{ "id": 8318580, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF: J.B", "name_abbreviation": "In re J.B.", "decision_date": "2005-08-02", "docket_number": "No. COA04-579", "first_page": "1", "last_page": "27", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "172 N.C. App. 1" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "359 N.C. 539", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3804066 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "No. 417PA04" } ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0539-01" ] }, { "cite": "612 S.E.2d 436", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632830 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/612/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 U.S. 1056", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11589312, 11589826, 11589763, 11589283, 11589542, 11589414, 11589341, 11589704, 11589965, 11589455, 11589649, 11589375, 11589909, 11589498, 11589597, 11589887 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/522/1056-02", "/us/522/1056-13", "/us/522/1056-12", "/us/522/1056-01", "/us/522/1056-08", "/us/522/1056-05", "/us/522/1056-03", "/us/522/1056-11", "/us/522/1056-16", "/us/522/1056-06", "/us/522/1056-10", "/us/522/1056-04", "/us/522/1056-15", "/us/522/1056-07", "/us/522/1056-09", "/us/522/1056-14" ] }, { "cite": "610 S.E.2d 424", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 N.C. App. 375", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8470251 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/169/0375-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 N.C. App. 430", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9005766 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/170/0430-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 S.E.2d 304", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "306", "parenthetical": "distinguishing between the \"rendering\" and \"entry\" of judgment and noting that judgment is not automatically entered when announced in open court where there is \"[a]n instruction by the court that the prevailing party's attorney is to draft the order[.]\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 N.C. App. 652", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 5313731 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656", "parenthetical": "distinguishing between the \"rendering\" and \"entry\" of judgment and noting that judgment is not automatically entered when announced in open court where there is \"[a]n instruction by the court that the prevailing party's attorney is to draft the order[.]\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/106/0652-01" ] }, { "cite": "401 S.E.2d 638", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 276", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2538159 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0276-01" ] }, { "cite": "559 S.E.2d 774", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "784", "parenthetical": "citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 58 and Stachlowski v. Stach, 328 N.C. 276, 401 S.E.2d 638 (1991)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 220051 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242", "parenthetical": "citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 58 and Stachlowski v. Stach, 328 N.C. 276, 401 S.E.2d 638 (1991)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 S.E.2d 76", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 792", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4725056, 4730755, 4729611, 4727700, 4728892 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0792-03", "/nc/320/0792-02", "/nc/320/0792-04", "/nc/320/0792-01", "/nc/320/0792-05" ] }, { "cite": "277 S.E.2d 122", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 N.C. App. 522", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 2644830 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/51/0522-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 S.E.2d 743", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "745" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 N.C. App. 333", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12169896 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "337" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/85/0333-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 S.E.2d 642", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "646" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 N.C. App. 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521090 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/89/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 S.E.2d 367", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "370" }, { "page": "370" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 N.C. App. 733", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9497715 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "738" }, { "page": "739" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/139/0733-01" ] }, { "cite": "453 S.E.2d 220", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "225" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 N.C. App. 693", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526237 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "700" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/117/0693-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 S.E.2d 470", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4736775, 4739944, 4740168, 4736235, 4733980 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0283-02", "/nc/318/0283-04", "/nc/318/0283-05", "/nc/318/0283-01", "/nc/318/0283-03" ] }, { "cite": "344 S.E.2d 36", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "38" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 N.C. App. 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521439 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/81/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 S.E.2d 879", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "884" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 N.C. App. 423", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524867 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/90/0423-01" ] }, { "cite": "543 S.E.2d 906", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "910" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 N.C. App. 607", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9442570 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/142/0607-01" ] }, { "cite": "589 S.E.2d 157", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "160" }, { "page": "160-61" }, { "page": "161" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 N.C. App. 650", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8959782 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/161/0650-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 S.E.2d 713", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "715", "parenthetical": "rejecting the respondent's argument that she was denied her constitutional right to confrontation by being excluded from the courtroom while her child testified" }, { "page": "716" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 N.C. App. 267", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520490 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "270", "parenthetical": "rejecting the respondent's argument that she was denied her constitutional right to confrontation by being excluded from the courtroom while her child testified" }, { "page": "269" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/61/0267-01" ] }, { "cite": "571 S.E.2d 65", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "71" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 N.C. App. 565", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9250860 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "574" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/153/0565-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 L. Ed. 2d 1023", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "453 U.S. 927", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11729144, 11729066, 11729020 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/453/0927-03", "/us/453/0927-02", "/us/453/0927-01" ] }, { "cite": "452 U.S. 18", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1313768 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "32" }, { "page": "653" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/452/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "424 US 319", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12026449 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/424/0319-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 S.E.2d 577", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 663", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2503783 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0663-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 U.S. 745", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11307633 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "753" }, { "page": "606" }, { "page": "754" }, { "page": "607", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "758-59" }, { "page": "610", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/455/0745-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 S.E.2d 396", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397" }, { "page": "397-98" }, { "page": "398" }, { "page": "400" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 N.C. App. 651", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524830 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "653" }, { "page": "653" }, { "page": "654" }, { "page": "658" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/105/0651-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 122-8.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8-44.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "175 S.E. 836", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 2, "year": 1934, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "838" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 N.C. 6", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8621595 ], "year": 1934, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/207/0006-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 S.E.2d 227", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "232-33" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 708", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4683935 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "715-16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0708-01" ] }, { "cite": "01 J 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Johns.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "428 S.E.2d 232", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 N.C. App. 539", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525909 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "545" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/109/0539-01" ] }, { "cite": "547 S.E.2d 9", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 374", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135896, 135730, 135565, 135847 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0374-03", "/nc/353/0374-01", "/nc/353/0374-02", "/nc/353/0374-04" ] }, { "cite": "536 S.E.2d 838", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "846" }, { "page": "845" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 N.C. App. 288", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12125951 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "300" }, { "page": "298" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/140/0288-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 71", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 N.C. App. 550", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527964 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/101/0550-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 S.E.2d 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "833" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4755941 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "2" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 N.C. App. 333", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526346 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/67/0333-01" ] }, { "cite": "281 S.E.2d 47", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "proceedings to terminate parental rights are either civil actions or special proceedings, both of which are governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, \"except where a different procedure may be prescribed by statute\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 592", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574984 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "proceedings to terminate parental rights are either civil actions or special proceedings, both of which are governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, \"except where a different procedure may be prescribed by statute\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0592-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 L. Ed. 2d 651", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "488 S.E.2d 225", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "230", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 689", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139340 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "696-97", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0689-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 S.E.2d 562", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8557304 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 S.E.2d 905", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "910-11", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Tatum, 291 N.C. 73, 229 S.E.2d 562 (1976)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 270", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569542 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Tatum, 291 N.C. 73, 229 S.E.2d 562 (1976)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0270-01" ] }, { "cite": "375 S.E.2d 676", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "679" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 N.C. App. 662", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527488 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "666" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/92/0662-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 S.E.2d 26", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "28" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 N.C. App. 22", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526124 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/72/0022-01" ] }, { "cite": "577 S.E.2d 421", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "425", "parenthetical": "citing Doby v. Lowder, 72 N.C. App. 22, 24, 324 S.E.2d 26, 28 (1984)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 N.C. App. 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9191392 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "538", "parenthetical": "citing Doby v. Lowder, 72 N.C. App. 22, 24, 324 S.E.2d 26, 28 (1984)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/156/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "595 S.E.2d 794", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"J.B. I\"" }, { "page": "795" }, { "page": "797" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 N.C. App. 394", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8897753 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"J.B. I\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/164/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-271", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "398 S.E.2d 323", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "324", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-271" }, { "page": "324" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 624", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2496339 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "625", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-271" }, { "page": "625" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0624-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 539", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3804066 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "No. 417PA04" }, { "page": "553" }, { "page": "553" }, { "page": "553" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0539-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1671, "char_count": 63806, "ocr_confidence": 0.75, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.06343181207189e-07, "percentile": 0.9082265027806641 }, "sha256": "8b8a7dbf18eaa3973c88d38cc000308a9d33aba77b235d11ea4f23781c2152b5", "simhash": "1:afebe02e572e0554", "word_count": 10075 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:22:54.702952+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUDSON and STEELMAN concur." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF: J.B." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge.\nRespondent-mother appeals the trial court order terminating her parental rights to her minor son, John. For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm the order of the trial court.\nThe facts and procedural history pertinent to the instant appeal are as follows: On 7 October 2002, Buncombe County Department of Social Services (\u201cpetitioner\u201d) filed a petition to terminate respondent\u2019s parental rights to John. The petition asserted that sufficient evidence exists to terminate respondent\u2019s parental rights to John pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1111(a)(1), (2) and (6), in that respondent: (i) neglected John by failing to provide him with appropriate care, by subjecting him to an environment injurious to his emotional welfare, and by emotionally abusing John; (ii) willfully left John in foster care or placement out of the home for more than twelve months without making reasonable progress under the circumstances to correct those conditions which led to John\u2019s removal; and (iii) was incapable of providing for the proper care and supervision of John. The case proceeded to trial, and, after hearing arguments and receiving evidence from the parties, the trial court concluded that sufficient grounds exist to terminate respondent\u2019s parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), and (6). After concluding that it was in the best interests of John to do so, the trial court entered an order terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights on 27 October 2003. It is from this order that respondent appeals.\nWe note initially that respondent\u2019s brief contains arguments supporting only fourteen of the original fifteen assignments of error. Pursuant to N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (2005), the omitted assignment of error is deemed abandoned. Therefore, we limit our present review to those issues properly preserved by respondent for appeal.\nThe issues on appeal are whether the trial court erred by: (I) exercising personal jurisdiction over respondent; (II) denying respondent\u2019s request for a stay in the proceedings and thus exercising subject matter jurisdiction over the case; (III) denying respondent\u2019s motion to continue the trial; (IV) denying respondent\u2019s request for expenses; (V) denying respondent\u2019s motion to interview John; (VI) admitting into evidence prior disposition orders in the matter; (VII) admitting into evidence respondent\u2019s mental health records; (VIII) allowing two therapists to testify and render conclusions regarding their evaluations; (IX) excluding respondent from the courtroom during John\u2019s testimony; (X) concluding that respondent\u2019s parental fights should be terminated prior to a disposition hearing; (XI) concluding that it was in John\u2019s best interests to terminate respondent\u2019s parental rights; (XII) directing petitioner\u2019s attorney to draft the order for termination of parental rights; and (XIII) failing to enter the order terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights within thirty days.'\nI. Personal Jurisdiction\nRespondent first argues that the trial court erred by exercising personal jurisdiction over her. Respondent asserts that the failure to properly serve John prevented the trial court from acquiring jurisdiction over respondent. We disagree.\nUpon the filing of a petition to terminate parental rights, the Juvenile Code requires that a summons regarding the proceeding be issued to the juvenile whose rights are to be terminated. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1106(a)(5) (2003). \u201c[T]he summons and other pleadings or papers directed to the juvenile shall be served upon the juvenile\u2019s guardian ad litem if one has been appointed[.]\u201d Id. In the instant case, the record reflects that the summons required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1106(a)(5) was served upon the guardian ad litem\u2019s attorney advocate rather than the guardian ad litem. Assuming arguendo that this was error, we note that the guardian ad litem did not object at trial to the sufficiency of service, nor does the guardian ad litem argue on appeal that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over John. Instead, respondent objects to the sufficiency of the service, arguing that the failure to properly serve John constitutes grounds for reversal of the trial court order.\n\u201cOnly a \u2018party aggrieved\u2019 may appeal from an order or judgment of the trial division.\u201d Culton v. Culton, 327 N.C. 624, 625, 398 S.E.2d 323, 324 (1990) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-271). \u201cAn aggrieved party is one whose rights have been directly and injuriously affected by the action of the court.\u201d Culton, 327 N.C. at 625, 398 S.E.2d at 324. In the instant case, respondent has failed to demonstrate any prejudice to her resulting from the alleged failure to properly serve John. Thus, we are unable to conclude that respondent was \u201cdirectly and injuriously\u201d affected by the alleged error, and, accordingly, we overrule this argument.\nII. Subject Matter Jurisdiction\nRespondent presents two arguments asserting that the trial court erred by exercising subject matter jurisdiction over the case. Respondent first asserts that the trial court erred by denying her request for a stay in the termination proceeding pending this Court\u2019s determination of her appeal of previous orders. Respondent also asserts that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case at the time of the termination hearing, \u201cpursuant to the decision of this [C]ourt captioned as In re J.B., 03-807[.]\u201d Because of the similarity of these two arguments, we have chosen to address them concurrently, and, in light of the record before us, we conclude that the trial court did not err.\nIn In re J.B., 164 N.C. App. 394, 595 S.E.2d 794 (2004) (\u201cJ.B. I\u201d), this Court reviewed a previous appeal by respondent stemming from trial court orders changing the permanency plan for John, releasing petitioner from all efforts to reunify respondent with John, and dismissing respondent\u2019s previous appeals regarding production of medical records and permanency planning hearings. Respondent contended in J.B. I \u201cthat the trial court did not possess subject matter jurisdiction in this matter because [John] and respondent were residing outside of North Carolina at the time the proceedings in this case were initiated.\u201d Id. at 396, 595 S.E.2d at 795. After reviewing the record, we were unable to conclude whether the trial court possessed subject matter jurisdiction. We thus vacated the order and remanded the case with instructions to the trial court to \u201cmake specific findings of fact to support its conclusion of law that it possessed subject matter jurisdiction under the [Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act] and [Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act] as outlined in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-201.\u201d Id. at 398, 595 S.E.2d at 797.\nThe record in the instant case reveals that, while respondent\u2019s prior appeal was pending, the trial court entered the instant order terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights. Respondent contends that the trial court was prohibited from entering an order terminating her parental rights while her prior appeal was pending before this Court. However, our Supreme Court has recently issued an opinion in In re R.T.W., 359 N.C. 539, - S.E.2d - (Filed 1 July 2005) (No. 417PA04), whereby the Court held that \u201ca trial court retains jurisdiction to terminate parental rights during the pendency of a custody order appeal in the same case.\u201d 359 N.C. at 553, - S.E.2d at - . The Court noted that \u201c[e]ach termination order relies upon an independent finding that clear, cogent, and convincing evidence supports at least one of the grounds for termination under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1111[,]\u201d Id. at 553, - S.E.2d at -, and it concluded that, where a termination order is entered while a prior custody order is pending, \u201c[t]he termination order necessarily renders the pending appeal moot.\u201d Id. at 553, - S.E.2d at -. In the instant case, the trial court provided several findings of fact in support of its decision to exercise jurisdiction over the case in general and the termination proceedings in particular. Respondent does not object to any of these findings of fact on appeal. Therefore, in light of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the case and did not err in denying respondent\u2019s motion to stay the termination proceeding. Accordingly, this argument is overruled.\nIII. Motion to Continue\nRespondent also argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion to continue the termination hearing. Respondent asserts that the trial court was required to continue the termination hearing due to respondent\u2019s recent incarceration. We disagree.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-803 (2003) provides as follows:\nThe court may, for good cause, continue the hearing for as long as is reasonably required to receive additional evidence, reports, or assessments that the court has requested, or other information needed in the best interests of the juvenile and to allow for a reasonable time for the parties to conduct expeditious discovery. Otherwise, continuances shall be granted only in extraordinary circumstances when necessary for the proper administration of justice or in the best interests of the juvenile.\nA trial court\u2019s decision regarding a motion to continue is discretionary and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion. In re Humphrey, 156 N.C. App. 533, 538, 577 S.E.2d 421, 425 (2003) (citing Doby v. Lowder, 72 N.C. App. 22, 24, 324 S.E.2d 26, 28 (1984)). Continuances are generally disfavored, and the burden of demonstrating sufficient grounds for continuation is placed upon the party seeking the continuation. Id. \u201cWhere the lack of preparation for trial is due to a party\u2019s own actions, the trial court does not err in denying a motion to continue.\u201d In re Bishop, 92 N.C. App. 662, 666, 375 S.E.2d 676, 679 (1989).\nIn the instant case, respondent requested'that the trial court continue the termination hearing because she had been incarcerated prior to the hearing and was thus unable to gather evidence located in Oregon. However, as the trial court noted in the order terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights, the termination hearing had been rescheduled numerous times prior to that proceeding which eventually occurred the week of 21 July 2003. The termination hearing was originally scheduled for March 2003, but, upon agreement of the parties, the matter was continued until 21 April 2003. On 21 April 2003, respondent requested a continuance on the grounds that she had been injured in an automobile accident in Oregon and was unable to attend the termination hearing in North Carolina. She also expressed that she needed additional time to secure evidence for the hearing. The trial court granted respondent\u2019s motion and ordered that the termination hearing be rescheduled for 13 June 2003. However, on or about 23 May 2003, respondent returned to North Carolina from Oregon and allegedly kidnapped John. In its order terminating parental rights, the trial court made the following pertinent finding of fact:\nOn or about May 23, 2003, [respondent] came back to North Carolina and abducted [John] by waiting for him at his school bus stop and getting him in her vehicle and taking him to Oregon. This was at least the second time [respondent] had removed [John] from his foster placement and left the state with him. A felony warrant was issued against [respondent] and [respondent] and [John] were located in Oregon. On June 5, 2003 [respondent] was arrested for felony abduction and [John] was returned to North Carolina. [Respondent] initially resisted being ex[tradited] back to North Carolina, but she subsequently agreed to and was extradited] back to North Carolina.\nFollowing her arrest for felony kidnapping, respondent filed a second motion to continue the termination hearing and challenged her extradition to North Carolina. The trial court granted respondent\u2019s second motion to continue and ordered that the termination hearing be rescheduled to commence on 21 July 2003.\nWe note that respondent\u2019s incarceration in Oregon was the result of her own actions in abducting John, and we also note that the trial court granted respondent a continuance more than one month before her incarceration \u2014 a continuance sought by respondent for the express purpose of allowing her to gather the documents she now asserts she was unable to obtain. In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying respondent\u2019s third motion to continue. Therefore, we overrule this argument.\nIV. Request for Expenses\nRespondent further argues that the trial court erred by denying her request for expenses related to expert witness fees. Respondent asserts that she sufficiently demonstrated her need for assistance in procuring and paying for expert witness testimony and was thus entitled to expenses from the State. We disagree.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-450 (2003) provides as follows:\n(b) Whenever a person, under the standards and procedures set out in this Subchapter, is determined to be an indigent person entitled to counsel, it is the responsibility of the State to provide him with counsel and the other necessary expenses of representation. The professional relationship of counsel so provided to the indigent person he represents is the same as if counsel had been privately retained by the indigent person.\n\u201c[T]he appointment of experts to assist an indigent in his defense depends really upon the facts and circumstances of each case and lies, finally, within the discretion of the trial judge.\u201d State v. Gray, 292 N.C. 270, 277, 233 S.E.2d 905, 910-11 (1977) (citing State v. Tatum, 291 N.C. 73, 229 S.E.2d 562 (1976)).\nTo establish a particularized need for expert assistance, a defendant must show that: (1) he will be deprived of a fair trial without the expert assistance, or (2) there is a reasonable likelihood that the expert will materially assist him in the preparation of his case. Although particularized need is a flexible concept and must be determined on a case-by-case basis, \u201c[m]ere hope or suspicion that favorable evidence is available is not enough to require that such help be provided[.]\u201d The trial court has discretion to determine whether a defendant has made an adequate showing of particularized need. In making its determination the trial court should consider all the facts and circumstances known to it at the time the motion for psychiatric assistance is made.\nState v. Page, 346 N.C. 689, 696-97, 488 S.E.2d 225, 230 (1997) (citations omitted) (alteration in original), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1056, 139 L. Ed. 2d 651 (1998).\nIn the instant case, on 11 April 2003, respondent filed a pretrial motion requesting \u201capproval of expenses for supporting services; specifically, for the services of expert witnesses and/or expenses related to taking the depositions of mental health treatment providers in the State of Oregon.\u201d In support of this motion, respondent asserted that she had \u201clived in Oregon for some time and her current and most recent mental health providers are all located in the state of Oregonf,]\u201d and that she \u201cneedfed] approval. . . for expenses in order to secure the testimony of the Providers who can establish [her] current mental health status ....\u201d On 21 April 2003, the trial court denied respondent\u2019s request, finding in pertinent part that\n[Respondent] did not provide to the court any showing of need to have the court appoint and pay for expert witnesses in Oregon as [respondent] has her own therapists in Oregon who have been addressing these issues with [respondent]. The court did advise [respondent\u2019s] attorney that the attorney can submit any bills for the court\u2019s consideration concerning a telephone deposition for [respondent] with her therapist, or with any costs related to providing records concerning [respondent\u2019s] relationship with the therapist, the therapist\u2019s treatment for [respondent], any diagnosis, and any treatment recommendations, and the court will make a determination at that time.\nAfter reviewing the record in the instant case, we conclude that respondent has failed to demonstrate how the diagnosis and records of a new mental health care provider would \u201cmaterially assist\u201d her in her trial preparation, and we further conclude that respondent is unable to demonstrate how she was deprived of a fair trial without the requested expert assistance. Moreover, we note that there is no indication in the record that respondent submitted any bills or costs related to depositions and records of her current therapists, despite the trial court\u2019s instruction allowing respondent to do so. In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying respondent\u2019s request, and, accordingly, we overrule this argument.\nV. Motion to Interview John\nRespondent also argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion to interview John. Respondent asserts that by preventing her from interviewing John, the trial court denied her the right to fully prepare for the termination hearing. We disagree.\nJuvenile proceedings are generally governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure. See In re Clark, 303 N.C. 592, 598 n. 3, 281 S.E.2d 47, 52 n. 3 (1981) (proceedings to terminate parental rights are either civil actions or special proceedings, both of which are governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, \u201cexcept where a different procedure may be prescribed by statute\u201d); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-193 (2003). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(1) (2003) provides that \u201c[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party.\u201d However, Rule 26(b)(1) provides that discovery may be limited by the court if it is \u201cunduly burdensome.\u201d According to the Rule, \u201c[t]he court may act upon its own initiative after reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under section (c).\u201d Id. Similarly, under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-700(a) (2003), the trial court may, \u201cupon written motion of a party and a finding of good cause,... order that discovery be denied, restricted, or deferred.\u201d We review a trial court\u2019s ruling on discovery matters under the abuse of discretion standard. Ritter v. Kimball, 67 N.C. App. 333, 335, 313 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1984). A trial court may be reversed for abuse of discretion only upon a showing that its ruling was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision. White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985).\nIn the instant case, the record indicates that at or prior to a permanency planning and review hearing on 4 February 2002, respondent requested that John be present at all court hearings. In a permanency planning and review order filed 17 April 2002, the trial court found that during supervised visits with John, petitioner required that respondent \u201ckeep[] the focus of the visit on [John] and not on her own issues like mental or physical health, felony charges and placement issues for [John], so as to avoid causing [John] undue worry.\u201d The trial court thereafter ordered that \u201c[John\u2019s] therapist shall provide a written report regarding the appropriateness of [John\u2019s] participation in upcoming treatment team meetings and court hearings.\u201d In subsequent orders, the trial court continued to require the approval of John\u2019s therapists prior to John having contact with respondent. In a permanency planning review order entered 22 October 2002, the trial court extended a restraining order which prevented respondent from contacting John\u2019s father. At the time of the permanency planning review hearing, social workers were attempting to extend John\u2019s visits with his father, but \u201cthis placement\u201d had been \u201cdisrupted ... to the detriment of [John]\u201d by respondent\u2019s \u201ccontinuing and escalating intrusive behaviors of allegedly contacting [John] at the day camp he attended, sending secret messages to [John] though his younger sister . . . , making repeated calls to [John\u2019s] new therapist\u2019s office, [and] contacting his counselors at the camp wanting information about [John\u2019s father\u2019s whereabouts].\u201d\nIn a permanency planning and review order entered 4 June 2003, the trial court granted a request to provide respondent with John\u2019s school and medical records, but the trial court required that \u201cany identifying information concerning the foster parents or where [John] lives\u201d be removed from the records prior to their presentation. The trial court later found that John\u2019s guardian ad litem, social worker, and therapists were concerned that contact with respondent \u201chas given false hope and information to [John], and that this is causing confusion to [John], and causing him to be mistrustful with his social worker and his therapist.\u201d\nRespondent\u2019s instant argument arises from a Motion To Allow Counsel To Interview Child filed 11 April 2003. In that motion, respondent requested that the trial court allow her an \u201copportunity to interview [John] in order to determine whether or not to present his testimony to the court.\u201d Respondent asserted that John was \u201ca fact witness to a number of allegations contained within the petition.\u201d Respondent noted the \u201callegation] that [respondent] had contact with [John] in violation of a court order during the summer of 2002 and that this contact jeopardized [John\u2019s] placement!,]\u201d and she asserted that John \u201cwould provide the court the very best evidence as to the truth of these allegations.\u201d On 6 June 2003, the trial court entered an order denying respondent\u2019s motion to interview John, finding as fact that \u201cthis motion has already been heard by this court and [John\u2019s] therapist is to inform this court when, and if, [John] should have contact with\u201d respondent.\nAfter reviewing the record in the instant case, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying respondent\u2019s request to interview John. As evidenced by multiple findings of fact contained within multiple court orders, any contact respondent had with John was disruptive to his own therapeutic progress. It is clear from the record that the trial court was concerned with respondent\u2019s behavior in attempting to learn of John\u2019s whereabouts. As detailed above, in the order terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights, the trial court found as fact that respondent abducted John \u201cfor the second time\u201d on 23 May 2003, after \u201cwaiting for him at his school bus stop and getting him in her vehicle and taking him to Oregon.\u201d In 2001, respondent removed John from foster care in North Carolina and absconded to a homeless shelter in South Carolina. As discussed below, the trial court did not prevent respondent from subpoenaing John to testify at the termination hearing. Therefore, in light of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not err by denying respondent\u2019s motion to interview John. Accordingly, we overrule this argument.\nVI. Prior Disposition Orders\nRespondent next argues that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence prior disposition orders in the matter. Respondent contends that the trial court was required to exclude the orders because they were based upon a lower evidentiary standard. We disagree.\n\u201cA trial court may take judicial notice of earlier proceedings in the same cause.\u201d In re Isenhour, 101 N.C. App. 550, 553, 400 S.E.2d 71, 73 (1991). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 201(b) (2003) provides that \u201c[a] judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is . . . capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.\u201d This Court has previously held that in a termination of parental rights proceeding, prior adjudications of abuse or neglect are admissible, but they are not determinative of the ultimate issue. In re Huff, 140 N.C. App. 288, 300, 536 S.E.2d 838, 846 (2000), disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 374, 547 S.E.2d 9 (2001); In re Beck, 109 N.C. App. 539, 545, 428 S.E.2d 232, 236 (1993).\nIn the instant case, the trial court allowed petitioner to introduce into evidence \u201cjudgments and orders in the underlying juvenile court action, File #01 J 124[.]\u201d Respondent contends that thjs decision was improper, in that the trial court thereby admitted into evidence review orders from hearings where the evidence was subject to a lower standard of evidentiary proof. However, respondent cites no authority for the contention that \u201cjudicial notice is inappropriate where the other orders have a lower evidentiary standard[,]\u201d and she is unable to overcome the well-established supposition that the trial court in a bench trial \u201cis presumed to have disregarded any incompetent evidence.\u201d Huff, 140 N.C. App. at 298, 536 S.E.2d at 845. Furthermore, nothing in the record indicates that the trial court failed to conduct the independent determination required at a termination hearing when prior disposition orders have been entered in the matter. In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 715-16, 319 S.E.2d 227, 232-33 (1984). Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err by admitting the prior disposition orders, and, accordingly, we overrule this argument.\nVII. Respondent\u2019s Mental Health Records\nRespondent also argues that the trial court erred by allowing petitioner to introduce into evidence respondent\u2019s mental health records. We note initially that respondent originally assigned error to the admissibility of the records on the basis that she was not given an opportunity to cross-examine the mental health officials who provided the records. However, in her brief, respondent, asserts that the mental health records were inadmissible at the termination hearing because they were not covered under the statutory definition of \u201chospital medical records.\u201d It is well established that \u201cthe law does not permit parties to swap horses between courts in order to get a better mount\u201d in the appellate court. Weil v. Herring, 207 N.C. 6, 10, 175 S.E. 836, 838 (1934). Nevertheless, in our discretion pursuant to N.C.R. App. P. 2, we have chosen to review respondent\u2019s argument, and, as detailed below, we conclude that the trial court did not err.\nThe record indicates that the trial court ordered the production of respondent\u2019s mental health records at a permanency planning review hearing held prior to the termination hearing. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 45(c)(2) (2003) provides that where a custodian of hospital medical records is ordered to produce certain records in the custodian\u2019s custody, the custodian may tender to the court certified copies of the records requested. \u201cAny original or certified copy of records or an affidavit delivered according to the provisions of this subdivision, unless otherwise objectionable, shall be admissible in any action or proceeding without further certification or authentication.\u201d Id.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8-44.1 (2003) provides that copies or originals of hospital medical records\nshall not be held inadmissible in any court action or proceeding on the grounds that they lack certification, identification, or authentication, and shall be received as evidence if otherwise admissible, in any court or quasi-judicial proceeding, if they have been tendered to the presiding judge or designee by the custodian of the records[.]\nThe statute defines \u201chospital medical records\u201d as \u201crecords made in connection with the diagnosis, care and treatment of any patient or the charges for such services[,]\u201d but it further provides that records covered by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 122-8.1 and 90-109.1 are \u201csubject to the requirements of said statutes.\u201d Id. In the instant case, respondent contends that the challenged medical records were inadmissible based upon the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. Chapter 122C, which replaced repealed Chapter 122. We cannot agree.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 122C-3(9) (2003) defines \u201cconfidential information\u201d as \u201cany information, whether recorded or not, relating to an individual served by a facility that was received in connection with the performance of any function of the facility.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 122C-52(b) (2003) provides that \u201cno individual having access to confidential information may disclose this information.\u201d However, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 122C-54 (2003) provides express exceptions to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 122C-52. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 122C-54(a) requires a medical facility to \u201cdisclose confidential information if a court of competent jurisdiction issues an order compelling disclosure.\u201d In light of these statutory provisions, we conclude that petitioner was not precluded from admitting respondent\u2019s mental health records into evidence.\nFurthermore, we note that in its order terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights, the trial court made the following pertinent findings of fact regarding respondent\u2019s mental health records:\n35. [Respondent\u2019s] mental health records were admitted into evidence at this hearing and were previously admitted into evidence in the underlying juvenile court action, 01 J 124, and were summarized by the court in its order of March 13th & 15th, 2002, which was entered by the court May 13, 2002, as follows: [Respondent] has had 10 mental health hospitalizations in this area since April 1999, approximately half of which were involuntary commitments for various periods of time. Approximately six (6) of these admissions involved some sort of self-inflicted injury of [respondent], all of which were not life threatening. Of the remaining voluntary commitments, two (2) involved non-life threatening, self-inflicted injury by [respondent]. In addition, [respondent] has had four (4) prior mental health admissions in Oregon, three (3) for eating disorders and one (1) for depression. The dates of these admissions to the hospital occurred from March 1999 through November 2001. [Respondent] has been diagnosed with bulimia, borderline personality disorder, and major depression. The records also indicate a history of Percoset abuse and post traumatic stress disorder. It was noted that therapeutic trust was a formidable task for [respondent], as well as confusing boundaries between her and her therapist(s). In April 2000 'Dr. Mike Hopping, Medical Director of Blue Ridge Center, stated in writing that [respondent] had \u201csuccessfully evaded all of our attempts to gain any sort of control over her self destructive behavior\u201d, that she gave and then retracted releases of information, maintained another psychiatrist[] at one point, with whom Blue Ridge Center was not allowed to communicate with, attempted to prevent communication between Blue Ridge Center and in-patient units, and prevented Blue Ridge Center from talking to those who might be supportive to her in the community. It was his opinion that, at that time, long-term inpatient treatment for [respondent] would provide the only possibility for effective containment of her self-destructive or therapy interfering behaviors.\n36. [Respondent] continues to exhibit the same types of behaviors that were concerning to the mental health professionals as stated above, and she has continued in her self-destructive and therapy interfering behaviors. She has never effectively addressed her mental health issues, and her mental health issues remain, her mental health issues are serious, her mental health issues seriously impede her ability to provide minimally acceptable parenting for [John], and her mental health issues have a detrimental impact on [John] when he is in her care.\nAs detailed in finding of fact number thirty-five, the mental health records now challenged by respondent were originally admitted into evidence during a permanency planning review hearing held 13 March 2002 and 15 March 2002. Respondent did not appeal the trial court\u2019s subsequent order, and, as discussed above, we conclude that the trial court did not err by admitting into evidence prior disposition records in the matter. Because we also conclude that the trial court\u2019s termination of parental rights was based upon a determination independent of the prior disposition orders in the case, we further conclude that the trial court did not err by considering mental health records contained within the underlying file and previously admitted into evidence. Accordingly, we overrule this argument.\nVIII. Testimony of Therapists\nRespondent next argues that the trial court erred by allowing Alan Dodson (\u201cDodson\u201d) and Gail Azar (\u201cAzar\u201d) to testify and render conclusions regarding their evaluations. Respondent contends that neither therapist was a qualified expert witness, and that their diagnoses were based upon inadmissible evidence. We note that \u201c[i]n order to preserve a question for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling the party desired the court to make[.]\u201d N.C.R. App. R 10(b)(1). In the instant case, respondent offered no objection during the hearing to either of the witnesses\u2019 qualifications, and, on appeal, she does not point to any testimony by the witnesses admitted over her objection. Therefore, we conclude that respondent has waived the right to challenge the witnesses\u2019 testimony on appeal, and, accordingly, we overrule this argument.\nIX. Exclusion of Respondent From Courtroom\nRespondent next argues that the trial court erred by excluding her from the courtroom during John\u2019s testimony. Respondent asserts that the trial court was required to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the fundamental fairness of its determination. We disagree.\nBecause \u201c \u2018persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have a more critical need for procedural protections than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs [,]\u2019 \u201d this Court has previously held that \u201c \u2018[w]hen the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures,\u2019 which meet the rigors of the due process clause.\u201d In re Murphy, 105 N.C. App. 651, 653, 414 S.E.2d 396, 397 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 606 (1982)), aff\u2019d per curiam, 332 N.C. 663, 422 S.E.2d 577 (1992).\n\u201c[T]he nature of process due in parental rights termination proceedings turns on a balancing of the \u2018three distinct factors\u2019 specified in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 US 319, 335, 47 L Ed 2d 18, 96 S Ct 893 (1976): the private interests affected by the proceeding; the risk of error created by the State\u2019s chosen procedure; and the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure.\u201d\nMurphy, 105 N.C. App. at 653, 414 S.E.2d at 397-98 (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 607 (citations omitted)) (alteration in original).\nIn the instant case, respondent contends that the trial court was required to provide specific findings and conclusions regarding the minimum requirements of fundamental fairness and its relation to the trial court\u2019s decision to exclude respondent from the courtroom during John\u2019s testimony. However, we note that in Murphy, \u201cthe record d[id] not disclose whether the trial court balanced the Eldridge factors and made specific findings and conclusions regarding the minimum requirements of fundamental fairness.\u201d 105 N.C. App. at 654, 414 S.E.2d at 398. Our subsequent decision in Murphy to ignore the insufficiency of the record indicates that the trial court is not required to make the specific findings and conclusions asserted by respondent. Nevertheless, \u201c \u2018because child-custody litigation must be concluded as rapidly as is consistent with fairness,\u2019 \u201d in the absence of specific findings, we may determine sua sponte whether the trial court denied respondent due process of law when ruling on respondent\u2019s request to be in the courtroom during John\u2019s examination. Id. (quoting Lassiter v. Dep\u2019t of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 32, 68 L. Ed. 2d 640, 653, reh\u2019g denied, 453 U.S. 927, 69 L. Ed. 2d 1023 (1981)).\nIn the instant case, our review of the Eldridge factors leads us to conclude that the trial court did not err by excluding respondent from the courtroom. The first Eldridge factor requires us to consider the private interests involved in the decision to exclude the respondent from the courtroom. We recognize that \u201c \u2018[a] parent\u2019s interest in the accuracy and justice of the decision to terminate his or her parental status is ... a commanding one[,]\u2019 \u201d Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758-59, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 610 (citation omitted), and, in light of this interest, we conclude that the first Eldridge factor weighs in favor of respondent.\nIn considering the third Eldridge factor \u2014 the petitioner\u2019s interest in excluding the respondent from the courtroom \u2014 we note that the right to be present, to testify, and to confront witnesses at a termination hearing is subject to limitations, Murphy, 105 N.C. App. at 658, 414 S.E.2d at 400, including the State\u2019s interest \u201cin ensuring a fair hearing and a correct decision and protecting the dignity of the courtroom.\u201d In re Faircloth, 153 N.C. App. 565, 574, 571 S.E.2d 65, 71 (2002). Thus, where \u201cthe excluded party\u2019s presence during testimony might intimidate the witness and influence his answers, due to that party\u2019s position of authority over the testifying witness, any right. . . to confront the witnesses is properly limited.\u201d In re Barkley, 61 N.C. App. 267, 270, 300 S.E.2d 713, 715 (1983) (rejecting the respondent\u2019s argument that she was denied her constitutional right to confrontation by being excluded from the courtroom while her child testified).\nIn the instant case, Azar, a licensed professional counselor who worked directly with John regarding his relationship with respondent, testified that John \u201cis very influenced by\u201d respondent, and that respondent \u201chas a tendency to be very enmeshed with [John] when she\u2019s with him.\u201d Azar testified that respondent was \u201cvery manipulative [,]\u201d and that she believed \u201cthat there were stories constructed that [John] was asked to corroborate and to justify to.\u201d Azar testified that she believed respondent had told John to lie to investigators, and that\nhe\u2019s faced with a real moral dilemma testifying in front of his mother. There are things that she has asked of him, and he has stated that he needs to tell the truth. And, yes, he cares about his mother and cares about her feelings and hurting her and \u2014 and I believe that testifying in front of her to the truth would \u2014 would really impact- \u2014 impact him in a very negative way.\nThe trial court was aware at the time of the termination hearing that respondent had been charged with kidnapping John and absconding to Oregon, and Azar testified that John was \u201creluctant about testifying\u201d and \u201cha[d] requested . . . that he not testify in front of his mother . ...\u201d In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the third Eldridge factor weighs as equally in favor of petitioner as the first Eldridge factor weighs in favor of respondent. Therefore, our determination of whether respondent\u2019s due process rights were violated turns upon the second Eldridge factor: the risk of error created by the procedure used by the trial court.\nThe transcript of the termination hearing indicates that the trial court employed various procedures to allow respondent to view and hear John\u2019s testimony as well as communicate with her counsel. Respondent was placed in an adjacent room with a television monitor and had telephonic access to her attorneys. The trial court instructed respondent\u2019s guardian ad litem to \u201cgo in there with [respondent]\u201d to \u201c[m]ake sure she understands how to use the equipment],]\u201d and the equipment was tested prior to John\u2019s testimony. During his cross-examination, John was instructed that respondent was \u201cin another room and can hear the conversation],]\u201d and respondent\u2019s counsel indicated that he was \u201cconferring with\u201d respondent during John\u2019s testimony. In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the risk of error from the procedure employed at trial was slight. Because the trial court preserved respondent\u2019s opportunity to cross-examine John through her court-appointed counsel, we also conclude that respondent suffered no prejudice as a result of her exclusion from the courtroom during John\u2019s testimony. Barkley, 61 N.C. App. at 269, 300 S.E.2d at 716. Therefore, in light of Eldridge and other relevant case law, we conclude that the trial court did not err by excluding respondent from the courtroom during John\u2019s testimony. Accordingly, we overrule this argument.\nX. Termination of Parental Rights\nRespondent next argues that the trial court erred by concluding that her parental rights should be terminated. Respondent asserts that the trial court did not properly conduct a disposition hearing prior to terminating her parental rights. We disagree.\nTermination of parental rights involves a two-stage process. In re Howell, 161 N.C. App. 650, 656, 589 S.E.2d 157, 160 (2003). During the adjudication stage, the trial court examines the evidence and determines whether sufficient grounds exist under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1111 to warrant termination of parental rights. Id. The trial court\u2019s findings must be supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. Id. at 656, 589 S.E.2d at 160-61. If the trial court determines that any one of the grounds for termination listed in \u00a7 7B-1111 exists, the trial court then proceeds to the disposition stage, where the trial court may terminate parental rights consistent with the best interests of the child. Id. at 656, 589 S.E.2d at 161. \u201cEvidence heard or introduced throughout the adjudicatory stage, as well as any additional evidence, may be considered by the court during the disposi-tional stage.\u201d In re Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. 607, 613, 543 S.E.2d 906, 910 (2001).\nIn the instant case, respondent contends that the trial court did not \u201cafford [her] the opportunity to present any evidence as to disposition.\u201d However, the transcript reflects the following pertinent exchange at the adjudicatory stage during the parties\u2019 arguments regarding evidence presented:\nRespondent\u2019s Counsel: Your Honor, am I correct in understanding we\u2019ll argue the best interest argument after disposition since we\u2019re just addressing the grounds at this point?\nTrial Court: At this point we\u2019re talking about the adjudication.\nFollowing respondent\u2019s adjudication argument, the trial court announced that it \u201cwould find that there is clear and convincing evidence that the parental rights of [respondent] should be terminated.\u201d Following a recitation of its findings related to adjudication, the trial court stated that it would \u201cproceed to the dispositional hearing at this time.\u201d When the trial court asked respondent\u2019s counsel whether he had anything further to offer, he stated that he would \u201cask the Court to consider at disposition all of the reports and exhibits submitted at the various review hearings by my client which are contained in the underlying file.\u201d Respondent\u2019s counsel then proceeded to argue that \u201cwe do not think it is in the best interest to terminate this child\u2019s relationship with his mother.\u201d\n\u201cThere is no requirement that the adjudicatory and dispositional stages be conducted at two separate hearings.\u201d In re Parker, 90 N.C. App. 423, 430, 368 S.E.2d 879, 884 (1988). Furthermore, because termination proceedings are held before a judge sitting without a jury, in the absence of an affirmative indication to the contrary, appellate courts presume that \u201cthe judge, having knowledge of the law, is able to consider the evidence in light of the applicable legal standard and to determine whether grounds for termination exist before proceeding to consider evidence relevant only to the dispositional stage.\u201d In re White, 81 N.C. App. 82, 86, 344 S.E.2d 36, 38, disc. review denied, 318 N.C. 283, 347 S.E.2d 470 (1986). In the instant case, the trial court accepted evidence from both parties \u201cfor dispositional purposes\u201d during the adjudication stage, and, as detailed above, the trial court conducted a disposition hearing following the adjudicatory stage. In light of the record in the instant case, we conclude that respondent was given ample opportunity to present evidence and provide argument regarding disposition. Therefore, we overrule this argument.\nXI. Best Interests of the Minor Child\nRespondent further argues that the trial court erred by concluding that it was in John\u2019s best interests to terminate respondent\u2019s parental rights. Respondent contends that the trial court failed to make proper findings of fact regarding John\u2019s best interests. We disagree.\nWe review a trial court\u2019s determination regarding the best interests of the juvenile under an abuse of discretion standard. In re Nolen, 117 N.C. App. 693, 700, 453 S.E.2d 220, 225 (1995). In the instant case, respondent does not argue that the trial court abused its discretion in making this determination or that the trial court\u2019s findings regarding John\u2019s best interests are unsupported by competent evidence. Instead, respondent contends that the trial court erred in its determination because it did not enter oral findings regarding John\u2019s best interests following the disposition portion of the termination hearing. We cannot agree.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1110(a) (2003) provides that, should the trial court determine that conditions authorizing termination exist and that it is in the best interests of the juvenile to do so, the trial court should enter a written, signed order terminating the respondent\u2019s parental rights. The statute does not require that the trial court issue oral findings with regard to its determination. In In re Brim, 139 N.C. App. 733, 738, 535 S.E.2d 367, 370 (2000), this Court recognized that, under former N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-651 (now N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-905), the trial court was not required to announce its findings of fact and conclusions of law in open court. Instead, the terms of disposition must only have been stated with \u201cparticularity\u201d in open court. Id. (citing In re Bullabough, 89 N.C. App. 171, 179, 365 S.E.2d 642, 646 (1988)). Referring to former N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-289.31 (now N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1110), we noted that \u201cthere is no requirement. . . that the court orally state \u2018with particularity\u2019 the exact terms of the disposition.\u201d Brim, 139 N.C. App. at 739, 535 S.E.2d at 370.\nIn the instant case, following the close of the proceedings, the trial court stated from the bench that it was terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights. The trial court then ordered that John remain in petitioner\u2019s custody, and it scheduled a post-termination of parental rights review hearing. In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court satisfied its statutory duties related to disposition. Furthermore, we note that in its written order terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights, the trial court made several detailed findings regarding its conclusion that termination of respondent\u2019s parental rights is in John\u2019s best interests. The trial court\u2019s written order conforms with its oral determination at trial, and its findings of fact are based on competent evidence contained within the record. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err by failing to make specific oral findings regarding disposition, and, accordingly, we overrule respondent\u2019s argument.\nXII. Drafting of Order Terminating Parental Rights\nRespondent next argues that the trial court erred in drafting the order terminating her parental rights. Respondent asserts that the trial court was prohibited from directing petitioner\u2019s counsel to draft an order containing written findings of fact and conclusions of law on its behalf. We disagree.\n\u201cThis Court has previously held that pursuant to the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, after \u2018entry\u2019 of judgment in open court, a trial court retains the authority to approve the judgment and direct its prompt preparation and filing.\u201d Hightower v. Hightower, 85 N.C. App. 333, 337, 354 S.E.2d 743, 745 (citing Condie v. Condie, 51 N.C. App. 522, 277 S.E.2d 122 (1981)), cert. denied, 320 N.C. 792, 361 S.E.2d 76 (1987). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 58 (2003) provides that a judgment is entered when it is reduced to writing, signed by the trial court, and filed with the clerk of court. Nothing in the statute or common practice precludes the trial court from directing the prevailing party to draft an order on its behalf. Instead, \u201c[similar procedures are routine in civil cases[.]\u201d Farris v. Burke County Bd. of Educ., 355 N.C. 225, 242, 559 S.E.2d 774, 784 (2002) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 58 and Stachlowski v. Stach, 328 N.C. 276, 401 S.E.2d 638 (1991)); see also In re Hayes, 106 N.C. App. 652, 656, 418 S.E.2d 304, 306 (1992) (distinguishing between the \u201crendering\u201d and \u201centry\u201d of judgment and noting that judgment is not automatically entered when announced in open court where there is \u201c[a]n instruction by the court that the prevailing party\u2019s attorney is to draft the order[.]\u201d). In the instant case, the trial court clearly indicated that it had determined that sufficient grounds exist to terminate respondent\u2019s parental rights pursuant to each of the statutory grounds alleged in the petition. The trial court directed petitioner to draft an order terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights, and it designated \u201cspecific findings of fact\u201d it wanted included in the order. Following presentation of evidence and argument regarding John\u2019s best interests, the trial court concluded that \u201c[u]nder the statute I will terminate the parental rights of [respondent].\u201d In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not err in directing petitioner to draft the termination order on its behalf. Accordingly, we overrule this argument.\nXIII. Entry of Order Terminating Parental Rights\nRespondent\u2019s final argument is that the trial court erred in entering the order terminating her parental rights. Respondent asserts that the trial court\u2019s order must be vacated because it was not filed within thirty days of the completion of the termination hearing. We disagree.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1110(a) provides that \u201c[a]ny order [terminating parental rights] shall be reduced to writing, signed, and entered no later than 30 days following the completion of the termination of parental rights hearing.\u201d In the instant case, the termination hearing was completed on 23 July 2003 and the order was not filed until 27 October 2003. Thus, the trial court filed the order terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights outside of the thirty-day mandate of the statute. This Court has recently found prejudice and reversed termination orders where the orders were entered approximately six to seven months after the conclusion of the termination hearings. See In re T.L.T., 170 N.C. App. 430, 612 S.E.2d 436 (2005); In re L.E.B., 169 N.C. App. 375, 610 S.E.2d 424 (2005). However, after reviewing the record in the instant case, we conclude that respondent has failed to sufficiently demonstrate such prejudice regarding the delay in the entry of the termination order. Accordingly, we overrule respondent\u2019s final argument.\nXIV. Conclusion\nIn light of the foregoing conclusions, we affirm the order terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights.\nAffirmed.\nJudges HUDSON and STEELMAN concur.\n. For the purposes of this opinion, we will refer to the minor child by the pseudonym \u201cJohn.\u201d", "type": "majority", "author": "TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Charlotte A. Wade, Esq., for petitioner-appellee Buncombe County Department of Social Services.", "Judy N. Rudolph, for guardian ad litem-appellee.", "Hall & Hall, Attorneys at Law, P.C., by Susan P. Hall, for respondent-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF: J.B.\nNo. COA04-579\n(Filed 2 August 2005)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 failure to argue\nThe assignment of error that respondent mother omitted from her brief is deemed abandoned pursuant to N.C. R. App. R 28(b)(6).\n2. Process and Service\u2014 termination of parental rights\u2014 service of summons on guardian ad litem\u2019s attorney advocate instead of guardian ad litem\nThe trial court did not err in a termination of parental rights case by exercising personal jurisdiction over respondent mother even though respondent contends the minor child was improperly served when the summons required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1106(a) (5) was served upon the guardian ad litem\u2019s attorney advocate rather than the guardian ad litem, because: (1) assuming arguendo that this was error, the guardian ad litem did not object at trial to the sufficiency of service, nor does the guardian ad litem argue on appeal that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the minor child; and (2) respondent has failed to demonstrate any prejudice to her resulting from an alleged failure to properly serve the minor child, and thus, it cannot be concluded that respondent was an aggrieved party directly and injuriously affected by the alleged error.\n3. Termination of Parental Rights\u2014 subject matter jurisdiction \u2014 termination of parental rights order entered while prior appeal pending \u2014 motion to stay proceedings\nThe trial court did not err in a termination of parental rights case by denying respondent mother\u2019s request for a stay in the proceedings and thus exercising subject matter jurisdiction over the case by entering the instant order terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights while respondent\u2019s appeal of prior orders was pending before the Court of Appeals, because: (1) a trial court retains jurisdiction to terminate parental rights during the pen-dency of a custody order appeal in the same case; (2) where a termination order is entered while a prior custody order is pending, the termination order necessarily renders the pending appeal moot; and (3) the trial court provided several findings of fact in support of its decision to exercise jurisdiction over the case in general and the termination proceedings in particular, and respondent does not object to any of these findings of fact on appeal.\n4. Termination of Parental Rights; Trials\u2014 motion to continue to gather evidence \u2014 recent incarceration\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a termination of parental rights case by denying respondent mother\u2019s third motion to continue the trial based on respondent\u2019s recent incarceration in Oregon prior to the hearing and alleged insufficient time to gather evidence, because: (1) where the lack of preparation for trial is due to a party\u2019s own actions, the trial court does not err in denying a motion to continue; (2) respondent\u2019s incarceration in Oregon was the result of her own actions in abducting the minor child; and (3) the trial court granted respondent a continuance more than one month before her incarceration which was sought by respondent for the express purpose of allowing her to gather the documents she now asserts she was unable to attain. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-803.\n5. Indigent Defendants\u2014 request for expenses \u2014 expert witness fees\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a termination of parental rights case by denying respondent mother\u2019s request for expenses related to expert witness fees, because: (1) respondent has failed to demonstrate how the diagnosis and records of a new mental health care provider would materially assist her in her trial preparation; (2) respondent is unable to demonstrate how she was deprived of a fair trial without the requested expert assistance; and (3) there is no indication in the record that respondent submitted any bills or costs related to depositions and records of her current therapists despite the trial court\u2019s instruction allowing respondent to do so. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-450.\n6. Discovery\u2014 termination of parental rights \u2014 motion to interview minor child\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a termination of parental rights case by denying respondent mother\u2019s motion to interview the minor child, because: (1) as evidenced by multiple findings of fact contained within multiple court orders, any contact respondent had with her son was disruptive to his own therapeutic progress; (2) the trial court was concerned with respondent\u2019s behavior in attempting to learn of her son\u2019s whereabouts when in 2001 respondent removed her son from foster care in North Carolina and absconded to a homeless shelter in South Carolina, and the trial court found as fact that respondent abducted her son for the second time on 23 May 2003 after waiting for him at his school bus stop, getting him in her vehicle, and taking him to Oregon; and (3) the trial court did not prevent respondent from subpoenaing her son to testify at the termination hearing.\n7. Evidence\u2014 prior disposition orders \u2014 judicial notice \u2014 independent determination\nThe trial court did not err in a termination of parental rights case by admitting into evidence prior disposition orders in the matter even though respondent mother contends their exclusion is required since they were based upon a lower evidentiary standard, because: (1) respondent failed to cite authority for the contention that judicial notice is inappropriate where the other orders have a lower evidentiary standard, and she is unable to overcome the well-established supposition that the trial court in a bench trial is presumed to have disregarded any incompetent evidence; and (2) nothing in the record indicates that the trial court failed to conduct the independent determination required at a termination hearing when prior disposition orders have been entered in the matter.\n8. Evidence\u2014 mental health records of parent \u2014 hospital medical records \u2014 previously admitted into evidence\nThe trial court did not err in a termination of parental rights case by admitting into evidence respondent mother\u2019s mental health records even though respondent contends they were not covered in the definition of hospital medical records under N.C.G.S. Ch. 122C, because: (1) N.C.G.S. \u00a7 122C-3(9) defines confidential information as any information, whether recorded or not, relating to an individual served by a facility that was received in connection with the performance of any function of the facility, and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 122C-54(a) requires a medical facility to disclose confidential information if a court of competent jurisdiction issues an order compelling disclosure; and (2) the mental health records now challenged were originally admitted into evidence during a permanency planning review hearing held 13 and 15 March 2002, respondent did not appeal the trial court\u2019s subsequent order, the trial court did not err by admitting into evidence prior disposition records in the matter, and the trial court\u2019s termination of parental rights was based upon a determination independent of the prior disposition orders in the case.\n9. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 failure to object\nAlthough respondent mother contends the trial court erred in a termination of parental rights case by allowing two therapists to testify and render conclusions regarding their evaluations, respondent waived her right to challenge this issue on appeal because: (1) respondent offered no objection during the hearing to either of the witnesses\u2019 qualifications; and (2) on appeal, respondent does not point to any testimony by the witnesses admitted over her objection.\n10.Termination of Parental Rights\u2014 exclusion of parent from courtroom during child\u2019s testimony \u2014 Eldridge factors\nThe trial court did not err in a termination of parental rights case by excluding respondent mother from the courtroom during her minor son\u2019s testimony without providing specific findings and conclusions regarding the minimum requirements of fundamental fairness and its relation to the trial court\u2019s decision to exclude respondent from the courtroom, because: (1) trial courts are not required to make the specific findings and conclusions asserted by respondent; (2) a review of the Eldridge factors leads to the conclusion that the trial court did not err when the risk of error from the procedure employed at trial was slight in light of the fact that respondent was placed in an adjacent room with a television monitor and had telephonic access to her attorneys; and (3) respondent did not suffer prejudice as a result of her exclusion from the courtroom since the trial court preserved respondent\u2019s opportunity to cross-examine the minor child through her court-appointed counsel.\n11. Termination of Parental Rights\u2014 disposition hearing \u2014 separate hearing not required\nThe trial court did not improperly fail to conduct a disposi-tional hearing prior to concluding that respondent mother\u2019s parental rights should be terminated, because: (1) there is no requirement that the adjudicatory and dispositional stages be conducted at two separate hearings; (2) absent affirmative indication to the contrary, appellate courts presume that the judge sitting without a jury is able to consider the evidence in light of the applicable legal standard and to determine whether grounds for termination exist before proceeding to consider evidence relevant only to the dispositional stage; (3) the trial court accepted evidence from both parties for dispositional purposes during the adjudication stage and the trial court conducted a disposition hearing following the adjudicatory stage; and (4) respondent was given ample opportunity to present evidence and provide argument regarding disposition.\n12. Termination of Parental Rights\u2014 best interests of child\u2014 specific oral findings regarding disposition not required\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that it was in the minor child\u2019s best interests to terminate respondent mother\u2019s parental rights even though respondent contends the trial court failed to make specific oral findings regarding disposition, because: (1) N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1110(a) does not require the trial court to issue oral findings with regard to its determination; (2) the terms of disposition must have been stated with particularity, and following the closing of the proceedings in the instant case, the trial court stated from the bench that it was terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights; and (3) the trial court\u2019s written order conforms with its oral determination at trial, and its findings of fact are based on competent evidence contained within the record.\n13. Termination of Parental Rights\u2014 prevailing party drafting order \u2014 common practice\nThe trial court did not err by directing petitioner\u2019s attorney to draft the order for termination of parental rights, because: (1) nothing in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 58 or common practice precludes the trial court from directing the prevailing party to draft an order on its behalf; and (2) the trial court indicated that it had determined that sufficient grounds exist to terminate respondent\u2019s parental rights pursuant to each of the statutory grounds alleged in the petition, and it also designated specific findings of fact that it wanted included in the order.\n14. Termination of Parental Rights\u2014 delay in entering order\u2014 failure to demonstrate prejudice\nThe trial court did not commit prejudicial error by failing to enter the order terminating respondent mother\u2019s parental rights within thirty days as required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1110(a) when the termination hearing was completed on 23 July 2003 and the order was not filed until 27 October 2003, because respondent failed to sufficiently demonstrate prejudice regarding the delay in the entry of the termination order.\nAppeal by respondent from order entered 27 October 2003 by Judge Marvin P. Pope, Jr., in Buncombe County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 26 January 2005.\nCharlotte A. Wade, Esq., for petitioner-appellee Buncombe County Department of Social Services.\nJudy N. Rudolph, for guardian ad litem-appellee.\nHall & Hall, Attorneys at Law, P.C., by Susan P. Hall, for respondent-appellant.\n. By order of this Court, the filing of this opinion was delayed pending the outcome of our Supreme Court\u2019s decision in In re R.T.W., 359 N.C. 539, - S.E.2d - (Filed 1 July 2005) (No. 417PA04)." }, "file_name": "0001-01", "first_page_order": 31, "last_page_order": 57 }