{ "id": 8318780, "name": "KENNETH R. BURSELL, Employee, Plaintiff v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, Employer, ELECTRIC INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Bursell v. General Electric Co.", "decision_date": "2005-08-02", "docket_number": "No. COA04-1310", "first_page": "73", "last_page": "84", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "172 N.C. App. 73" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "589 S.E.2d 384", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387", "parenthetical": "noting that, in order to qualify as an occupational disease, \"a plaintiff has to show that his psychological condition, or the aggravation thereof, was (1" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 N.C. App. 717", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8960268 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "721", "parenthetical": "noting that, in order to qualify as an occupational disease, \"a plaintiff has to show that his psychological condition, or the aggravation thereof, was (1" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/161/0717-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-53", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(13)", "parenthetical": "defining occupational disease" }, { "page": "(13)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 Wake Forest L. Rev. 193", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Wake Forest L. Rev.", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "207" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "586 S.E.2d 544", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "545" }, { "page": "546" }, { "page": "546" }, { "page": "547" }, { "page": "547" }, { "page": "546" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 N.C. App. 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8957160 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "545" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/160/0542-01" ] }, { "cite": "543 S.E.2d 124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 351", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155760, 1155803, 1155704, 1155669 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0351-03", "/nc/351/0351-04", "/nc/351/0351-01", "/nc/351/0351-02" ] }, { "cite": "519 S.E.2d 61", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "63" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 N.C. App. 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11239310 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/135/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 S.E.2d 104", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "106" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 67", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2543161 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0067-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 S.E.2d 395", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397" }, { "page": "398" }, { "page": "399" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 670", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4779479 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "673" }, { "page": "675" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0670-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 S.E.2d 53", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 753", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 54120, 54158, 53875, 54037, 53942 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0753-01", "/nc/345/0753-04", "/nc/345/0753-03", "/nc/345/0753-05", "/nc/345/0753-02" ] }, { "cite": "476 S.E.2d 410", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414", "parenthetical": "stating that, \"[w]e cannot conclude that mental injuries by accident are not covered under the Act when we have clearly awarded workers' compensation for mental conditions as occupational diseases\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 N.C. App. 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11888632 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118-19", "parenthetical": "stating that, \"[w]e cannot conclude that mental injuries by accident are not covered under the Act when we have clearly awarded workers' compensation for mental conditions as occupational diseases\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/124/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "566 S.E.2d 807", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "810" }, { "page": "811" }, { "page": "811" }, { "page": "811-12" }, { "page": "811" }, { "page": "810" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 N.C. App. 641", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9081725 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "644" }, { "page": "645" }, { "page": "645" }, { "page": "646" }, { "page": "645-46" }, { "page": "644" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/151/0641-01" ] }, { "cite": "562 S.E.2d 422", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 220142 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0483-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 893, "char_count": 26474, "ocr_confidence": 0.744, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.676830387708631e-08, "percentile": 0.35662503875708584 }, "sha256": "a2105e70b6047a2fde8a63491dd095253f1183046ea29d7605d125bd73ec1f9a", "simhash": "1:f7266ecb2a8f0a8e", "word_count": 4107 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:22:54.702952+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges TIMMONS-GOODSON and BRYANT concur." ], "parties": [ "KENNETH R. BURSELL, Employee, Plaintiff v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, Employer, ELECTRIC INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN, Chief Judge.\nPlaintiff appeals from an opinion and award of the North Carolina Industrial Commission concluding that plaintiff had failed to show he suffered an injury by accident or an occupational disease. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand this case to the Commission.\nOn 4 October 2001, plaintiff filed a notice of accident to his employer, defendant General Electric Company (\u201cGeneral Electric\u201d), alerting the company he had sustained \u201cpsychiatric trauma due to false accusation of theft by the company\u201d on the afternoon of 26 October 1999. General Electric denied plaintiffs claim, and the case came for hearing before the Industrial Commission (\u201cthe Commission\u201d) on 14 October 2003.\nThe relevant facts, as found by the Commission, are as follows: plaintiff began employment with General Electric in 1979. In October of 1999, at the time of the alleged injury, plaintiff worked in General Electric\u2019s aircraft section, where his duties \u201cmainly consisted of gathering components together to make an engine kit to ship to Ohio.\u201d On 26 October 1999, plaintiff assisted other employees in packing laptop computers into boxes. Plaintiff remarked that it was unusual to be packing laptop computers for surplus. At the end of plaintiffs shift, the packed boxes containing the computers were \u201cput to the side for pickup on the next day.\u201d\nTwo days later, managers for General Electric summoned plaintiff for a meeting. Plaintiff believed he was being sought out for receipt of an award. Instead, he was informed that some of the laptop computers he packed were missing from the shipment. Plaintiff denied any knowledge of the missing computers. The Commission found that Andrea Hughes, a human resources manager for General Electric, told plaintiff she had interviewed the other employees who had packed the computers; that \u201cnone of their stories matched;\u201d and that she was therefore \u201cfiring\u201d him. Plaintiff was then escorted to his locker by a security guard, who took plaintiffs employee identification badge and escorted him to the parking lot, where he removed the parking sticker from plaintiffs vehicle. Plaintiff was \u201cextremely surprised and upset that he had been fired.\u201d The other employees were also fired.\nThe following week, General Electric requested that plaintiff return to work. When he returned, plaintiff was given a document called \u201cdecision making leave\u201d and was advised he had been on \u201ccrisis suspension\u201d because he was observed away from his work area and in the parking lot without permission on 26 October 1999. He was further cited for failing to secure property under his control. Plaintiff appealed the crisis suspension to a peer review committee. At the review hearing, plaintiff was \u201cvisibly shaking.\u201d The peer review committee sent plaintiff a letter reminding him of rules regarding breaks away from the workstation. General Electric found no evidence that plaintiff had stolen anything.\nWhen plaintiff returned to work, many employees asked him about the incident. He was harassed and called \u201ca thief.\u201d The Commission found that \u201c[p]eople were constantly pointing at plaintiff\u2019 and that he became \u201cnervous, panicky and paranoid.\u201d He could not sleep at night and began having panic attacks. Plaintiff sought assistance for his symptoms and was referred through his employment to Dr. Koff, a clinical psychologist, who diagnosed him with \u201cadjustment disorder with mixed features.\u201d Dr. Koff testified that, but for the October 1999 incident, plaintiff most likely would not have developed his condition.\nPlaintiff also sought treatment with Dr. Robert Weinstein, who diagnosed plaintiff with \u201cmajor depression with obsessions.\u201d Dr. Weinstein treated plaintiff with \u201csupportive therapy and medicines such as antidepressants, sleeping pills, and atypical antipsycho-tics.\u201d Dr. Weinstein testified that plaintiff would need medication and support for the rest of his life and would not be able to maintain regular attendance in any employment. He opined that plaintiffs condition was caused by the circumstances surrounding plaintiffs firing at work. After two years of treatment, Dr. Weinstein placed plaintiff at maximum medical improvement and stated he was permanently and totally disabled from all types of employment. Dr. Weinstein noted that plaintiff was also possibly suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder.\nThe Commission found that \u201c[a]s a result of being accused of stealing, fired and his treatment after he returned to work, plaintiff developed \u2018major depression with obsessions\u2019 and possibly post-traumatic stress disorder, which led to his incapacity to work . . . .\u201d The Commission also found that \u201cthe sudden meeting and abrupt firing of plaintiff due to accusations of stealing were unexpected and not reasonably designed by plaintiff[.]\u201d Nevertheless, the Commission found that plaintiff had failed to show that the events surrounding his alleged injury \u201cwere unusual workplace occurrences\u201d so as to constitute an injury by accident. In its conclusions of law, the Commission compared the present case to the facts of Woody v. Thomasville Upholstery, Inc., 355 N.C. 483, 562 S.E.2d 422 (2002) and stated that \u201c[p]laintiff has arguably shown unfair treatment by his employer, which was unexpected, but the fact that the unfair treatment was unexpected does not make it an \u2018unusual\u2019 or \u2018unforeseen\u2019 condition of his employment, under the rationale of Woody.\u201d According to the Commission, plaintiff had thus \u201cnot shown evidence of either a compensable injury by accident or an occupational disease\u201d and entered an opinion and award denying his claim. Plaintiff appeals. Defendants present several cross-assignments of error on appeal.\nPlaintiff argues the Commission erred in concluding that he failed to show he sustained an injury by accident or an occupational disease. By cross-assignments of error, defendants argue the Commission erred in several of its pertinent findings of fact. We hold the Commission\u2019s conclusions that plaintiff did not sustain an injury by accident either directly contradict or are unsupported by certain of its findings and that additional findings are required to resolve the question. We conclude, however, that the Commission properly concluded that plaintiff failed to show he suffered from an occupational disease. With regard to defendants\u2019 cross-assignments of error, we agree that certain of the Commission\u2019s findings are unsupported by the evidence, but such errors do not offer an alternative basis for affirming the Commission\u2019s opinion and award. In sum, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the opinion and award to the Commission.\nI. Plaintiff\u2019s Appeal\nPlaintiff argues the Commission erred by concluding he failed to show he sustained an injury by accident or an occupational disease. This Court reviews an opinion and award of the Industrial Commission to determine whether there is competent evidence in the record to support the Commission\u2019s findings of fact and whether these findings support the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law. Pitillo v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Envtl. Health & Natural Res., 151 N.C. App. 641, 644, 566 S.E.2d 807, 810 (2002). Although plaintiff originally assigned error to several of the Commission\u2019s findings as unsupported by the evidence, his brief on appeal contains only arguments pertaining to the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law. Thus, plaintiff\u2019s assignments of error to the Commission\u2019s findings are deemed abandoned. N.C. R. App. P. 28(a) (2005). Therefore, we examine the Commission\u2019s findings in this case to determine whether they support the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law that plaintiff failed to sustain a compensable mental injury or occupational disease in the course of his employment. We first consider whether plaintiff has shown that he suffered a compensable injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.\nA. Injury by Accident\nUnder the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (\u201cthe Act\u201d), a mental or psychological illness may be a compensable injury if it has occurred as a result of an \u201caccident\u201d arising out of and in the course of the claimant\u2019s employment. See Jordan v. Central Piedmont Community College, 124 N.C. App. 112, 118-19, 476 S.E.2d 410, 414 (1996) (stating that, \u201c[w]e cannot conclude that mental injuries by accident are not covered under the Act when we have clearly awarded workers\u2019 compensation for mental conditions as occupational diseases\u201d), disc. review denied, 345 N.C. 753, 485 S.E.2d 53 (1997). The claimant bears the burden of proving the existence of an accident. Pitillo, 151 N.C. App. at 645, 566 S.E.2d at 811. An injury does not arise by accident \u201c[i]f an employee is injured while carrying on his usual tasks in the usual way[.]\u201d Gunter v. Dayco Corp., 317 N.C. 670, 673, 346 S.E.2d 395, 397 (1986). \u201cAn accidental cause will be inferred, however, when an interruption of the work routine and the introduction thereby of unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected consequences occurs.\u201d Id. To be an accident, the incident must have been for the employee an \u201cunlooked for and untoward event.\u201d Cody v. Snider Lumber Co., 328 N.C. 67, 70, 399 S.E.2d 104, 106 (1991); see also Pitillo, 151 N.C. App. at 645, 566 S.E.2d at 811 (stating that an accident involves \u201c \u2018an unlooked for and untoward event which is not expected or designed by the person who suffers the injury\u2019 \u201d involving \u201c \u2018the interruption of the routine of work and the introduction thereby of unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected consequences.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Calderwood v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 135 N.C. App. 112, 115, 519 S.E.2d 61, 63 (1999), disc. review denied, 351 N.C. 351, 543 S.E.2d 124 (2000)).\nIn Pitillo, this Court held that the Commission\u2019s findings of fact supported its conclusion that the plaintiff had failed to show a com-pensable mental injury. The Pitillo plaintiff alleged she suffered a nervous breakdown and stress-induced anxiety after meeting with her supervisor regarding a performance review. The Commission found the plaintiff had initiated the meeting, the meeting was not out of the ordinary, and everyone involved was treated courteously. Specifically, the Commission found that \u201cthe discussion was a routine, problem-solving meeting;\u201d that \u201c[n]othing in this meeting was different from other meetings to discuss performance evaluations;\u201d and that \u201c[t]he meeting to discuss plaintiff\u2019s job performance evaluation was requested by plaintiff and was an ordinary incident of employment.\u201d Pitillo, 151 N.C. App. at 646, 566 S.E.2d at 811-12. Based on these findings, the Commission concluded the meeting could not be considered an \u201cunlooked for or untoward event\u201d or an interruption of the work routine so as to be considered an \u201caccident\u201d under the Act.\nSimilarly, in Knight v. Abbott Laboratories, 160 N.C. App. 542, 586 S.E.2d 544 (2003), the Commission denied a mental injury claim by a plaintiff who allegedly developed post-traumatic stress disorder and recurrent major depression after an argument with her supervisor. The Commission found that the plaintiff had initiated the meeting with her supervisor and that \u201cthe confrontation . .. did not constitute an unexpected, unusual[,] or untoward occurrence; nor did it constitute an interruption of the work routine and the introduction thereby of unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected consequences.\u201d Id. at 545, 586 S.E.2d at 546. This Court affirmed the opinion and award of the Commission, stating that \u201c[t]he evidence shows that plaintiff deliberately initiated the meeting with [her supervisor] to voice her disagreement with his decision to award the vacation day to another employee. It is not unexpected that this would lead to a heated discussion involving raised voices on both the part of the supervisor and employee.\u201d Id. at 546, 586 S.E.2d at 547. The Knight Court compared its case to Pitillo:\nthe evidence at most reveals the events themselves did not result in injury, but rather that it was [the] plaintiff\u2019s emotional response to the meeting, which she had initiated, that resulted in her psychological harm. See Pitillo, 151 N.C. App. at 645-46, 566 S.E.2d at 811. Thus, we conclude the Commission\u2019s findings of fact support its conclusion that [the] plaintiff did not suffer a compensable injury by accident.\nId. at 547, 586 S.E.2d at 547.\nIn the present case, the Commission found that the \u201csudden meeting and abrupt firing of plaintiff due to accusations of stealing were unexpected and not reasonably designed by plaintiff[.]\u201d The Commission also found that \u201c[s]ince plaintiff did not steal the computers, he had no expectation of being accused of stealing and was extremely surprised, upset and humiliated by his firing.\u201d Notwithstanding these findings, the Commission also found that plaintiff had not shown that such \u201csudden\u201d meetings and \u201cabrupt\u201d firings were \u201cunusual workplace occurrences\u201d and thus concluded that \u201cthe meeting with Ms. Hughes and [plaintiff\u2019s] subsequent firing [did not] constitute[] a compensable injury by accident.\u201d Plaintiff contends the Commission\u2019s conclusion in this regard is unsupported by its findings. We agree.\nUnlike Pitillo and Knight, in this case the Commission made no finding that the meeting with Hughes and the events following that meeting were \u201croutine\u201d or \u201cordinary.\u201d Indeed, the Commission specifically found that the meeting was \u201csudden,\u201d \u201cunexpected,\u201d and that plaintiff did not initiate the meeting. Further, the Commission found plaintiffs firing was \u201cabrupt.\u201d Although the Commission did find that plaintiff had \u201cnot shown that [the sudden meeting and abrupt firing] were unusual workplace occurrences,\u201d this single, conclusory finding is contradicted by the Commission\u2019s multiple other findings regarding the unexpected nature of the events leading to plaintiffs injury. The Commission\u2019s conclusion that plaintiff failed to show he sustained an injury by accident is therefore unsupported by its findings and must be reversed.\nDefendants argue that plaintiff\u2019s firing was a \u201clegitimate personnel action\u201d which did not interrupt the normal work routine and thus could not give rise to any injury \u201cby accident.\u201d Compare James R. Martin, Comment, A Proposal to Reform the North Carolina Workers\u2019 Compensation Act to Address Mental-Mental Claims, 32 Wake Forest L. Rev. 193, 207 (1997) (arguing that, \u201c[i]f an employer determines that an employee should be transferred, demoted, or dismissed, and does so without violating federal statutes or public policy, then that employer should not be liable for any mental injury resulting from the personnel action. Otherwise, employers would be limited in making their personnel decisions according to which employees they feel are likely to suffer mental injury. Further, insulating employers from liability for legitimate personnel decisions would prevent fired employees from claiming a mental injury due to the suddenness of termination, simply to gain revenge on the employer\u201d). However, the Commission made no findings regarding whether the disciplinary action was a \u201clegitimate personnel action\u201d or part of plaintiff\u2019s \u201cnormal work routine.\u201d This Court may not substitute its own findings for those made by the Commission. We do not agree with defendants that a \u201clegitimate personnel action\u201d can never involve the interruption of the work routine. Whether or not a particular personnel action is part of an \u201cestablished sequence of operations\u201d is a factual matter which must be decided on a case-by-case basis. See Gunter, 317 N.C. at 675, 346 S.E.2d at 398. \u201cThe Workers\u2019 Compensation Act should be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose to provide compensation for injured employees and its benefits should not be denied by a narrow, technical and strict construction\u201d. Id. at 676-77, 346 S.E.2d at 399.\nBecause the Commission failed to make sufficient findings regarding whether the personnel action leading to plaintiff\u2019s injury was the \u201cnormal work routine\u201d or part of an \u201cestablished sequence of operations,\u201d we cannot determine whether plaintiff sustained an injury by accident under the law. We therefore reverse that portion of the opinion and award of the Commission concluding that plaintiff failed to show he suffered an injury by accident and remand this case to the Commission for additional findings.\nB. Occupational Disease\nPlaintiff also argues the Commission erred in concluding he failed to show he is suffering from an occupational disease. We reject plaintiffs argument on several grounds.\nFirst, the Commission specifically found that \u201cplaintiff is not claiming that he suffers from an occupational disease.\u201d Plaintiff does not take issue with this finding and is therefore bound by it. Second, plaintiff failed to show that his depression was due to \u201ccauses and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular trade, occupation or employment.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-53(13) (2003) (defining occupational disease); Woody v. Thomasville Upholstery, Inc., 355 N.C. 483, 562 S.E.2d 422 (2002); Clark v. City of Asheville, 161 N.C. App. 717, 721, 589 S.E.2d 384, 387 (2003) (noting that, in order to qualify as an occupational disease, \u201ca plaintiff has to show that his psychological condition, or the aggravation thereof, was (1) \u2018due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular trade, occupation or employment\u2019 and that it is not (2) an \u2018ordinary disease[] of life to which the general public is equally exposed\u2019 \u201d) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-53(13)). Plaintiff presented no evidence, and the Commission made no findings to support a conclusion, that plaintiff\u2019s depression was due to causes and conditions characteristic of and peculiar to his employment in the aircraft section of General Electric. We overrule this assignment of error.\nII. Defendants\u2019 Cross-Assignments of Error\nDefendants cross-assign error to several of the Commission\u2019s findings as being unsupported by the evidence. Specifically, defendants assign error to the Commission\u2019s findings indicating that plaintiff was accused of theft and that he was \u201cfired.\u201d They also argue that the Commission\u2019s finding as to the action taken by defendant General Electric\u2019s peer review committee was incomplete and misleading as it left the impression that plaintiff was exonerated from wrongdoing. We review the record to determine whether the findings about which defendants complain are supported by any competent evidence. Pitillo, 151 N.C. App. at 644, 566 S.E.2d at 810.\nPlaintiff testified that, on 28 October 1999, he was summoned to a conference room where he met with Andrea Hughes, the human resources manager, Todd Best, an ombudsman, and a security guard. Hughes informed plaintiff of the missing computers. Plaintiff \u201cassured [Hughes] right then that [he] didn\u2019t have anything to do with the laptop missing.\u201d Hughes informed plaintiff that \u201cnone of the stories matched up, and that she was going to have to take drastic steps, and she was suspending [plaintiff] from work because of the [theft] of the laptop computers.\u201d Plaintiff told Hughes that \u201cwhat she was doing was wrong\u201d and that \u201cshe was questioning [his] integrity.\u201d As the security guard escorted plaintiff from the building, plaintiff felt \u201cthere were employees looking at me like I was a convict.\u201d When plaintiff returned to work, he \u201cwas harassed by people.\u201d As plaintiff explained:\nPeople would call back there in the area where the phone was at and if I spoke in it, they would say, \u201cThief.\u201d Several times I\u2019ve been called at home, harassed on the telephone. People pointing at me. People that had never been back there in \u2014 in shipping \u2014 that I had never seen \u2014 you could see them underneath the tables pointing to me ... .\nPlaintiff became \u201cvery paranoid and very nervous and very panicky.\u201d He appealed his suspension to a peer review committee, which issued plaintiff a written reminder regarding breaks away from the work station. The peer review committee found no evidence that plaintiff had stolen anything.\nFrom the above-referenced testimony, we conclude there was competent evidence to support the Commission\u2019s findings that plaintiff was \u201caccused of theft.\u201d Although General Electric may never have directly and explicitly informed plaintiff that it believed he had stolen the missing property, such an accusation was clearly implied in every way. Hughes informed plaintiff he was being suspended \u201cbecause of the theft of the laptop computers.\u201d Certainly, it is obvious from plaintiff\u2019s testimony that he believed he was being accused of theft, and that other employees believed the same. Persons harassed plaintiff at work and called him \u201cThief.\u201d The peer review committee specifically found there was no evidence that plaintiff had stolen anything. The Commission\u2019s findings that plaintiff was \u201caccused of theft\u201d are therefore supported by the evidence.\nLikewise, we find support in the evidence for the Commission\u2019s finding that \u201cPlaintiff received a letter from the peer review committee reminding him of rules regarding breaks away from the workstation. Defendant-employer did not find any evidence that plaintiff had stolen anything.\u201d Contrary to defendants\u2019 argument, we do not agree that the finding was either incomplete or misleading.\nHowever, we agree with defendants that there is no evidence in the record to support the Commission\u2019s numerous findings that plaintiff was \u201cfired\u201d from his position at General Electric. Rather, plaintiff testified he was placed on \u201ccrisis suspension.\u201d Although plaintiff testified he \u201cdidn\u2019t know what a crisis suspension was[,]\u201d plaintiff never testified that anyone from General Electric informed him he was fired, or that he believed himself to be terminated. As such, the Commission erred in finding that plaintiff was \u201cfired,\u201d and these findings must be set aside. Our action in doing so, however, does not afford defendants an alternative basis for sustaining the Commission\u2019s opinion and award, see N.C. R. App. P. 10(d) (2005), because whether plaintiff was fired or disciplined in some other way, under the circumstances in this case, is not determinative of the issue of whether he suffered a injury by accident. As we have noted above, the issue to be determined is whether the actions taken by defendant General Electric\u2019s employees with respect to plaintiff on 26 October 1999 were \u201cunexpected, unusual, or untoward occurrences constituting an interruption of the work routine and the introduction thereby of unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected consequences.\u201d Knight, 160 N.C. App. at 545, 586 S.E.2d at 546.\nIII. Conclusion\nIn conclusion, we hold the Commission erred in concluding plaintiff failed to sustain an injury by accident where it found that the events giving rise to plaintiff\u2019s injury were sudden, abrupt, and unexpected by plaintiff, and made no findings regarding whether the events giving rise to plaintiff\u2019s injury were ordinary, routine, or in the course of normal business operations. The Commission also erred in finding that plaintiff was fired. We therefore reverse that portion of the opinion and award of the Commission finding that plaintiff was fired and concluding that he failed to show he sustained an injury by accident. Upon remand, the Commission should reconsider whether plaintiff has suffered an injury by accident by determining and making findings regarding whether the events giving rise to plaintiff\u2019s injury were a part of the normal work routine or an established sequence of operations. We affirm that portion of the opinion and award concluding that plaintiff failed to show he sustained an occupational disease.\nAffirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.\nJudges TIMMONS-GOODSON and BRYANT concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Law Offices of George W. Lennon, by George W. Lennon, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Young Moore and Henderson P.A., by Jeffrey T. Linder, for defendant-appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "KENNETH R. BURSELL, Employee, Plaintiff v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, Employer, ELECTRIC INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants\nNo. COA04-1310\n(Filed 2 August 2005)\n1. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 injury by accident \u2014 depression after being suspended\nThe Industrial Commission erred in a workers\u2019 compensation case by concluding that plaintiff employee failed to show he sustained an injury by accident arising out of plaintiff\u2019s depression after being put on crisis suspension from work due to accusations of stealing, and the case is remanded for additional findings, because: (1) the sudden meeting and abrupt suspension of plaintiff due to accusations of stealing were unexpected and not reasonably designed by plaintiff; and (2) it cannot be determined whether plaintiff sustained an injury by accident under the law since the Commission failed to make sufficient findings regarding whether the personnel action leading to plaintiff\u2019s injury was the normal work routine or part of an established sequence of operations.\n2. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 occupational disease \u2014 depression\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in a workers\u2019 compensation case by concluding that plaintiff employee failed to show he suffered from an occupational disease arising out of plaintiffs depression after being put on crisis suspension due to accusations of stealing, because: (1) plaintiff did not take issue with the Commission\u2019s finding that plaintiff is not claiming that he suffers from an occupational disease, and therefore he is bound by it; and (2) plaintiff failed to show that his depression was due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to his employment in the aircraft section of General Electric.\n3. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 findings \u2014 accused of theft \u2014 actions taken by company\u2019s peer review committee \u2014 employee fired\nAlthough the Industrial Commission did not err in a workers\u2019 compensation case by making the findings that plaintiff was accused of theft, the Commission erred by finding that plaintiff was fired from his position. However, this error does not afford defendants an alternative basis for sustaining the Commission\u2019s opinion and award since whether plaintiff was fired or disciplined in some other way, under the circumstances in this case, is not determinative of the issue of whether he suffered an injury by accident.\nAppeal by plaintiff from opinion and award entered 25 May 2004 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 June 2005.\nLaw Offices of George W. Lennon, by George W. Lennon, for plaintiff-appellant.\nYoung Moore and Henderson P.A., by Jeffrey T. Linder, for defendant-appellants." }, "file_name": "0073-01", "first_page_order": 103, "last_page_order": 114 }