of employees over which they exercised reasonable control and which violate reasonable requirements of the job, . . . but shall not include (1) minor infractions of rules unless such infractions are repeated after a warning was received by the employee, (2) inadvertent mistakes made by the employee, nor (3) failures to perform work because of insufficient skill, ability, or equipment.\n(emphasis added).\n\u201cThe essence of G.S. \u00a7 96-14(2[a]) is that if an employer establishes a reasonable job policy to which an employee can conform, her failure to do so constitutes substantial fault.... An employee has \u2018reasonable control\u2019 when she has the physical and mental ability to conform her conduct to her employer\u2019s job requirements. . .. Reasonable control coupled with failure to live up to a reasonable employment policy equals substantial fault.\u201d Lindsey v. Qualex, Inc., 103 N.C. App. 585, 590, 406 S.E.2d 609, 612 (1991) (citation omitted).\nIn the instant case, petitioner failed to except to any of the ESC\u2019s findings of fact in his petition for review in Superior Court. Accordingly, the Commission\u2019s findings are conclusively presumed to be correct on appeal. These findings include, in relevant part, the following:\n2. The claimant began working for the employer on or about April 23, 2002. He last worked for the employer on March 18, as a dock worker/local driver.\n3. The claimant was discharged for repeated problems and carelessness in the performance of his loading dock and driving duties.\n4. The claimant failed to complete his trip sheet paperwork that he was required to complete.\n5. On August 8, 2002, the claimant failed to properly fill out freight paperwork, including marking a freight bill that was short on freight while the claimant was present on the loading dock.\n6. On September 8, 2002, the claimant mistakenly loaded a trailer. More specifically, the claimant failed to correctly load the freight into the correct trailer. The claimant\u2019s mistake was due to a lack of attention. The claimant was warned and suspended three days as a result of his mistake.\n7. On the same day, the claimant mistakenly recorded freight as having come in on a trailer.\n8. On February 5, 2003, the claimant failed to place a pallet of salt bags in a storage trailer as directed; and on February 18, 2003, the claimant failed to sweep out a trailer as directed. The employer proposed the claimant\u2019s discharge under the governing collective bargaining agreement with the claimant\u2019s union. The claimant\u2019s proposed discharge was submitted to a joint employer-union grievance committee.\n9. The joint committee ruled that the failure to sweep out the trailer did not warrant discharge, but did warrant a disciplinary warning letter. However, the committee also upheld the discharge based on the February 5, 2003 failure to place a pallet of salt bags in a proper storage trailer. The employer followed the required and approved disciplinary and discharge process. The claimant repeatedly failed to perform his job duties as required and was discharged on March 17, 2003.\nOn the basis of its findings of fact, the Commission concluded as a matter of law that petitioner had been dismissed for substantial fault, noting that \u201cthe claimant\u2019s own testimony and documents amounted to admissions of the claimant\u2019s failure to comply with the reasonable requirements of his job.\u201d\nWe conclude that the Commission\u2019s findings of fact support its conclusion of law that petitioner was discharged for substantial fault. We also conclude that Yellow Transportation\u2019s requirements that petitioner, e.g., load and unload materials as directed, and keep proper records, were reasonable and were under petitioner\u2019s control. Accordingly, we conclude that the Commission did not err by concluding that petitioner was discharged for substantial fault, and that the trial court did not err by upholding the Commission\u2019s ruling. This assignment of error is overruled.\nWe next consider petitioner\u2019s argument that the trial court erred by upholding the Commission\u2019s decision not to shorten the period of petitioner\u2019s disqualification from UI benefits.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 96-14(2a) .(2003), provides in pertinent part that a claimant \u201cshall be disqualified for benefits:\n(2a) For a period of not less than four nor more than 13 weeks ... if it is determined by the Commission that such individual . . . was discharged for substantial fault on his part connected with his work . . . Upon a finding of discharge under this subsection, the individual shall be disqualified for a period of nine weeks unless, based on findings by the Commission of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the period of disqualification is lengthened or shortened within the limits set out above.\nIn the present case, the Commission concluded that claimant\u2019s \u201crepeated failures do not justify mitigating the offense of substantial fault.\u201d This conclusion is supported by the Commission\u2019s findings of fact, and does not constitute error on the part of the Commission. Moreover, petitioner did not raise this issue by his petition, and thus did not preserve it for appellate review. We conclude that the Commission did not err by declining to reduce the period of petitioner\u2019s disqualification from UI benefits.\nWe have considered petitioner\u2019s remaining arguments, and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the trial court\u2019s ruling in Docket 03(UI)6077 is affirmed.\nAffirmed in part, dismissed in part.\nJudges HUNTER and McCULLOUGH concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "LEVINSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Thomas H. Hodges, Jr., for respondent-appellee Employment Security Commission of North Carolina.", "Daniel F. Read, for petitioner-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SHAWN M. REEVES, Petitioner v. YELLOW TRANSPORTATION, INC., and EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION OF NORTH CAROLINA, Respondents\nNo. COA04-1140\n(Filed 7 June 2005)\n1. Unemployment Compensation\u2014 judicial review \u2014 interlocutory appeal\nAppeal from superior court review of an Employment Security Commission decision is as provided in civil cases, and in general may not be from an interlocutory order. The trial court here did not rule on the merits of the claim and the appeal was dismissed as interlocutory.\n2. Unemployment Compensation\u2014 discharge for substantial fault \u2014 findings\nEmployment Security Commission findings concerning problems in petitioner\u2019s performance of loading and driving duties for a shipping company were presumed correct on appeal because plaintiff did not except to them, and those findings supported the conclusion that petitioner was discharged for substantial fault.\n3. Unemployment Compensation\u2014 disqualification \u2014 no reduction \u2014 supported by landings\nThe Employment Security Commission decision not to reduce the period of petitioner\u2019s disqualification from unemployment insurance benefits was supported by the findings and did not constitute error.\nAppeal by petitioner from orders entered 9 June 2004 by Judge Wade Barber in Orange County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 March 2005.\nThomas H. Hodges, Jr., for respondent-appellee Employment Security Commission of North Carolina.\nDaniel F. Read, for petitioner-appellant." }, "file_name": "0610-01", "first_page_order": 640, "last_page_order": 648 }