{ "id": 8435867, "name": "HUGH KEVIN HINES, Plaintiff v. GARLAND N. YATES, in his Individual and Personal Capacity and in His Official Capacity as the District Attorney for the 19-B Prosecutorial District, State of North Carolina; LITCHARD D. HURLEY, in His Individual and Personal Capacity and in His Official Capacity as the Sheriff of Randolph County, North Carolina; WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, a South Dakota Corporation, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Hines v. Yates", "decision_date": "2005-07-05", "docket_number": "No. COA04-775", "first_page": "150", "last_page": "169", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "171 N.C. App. 150" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "129 N.C. App. 6", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-5", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(cl)(2)" }, { "page": "(cl)(2)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 P.2d 25", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "174 Cal. App. 2d 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4387121 ], "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-2d/174/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "493 S.E.2d 429", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422", "parenthetical": "holding that absent a contract, employment is presumed to be at will; reassurances of employment alone do not constitute a contract" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551232 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "331", "parenthetical": "holding that absent a contract, employment is presumed to be at will; reassurances of employment alone do not constitute a contract" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0329-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 S.E.2d 490", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4686660, 4695653, 4695471, 4689718, 4689592 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0331-03", "/nc/314/0331-01", "/nc/314/0331-05", "/nc/314/0331-02", "/nc/314/0331-04" ] }, { "cite": "328 S.E.2d 818", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "826" }, { "page": "826" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 N.C. App. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524570 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "342" }, { "page": "342" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/74/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 S.E.2d 445", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447" }, { "page": "447" }, { "page": "446" }, { "page": "447" }, { "page": "447", "parenthetical": "quotation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2488329 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 S.E.2d 99", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 11, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "104" }, { "page": "103-04" }, { "page": "104" }, { "page": "103" }, { "page": "175" }, { "page": "104", "parenthetical": "the plaintiff gave truthful information on the district attorney's expense accounts and falsification of bank documents to a law enforcement agency" }, { "page": "99" }, { "page": "103", "parenthetical": "quotation omitted" }, { "page": "103" }, { "page": "104" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 N.C. App. 649", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11652142 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "658" }, { "page": "656-57" }, { "page": "656" }, { "page": "656-57" }, { "page": "649" }, { "page": "656" }, { "page": "656" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/129/0649-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 L. Ed. 2d 431", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "506 U.S. 985", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12035616, 12035130, 12035173, 12035238, 12035081, 12035561, 12035342, 12034992, 12035285, 12035509, 12035449, 12035034, 12035391 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/506/0985-13", "/us/506/0985-04", "/us/506/0985-05", "/us/506/0985-06", "/us/506/0985-03", "/us/506/0985-12", "/us/506/0985-08", "/us/506/0985-01", "/us/506/0985-07", "/us/506/0985-11", "/us/506/0985-10", "/us/506/0985-02", "/us/506/0985-09" ] }, { "cite": "413 S.E.2d 276", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293" }, { "page": "293" }, { "page": "293" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 761", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2511641 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "788" }, { "page": "788" }, { "page": "788" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0761-01" ] }, { "cite": "444 S.E.2d 685", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 N.C. App. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12127930 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/115/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "450 S.E.2d 747", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "748", "parenthetical": "citing Gunter v. Anders, 115 N.C. App. 331, 444 S.E.2d 685 (1994)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 N.C. App. 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524171 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "88", "parenthetical": "citing Gunter v. Anders, 115 N.C. App. 331, 444 S.E.2d 685 (1994)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/117/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 S.E.2d 46", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2535471 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 S.E.2d 31", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 795", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2549696, 2549262, 2548312, 2548187, 2550014 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0795-04", "/nc/333/0795-05", "/nc/333/0795-01", "/nc/333/0795-02", "/nc/333/0795-03" ] }, { "cite": "427 S.E.2d 142", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" }, { "page": "144-45" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 N.C. App. 379", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525532 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "382" }, { "page": "383" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/109/0379-01" ] }, { "cite": "436 S.E.2d 276", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "279", "parenthetical": "quoting Whitaker v. Clark, 109 N.C. App. 379, 382, 427 S.E.2d 142, 144, disc. rev. and cert. denied, 333 N.C. 795, 431 S.E.2d 31 (1993)" }, { "page": "279" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 N.C. App. 604", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523032 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "607", "parenthetical": "quoting Whitaker v. Clark, 109 N.C. App. 379, 382, 427 S.E.2d 142, 144, disc. rev. and cert. denied, 333 N.C. 795, 431 S.E.2d 31 (1993)" }, { "page": "608" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/112/0604-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 S.E.2d 149", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 341", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4777283, 4773604, 4775440, 4775350, 4777148 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0341-02", "/nc/317/0341-03", "/nc/317/0341-04", "/nc/317/0341-01", "/nc/317/0341-05" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E.2d 639", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "643" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 N.C. App. 458", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522041 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "463" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/78/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "385 S.E.2d 498", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 546", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2491716, 2492262, 2491956, 2491610, 2489499 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0546-05", "/nc/325/0546-02", "/nc/325/0546-04", "/nc/325/0546-01", "/nc/325/0546-03" ] }, { "cite": "382 S.E.2d 836", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "841" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 N.C. App. 301", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520544 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/95/0301-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 S.E.2d 119", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "124", "parenthetical": "citing McLaughlin v. Barclays American Corp., 95 N.C. App. 301, 308, 382 S.E.2d 836, 841, cert. denied, 325 N.C. 546, 385 S.E.2d 498 (1989); Uzzell v. Integon Life Ins. Corp., 78 N.C. App. 458, 463, 337 S.E.2d 639, 643 (1985), cert. denied, 317 N.C. 341, 346 S.E.2d 149 (1986)" }, { "page": "124" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 N.C. App. 579", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523743 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "587", "parenthetical": "citing McLaughlin v. Barclays American Corp., 95 N.C. App. 301, 308, 382 S.E.2d 836, 841, cert. denied, 325 N.C. 546, 385 S.E.2d 498 (1989); Uzzell v. Integon Life Ins. Corp., 78 N.C. App. 458, 463, 337 S.E.2d 639, 643 (1985" }, { "page": "587" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/113/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 S.E.2d 336", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 621", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2530443, 2532332, 2530396, 2531257, 2532508 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0621-03", "/nc/334/0621-02", "/nc/334/0621-05", "/nc/334/0621-04", "/nc/334/0621-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 S.E.2d 489", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492-93" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 N.C. App. 707", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526342 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "712" }, { "page": "715" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/110/0707-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 767", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "769" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 N.C. App. 636", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8528017 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "639" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/101/0636-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 S.E.2d 115", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Herndon v. Barrett, 101 N.C. App. 636, 639, 400 S.E.2d 767, 769 (1991)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 436", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867688, 867668, 867542, 867642, 867614 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Herndon v. Barrett, 101 N.C. App. 636, 639, 400 S.E.2d 767, 769 (1991)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0436-01", "/nc/344/0436-04", "/nc/344/0436-03", "/nc/344/0436-05", "/nc/344/0436-02" ] }, { "cite": "468 S.E.2d 846", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "849", "parenthetical": "citing Herndon v. Barrett, 101 N.C. App. 636, 639, 400 S.E.2d 767, 769 (1991)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 N.C. App. 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11916366 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201", "parenthetical": "citing Herndon v. Barrett, 101 N.C. App. 636, 639, 400 S.E.2d 767, 769 (1991)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/122/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "512 S.E.2d 783", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "785", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "786", "parenthetical": "citing Messick v. Catawba County, 110 N.C. App. 707, 712, 431 S.E.2d 489, 492-93, disc. rev. denied, 334 N.C. 621, 435 S.E.2d 336 (1993)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 N.C. App. 556", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11239233 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "558-59", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "559", "parenthetical": "citing Messick v. Catawba County, 110 N.C. App. 707, 712, 431 S.E.2d 489, 492-93, disc. rev. denied, 334 N.C. 621, 435 S.E.2d 336 (1993)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/132/0556-01" ] }, { "cite": "562 S.E.2d 18", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "n.8" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. App. 509", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9129570 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "n.8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/149/0509-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 13, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "186 S.E.2d 400", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "403" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 460", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572515 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "465" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0460-01" ] }, { "cite": "486 S.E.2d 229", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "231", "parenthetical": "\"The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of clearly establishing a lack of any triable issue of fact by the record proper before the court.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "126 N.C. App. 637", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11712422 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "639", "parenthetical": "\"The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of clearly establishing a lack of any triable issue of fact by the record proper before the court.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/126/0637-01" ] }, { "cite": "481 S.E.2d 14", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "20" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53966 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 S.E.2d 70", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4731270, 4725127, 4731207, 4729403, 4727420 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0177-03", "/nc/320/0177-05", "/nc/320/0177-02", "/nc/320/0177-01", "/nc/320/0177-04" ] }, { "cite": "353 S.E.2d 439", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "84 N.C. App. 686", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12169177 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "688" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/84/0686-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 S.E.-2d 292", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293", "parenthetical": "quoting W.S. Clark & Sons, Inc. v. Union Nat'l Bank, 84 N.C. App. 686, 688, 353 S.E.2d 439, 440, disc. rev. denied, 320 N.C. 177, 358 S.E.2d 70 (1987)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 735", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2571382 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "737", "parenthetical": "quoting W.S. Clark & Sons, Inc. v. Union Nat'l Bank, 84 N.C. App. 686, 688, 353 S.E.2d 439, 440, disc. rev. denied, 320 N.C. 177, 358 S.E.2d 70 (1987)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0735-01" ] }, { "cite": "250 S.E.2d 255", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "257" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566400 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "402" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 S.E.2d 99", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "440 S.E.2d 119", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "124", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "113 N.C. App. 579", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523743 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "587", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/113/0579-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1399, "char_count": 47676, "ocr_confidence": 0.746, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.055183886475753e-07, "percentile": 0.8562095705193623 }, "sha256": "db61a1d7963faa12893abcc2b5f2ceab26f7c903a6c000fb510860092497e41f", "simhash": "1:012950f25c2f3453", "word_count": 7385 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:08:31.744997+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge McGEE concurs.", "Judge WYNN concurs in part, dissents in part." ], "parties": [ "HUGH KEVIN HINES, Plaintiff v. GARLAND N. YATES, in his Individual and Personal Capacity and in His Official Capacity as the District Attorney for the 19-B Prosecutorial District, State of North Carolina; LITCHARD D. HURLEY, in His Individual and Personal Capacity and in His Official Capacity as the Sheriff of Randolph County, North Carolina; WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, a South Dakota Corporation, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TYSON, Judge.\nGarland N. Yates (\u201cYates\u201d), Litchard D. Hurley (\u201cHurley\u201d), and Western Surety Company (collectively, \u201cdefendants\u201d) appeal from an order denying their motions for summary judgment. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and dismiss plaintiff\u2019s complaint.\nI. Background\nFrom 7 January 1999 to 31 December 2002, Hugh Kevin Hines (\u201cplaintiff\u2019) worked as an investigatorial assistant in the district attorney\u2019s office for 19-B Prosecutorial District. Plaintiff\u2019s job duties included locating and interviewing witnesses, serving subpoenas for attendance at trials, and acting as a liaison between the district attorney\u2019s office and law enforcement agencies. Prior to working for Yates, plaintiff worked as a lieutenant for the sheriff of Randolph County.\nDuring the 2002 election, plaintiff became a candidate in the republican primary election for sheriff of Randolph County and challenged Hurley, the incumbent sheriff. Over the course of the campaign, plaintiff publicly criticized Yates for his prosecutorial decisions in prior cases and publicly announced his disagreement with Yates\u2019 decision to not criminally charge a sheriff\u2019s deputy who had collided with a motorcyclist during a pursuit. The motorcyclist died from injuries sustained from the collision. Plaintiff also publically expressed his disagreement with the sheriff\u2019s department\u2019s investigation and handling of an unrelated and unsolved murder case.\nPlaintiff\u2019s affidavit states that:\nYates, on numerous occasions personally stated to me that he intended to discharge me from my employment . . . due to my seeking the office of Sheriff of Randolph County . . . after each occasion on which I made a public appearance or there was some news media attention in connection with my election campaign.\nAfter plaintiff appeared at a public event to express interest in running for the sheriffs position, plaintiff was instructed by Yates not to work on pending cases involving the Randolph County sheriffs department.\nIn the primary election held 10 September 2002, Hurley defeated plaintiff, secured the republican party\u2019s nomination, and won reelection as sheriff of Randolph County in the November general election. On 16 September 2002, less than one week after the primary election, plaintiffs annual employee performance report was completed. On 26 September 2002, Kay Lovin, Yates\u2019 administrative assistant and plaintiff\u2019s supervisor, informed plaintiff of his impending termination. Yates extended the termination date to 31 October 2002, and again to 31 December 2002, and offered plaintiff the opportunity to resign. Yates also offered to provide a reference to other law enforcement agencies. Plaintiff refused to resign and continued to criticize the sheriff\u2019s department after the election.\nIn his sworn affidavit, Yates stated, \u201c[Plaintiff] continued to criticize the Sheriff and even accused him of voter fraud\u201d and \u201cstated pub-lically that he intended to run against the Sheriff again in 2006.\u201d On 31 December 2002, plaintiff received a separation notice from Yates stating as grounds that \u201c[e]mployee is no longer able to function effectively in his position. To wit: cooperate and maintain an effective and confidential relationship with all law enforcement agencies in the judicial district.\u201d Yates listed as a second reason for plaintiff\u2019s separation as \u201c[e]mployee further directly criticized supervisor\u2019s decision in the media concerning a law enforcement matter.\u201d\nPlaintiff instituted this action seeking damages from defendants for various torts: (1) wrongful discharge against Yates in both his official and individual capacity; (2) malicious interference with contractual relations against Hurley; (3) violation of plaintiff\u2019s State constitutional rights by Yates and Hurley in their official capacities; (4) violation of plaintiff\u2019s federal constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against Yates and Hurley in their official and personal individual capacities; and (5) claims for punitive damages for Hurley\u2019s and Yates\u2019 conduct in their official and personal individual capacities. Plaintiff asserted claims against Western Surety Company on Hurley\u2019s official bond. Defendants answered and asserted defenses of sovereign immunity, qualified immunity, and that plaintiff was an \u201cat will employee.\u201d\nDefendants moved for summary judgment. Hurley\u2019s sworn affidavit, filed with his motion for summary judgment, admits he asked Yates to reassign plaintiff from the sheriffs department\u2019s cases due to \u201c[his] concern that a conflict of interest was arising by plaintiff\u2019s reportedly questioning crime victims as to whether they were satisfied with response times, friendliness, etc. of deputy investigators ... for the time during the election campaign.\u201d Hurley denies requesting Yates to terminate plaintiff. Yates\u2019 sworn affidavit states, \u201c[a]t no time did Sheriff Hurley or anyone on his behalf ask me to fire [plaintiff], I made the decision.\u201d\nThe trial court granted defendants\u2019 motions regarding: (1) \u201cplaintiff\u2019s first claim for relief as against defendant Yates in his official capacity and in his individual and personal capacity\u201d (wrongful discharge); (2) \u201cplaintiff\u2019s third claim for relief as against defendant Hurley in his official capacity and in his individual and personal capacity\u201d (denial of State constitutional rights); (3) \u201cplaintiff\u2019s third claim for relief as against defendant Yates in his official capacity, but not as against defendant Yates in his individual and personal capacity\u201d (denial of State constitutional rights); (4) \u201cplaintiff\u2019s fourth claim for relief as against defendant Yates in his official capacity for all forms of relief except injunctive relief, but not as against defendant Yates in his individual and personal capacity\u201d (denial of federal constitutional rights under color of State law); (5) \u201cplaintiff\u2019s sixth claim for relief as against defendant Yates in his official capacity, but not as against defendant Yates in his individual and personal capacity\u201d (punitive damages); and (6) plaintiff\u2019s sixth claim for relief as against defendant Hurley in his official capacity but not as against defendant Hurley in his individual and personal capacity (punitive damages).\nThe trial court denied defendants\u2019 motions for summary judgment on plaintiff\u2019s: (1) second claim of relief for malicious interference with contractual relations against Hurley; (2) injunctive relief for violation of plaintiff\u2019s State constitutional rights by Yates in his individual and personal capacities; (3) violation of plaintiff\u2019s federal constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against Yates in his individual and personal capacities limited to injunctive relief; (4) plaintiff\u2019s fifth claim for relief on the sheriff\u2019s bond against Western Surety Company (for wrongful conduct by Hurley in his official capacity as sheriff); and (5) punitive damages against both Hurley and Yates in their individual and personal capacities. Defendants appeal and plaintiff cross appeals.\nII. Issues\nThe common issues presented by defendants are whether the trial court erred in denying defendants\u2019 summary judgment motions on plaintiffs claims for violation under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and punitive damages. Defendants Hurley and Western Surety separately assert the trial court erred in denying summary judgment on plaintiffs malicious interference with contractual relations as plaintiff failed to allege a waiver of immunity.\nPlaintiff assigned cross assignments of error on the granting of defendants\u2019 motions for summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs claims for: (1) wrongful discharge by Yates; (2) punitive damage charge against Hurley in his official capacity; (3) all forms of relief except injunction in regards to his 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 action; and (4) punitive damages against Yates and Hurley in their official capacities. Except for the trial court\u2019s granting Yates summary judgment and dismissing plaintiff\u2019s claims for wrongful discharge, plaintiff\u2019s arguments in his brief assert solely alternative grounds to support the trial court\u2019s partial summary judgment in his favor. Plaintiff abandoned his remaining cross assignments of error by not arguing them in his brief. N.C. R. App. P. 28(a) (2004); Summers v. City of Charlotte, 149 N.C. App. 509 n.8, 562 S.E.2d 18 n.8 (2002). Also, plaintiff\u2019s cross appeals, except the wrongful discharge, are interlocutory and are dismissed. N.C. R. App. P. 10 (2004).\nIII. Interlocutory Appeal\nDefendants\u2019 appeal of an order denying their motions for summary judgment is interlocutory. However, \u201cthis Court has repeatedly held that appeals raising issues of governmental or sovereign immunity affect a substantial right sufficient to warrant immediate appellate review.\u201d Price v. Davis, 132 N.C. App. 556, 558-59, 512 S.E.2d 783, 785 (1999) (citations omitted). We recognize the non-prevailing party\u2019s right to immediate review because \u201c \u2018the essence of absolute immunity is its possessor\u2019s entitlement not to have to answer for his conduct in a civil damages action.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Epps v. Duke University, Inc., 122 N.C. App. 198, 201, 468 S.E.2d 846, 849, disc. rev. denied, 344 N.C. 436, 476 S.E.2d 115 (1996) (citing Herndon v. Barrett, 101 N.C. App. 636, 639, 400 S.E.2d 767, 769 (1991))). Defendants\u2019 answer and arguments assert the affirmative defense of immunity and qualified immunity. This appeal is properly before this Court. Id.\nIV. Standard of Review\n. In a motion for summary judgment, the movant has the burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact. The movant can meet the burden by either: \u201c1) Proving that an essential element of the opposing party\u2019s claim is nonexistent; or 2) Showing through discovery that the opposing party cannot produce evidence sufficient to support an essential element of his claim nor [evidence] sufficient to surmount an affirmative defense to his claim.\u201d Price v. Davis, 132 N.C. App. 556, 559, 512 S.E.2d 783, 786 (1999) (citing Messick v. Catawba County, 110 N.C. App. 707, 712, 431 S.E.2d 489, 492-93, disc. rev. denied, 334 N.C. 621, 435 S.E.2d 336 (1993)).\nWhen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(e) (2003).\nV. Interference with Contract\nHurley asserts the trial court erred in its order denying his motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs claim against him for malicious interference with contractual relations in his official and individual capacity. We agree.\nThe five essential elements a plaintiff must show for a viable claim for malicious interference with contract are:\n(1) a valid contract existed between plaintiff and a third person, (2) defendant knew of such contract, (3) defendant intentionally induced the third person not to perform his or her contract with plaintiff, (4) defendant had no justification for his or her actions, and (5) plaintiff suffered damage as a result.\nWagoner v. Elkin City Schools\u2019 Bd. of Education, 113 N.C. App. 579, 587, 440 S.E.2d 119, 124 (1994) (citing McLaughlin v. Barclays American Corp., 95 N.C. App. 301, 308, 382 S.E.2d 836, 841, cert. denied, 325 N.C. 546, 385 S.E.2d 498 (1989); Uzzell v. Integon Life Ins. Corp., 78 N.C. App. 458, 463, 337 S.E.2d 639, 643 (1985), cert. denied, 317 N.C. 341, 346 S.E.2d 149 (1986)).\nPlaintiffs complaint alleges \u201c[a]t all times herein alleged, Hurley was the duly elected Sheriff of Randolph County.\u201d Plaintiff\u2019s claim for malicious interference with contractual relations asserts Hurley \u201cacted without any proper purpose related to his duties as Sheriff . . . solely for reasons of ill will and malice ... to intentionally and maliciously cause defendant Yates to terminate plaintiffs employment.\u201d Hurley argues public official immunity and qualified immunity bar this claim.\n\u201cGovernmental immunity protects the governmental entity and its officers or employees sued in their \u2018official capacity.\u2019 \u201d Taylor v. Ashburn, 112 N.C. App. 604, 607, 436 S.E.2d 276, 279 (1993) (quoting Whitaker v. Clark, 109 N.C. App. 379, 382, 427 S.E.2d 142, 144, disc. rev. and cert. denied, 333 N.C. 795, 431 S.E.2d 31 (1993)), cert. denied, 336 N.C. 77, 445 S.E.2d 46 (1994). We have held \u201cabsent an allegation to the effect that immunity has been waived, the complaint fails to state a cause of action.\u201d Clark v. Burke County, 117 N.C. App. 85, 88, 450 S.E.2d 747, 748 (1994) (citing Gunter v. Anders, 115 N.C. App. 331, 444 S.E.2d 685 (1994)). We have also held \u201c[g]overnmental immunity . . . does not preclude an action against the sheriff and the officers sued in their official capacities .... The statutory mandate that the sheriff furnish a bond works to remove the sheriff from the protective embrace of governmental immunity . . . .\u201d Messick, 110 N.C. App. at 715, 431 S.E.2d at 494 (internal citations omitted).\nAlthough plaintiff failed to plead Hurley or Yates waived immunity, plaintiff joined the issuer of the sheriff\u2019s bond as a party defendant. His failure to allege waiver of immunity procedurally does not bar review of his claim. Hurley\u2019s governmental immunity in his official capacity has been sufficiently waived as to allow review of this claim. Id.\nPlaintiff\u2019s complaint alleges conduct that occurred at all times while Hurley was sheriff, about matters and conversations concerning the sheriff\u2019s department and its working relationship with the district attorney\u2019s office. The allegations indicate a cause of action against Hurley in his official capacity. See Taylor, 112 N.C. App. at 608, 436 S.E.2d at 279; see also Whitaker, 109 N.C. App. at 383, 427 S.E.2d at 144-45.\nHurley stated in his response to plaintiff\u2019s interrogatories that he had concerns about: (1) plaintiff\u2019s derogatory comments about a deputy; and (2) the perception of a conflict of interest with plaintiff working at Yates\u2019 office in Randolph County and had requested that plaintiff work in other counties in the judicial district. Hurley stated Yates did not act on this request and reassign plaintiff. Hurley also stated in his affidavit that plaintiff\u2019s public criticism of himself, a deputy, and Yates concerning a discretionary decision on a particular case, created an unsatisfactory and potentially damaging working relationship between the sheriff\u2019s department and the district attorney\u2019s office.\nPlaintiff\u2019s allegations fail to establish the fourth element of \u201cno justification\u201d to support his claims for malicious interference with contract. Wagoner, 113 N.C. App. at 587, 440 S.E.2d at 124. Plaintiff\u2019s allegations do not show Hurley did not have an official or personal justification in requesting plaintiff to be reassigned or terminated and that Hurley, as a constitutionally elected officer, enjoyed a qualified immunity from tort in communicating with Yates, also a constitutionally elected officer. Id.\nPlaintiff states in his affidavit:\nMr. Yates stated to me that Sheriff Hurley had contacted him to complain about my continuing campaign activities .\u2022 . . during the period between October 15, 2001, and August 22, 2002, stated to me on many different occasions that Sheriff Hurley had told him that Sheriff Hurley wanted him to terminate me from my employment with the District Attorney\u2019s office.\nPlaintiff concedes he was not fired at that time and was given two extensions by Yates of his pending termination in order to secure other employment along with the option to resign and receive a reference to other law enforcement agencies after the 2002 primary and general elections were held. Plaintiff was terminated on 31 December 2002, more than three months after the conclusion of the primary election. Plaintiff offered no evidence to show Yates terminated him because of Hurley\u2019s request. Yates stated in his sworn answers to plaintiff\u2019s interrogatories that plaintiff was terminated because of his\ninability to cooperate with and to maintain good working relations with the law enforcement agencies in the prosecutorial district; inability to function as an effective liaison with sheriff\u2019s department;... inability to show loyalty to the District Attorney\u2019s office by criticizing me over the motorcycle incident; [and] inability to refrain from campaigning on office time ....\nPlaintiff was terminated several months after Hurley\u2019s purported request. Yates\u2019 affidavit and answers to plaintiff\u2019s interrogatories sets forth objective and substantial reasons for terminating plaintiff, none of which were based upon Hurley\u2019s request to do so. Examination of the verified pleadings shows: (1) Yates had justification for his actions; and (2) plaintiff suffered no recoverable damage as a result. Id. Plaintiff made no showing that he was terminated because of Hurley\u2019s request or that he suffered recoverable damages as a result of Hurley requesting plaintiff\u2019s termination. Id.\nAs the material facts are not in dispute, the trial court should have granted summary judgment for Hurley and Western Surety on plaintiff\u2019s claim for malicious interference with contractual relations. That portion of the trial court\u2019s order is reversed.\nVI. State Constitutional Rights\nThe trial court concluded that Yates was not entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff\u2019s claim for relief under violations of the North Carolina Constitution \u201cin [his] individual and personal capacity.\u201d It is well settled in North Carolina that no direct cause of action for monetary damages exists against officials sued in their individual capacities who have allegedly violated a plaintiff\u2019s constitutional rights. Corum v. University of North Carolina, 330 N.C. 761, 788, 413 S.E.2d 276, 293, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 985, 121 L. Ed. 2d 431 (1992). In Corum, our Supreme Court held, a \u201cplaintiff may assert his freedom of speech right only against state officials, sued in their official capacity.\u201d 330 N.C. at 788, 413 S.E.2d at 293.\nPlaintiff concedes his complaint does not set forth a cause of action against Yates in his \u201cindividual and personal capacity\u201d in his State constitutional claim for relief. \u201cThe trial court should have granted [defendants\u2019] motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff\u2019s claims against him .... The trial court\u2019s failure to do so was error.\u201d Caudill v. Dellinger, 129 N.C. App. 649, 658, 501 S.E.2d 99, 104 (1998). That portion of the trial court\u2019s judgment denying Yates\u2019 motion for summary judgment on plaintiff\u2019s State constitutional claim is reversed.\nVIL Wrongful Termination\nPlaintiff assigns error to the trial court granting summary judgment for Yates and argues he was wrongfully terminated, immunity does not bar his claim, and he properly asserted a 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 action against defendants. Plaintiff was employed by Yates as an investigatorial assistant \u201cto serve at his pleasure.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-69 (2003). Yates argues he: (1) retained complete discretion in the evaluation of plaintiffs job performance and retention; (2) was acting in his official capacity in terminating plaintiff; and (3) is entitled to public official and qualified immunity.\nIn Coman v. Thomas Manufacturing Co., the plaintiff alleged that he was discharged from his employment as a long-distance truck driver after refusing to violate federal transportation regulations. 325 N.C. 172, 381 S.E.2d 445 (1989). The plaintiff brought suit for wrongful discharge. In Coman, our Supreme Court explicitly recognized a public policy exception to the well-entrenched employment-at-will doctrine, quoting with approval the following language from the Court of Appeals\u2019 opinion:\n[W]hile there may be a right to terminate a contract at will for no reason, or for an arbitrary or irrational reason, there can be no right to terminate such a contract for an unlawful reason or purpose that contravenes public policy. A different interpretation would encourage and sanction lawlessness, which law by its very nature is designed to discourage and prevent.\n325 N.C. at 175, 381 S.E.2d at 447 (quoting Sides v. Duke University, 74 N.C. App. 331, 342, 328 S.E.2d 818, 826, disc. rev. denied, 314 N.C. 331, 333 S.E.2d 490 (1985), overruled on other grounds by Kurtzman v. Applied Analytical Industries, Inc., 347 N.C. 329, 331, 493 S.E.2d 429, 422 (1997) (holding that absent a contract, employment is presumed to be at will; reassurances of employment alone do not constitute a contract)). The Court stated, \u201cpublic policy has been defined as the principle of law which holds that no citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good.\u201d Id. at 175 n.2, 381 S.E.2d at 447 n.2 (citing Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959)).\nPursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-5(cl)(2) (2003), a plaintiff, as an \u201c[o]fficer[] and [or] employee[] of the Judicial Department,\u201d is exempt from protections of the State Personnel Act. Plaintiff served at the \u201cpleasure\u201d of the district attorney, was exempt from coverage under the State Personnel Act, and was an \u201cat will\u201d employee to Yates. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-69.\nThis Court held in Caudill a district attorney\u2019s termination of his administrative assistant\u2019s employment,\u201d as permitted through N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-68, because she cooperated with the State Bureau of Investigation is in direct conflict with public policy. 129 N.C. App. at 656-57, 501 S.E.2d at 103-04. We held, \u201cit is the public policy of this state that citizens cooperate with law enforcement officials in the investigation of crimes.\u201d Id. at 657, 501 S.E.2d at 104.\nUnlike the plaintiff in Caudill, plaintiffs allegations do not show he was discharged for any reason that \u201ccontravenes public policy.\u201d Coman, 325 N.C. at 175, 381 S.E.2d at 447 (quoting Sides, 74 N.C. App. at 342, 328 S.E.2d at 826); see also Caudill, 129 N.C. App. at 656, 501 S.E.2d at 103. Plaintiff argues he is entitled to publically criticize the sheriff and the district attorney while a candidate for sheriff. Yates states in his sworn affidavit that plaintiff\u2019s speeches were directly injurious to him and the district attorney\u2019s office and detrimental to its cooperation and coordination with the sheriff\u2019s department and other law enforcement agencies. Yates stated in plaintiff\u2019s notice of termination that he was \u201cno longer able to function effectively in his position\u201d and Yates cited his \u201clack of confidence\u201d in plaintiff\u2019s ability to maintain a relationship with law enforcement ag\u00e9ncies and plaintiff\u2019s insubordinate criticism of his employer\u2019s discretionary decisions. Plaintiff was not restrained by Yates from running for public office, making any speech, or engaging in a protected activity which furthers a public policy. Id. at 175, 381 S.E.2d at 446. As an at will and exempt employee, plaintiff\u2019s public opposition to his superior\u2019s discretionary decisions and his inability to work cooperatively with law enforcement agencies with which the district attorney must communicate and coordinate on a daily basis is a legally sufficient reason for Yates to terminate plaintiff\u2019s employment. Unlike the plaintiff in Coman and in Caudill, plaintiff here did not allege his candidacy, speeches, and activities, for which he was allegedly terminated, resulted from his employer\u2019s demand that he conduct some unlawful activity or was in retaliation for cooperating with a law enforcement agency conducting an investigation. See Coman, 325 N.C. at 175-76, 381 S.E.2d at 447; Caudill, 129 N.C. App. at 656-57, 501 S.E.2d at 104 (the plaintiff gave truthful information on the district attorney\u2019s expense accounts and falsification of bank documents to a law enforcement agency).\nPlaintiff\u2019s allegations and evidence does not show how his candidacy for sheriff immunizes his speech as political expression that is protected by a public policy exception to bar his termination, when that speech publically exudes insubordination and directly criticizes his supervisor\u2019s prosecutorial discretion whether to bring criminal charges. Plaintiff was a candidate for sheriff, not for district attorney, and was told by Yates to \u201ckeep his office out of it\u201d when Yates learned plaintiff would be a candidate for sheriff.\nPlaintiffs public statements criticizing Yates\u2019 discretionary decisions and the disruption of his office\u2019s working relationship with law enforcement agencies were sufficient reasons, standing alone, to terminate plaintiff\u2019s at will employment. Yates\u2019 decision to terminate plaintiff rested within his lawful and discretionary scope of authority. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-69. Plaintiff\u2019s termination was not injurious to the public or \u201cagainst the public good.\u201d Coman, 325 N.C. at 175 n.2, 381 S.E.2d at 447 n.2. Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact to support a claim for wrongful discharge against Yates. Plaintiff\u2019s cross assignment of error is overruled. That portion of the trial court\u2019s order is affirmed.\nVIII. 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983\nDefendants argue the trial court erred in denying summary judgment for them for immunity against plaintiff\u2019s 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 claim. We agree.\n42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 (2003) provides:\nEvery person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding to redress ....\nAs an at will and exempt employee, plaintiff has no protected \u201crights, privilege, or immunities\u201d or property interest to assert in his employment by Yates without proof of violation of a public policy or constitutional deprivation. Id. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-69 provides an investigatorial assistant \u201cserve[s] at his [district attorney\u2019s] pleasure.\u201d Further, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-5(cl)(2), plaintiff, as an \u201c[o]fficer[] and [or] employeef] of the Judicial Department,\u201d is exempt from the State Personnel Act. Plaintiff is an at will employee., Caudill, 129 N.C. App. at 649, 501 S.E.2d at 99 (an administrative assistant pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-68 was an employee to serve at the pleasure of the district attorney and was not covered under the State Personnel Act, thus an at will employee, but her termination was protected under the Whistle Blower Act).\nPlaintiff has failed to show any public policy exception which cloaks him from termination of his at will employment. Moreover, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff was deprived of \u201cany rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws ...\u201d as a terminated at will employee of Yates. 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983.\nPlaintiffs right to say whatever he \u201cwanted was not restrained by Yates or anyone else. Yates had the right to terminate plaintiffs employment for any reason or for \u201cno reason, or for an arbitrary or irrational reason,\u201d so long as Yates\u2019 actions did not violate a recognized public policy. Coman, 325 N.C. at 175, 381 S.E.2d at 447 (quotation omitted); Caudill, 129 N.C. App. at 656, 501 S.E.2d at 103 (quotation omitted). Without any showing of a deprivation of any constitutionally protected rights, plaintiffs 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 claim must be dismissed. The trial court erred in not granting summary judgment for defendants on this claim.\nIX. Conclusion\nNo genuine issue of material fact supports the elements for plaintiff\u2019s malicious interference with contract claim against Hurley. Plaintiff concedes his State constitutional claim against Yates in his individual capacity. Yates can not be held liable for monetary relief for violation of plaintiff\u2019s State constitutional rights without State action. Corum, 330 N.C. at 788, 413 S.E.2d at 293. Plaintiff fails to assert a contravention of \u201cpublic policy\u201d claim or a wrongful termination claim against Yates. Id. Plaintiff\u2019s 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 action should have been dismissed because no genuine issue of material fact tends to show he was deprived of any protected \u201crights, privileges or immunities\u201d under color of law, or public policy as a terminated at will employee. 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983.\nAs a constitutionally elected officer, Yates has the statutory right to choose his staff to \u201cserve at his pleasure.\u201d Caudill, 129 N.C. App. at 656, 501 S.E.2d at 103; N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-69. Plaintiff\u2019s inconsistency and fallacy throughout his claims and arguments are his assertions that freedom of speech and expression shields his termination from at will employment, (that is exempt from the State Personnel Act), and compels his reinstatement by injunctive relief and allows him to hold Yates and Hurley liable for compensatory and punitive damages.\nPlaintiff asserts Hurley is liable in tort for speaking Ms views of plaintiff to Yates on matters that concern both constitutional officers, and Yates must suffer plaintiffs continued employment while his subordinate publically criticizes and disrespects the district attorney\u2019s office, and erodes its working relationship with a law enforcement agency. Plaintiff told Yates he planned to continue this behavior for the next four years when he would again be a candidate for sheriff.\nPlaintiff was never: (1) restrained from becoming a candidate, filing, and running for elective office; (2) restrained from making any speeches or representations, other than his employer\u2019s request to \u201cleave [the district attorney\u2019s] office out of it;\u2019 \u201d or (3) terminated for any conduct protected by the United States or North Carolina Constitutions or established public policy. Plaintiff\u2019s insubordination and criticism of Yates\u2019 discretionary decisions were blatant, impugned the character of his employer, and disrupted an essential working relationship between the sheriff\u2019s department and the district attorney\u2019s office. When faced with plaintiff\u2019s continued criticism of the sheriff\u2019s department after the election, his allegations of voter fraud and plaintiff\u2019s stated intent to seek the sheriff\u2019s office again in 2006, Yates was not powerless to avoid years of continued turmoil and future criticisms.\nAny constitutionally elected officer of the judicial department possesses the inherent and statutory right to choose their staff. Such officers cannot be compelled under threats of injunctive relief or payment of damages to retain or reinstate an insubordinate at will employee where no constitutional or public policy violation demands retention or reinstatement. N.C. Gen. Stat. 7A-69; Caudill, 129 N.C. App. 6.49, 501 S.E.2d 99 (district attorney\u2019s administrative assistant fired in violation of public policy is not entitled to reinstatement under successor district attorney).\nWe have carefully reviewed plaintiff\u2019s remaining claims defendants appealed from and fail to find any claims plaintiff asserted, which shields him from termination of his at will and exempt employment as Yates\u2019 investigatorial assistant. Caudill, 129 N.C. at 658, 501 S.E.2d at 104. The trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment for Yates on plaintiff\u2019s wrongful discharge claim is affirmed. The trial court\u2019s denial of defendants\u2019 motions for summary judgment on the remainder of plaintiff\u2019s claims, including those for punitive damages, not previously dismissed is reversed. Plaintiff\u2019s complaint is dismissed.\nAffirmed in part, Reversed in part, and Dismissed.\nJudge McGEE concurs.\nJudge WYNN concurs in part, dissents in part.", "type": "majority", "author": "TYSON, Judge." }, { "text": "WYNN, Judge\nconcurring in part, dissenting in part.\nThe majority states that \u201cExamination of the verified pleadings shows: (1) Yates had justification for his actions; and (2) plaintiff suffered no damage as a result. Id. Plaintiff made no showing that he was terminated because of Hurley\u2019s request or that he suffered recoverable damages as a result of Hurley requesting plaintiffs termination.\u201d Because, beyond the pleadings, which are not verified, the \u201cdepositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2004), reveal that there exists a material dispute of fact as to Plaintiffs interference with contract claim, I respectfully dissent as to that claim.\nSection 1A-1, Rule 56 of our General Statutes states that summary judgment \u201cshall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c). Summary judgment\nis \u201ca drastic measure, and it should be used with caution.\u201d Williams v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 296 N.C. 400, 402, 250 S.E.2d 255, 257 (1979). \u201cWhen ruling on a motion for summary judgment, \u2018the court must look at the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.\u2019 \u201d Wilkes County Vocational Workshop, Inc. v. United Sleep Prods., 321 N.C. 735, 737, 365 S.E.-2d 292, 293 (1988) (quoting W.S. Clark & Sons, Inc. v. Union Nat\u2019l Bank, 84 N.C. App. 686, 688, 353 S.E.2d 439, 440, disc. rev. denied, 320 N.C. 177, 358 S.E.2d 70 (1987)).\nMoore v. City of Creedmoor, 345 N.C. 356, 364, 481 S.E.2d 14, 20 (1997).\nOn summary judgment, the movant has the burden of clearly establishing the lack of any material factual dispute. Jennings Communs. Corp. v. PCG of the Golden Strand, Inc., 126 N.C. App. 637, 639, 486 S.E.2d 229, 231 (1997) (\u201cThe party moving for summary judgment has the burden of clearly establishing a lack of any triable issue of fact by the record proper before the court.\u201d) (citing Singleton v. Stewart, 280 N.C. 460, 465, 186 S.E.2d 400, 403 (1972)).\nAs the majority notes,\nThere are five essential elements for an action for malicious interference with contract: (1) a valid contract existed between plaintiff and a third person, (2) defendant knew of such contract, (3) defendant intentionally induced the third person not to perform his or her contract with plaintiff, (4) defendant had no justification for his or her actions, and (5) plaintiff suffered damage as a result.\nWagoner v. Elkin City Sch. Bd. of Educ., 113 N.C. App. 579, 587, 440 S.E.2d 119, 124 (1994) (citations omitted).\nThe majority here finds that \u201cExamination of the verified pleadings shows: (1) Yates had justification for his actions; and (2) plaintiff suffered no damage as a result. Id. Plaintiff made no showing that he was terminated because of Hurley\u2019s request or that he suffered recoverable damages as a result of Hurley requesting plaintiffs termination.\u201d Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, as required by law, I disagree.\nFirst, as to the \u201cno justification\u201d element, the evidence in the record demonstrates a material dispute of fact. In Plaintiffs affidavit of 13 November 2003, he stated that \u201cMr. Garland Yates, on numerous occasions personally stated to me that he intended to discharge me from my employment as his investigatorial assistant due to my seeking the office of Sheriff of Randolph County.\u201d Plaintiff stated that \u201c[o]n each such occasion, Mr. Yates stated to me that Sheriff Hurley had contacted him to complain about my continuing campaign activities.\u201d\nMr. Tony Yates, Defendant Yates\u2019 brother, stated in his deposition that when he went to his brother Defendant Yates\u2019 office, \u201cI told him, I said, I\u2019ve come over here because I heard you were going to fire Kevin because he\u2019s going to run for sheriff. And I said I realize that, you know, you have the right to do whatever you want.... But I said, I don\u2019t think this is fair because a person has a right to run for a political office in this country.\u201d Upon being asked whether \u201cyour brother ever t[old] you that Sheriff Hurley expressed any interest in having Mr. Hines discharged[,]\u201d Mr. Yates answered \u201c[y]es\u201d and stated that \u201c[a]t the end of that little statement, he made the \u2014 made the state-merit that the sheriff had called him and told him that he had to get rid of Kevin now.\u201d\nIn his deposition, Plaintiff stated that Defendant Yates\u2019 brother, Tony Yates, as well as Defendant Yates himself, informed him that Defendant Hurley demanded that Defendant Yates terminate Plaintiff\u2019s employment because of Plaintiff\u2019s candidacy for sheriff. Plaintiff stated that Defendant Yates told him \u201cthat the sheriff come to him and told him he wanted me \u2014 that he wanted me moved out of the county. He wanted me fired.\u201d Plaintiff said that Defendant Yates \u201ctold me he was going to fire me at different \u2014 at different times. He was going to fire me if I filed. And then when I filed, he decided to wait, and then he told me he was going to fire me before the election, and then he told me he was going to fire me after the election. I was told countless times that he was going to fire me if I ran against him.\u201d\nIn her deposition and through an accompanying exhibit, Ms. Cynthia Kay Lovin, administrative assistant to Defendant Yates, indicated that Plaintiff\u2019s performance evaluations for 2001 and 2002 rated Plaintiff\u2019s job performance as being satisfactory to outstanding. A portion of his 2001 performance evaluation stated:\nKevin had previous law enforcement experience when he joined our office. He possesses excellent investigative skills, which our office uses to develop and prepare cases for trial. He also serves as a liaison with the law enforcement agencies and has a proactive working relationship with these agencies.\nKevin has a very easy-going personality, which is a true asset in his job performance. He has proven to be invaluable in his ability to locate and interview witnesses. This is often a time-consuming process and requires someone with excellent investigative techniques and the ability to communicate with all segments of society.\nKevin is also very informed as to the elements of criminal law and the policies and procedures of the judicial system. He works independently and has the ability to analyze each case or situation and make any necessary decisions.\nKevin is always available and willing to help . . . whether it is directly in our office or in the judicial community.\nIn Defendant Hurley\u2019s deposition, the following colloquy took place:\nQ: Is it within the scope of your authority as sheriff of Randolph County to cause or seek to cause the termination of any employee at the district attorney\u2019s office?\nA: No. I didn\u2019t try to do that.\nQ: Well, my question is simply is that within the scope of your authority.\nA: No, sir.\nQ: So whether you did it or not, you agree you don\u2019t have any legal right to try to cause a termination of an employee at the district attorney\u2019s office?\nA: Absolutely not.\n* * *\nQ: Did you have any legal right or lawful authority in the fall of 2001 to ask Garland Yates to get rid of Kevin Hines?\nA: No.\nWith regard to the damages element of Plaintiff\u2019s interference with contract claim, Plaintiff made clear that he was terminated from his employment with Defendant Yates, and at his deposition on 13 June 2003 that he was seeking but had not yet found full-time employment and was \u201cdrawing from the state of North Carolina unemployment . . . .\u201d Indeed, Plaintiff stated that Defendant Hurley had contacted an administrator at a community college, at which Plaintiff obtained part-time employment after his termination by the District Attorney\u2019s Office, and \u201ctried to get me fired . . . .\u201d\nIn sum, the pleadings in this matter, contrary to the majority\u2019s assertion, are unverified. Under the \u201cdrastic measure\u201d of summary judgment, this Court must look at the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Beyond the unverified pleadings, the \u201cdepositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits\u201d in this case show that there are genuine issues of material fact as to Plaintiff\u2019s interference with contract claim. Thus, Superior Court Judge John O. Craig, III, correctly applied the law to this claim in denying summary judgment.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "WYNN, Judge" } ], "attorneys": [ "Puryear and Lingle, P.L.L.C., by David B. Puryear, Jr., for plaintiff-appellee/cross-appellant.", "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Grady L. Balentine, Jr., for defendant-appellant/cross-appellee Garland N. Yates.", "Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, A Professional Limited Liability Company, by Allan R. Gitter and Douglas R. Vreeland, for defendants-appellants/cross-appellees Litchard D. Hurley and Western Surety Company." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "HUGH KEVIN HINES, Plaintiff v. GARLAND N. YATES, in his Individual and Personal Capacity and in His Official Capacity as the District Attorney for the 19-B Prosecutorial District, State of North Carolina; LITCHARD D. HURLEY, in His Individual and Personal Capacity and in His Official Capacity as the Sheriff of Randolph County, North Carolina; WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, a South Dakota Corporation, Defendants\nNo. COA04-775\n(Filed 5 July 2005)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 appealability \u2014 preservation of issues\u2014 failure to argue \u2014 interlocutory order\nThe cross-assignments of error that plaintiff failed to argue in his brief are deemed abandoned under N.C. R. App. P. 28(a) and plaintiffs cross-appeals, except for wrongful discharge, are interlocutory and dismissed under N.C. R. App. P. 10.\n2. Appeal and Error\u2014 appealability \u2014 denial of summary judgment \u2014 immunity\u2014substantial right\nAlthough an appeal from the denial of a motion for summary judgment is generally an appeal from an interlocutory order, defendants\u2019 appeal is properly before the Court of Appeals because defendants\u2019 answer and arguments assert the affirmative defenses of immunity and qualified immunity which affect a substantial right sufficient to warrant immediate appellate review.\n3. Wrongful Interference\u2014 malicious interference with contractual relations \u2014 summary judgment\nThe trial court erred by denying defendant sheriff\u2019s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff\u2019s claim for malicious interference with contractual relations in defendant\u2019s official and individual capacity, because: (1) plaintiff\u2019s allegations fail to establish the element of \u201cno justification\u201d to support his claims for malicious interference with contract as an investigatorial assistant in the district attorney\u2019s office; (2) plaintiff\u2019s allegations do not show that defendant sheriff did not have an official or personal justification in requesting plaintiff to be reassigned or terminated and that defendant, as a constitutionally elected officer, enjoyed a qualified immunity from tort in communicating with defendant district attorney who was also a constitutionally elected officer; (3) plaintiff offered no evidence to show that the district attorney terminated him because of the sheriff\u2019s request or that he suffered recoverable damages as a result of the sheriff requesting plaintiffs termination; and (4) the district attorney\u2019s affidavit and answers to plaintiffs interrogatories set forth objective and substantial reasons for terminating plaintiff, none of which were based upon the sheriffs request to do so.\n4. Constitutional Law\u2014 North Carolina \u2014 suit against district attorney in individual and personal capacity \u2014 summary judgment\nThe trial court erred by concluding that defendant district attorney was not entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs claim for relief under violations of the North Carolina Constitution in defendant\u2019s individual and personal capacity, because: (1) it is well settled in North Carolina that no direct cause of action for monetary damages exists against officials sued in their individual capacities who have allegedly violated a plaintiff\u2019s constitutional rights; and (2) plaintiff concedes that his complaint does not set forth a cause of action against defendant in his individual and personal capacity for this claim.\n5. Public Officers and Employees\u2014 wrongful termination\u2014 investigatorial assistant in district attorney\u2019s office\nThe trial court did not err by granting summary judgment for defendant district attorney on plaintiff\u2019s wrongful termination claim based on defendant firing plaintiff as an investigatorial assistant after plaintiff\u2019s unsuccessful candidacy for sheriff, because: (1) plaintiff did not show that he was discharged for any reason that contravenes public policy; (2) plaintiff was not restrained by defendant from running for public office, making any speech, or engaging in a protected activity which furthers a public policy; (3) as an at-will and exempt employee under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 126-5(cl)(2) based on his employment in the Judicial Department, plaintiff\u2019s public opposition to his superior\u2019s discretionary decisions and his inability to work cooperatively with law enforcement agencies with which the district attorney must communicate and coordinate on a daily basis is a legally sufficient reason for defendant to terminate plaintiff\u2019s employment; (4) plaintiff did not allege that his candidacy for sheriff, speeches, and activities, for which he was allegedly terminated, resulted from his employer\u2019s demand that he conduct some unlawful activity or was in retaliation for cooperating with a law enforcement agency conducting an investigation; (5) plaintiff\u2019s allegations and evidence did not show how his candidacy for sheriff immunized his speech as political expression that is protected by a public policy exception to bar his termination when that speech publicly exuded insubordination and directly criticized his supervisor\u2019s prosecutorial discretion whether to bring criminal charges; (6) plaintiffs public statements criticizing defendant\u2019s discretionary decisions and the disruption of his office\u2019s working relationship with law enforcement agencies were sufficient reasons, standing alone, to terminate plaintiff\u2019s at-will employment; and (7) defendant\u2019s decision to terminate plaintiff rested within his lawful and discretionary scope of authority under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-69.\n6. Civil Rights\u2014 \u00a7 1983 claim \u2014 failure to show deprivation of constitutionally protected rights\nThe trial court erred by denying summary judgment for defendants on plaintiff\u2019s 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 claim, because: (1) plaintiff failed to show any public policy exception which cloaks him from termination of his at-will employment as an investiga-torial assistant who serves at the pleasure of the district attorney as provided by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-69; (2) there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff was deprived of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws as a terminated at-will employee of defendant district attorney (DA); (3) plaintiff\u2019s right to say whatever he wanted was not restrained by defendant DA or anyone else; and (4) defendant DA had the right to terminate plaintiff\u2019s employment for any reason, for no reason, or for an arbitrary or irrational reason so long as his actions did not violate a recognized public policy.\n7. Damages and Remedies\u2014 punitive damages \u2014 summary judgment\nThe trial court\u2019s denial of defendants\u2019 motions for summary judgment on the remainder of plaintiff\u2019s claims, including those for punitive damages, that have not been previously dismissed are reversed.\nJudge Wynn concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nAppeals by defendants and cross appeals by plaintiff from order entered 26 February 2004 by Judge John O. Craig, III, in Randolph County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 2 February 2005.\nPuryear and Lingle, P.L.L.C., by David B. Puryear, Jr., for plaintiff-appellee/cross-appellant.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Grady L. Balentine, Jr., for defendant-appellant/cross-appellee Garland N. Yates.\nWomble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, A Professional Limited Liability Company, by Allan R. Gitter and Douglas R. Vreeland, for defendants-appellants/cross-appellees Litchard D. Hurley and Western Surety Company." }, "file_name": "0150-01", "first_page_order": 180, "last_page_order": 199 }