{ "id": 8320025, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOSE SANCHEZ", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Sanchez", "decision_date": "2005-08-02", "docket_number": "No. COA04-518", "first_page": "330", "last_page": "335", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "172 N.C. App. 330" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "359 N.C. 602", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3799620 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "606", "parenthetical": "No. 491PA04" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0602-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 425", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3796256 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "No. 485PA04" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0425-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 L. Ed. 2d 808", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "537 U.S. 1125", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9346112, 9346147, 9346340, 9346181, 9346084, 9346053, 9346027, 9346413, 9346288, 9346451, 9346233, 9345946, 9345980, 9345918, 9346495 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/537/1125-07", "/us/537/1125-08", "/us/537/1125-12", "/us/537/1125-09", "/us/537/1125-06", "/us/537/1125-05", "/us/537/1125-04", "/us/537/1125-13", "/us/537/1125-11", "/us/537/1125-14", "/us/537/1125-10", "/us/537/1125-02", "/us/537/1125-03", "/us/537/1125-01", "/us/537/1125-15" ] }, { "cite": "565 S.E.2d 609", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "629" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 501", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 219972 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "534" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0501-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 U.S. 554", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 601912 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "557" }, { "page": "956" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/484/0554-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 U.S. 415", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1525326 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "937" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/380/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 U.S. 308", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6174956 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "315", "parenthetical": "quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 13 L. Ed. 2d 934, 937 (1965)" }, { "page": "353", "parenthetical": "quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 13 L. Ed. 2d 934, 937 (1965)" }, { "page": "316" }, { "page": "353" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/415/0308-01" ] }, { "cite": "541 U.S. 36", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5873383 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/541/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "527 U.S. 116", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1248251 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "123-24", "parenthetical": "internal quotations and citations omitted" }, { "page": "126", "parenthetical": "internal quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/527/0116-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 586, "char_count": 10722, "ocr_confidence": 0.755, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.2024419184284489 }, "sha256": "56ba9e4075138d8528d8c2014c6bc17bd8ab1c8fcfdb6454881f6d69e3a221c5", "simhash": "1:c805e6b2f3a58b60", "word_count": 1746 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:22:54.702952+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WYNN and McGEE concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOSE SANCHEZ" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TYSON, Judge.\nJose Sanchez (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals from judgment entered after a jury found him to be guilty of taking indecent liberties with a child. We hold that defendant received a fair trial free from error, vacate defendant\u2019s sentence, and remand for resentencing.\nI. Background\nE.S. (\u201cthe minor\u201d) was born on 15 April 1986. In September 1999 when she was thirteen years old, she moved from her grandparents\u2019 home in El Salvador to North Carolina to live with her mother, Ana Sanchez (\u201cSanchez\u201d), and her father, defendant.\nThe minor dated seventeen-year-old Salvadore Ruiz (\u201cRuiz\u201d), who worked with defendant. Ruiz and the minor had a sexual relationship, which resulted in the minor becoming pregnant in September 2001.\nOn 24 September 2001, the minor signed herself out of school and called Ruiz to pick up her. While with Ruiz, the minor wrote a letter to Sanchez stating that she had run away with Ruiz and requested her not to call the police. The minor left the note at home and spent the rest of the day with Ruiz.\nOn 25 September 2001, defendant reported that his daughter was missing and informed Officer Gilberto Narvaez (\u201cofficer Narvaez\u201d) he believed his daughter was with Ruiz. Officer Narvaez located Ruiz at a job site, questioned him about his relationship with the minor, and informed Ruiz that the minor was fifteen years old. Ruiz escorted Officer Narvaez to his apartment where both had spent the night.\nWhen Officer Narvaez began questioning the minor, she became very upset and stated that her father had been \u201chaving relations\u201d with her for over a year. Officer Carmen Mendoza (\u201cOfficer Mendoza\u201d), a female, was called to the scene. The minor informed Officer Mendoza that her father began having sexual intercourse with her in January 2000, when she was thirteen years old. She claimed that several times a week, her father would come into her room in the middle of the night, take off her clothes, and have sex with her. The minor stated intercourse ceased in March 2001, but defendant continued to touch her breasts and buttocks. The minor\u2019s testimony at trial was consistent with her statement.\nThe minor testified she first informed Father Joseph Elzi (\u201cFather Elzi\u201d) of the abuse during a Mass near her fifteenth birthday. Father Elzi testified at trial, but refused to reveal whether the minor had participated in confession or what she had told him. He testified that when a confessant tells him of sexual abuse, he advises them to speak to another priest, counselor, or other person to report to authorities.\nSanchez testified she informed social service personnel that defendant did not leave the marital bedroom during the night and that she had never found defendant alone with the minor in the minor\u2019s bedroom. Sanchez later testified to one incident where she woke up and defendant was not in their bed. She found him on top of the minor, who was wearing only underwear. On another occasion, Sanchez observed defendant lying on top of the minor on the couch. She also recalled that after hearing the minor screaming in her room, she ran to the minor, who told her defendant had touched her breasts. Sanchez did not inform the social worker about these incidents in September 2001 and was living with a new boyfriend by the time of trial.\nNo physical evidence was admitted. Defendant was found to be not guilty of felonious incest and statutory rape, and guilty of taking indecent liberties with a child. Defendant appeals.\nII. Issues\nThe issues on appeal are whether the trial court erred in: (1) admitting testimony by Father Elzi relating to the minor\u2019s statements to him; and (2) sentencing defendant in the aggravated range without a finding by the jury of aggravating factors.\nTTT. Sixth Amendment Right of Confrontation\nDefendant contends he was deprived of a fair trial because he was unable to adequately cross-examine Father Elzi. We disagree.\nOn 2 May 2003, Judge Yvonne Mims-Evans heard a motion to quash the subpoena filed by Father Elzi. During the hearing, Father Elzi testified that although North Carolina law allows a penitent to waive the penitent-priest privilege, to reveal the confession would compromise his religious beliefs. Judge Mims-Evans denied the motion to quash and ordered that admissibility of any questions concerning confidential communication would be determined by the trial court.\nPrior to Father Elzi testifying at trial, the trial court ruled he could be questioned regarding his practice and customs in general, but that the State could not question him regarding any individual\u2019s and specifically the minor\u2019s confession to him. Father Elzi testified that upon hearing \u201cthat some sort of sexual assault has occurred,\u201d he advises a victim to \u201creport it to proper authorities.\u201d Defendant objected but did not cross-examine Father Elzi, or make any offer of proof.\nDefendant argues the trial court erred by allowing Father Elzi\u2019s testimony regarding the advice he gives to alleged victims of sexual abuse that corroborated the minor\u2019s testimony. Defendant argues he was denied his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation because he was not allowed to fully cross-examine Father Elzi regarding the minor\u2019s confession.\nOur United States Supreme Court has held:\nIn all criminal prosecutions, state as well as federal, the accused has a right, guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution to be confronted with the witnesses against him. The central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.\nLilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 123-24, 144 L. Ed. 2d 117, 126 (1999) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004). \u201cConfrontation means more than being allowed to confront the witness physically. \u2018Our cases construing the [confrontation] clause hold that a primary interest secured by it is the right of cross-examination.\u2019 \u201d Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347, 353 (1974) (quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 13 L. Ed. 2d 934, 937 (1965)); see also Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177. A defendant must be afforded \u201can adequate opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses.\u201d United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 557, 98 L. Ed. 2d 951, 956 (1988). \u201cCross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested.\u201d Davis, 415 U.S. at 316, 39 L. Ed. 2d at 353.\nHere, defendant neither attempted to cross-examine Father Elzi nor did he request a voir dire or make an offer of proof regarding the questions he would have asked or what Father Elzi\u2019s testimony would have revealed. See State v. Williams, 355 N.C. 501, 534, 565 S.E.2d 609, 629 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1125, 154 L. Ed. 2d 808 (2003). Based on the transcript before us, we find that no testimony was erroneously admitted or excluded. Father Elzi did not testify to the contents of any statements the minor made to him. Presuming error in admitting Father Elzi\u2019s testimony, other overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt based on the testimony by Officers Navarez and Mendoza, the victim, and Sanchez renders any error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. This assignment of error is overruled.\nIV. Aggravated Sentencing\nDefendant contends the trial court erred by sentencing him in the aggravated range based on a finding by the trial court that \u201cdefendant took advantage of a position of trust of confidence to commit the offense.\u201d\nOur Supreme Court recently addressed and ruled on this issue in State v. Allen, 359 N.C. 425, -,-S.E.2d -,- (July 1, 2005) (No. 485PA04) and State v. Speight, 359 N.C. 602, 606, - S.E.2d -, \u2014 (July 1, 2005) (No. 491PA04). In vacating the defendant\u2019s aggravated sentence in Allen, our Supreme Court held \u201c[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed presumptive range must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d 359 N.C. at 437, - S.E.2d at-.\nThe Court later stated in Speight, \u201cthe rationale in Allen applies to all cases in which (1) a defendant is constitutionally entitled to a jury trial, and (2) a trial court has found one or more aggravating factors and increased a defendant\u2019s sentence beyond the presumptive range without submitting the aggravating factors to a jury.\u201d 359 N.C. at 606,-S.E.2d at \u2014.\nBased on our Supreme Court\u2019s holding in Allen and Speight, the trial court erred by sentencing defendant in the aggravated range without submission to or a finding by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt to support the aggravated sentence. Defendant\u2019s sentence is vacated and remanded for imposition of a sentence consistent with our Supreme Court\u2019s decisions in Allen and Speight.\nV. Conclusion\nThe trial court did not err in admitting Father Elzi\u2019s testimony regarding his customs and practices upon learning information of abuse. We hold defendant received a fair trial free from error. The trial court erred by sentencing defendant in the aggravated range without submitting the aggravating factors to a jury. Defendant\u2019s sentence is vacated and remanded for imposition of a sentence consistent, with our Supreme Court\u2019s decisions in Allen and Speight.\nNo Error at trial; Sentence Vacated and Remanded for Resentencing.\nJudges WYNN and McGEE concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "TYSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Diane G. Miller, for the State.", "Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Barbara S. Blackman, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOSE SANCHEZ\nNo. COA04-518\n(Filed 2 August 2005)\n1. Witnesses\u2014 cross-examination \u2014 priest\u2014testimony about confession\nA defendant charged with indecent liberties was not deprived of his right to a fair trial by not being able to adequately cross-examine a priest who testified about his general practice when hearing confessions from abuse victims, but did not testify about this victim\u2019s confession. Any error was rendered harmless by other overwhelming evidence of guilt.\n2. Sentencing\u2014 aggravating factor \u2014 Blakely error \u2014 jury finding required\nAny fact (other than a prior conviction) that increases the penalty beyond the presumptive range must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. A sentence in the aggravated range for indecent liberties based on a unilateral finding by the judge was remanded.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 26 August 2003 by Judge Richard D. Boner in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 January 2005.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Diane G. Miller, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Barbara S. Blackman, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0330-01", "first_page_order": 360, "last_page_order": 365 }