{ "id": 8439309, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LARRY CHAMPION", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Champion", "decision_date": "2005-07-19", "docket_number": "No. COA04-1264", "first_page": "716", "last_page": "725", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "171 N.C. App. 716" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "541 U.S. 36", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5873383 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/us/541/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 L. Ed. 2d 166", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "479 U.S. 871", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 673", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "693" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 398", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4720550 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0398-01" ] }, { "cite": "547 S.E.2d 35", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135609, 135642, 135739, 135869 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0392-01", "/nc/353/0392-04", "/nc/353/0392-03", "/nc/353/0392-02" ] }, { "cite": "537 S.E.2d 526", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "533" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 N.C. App. 422", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12128197 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "432" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/140/0422-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 S.E.2d 341", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2568444 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "400" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0392-01" ] }, { "cite": "604 S.E.2d 886", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "900", "parenthetical": "citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 203 (2004)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3803286 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154", "parenthetical": "citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 203 (2004)" }, { "page": "154" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0131-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 L. Ed. 2d 737", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "604 S.E.2d 292", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "523 S.E.2d 663", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "670", "parenthetical": "quoting Wright, 497 U.S. at 822, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 657" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 277", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155670 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288", "parenthetical": "quoting Wright, 497 U.S. at 822, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 657" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0277-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 U.S. 805", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6219632 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "822-23" }, { "page": "656-57" }, { "page": "822" }, { "page": "657" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/497/0805-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 L. Ed. 2d 88", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "525 U.S. 843", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11090275, 11090532, 11090373, 11090500, 11090344, 11090615, 11090570, 11090317, 11090254, 11090289, 11090423, 11090456, 11090395, 11090655 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/525/0843-02", "/us/525/0843-11", "/us/525/0843-06", "/us/525/0843-10", "/us/525/0843-05", "/us/525/0843-13", "/us/525/0843-12", "/us/525/0843-04", "/us/525/0843-01", "/us/525/0843-03", "/us/525/0843-08", "/us/525/0843-09", "/us/525/0843-07", "/us/525/0843-14" ] }, { "cite": "495 S.E.2d 677", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "690" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 412", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551134 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "436-37" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "450 S.E.2d 907", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "910-11" }, { "page": "911", "parenthetical": "\"Corroborating evidence should not be used to support a hearsay statement's particularized guarantee of trustworthiness.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 469", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2558726 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "474" }, { "page": "475" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0469-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 S.E.2d 561", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "566" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 616", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2569277 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "624" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0616-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 S.E.2d 183", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "191-92", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 804(b)(5)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 394", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2554014 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "408", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 804(b)(5)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 736", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "740" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4697175 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "508 S.E.2d 496", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "513" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571580 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "408" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "559 S.E.2d 212", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 N.C. App. 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9366970 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "538" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/148/0534-01" ] }, { "cite": "541 U.S. 36", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5873383 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68" }, { "page": "203" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/541/0036-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 939, "char_count": 21664, "ocr_confidence": 0.73, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.648655719978226e-08, "percentile": 0.40530104264766015 }, "sha256": "d93fae08b3f319abdfbe0dde7de2d1ac1c0e86135978ca4467183f1a0ddaec73", "simhash": "1:16680720c677985c", "word_count": 3406 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:08:31.744997+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge WYNN concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LARRY CHAMPION" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge.\nLarry Champion (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals his conviction for first-degree murder. For the reasons discussed herein, we hold that defendant received a trial free of prejudicial error.\nThe State\u2019s evidence presented at trial tends to show the following: In June 1998, defendant\u2019s wife, Lora Champion (\u201cLora\u201d), and defendant\u2019s son, Bryan Champion (\u201cBryan\u201d), were living at a residence shared by Jennifer Harris (\u201cJennifer\u201d) and her children. On the morning of 8 June 1998, defendant began knocking on Jennifer\u2019s front door. Jennifer\u2019s ten-year-old son, Jonathan Harris (\u201cJonathan\u201d), looked out the peephole of the front door and informed Jennifer that defendant was at the front door. Jonathan stood nearby and watched Lora open the door. Jonathan heard Lora initially refuse to speak with defendant, and then he heard Lora inform defendant that they could speak on the porch of the residence. However, defendant \u201cwanted to come in instead[,]\u201d and he thereafter forced his way past Lora. Shortly after defendant entered the residence, he and Lora began to \u201cstruggle.\u201d Jonathan saw defendant \u201ctrying to come in\u201d the residence and Lora \u201ctrying to push him out[,]\u201d and Jonathan then saw Lora fall \u201cbackwards\u201d over a couch and land on her stomach. Defendant thereafter \u201cattacked\u201d Lora, and Jonathan initially thought defendant was \u201cpunching her.\u201d However, after seeing defendant\u2019s hand \u201cturned upright\u201d while he attacked Lora, Jonathan and Jennifer fled to Jennifer\u2019s bedroom.\nOnce Jonathan and Jennifer reached Jennifer\u2019s bedroom, Jennifer barricaded the door with a dresser and called 9-1-1. While she was on the phone with the 9-1-1 dispatcher, defendant attempted to enter the room. Defendant eventually forced his way inside, and he looked \u201cangered.\u201d Jonathan saw a knife in defendant\u2019s hand. When Jennifer reached for the knife, defendant bit her on the hand. Jennifer told defendant to \u201cjust go on and get [his] son,\u201d who was in an adjacent bedroom. Defendant thereafter \u201cgrabbed\u201d Bryan and \u201cwent out the front door.\u201d\nRaleigh Police Department Officer Shawn Woolrich (\u201cOfficer Woolrich\u201d) was dispatched to Jennifer\u2019s residence to investigate the 9-1-1 call. As Officer Woolrich approached the residence, he saw defendant exiting the front door. Defendant was holding Bryan in his left arm and concealing his right hand from Officer Woolrich\u2019s view. Officer Woolrich noted that defendant\u2019s jacket and blue jeans were \u201cheavily blood stained,\u201d and he \u201cfelt certain [he] was looking at the person who [he] was sent to find.\u201d Officer Woolrich drew his weapon and repeatedly ordered defendant to release Bryan. Defendant eventually complied with Officer Woolrich\u2019s orders, and Officer Woolrich directed Bryan back inside the residence. After noticing \u201ca bloody knife protruding from [defendant\u2019s] back pocket[,]\u201d Officer Woolrich \u201ctossed\u201d the knife away from defendant and handcuffed him.\nDefendant was taken into custody and transported to the Raleigh Police Department. After he signed a waiver form and indicated that he understood his rights, defendant answered law enforcement officers\u2019 questions about the attack. Defendant initially informed the officers that he had gone to Jennifer\u2019s residence to ask Lora to take him to the doctor, and that they soon began arguing. Defendant stated that Lora thereafter left the room for a moment, but returned with a knife and started pushing and hitting him. Defendant recalled Lora being stabbed in the ensuing struggle, during which he was reaching for the knife to take it away from Lora. Defendant told the officers that after Lora was stabbed, he went to Jennifer\u2019s room. Defendant stated that he asked Jennifer for some clothes for Bryan, and he left when she told him to do so.\nAfter listening to defendant\u2019s initial version of the events, the interviewing officers \u201cconfronted\u201d defendant \u201con several issues.\u201d The officers were confused by defendant\u2019s statement that he could not see the knife and that it was dark in the room, and the officers believed \u201cthere was no way [Lora] could be stabbed as many times as she was if [defendant] was just reaching for the knife to take it away from her.\u201d After the veracity of his first version of the attack was questioned, defendant provided the officers with a second version of the attack. In his second version, defendant stated that he had taken the knife out of his mother\u2019s kitchen before going to Jennifer\u2019s residence, and that he had done so because Lora was a \u201cviolent person.\u201d Defendant further stated that when he arrived at Jennifer\u2019s residence, he and Lora began arguing, and Lora hit him. Defendant told the officers that as the two \u201cwere wrestling around[,]\u201d he \u201creached into [his] back pocket and pulled the knife out and stabbed her with it.\u201d Defendant recalled Lora \u201cmak[ing] some unusual breathing noises as [he] walked past her on [his] way out of the house.\u201d Defendant stated that after Lora did not answer him, he \u201cwent into [Jennifer\u2019s] room to ask her about getting some clothes for [his] son.\u201d Defendant recalled \u201cpush[ing] the door in\u201d and noticing that Jennifer was \u201con the phone with the police\u201d when he entered. Defendant stated that as he \u201cwas trying [to] get her to calm down[,]\u201d Jennifer \u201cgrabbed [his] hand and [he] bit her to get her to let go.\u201d Defendant informed the officers that he thereafter went to Bryan\u2019s room and \u201ctook him and was leaving when the police came.\u201d\nAfter the attack, Lora was transported to Wake Medical Center, where she subsequently died. On 20 July 1998, defendant was indicted for the first-degree murder of Lora. A superceding indictment, charging defendant with first-degree murder with aggravating circumstances, was filed on 25 February 2003. Defendant\u2019s trial began the week of 9 June 2003.\nAt trial, defendant objected to the State\u2019s presentation of hearsay statements made by Jennifer to Raleigh Police Department Detective H. Faulkner (\u201cDetective Faulkner\u201d) the day of the attack. After hearing voir dire examination and arguments from both parties, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to exclude the statements, concluding that the statements were admissible under the residual hearsay exception. Following the State\u2019s presentation of its evidence, defendant presented evidence that he was not mentally competent at the time of the attack and was unable to form the specific intent to kill Lora. In rebuttal, the State presented evidence that defendant was able to form the specific intent to kill Lora.\nOn 13 June 2003, the jury returned a guilty verdict on the charge of first-degree murder. The trial court thereafter sentenced defendant to life imprisonment without parole. Defendant appeals.\nWe note initially that defendant\u2019s appeal contains several violations of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. First, defendant\u2019s brief contains arguments supporting only one of the eleven original assignments of error on appeal. Pursuant to N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (2005), the omitted assignments of error are deemed abandoned. Furthermore, in his brief, defendant does not cite the specific assignment of error that he contends supports his one remaining argument, and he does not attach to his brief the pertinent portions of the trial proceedings related to.the argument. While we recognize that defendant has therefore further violated N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6) and (d)(1), and that such violations may result in waiver of the assignment of error, see State v. Gaither, 148 N.C. App. 534, 538, 559 S.E.2d 212, 215 (2002) and State v. Call, 349 N.C. 382, 408, 508 S.E.2d 496, 513 (1998), in our discretion pursuant to N.C.R. App. P. 2, we have chosen to overlook these errors and examine the merits of defendant\u2019s argument.\nDefendant\u2019s only argument on appeal is that the trial court erred by allowing Detective Faulkner to testify as to what Jennifer told her on the date of the attack. Defendant asserts that the trial court considered improper factors in determining whether Jennifer\u2019s statements were admissible under the residual hearsay exception.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 804(b)(5) (2003) allows the introduction of a hearsay statement where, even though the statement is not covered by a specific exception, the statement\u2019s declarant is unavailable and the statement possesses \u201ccircumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness\u201d equivalent to other hearsay exceptions. In order to allow the admission of a hearsay statement under this \u201cresidual\u201d exception, the trial court must find that the declarant is unavailable. State v. Triplett, 316 N.C. 1, 8, 340 S.E.2d 736, 740 (1986). Thereafter, the trial court must determine:\n(1) Whether the proponent of the hearsay provided proper notice to the adverse party of his intent to offer it and of its particulars;\n(2) That the statement is not covered by any of the exceptions listed in Rule 804(b)(l)-(4);\n(3) That the statement possesses \u201cequivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness\u201d;\n(4) That the proffered statement is offered as evidence of a material fact;\n(5) Whether the hearsay is \u201cmore probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can produce through reasonable means\u201d; and\n(6) Whether \u201cthe general purposes of [the] rules [of evidence] and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.\u201d\nState v. Ali, 329 N.C. 394, 408, 407 S.E.2d 183, 191-92 (1991) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 804(b)(5)) (alterations in original). In deciding whether a hearsay statement possesses the requisite \u201cequivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness,\u201d the trial court considers:\n(1) the declarant\u2019s personal knowledge of the underlying event; (2) the declarant\u2019s motivation to speak the truth; (3) whether the declarant recanted; and (4) the reason, within the meaning of Rule 804(a), for the declarant\u2019s unavailability.\nState v. Nichols, 321 N.C. 616, 624, 365 S.E.2d 561, 566 (1988). \u201cThe trial court should make findings of fact and conclusions of law when determining if an out-of-court hearsay statement possesses the necessary circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness to allow its admission.\u201d State v. Swindler, 339 N.C. 469, 474, 450 S.E.2d 907, 910-11 (1994).\nIn the instant case, Detective Faulkner testified during voir dire that Jennifer told her that Lora and defendant had been \u201chaving problems\u201d and had \u201csplit up\u201d approximately three months prior to the attack. Detective Faulkner also testified that Jennifer informed her that Lora had told Jennifer that she had tried to work on their problems, but that \u201c[i]t was time for [Lora and defendant] to go their separate ways.\u201d Detective Faulkner further testified as to what Jennifer remembered about the attack. Following examination of Detective Faulkner by defendant and argument from both parties, the trial court allowed Detective Faulkner to testify regarding Jennifer\u2019s statements, concluding that the statements \u201cpossess sufficient equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.\u201d We conclude that the trial court erred.\nAlthough the trial court\u2019s examination of a hearsay statement\u2019s trustworthiness is based upon the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement, State v. Richmond, 347 N.C. 412, 436-37, 495 S.E.2d 677, 690, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 843, 142 L. Ed. 2d 88 (1998), the trial court must not consider the corroborative nature of the statement when determining whether it qualifies as residual hearsay. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822-23, 111 L. Ed. 2d 638, 656-57 (1990). Instead, \u201c \u2018[h]earsay evidence used to convict a defendant must possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, not by reference to other evidence at trial.\u2019 \u201d State v. Hinnant, 351 N.C. 277, 288, 523 S.E.2d 663, 670 (2000) (quoting Wright, 497 U.S. at 822, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 657), cert. dismissed, \u2014 N.C. \u2014, 604 S.E.2d 292 (2004), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 161 L. Ed. 2d 737 (2005); see Swindler, 339 N.C. at 475, 450 S.E.2d at 911 (\u201cCorroborating evidence should not be used to support a hearsay statement\u2019s particularized guarantee of trustworthiness.\u201d). In the instant case, in its \u201cdetermination [regarding] the trustworthiness of the proffered statements,\u201d the trial court found as fact that \u201c[t]he statements made by Jennifer [] appear to be consistent with other evidence concerning the facts as they were \u2014 as they have been determined to be, although . . . Jennifer [] did make certain statements which were actually not available from any other source.\u201d In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court erred by considering the corroborative nature of Jennifer\u2019s statements.\nFurthermore, we note that \u201cthe Confrontation Clause bars the admission of out-of-court testimonial statements unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine him or her.\u201d State v. Morgan, 359 N.C. 131, 154, 604 S.E.2d 886, 900 (2004) (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 203 (2004)). Because defendant had filed notice of appeal with this Court and his case was pending when Crawford was issued, the decision applies to the instant case. Morgan, 359 N.C. at 154, 604 S.E.2d at 900. Here, the record reflects that Jennifer died in 2001, after the date of the attack and her interview with Detective Faulkner, but prior to defendant\u2019s trial. However, there is no indication that defendant was given an opportunity to cross-examine Jennifer regarding her statements to law enforcement officers. Therefore, defendant\u2019s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation under Crawford, was also violated by the trial court\u2019s determination. See Id. at 155-56, 604 S.E.2d at 901 (holding that deceased\u2019s statement to law enforcement officer was testimonial in nature because knowingly given in response to structured police questioning, and denial of opportunity to cross-examine deceased regarding the statement violated Sixth Amendment right to confront accuser).\nWe note that not every constitutional violation necessarily requires a new trial. Id. at 156, 604 S.E.2d at 901. Instead, where the State demonstrates that the constitutional violation was \u201charmless beyond a reasonable doubt,\u201d the error is deemed nonprejudicial, and reversal of a conviction is not required. Id; N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443(b) (2003). Our courts have previously concluded that \u201cthe presence of overwhelming evidence of guilt may render error of constitutional dimension harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d State v. Autry, 321 N.C. 392, 400, 364 S.E.2d 341, 346 (1988); State v. McKeithan, 140 N.C. App. 422, 432, 537 S.E.2d 526, 533 (2000), disc. review denied and appeal dismissed, 353 N.C. 392, 547 S.E.2d 35 (2001). After reviewing the record in the instant case, we conclude that the trial court\u2019s errors do not necessitate reversal of defendant\u2019s conviction.\nDefendant contends that Jennifer\u2019s statements to Detective Faulkner were used to demonstrate that defendant acted with premeditation and deliberation. However, \u201c [premeditation and deliberation relate to mental processes and ordinarily are not readily susceptible to proof by direct evidence.\u201d State v. Gladden, 315 N.C. 398, 430, 340 S.E.2d 673, 693, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871, 93 L. Ed. 2d 166 (1986). Therefore,\nAmong [the] circumstances to be considered in determining whether a killing was with premeditation and deliberation are: (1) want of provocation .on the part of the deceased; (2) the conduct and statements of the defendant before and after the killing; (3) threats and declarations of the defendant before and during the course of the occurrence giving rise to the death of the deceased; (4) ill-will or previous difficulty between the parties; (5) the dealing of lethal blows after the deceased has been felled and rendered helpless; and (6) evidence that the killing was done in a brutal manner. . . . [T]he nature and number of the victim\u2019s wounds are circumstances from which premeditation and deliberation can be inferred.\nId. at 430-31, 340 S.E.2d at 693 (citations omitted).\nIn the instant case, Jonathan testified that defendant knocked on the front door of his residence, began arguing with Lora, and then forced his way inside. Jonathan further testified that after defendant \u201cattacked\u201d Lora, he and Jennifer fled to Jennifer\u2019s bedroom. Jonathan recalled defendant forcing his way inside Jennifer\u2019s bedroom, holding a knife, and looking \u201cangered.\u201d The State introduced into evidence recorded copies and a transcript of Jennifer\u2019s call to the 9-1-1 dispatcher, during which a male voice in the background states, \u201cI told you she was going to get it.\u201d Officer Woolrich testified that defendant\u2019s clothing was \u201cheavily blood stained\u201d when he was arrested, and that defendant was carrying \u201ca bloody knife\u201d in his back pocket. Raleigh Police Department Detective Randy Miller (\u201cDetective Miller\u201d) testified that defendant informed him after his arrest that \u201c[h]e had taken a kitchen knife out of his mother\u2019s drawer and took it with him\u201d to Jennifer\u2019s residence the date of the attack. Defendant also admitted to the officers that he stabbed Lora after \u201c[h]e got mad and began tussling with her[,]\u201d and he recalled hearing Lora \u201cmake some unusual breathing noises\u201d afterwards. Detective Miller testified that defendant\u2019s mother \u201cacknowledged that [the knife] looked like one of her knives[,]\u201d and, after she searched her kitchen, defendant\u2019s mother informed the officers that her \u201cfavorite knife\u201d was missing. Doctor Dewey Pate (\u201cDr. Pate\u201d) of Wake Medical Center testified that Lora suffered \u201capproximately 51 stab wounds or lacerations\u201d during the attack, and that the wounds were located on her neck, chest, face, arms, and hands. Dr. Pate stated that Lora suffered a stab wound to her kidney, and he noted that some of the multiple stab wounds on her neck were \u201cdeep enough to penetrate [her] voice box and larynx and underlying air tube or tracheaf.]\u201d Dr. Pate also testified that two main arteries on the left and right side of Lora\u2019s neck had been severed during the attack, and that the severing of these two arteries was the ultimate cause of Lora\u2019s death.\nDefendant maintains that the State\u2019s continual reference to defendant\u2019s jealousy and the status of his relationship with Lora demonstrates that the State \u201crelied heavily\u201d upon Jennifer\u2019s state-merits to establish malice, and, therefore, defendant\u2019s guilt. However, we note that the jury heard similar evidence from other sources, and was free to determine defendant\u2019s guilt based upon evidence irrespective of Jennifer\u2019s statements. Defendant\u2019s mother informed officers that prior to the attack, defendant and Lora had been arguing \u201c[o]ver their relationship.\u201d Defendant told the officers himself that he \u201cwondered if [Lora] had someone else[,]\u201d and he stated that he \u201cknew [he and Lora] would not get back together.\u201d Therefore, after reviewing the entire record in the instant case, we conclude that any erroneous admission of Jennifer\u2019s statements was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence establishing defendant\u2019s guilt. Accordingly, we hold that defendant received a trial free of prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nChief Judge MARTIN and Judge WYNN concur.\n. Because we conclude that the trial court erred by considering the corroborative nature of the statements, we need not address defendant\u2019s additional assertions regarding their inadmissibility.", "type": "majority", "author": "TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Alexander McC. Peters, for the State.", "Center for Death Penalty Litigation, by Sheiagh Rebecca Kenney, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LARRY CHAMPION\nNo. COA04-1264\n(Filed 19 July 2005)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 appellate rule violations \u2014 failure to argue \u2014 failure to cite specific assignment of error \u2014 failure to attach pertinent portions of proceedings to brief\nDefendant\u2019s ten assignments of error that he did not support in his brief are deemed abandoned under N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6). Although defendant failed to cite the specific assignment of error that he contends supports his one remaining assignment of error and failed to attach to his brief the pertinent portions of the trial proceedings related to the argument in violation of N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6) and (d)(1), the Court of Appeals exercised its discretion under N.C. R. App. P. 2 to examine the merits of defendant\u2019s argument.\n2. Evidence; Constitutional Law\u2014 hearsay \u2014 residual hearsay . exception \u2014 right of confrontation \u2014 harmless error\nThe trial court erred in a first-degree murder case by allowing a detective to testify as to what a witness told her on the date of the attack under the residual hearsay exception of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 804(b)(5) because the court improperly considered the corroborative nature of the statements in determing their trustworthiness. Defendant\u2019s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) was also violated by the admission of those statements because, although the witness had died and was thus unavailable, there was no indication that defendant was given the opportunity to cross-examine the witness regarding the statements. However, the erroneous admission of the statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when: (1) the jury heard similar evidence from other sources and was free to determine defendant\u2019s guilt based upon evidence irrespective of the witness\u2019s statements; and (2) there was overwhelming evidence establishing defendant\u2019s guilt.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 13 June 2003 by Judge James C. Spencer in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 June 2005.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Alexander McC. Peters, for the State.\nCenter for Death Penalty Litigation, by Sheiagh Rebecca Kenney, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0716-01", "first_page_order": 746, "last_page_order": 755 }