{ "id": 8434805, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHRISTIAN LEE STRECKFUSS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Streckfuss", "decision_date": "2005-06-21", "docket_number": "No. COA04-609", "first_page": "81", "last_page": "89", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "171 N.C. App. 81" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "210 S.E.2d 207", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 N.C. 255", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565130 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "258" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/286/0255-01" ] }, { "cite": "527 S.E.2d 299", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "306", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Lindley, 286 N.C. 255, 258, 210 S.E.2d 207, 209 (1974)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 386", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155839 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "398", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Lindley, 286 N.C. 255, 258, 210 S.E.2d 207, 209 (1974)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "416 S.E.2d 398", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2502533, 2498248, 2500400, 2499516, 2497727 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0290-01", "/nc/331/0290-04", "/nc/331/0290-05", "/nc/331/0290-02", "/nc/331/0290-03" ] }, { "cite": "410 S.E.2d 226", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.C. App. 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522544 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "502" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/104/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 L. Ed. 2d 819", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "588 S.E.2d 453", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "460", "parenthetical": "internal quotes and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 604", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491509 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613-14", "parenthetical": "internal quotes and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0604-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 U.S. 610", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3674071 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1915, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "622", "parenthetical": "stating that it is within the police power of a state to \"prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all motor vehiclesf,]\" including licensing their drivers" }, { "page": "391", "parenthetical": "stating that it is within the police power of a state to \"prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all motor vehiclesf,]\" including licensing their drivers" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/235/0610-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-16.2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(f)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "188 S.E.2d 568", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "571" }, { "page": "571" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "14 N.C. App. 485", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550531 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "489" }, { "page": "489" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/14/0485-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 S.E.2d 291", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294", "parenthetical": "\"Legislative purpose is first ascertained from the plain words of the statute.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 651", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2538925 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656", "parenthetical": "\"Legislative purpose is first ascertained from the plain words of the statute.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0651-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-22", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "470 S.E.2d 16", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "21" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 202", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 798768 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209-10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0202-01" ] }, { "cite": "550 S.E.2d 853", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "860" }, { "page": "860" }, { "page": "858-60" }, { "page": "859", "parenthetical": "internal quotes and citations omitted" }, { "page": "859" }, { "page": "860" }, { "page": "859" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 N.C. App. 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11437376 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334" }, { "page": "334-35" }, { "page": "332" }, { "page": "332" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/145/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-16.5", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" }, { "parenthetical": "b" }, { "page": "(b)(l)" }, { "page": "(a)(5)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 831, "char_count": 20909, "ocr_confidence": 0.743, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.281871958003935e-07, "percentile": 0.785279180369203 }, "sha256": "f5992b8c2e42966e4be5f6f6eca52e8b49b88b91a1b2a6ba01c32cd6a8b594bd", "simhash": "1:2fb935e0146934f1", "word_count": 3363 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:08:31.744997+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges TYSON and GEER concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHRISTIAN LEE STRECKFUSS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McGEE, Judge.\nDeputy Joel B. Goodwin (Deputy Goodwin) of the Wake County Sheriff\u2019s Office was on patrol on 15 March 2002 traveling southbound on Capital Boulevard, at approximately 1:00 a.m., when he saw Christian Lee Streckfuss (defendant) turn onto northbound Capital Boulevard. Deputy Goodwin made a u-tum and followed defendant\u2019s vehicle, which was traveling approximately seventy-five m.p.h. in a fifty-five m.p.h. zone. He also observed that defendant was unable to maintain a steady, straight line in his lane of traffic. Deputy Goodwin pulled defendant over to the side of the road.\nWhen Deputy Goodwin approached defendant\u2019s vehicle, defendant rolled down his window and Deputy Goodwin smelled a \u201cstrong odor of alcoholic beverage emanating from the vehicle.\u201d Defendant produced a South Dakota driver\u2019s license and a North Carolina registration for the rental vehicle defendant was driving. Defendant admitted to having had \u201ca couple of drinks.\u201d Deputy Goodwin observed that defendant\u2019s \u201ceyes were kind of red and glassy and his speech was slightly slurred.\u201d Deputy Goodwin administered field sobriety tests to defendant. After defendant failed three attempts to stand on one foot, Deputy Goodwin formed the opinion that defendant\u2019s mental and physical capacities were impaired. Deputy Goodwin arrested defendant.\nChemical Analyst Jackie Oliver (Oliver) read defendant his rights prior to administering the Intoxilyzer test and gave defendant an opportunity to call an attorney, which defendant declined. Defendant refused to take the Intoxilyzer test. Oliver noted that defendant\u2019s eyes were \u201cred kind of glassy\u201d and that defendant smelled like alcohol.\nDeputy Goodwin seized defendant\u2019s South Dakota driver\u2019s license pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-16.5(b). Defendant\u2019s license was held by the State of North Carolina for thirty days and was not released until defendant paid the required $50.00 fee.\nAt a pre-trial hearing, defendant pled guilty to speeding, but moved to dismiss the driving while impaired (DWI) charge on double jeopardy grounds. In an order entered 30 October 2003, the trial court dismissed defendant\u2019s motion as being untimely filed. However, the trial court also ruled on the merits of the motion, concluding that the confiscation of defendant\u2019s South Dakota license did not \u201cplace Defendant in prior jeopardy for the offense.\u201d\nAt trial, defendant was convicted of driving while impaired. He received a sixty-day suspended sentence and was ordered to pay a fine of $713.00. Defendant appeals.\nI.\nDefendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the DWI charge against him. Defendant argues that criminal prosecution and punishment of defendant for driving while impaired were barred because the State\u2019s confiscation and retention of his South Dakota driver\u2019s license and imposition of a $50.00 fee constituted punishment for double jeopardy purposes.\nDefendant\u2019s license was seized pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-16.5 (b) when he refused to submit to the chemical analysis of an intoxilyzer test. Defendant concedes that our Courts have previously held that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-16.5 is remedial in nature, and that it does not constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes. See State v. Evans, 145 N.C. App. 324, 334, 550 S.E.2d 853, 860 (2001); see also State v. Oliver, 343 N.C. 202, 209-10, 470 S.E.2d 16, 21 (1996). However, defendant argues that these prior decisions are inapplicable to him because his license was an out-of-state license. Defendant asserts that our Courts\u2019 decisions that the statute\u2019s provisions do not constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes are premised on the recognition that the civil revocation serves a lawful remedial purpose that outweighs its punitive effects. See Evans, 145 N.C. App. at 334-35, 550 S.E.2d at 860. Defendant contends that because he was a nonresident driver, the confiscation of his out-of-state license punished him by depriving him of the ability to drive in the State of South Dakota for thirty days, and thus the punitive effects of the revocation outweigh the remedial purpose. We disagree.\nIn Evans, our Court thoroughly analyzed N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-16.5 to determine whether the statute, as amended in 1997, violated the Double Jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution or the Law of the Land clause of the North Carolina Constitution. Id. at 331-34, 550 S.E.2d at 858-60. We noted that \u201cbecause N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-16.5, as enacted, reflects an intent by the legislature for the revocation provision to be a remedial measure, only the clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.\u201d Evans, 145 N.C. App. at 332, 550 S.E.2d at 859 (internal quotes and citations omitted). We reiterated that the statute has a legitimate remedial purpose, which \u201cis to remove from our highways drivers who either cannot or will not operate a motor vehicle safely and soberly\u201d and \u201cto prevent unsafe and unfit drivers from operating vehicles and endangering the citizens of North Carolina.\u201d Id. at 331-32, 550 S.E.2d at 859. Finally, we concluded that the statute does not subject a person to double jeopardy because the statute \u201cis neither punitive in purpose nor effect[.]\u201d Id. at 334, 550 S.E.2d at 860.\nContrary to defendant\u2019s argument, nothing in our analysis of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-16.5 indicates that the purpose underlying the statute is different for out-of-state drivers than it is for North Carolina drivers. Certainly, the threat posed to the citizens of North Carolina by an impaired driver driving on North Carolina highways is the same regardless of what state\u2019s license the driver has. Furthermore, it is clear from the plain language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-16.5, and related statutes, that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-16.5 applies equally to a driver who has a North Carolina driver\u2019s license and to a driver who has a license from another state.\nFirst, related statute N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-22 provides that driver\u2019s licenses of out-of-state drivers \u201cshall be subject to suspension or revocation by the Division [of Motor Vehicles] in like manner and for like cause as a driver\u2019s license issued [in North Carolina] may be suspended or revoked.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-22(a) (2003). Therefore, the revocation of a license pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-16.5 for failure to submit to chemical analysis applies to nonresident drivers.\nSecond, the plain language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-16.5 demonstrates that the General Assembly intended for the statute to apply equally to drivers from other states, as well as to those from North Carolina. See Electric Supply Co. v. Swain Electrical Co., 328 N.C. 651, 656, 403 S.E.2d 291, 294 (1991) (\u201cLegislative purpose is first ascertained from the plain words of the statute.\u201d). The statute applies to any person \u201cwho operates a motor vehicle upon the highways of the State],]\u201d State v. Allen, 14 N.C. App. 485, 489, 188 S.E.2d 568, 571 (1972), and is charged with an implied consent offense, such as impaired driving. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-16.5(b)(l)-(3) (2003) (referring to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-16.2). Such a person \u201cis deemed to have given consent to a breathalyzer test.\u201d Allen, 14 N.C. App. at 489, 188 S.E.2d at 571. If the person \u201c[w]illfully refuses to submit to the chemical analysis],]\u2019 the person\u2019s driver\u2019s license is subject to revocation for thirty days, assuming the other provisions of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-16.5(b) are met. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-16.5(b).\nThird, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-16.5 expressly applies to licenses issued in states other than North Carolina. The statute defines \u201cSurrender of a Driver\u2019s License\u201d as \u201c[t]he act of turning over to a court or a law-enforcement officer the person\u2019s most recent, valid driver\u2019s license . . . issued by the Division [of Motor Vehicles] or by a similar agency in another jurisdiction[.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-16.5(a)(5) (2003) (emphasis added). Additionally, when N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-16.2 is read together with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-16.5, it is clear that the immediate civil license revocation for persons charged with implied-consent offenses in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-16.5 applies to persons with out-of-state licenses. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-16.2 includes a provision requiring the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles to notify \u201cthe motor vehicle administrator of the state of the person\u2019s residence and of any state in which the person has a license\u201d of the revocation when a nonresident\u2019s privilege to drive in the State has been revoked. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-16.2(f) (2003). Defendant\u2019s argument that the statute does not have a remedial purpose as applied to drivers with out-of-state licenses is without merit.\nSimilarly, we are not persuaded by defendant\u2019s contention that the punitive effects of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-16.5, as applied to a nonresident, outweigh the lawful remedial purpose discussed above. Defendant asserts that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-16.5 serves only to punish him by depriving him of the ability to drive in the State of South Dakota for thirty days. Defendant\u2019s argument is centered on the premise that the State of North Carolina does not have authority to restrict or interfere with defendant\u2019s ability to drive in his home state. See Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 622, 59 L. Ed. 385, 391 (1915) (stating that it is within the police power of a state to \u201cprescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all motor vehiclesf,]\u201d including licensing their drivers). However, that the State of North Carolina might have improperly seized defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license does not mean that the revocation amounts to punishment.\nDefendant does not argue, and nothing in the record indicates, that defendant was actually deprived of the ability to drive in the State of South Dakota for thirty days. Neither is there evidence in the record showing when or whether defendant returned to South Dakota. Nor does defendant demonstrate that he was denied the privilege of driving in South Dakota. \u201cThe license is merely physical evidence of the existence of the privilege to drive in the state wherein [the license] was issued.\u201d Opinion of Attorney General Robert Morgan, 40 N.C. Op. Att. Gen. 420, 422 (1969). Nothing in the record suggests that defendant could not have applied for or obtained a duplicate license or otherwise sought relief in South Dakota. Defendant was merely denied the physical evidence of the privilege to drive in his home state, his driver\u2019s license, which does not constitute punishment.\nAdditionally, the State provides statutory remedies for a driver to secure his revoked license, which mitigate any possible punitive effects of the State\u2019s confiscation of a nonresident\u2019s driver\u2019s license. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-16.5(g) provides that a person may contest the validity of a revocation in a hearing before a magistrate or district court judge, either of whom may rescind the revocation. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-16.5(g). The request for such a hearing \u201cmay be made at the time of the person\u2019s initial appearance, or within 10 days of the effective date of revocation\u201d and \u201cthe hearing must be held within three working days following the request if the hearing is before a magistrate or within five working days if the hearing is before a district court judge.\u201d Id. In addition to contesting the validity of the revocation, defendant could have sought a limited driving privilege under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-16.5(p).\nWhether or not the State should have required defendant to surrender his South Dakota driver\u2019s license, see Opinion of Attorney General Robert Morgan, 40 N.C. Op. Att. Gen. at 422 (\u201cTo require the surrender of a valid driver\u2019s license issued by another state would be an empty gesture since the North Carolina court cannot determine the status of a nonresident\u2019s privilege to drive in his home state.\u201d), the State\u2019s seizure of defendant\u2019s South Dakota license was not punishment. The only harm evident in the record is that defendant had to pay $50.00 to restore his privilege to drive in North Carolina after the thirty-day revocation period expired. Defendant does not argue, and we do not see, how this fee constituted punishment. The $50.00 charge is not a fine, but rather a minimal administrative fee that covers the \u201ccosts for the action[.]\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-16.5Q). Thus, defendant fails to offer proof sufficient to \u201coverride legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.\u201d See Evans, 145 N.C. App. at 332, 550 S.E.2d at 859. The trial court correctly concluded that defendant was not placed in prior jeopardy for driving while impaired, and we thereby affirm the trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds.\nII.\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred in dismissing defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss as being untimely filed. We agree. A motion to dismiss on the grounds of double jeopardy may be made at anytime. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-954(c) (2003). However, the trial court correctly ruled on the substantive issue of double jeopardy and its error in dismissing defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss as being untimely did not prejudice defendant.\nIII.\nDefendant\u2019s third assignment of error is that the trial court erred in applying a prejudice analysis in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss for double jeopardy. Specifically, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it concluded that \u201c[t]he unlawful actions of the State in seizing the license was not such a flagrant violation of Defendant\u2019s constitutional rights resulting in such irreparable prejudice that there is no remedy but to dismiss the prosecution.\u201d Defendant asserts that dismissal is mandatory under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-954 when the trial court concludes that a defendant has already been placed in jeopardy for the same offense, and thus engaging in a prejudice analysis was misplaced. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-954(a)(5) (2003). However, as discussed above, the trial court properly concluded that defendant was not placed in prior jeopardy for the offense. Thus, dismissal was not mandatory, and defendant\u2019s argument to the contrary is overruled.\nIV.\nFinally, defendant assigns as error the trial court\u2019s allowing Deputy Goodwin to testify regarding the field sobriety tests over defendant\u2019s objection. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing Deputy Goodwin to testify about the field sobriety tests when the State had failed to establish both that Deputy Goodwin was qualified to properly administer or interpret the field sobriety tests, and that the tests had been properly administered. However, we conclude that there was no error in admitting this evidence because it was relevant to Deputy Goodwin\u2019s lay testimony that defendant was impaired.\nRelevant evidence is admissible, except as specifically provided by law. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 402 (2003). \u201cEvidence is relevant if it has any logical tendency, however slight, to prove a fact in issue. In criminal cases, every circumstance that is calculated to throw any light upon the supposed crime is admissible. The weight of such evidence is for the jury.\u201d State v. Smith, 357 N.C. 604, 613-14, 588 S.E.2d 453, 460 (2003) (internal quotes and citations omitted), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 159 L. Ed. 2d 819 (2004). A trial court must determine if the proposed evidence has \u201cany tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 401 (2003). \u201c[A] trial court\u2019s rulings on relevancy . . . are not discretionary and therefore are not reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard[.]\u201d State v. Wallace, 104 N.C. App. 498, 502, 410 S.E.2d 226, 228 (1991), disc. review denied, 331 N.C. 290, 416 S.E.2d 398 (1992). Nevertheless, \u201csuch rulings are given great deference on appeal.\u201d Id.\nAt trial, the trial court allowed defendant to conduct a voir dire hearing outside the jury\u2019s presence to assess Deputy Goodwin\u2019s training and qualifications in administering field sobriety tests. Following the voir dire, the trial court concluded:\n[Deputy Goodwin] cannot testify that he administered standardized field sobriety tests. The officer may testify what he asked the defendant to do and what the defendant did in response thereto. The defense is free to cross-examine [Deputy Goodwin] at will with regard to that testimony, and if the defense chooses, may cross-examine him with regard to the standardized test, so forth as you choose.\nThe trial court stated that Deputy Goodwin could not testify that he believed defendant to be impaired because defendant failed the tests; however, he could testify that he formed an opinion that defendant was impaired when Deputy Goodwin asked defendant to stand on one leg and defendant started to hop and then fell over. In other words, Deputy Goodwin was permitted to testify as a lay witness, rather than as an expert.\n\u201c[A] lay person may give his opinion as to whether a person is intoxicated so long as that opinion is based on the witness\u2019s personal observation.\u201d State v. Rich, 351 N.C. 386, 398, 527 S.E.2d 299, 306 (2000) (citing State v. Lindley, 286 N.C. 255, 258, 210 S.E.2d 207, 209 (1974)). In the present case, Deputy Goodwin only testified that, based on his personal observations, he formed an opinion that defendant was impaired. Evidence that defendant was impaired is relevant to the issue of whether defendant was driving while impaired. Therefore, the trial court did not err in admitting Deputy Goodwin\u2019s testimony about defendant\u2019s field sobriety tests.\nNo error.\nJudges TYSON and GEER concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "McGEE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Patricia A. Duffy, for the State.", "George B. Currinfor defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHRISTIAN LEE STRECKFUSS\nNo. COA04-609\n(Filed 21 June 2005)\n1. Motor Vehicles\u2014 driving while impaired \u2014 motion to dismiss \u2014 sufficiency of evidence \u2014 double jeopardy\nThe trial court did not violate defendant\u2019s right against double jeopardy by denying his motion to dismiss the charge of driving while impaired even though the State confiscated and retained his South Dakota driver\u2019s license when defendant refused to take an Intoxilyzer test and imposed a $50 fee, because: (1) contrary to defendant\u2019s argument, nothing in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-16.5 indicates that the purpose underlying the statute is different for out-of-state drivers than it is for North Carolina drivers when the threat posed to the citizens of North Carolina by an impaired driver driving on North Carolina highways is the same regardless of what state\u2019s license the driver has; (2) it is clear from the plain language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-16.5 that it applies equally to a driver who has a North Carolina driver\u2019s license and to a driver who has a license from another state; (3) defendant does not argue, and nothing in the record indicates, that defendant was actually deprived of the ability to drive in the State of South Dakota for thirty days, and nothing in the record suggests that defendant could not have applied for or obtained a duplicate license or otherwise sought relief in South Dakota; (4) the State provides statutory remedies for a driver to secure his revoked license, which mitigate any possible punitive effects of the State\u2019s confiscation of a nonresident\u2019s license; and (5) the $50 fee is not a fine, but rather a minimal administrative fee that covers the costs for the action.\n2. Criminal Law\u2014 motion to dismiss \u2014 double jeopardy \u2014 time of motion \u2014 denial as harmless error\nThe trial court\u2019s error of dismissing as untimely defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss a driving while impaired charge on the ground of double jeopardy did not prejudice defendant when the trial court correctly ruled on the substantive issue of double jeopardy.\n3. Criminal Law\u2014 prejudice analysis \u2014 no double jeopardy violation\nThe trial court did not err by applying a prejudice analysis in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss a driving while impaired charge on the ground of double jeopardy, because dismissal was not mandatory when the trial court properly concluded that defendant was not placed in prior jeopardy for the offense.\n4. Evidence\u2014 lay testimony \u2014 field sobriety tests\nThe trial court did not err in a driving while impaired case by allowing a deputy to testify regarding the field sobriety tests over defendant\u2019s objection even though the State failed to establish both that the deputy was qualified to properly administer or interpret the tests and that the tests had been properly administered, because the testimony was relevant to the deputy\u2019s lay testimony that defendant was impaired.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 30 September 2003 and order entered 30 October 2003 by Judge Wade Barber in Superior Court; Wake County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 2 February 2005.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Patricia A. Duffy, for the State.\nGeorge B. Currinfor defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0081-01", "first_page_order": 111, "last_page_order": 119 }