{ "id": 8320394, "name": "DIANNE CATER and LYNNE O'CONNOR, Plaintiffs v. CATHERINE BARKER (now McKeon), Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Cater v. Barker", "decision_date": "2005-08-16", "docket_number": "No. COA04-795", "first_page": "441", "last_page": "452", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "172 N.C. App. 441" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "537 S.E.2d 815", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 826", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 131980, 132053, 132155, 131964, 131933 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0826-05", "/nc/350/0826-04", "/nc/350/0826-03", "/nc/350/0826-02", "/nc/350/0826-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 S.E.2d 335", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 N.C. App. 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11239125 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "537", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/132/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 S.E.2d 225", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228", "parenthetical": "quotation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "254 N.C. 484", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626961 ], "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488", "parenthetical": "quotation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/254/0484-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 S.E.2d 387", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "388" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 N.C. App. 759", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524344 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "762" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/56/0759-01" ] }, { "cite": "551 S.E.2d 569", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "571", "parenthetical": "citing Corbin, 23 N.C. App. at 27, 208 S.E.2d at 255" }, { "page": "571", "parenthetical": "\"Under the general rules of contract construction, where an agreement is clear and unambiguous, no genuine issue of material fact exists and summary judgment is appropriate.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 N.C. App. 696", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11439420 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "699", "parenthetical": "citing Corbin, 23 N.C. App. at 27, 208 S.E.2d at 255" }, { "page": "699" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/145/0696-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 S.E.2d 251", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254", "parenthetical": "\"Where the language is clear and unambiguous, the court is obliged to interpret the contract as written, and cannot, under the guise of construction, 'reject what parties inserted ....'\" (quotation and internal citation omitted)" }, { "page": "255" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "23 N.C. App. 21", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8547441 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "25", "parenthetical": "\"Where the language is clear and unambiguous, the court is obliged to interpret the contract as written, and cannot, under the guise of construction, 'reject what parties inserted ....'\" (quotation and internal citation omitted)" }, { "page": "27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/23/0021-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 S.E.2d 841", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "843", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "843" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "251 N.C. 642", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626814 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "644", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "644" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/251/0642-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 S.E.2d 198", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1946, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "226 N.C. 706", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624699 ], "year": 1946, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "710", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/226/0706-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 S.E.2d 228", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "234", "parenthetical": "quoting Indemnity Co. v. Hood, 226 N.C. 706, 710, 40 S.E.2d 198, 201 (1946) (citations omitted)" }, { "page": "234" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 N.C. 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4741751 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294", "parenthetical": "quoting Indemnity Co. v. Hood, 226 N.C. 706, 710, 40 S.E.2d 198, 201 (1946) (citations omitted)" }, { "page": "294" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/319/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 S.E.2d 840", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 622", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4698951 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0622-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 S.E.2d 479", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 114", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4690404, 4686826, 4689527, 4687736, 4688381 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0114-05", "/nc/314/0114-02", "/nc/314/0114-04", "/nc/314/0114-03", "/nc/314/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 S.E.2d 46", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "49" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 N.C. App. 566", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524987 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "570" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/73/0566-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 S.E.2d 571", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "572" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 870", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11918773 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "871" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0870-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 838", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "843", "parenthetical": "citing Jackson v. California Hardwood Co., 120 N.C. App. 870, 871, 463 S.E.2d 571, 572 (1995)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 N.C. App. 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11078414 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "26", "parenthetical": "citing Jackson v. California Hardwood Co., 120 N.C. App. 870, 871, 463 S.E.2d 571, 572 (1995)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/138/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "565 S.E.2d 9", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17", "parenthetical": "quotation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511222 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "13", "parenthetical": "quotation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 S.E.2d 457", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 715", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4779554, 4776469 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0715-01", "/nc/317/0715-02" ] }, { "cite": "343 S.E.2d 188", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "191" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 N.C. App. 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523953 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/80/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 S.E.2d 278", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "281" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 145", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8557433 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 S.E.2d 325", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567370 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 S.E.2d 425", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427", "parenthetical": "citing Caldwell, 288 N.C. 375, 218 S.E.2d 379" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2488503 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66", "parenthetical": "citing Caldwell, 288 N.C. 375, 218 S.E.2d 379" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 U.S. 654", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6170284 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/369/0654-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 S.E.2d 379", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381", "parenthetical": "quoting 6 Moore's Federal Practice \u00a7 56-15[3], at 2337 (2d ed. 1971); accord, United States v. Diebald, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 8 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1968)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 375", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568529 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378", "parenthetical": "quoting 6 Moore's Federal Practice \u00a7 56-15[3], at 2337 (2d ed. 1971); accord, United States v. Diebald, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 8 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1968)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0375-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 S.E.2d 283", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 S.E.2d 399", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "401" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 N.C. App. 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521088 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "314" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/49/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 S.E.2d 457", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 715", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4779554, 4776469 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0715-01", "/nc/317/0715-02" ] }, { "cite": "343 S.E.2d 188", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "191" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "80 N.C. App. 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523953 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384-85" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/80/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 S.E.2d 425", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2488503 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 S.E.2d 379", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381", "parenthetical": "quoting 6 James W. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice \u00a7 56-15[3], at 2337 (2d ed. 1971)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 375", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568529 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378", "parenthetical": "quoting 6 James W. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice \u00a7 56-15[3], at 2337 (2d ed. 1971)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0375-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 S.E.2d 283", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "271 S.E.2d 399", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "401" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "49 N.C. App. 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521088 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "314" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/49/0311-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 969, "char_count": 26879, "ocr_confidence": 0.752, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.086970116229963e-07, "percentile": 0.9379942614414972 }, "sha256": "5b6c4e6509df32b2d9c17e6d649556036d2ba9cb609d0df31ad1fab7f78b4f57", "simhash": "1:1b235ae0543b246c", "word_count": 4376 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:22:54.702952+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge McGEE concurs.", "Judge GEER concurs in part and dissents in part." ], "parties": [ "DIANNE CATER and LYNNE O'CONNOR, Plaintiffs v. CATHERINE BARKER (now McKeon), Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TYSON, Judge.\nCatherine Barker (now McKeon) (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals from the trial court\u2019s judgment granting Dianne Cater and Lynne O\u2019Connor (collectively, \u201cplaintiffs\u201d) summary judgment on their claim for breach of contract. We affirm.\nI. Background\nPlaintiffs purchased residential real property from defendant on 21 November 2000 in Macon County, North Carolina. Prior to closing, defendant began making repairs to the home. These repairs were either incomplete or had not begun at the time of the closing. The parties entered into an \u201cEscrow Agreement to Make Repairs\u201d (\u201cthe Agreement\u201d) that provided in its entirety:\nCATHERINE BARKER as Seller of the lands being conveyed this date to DIANE CATER, LYNNE O\u2019CONNOR and KATHLEEN C. O\u2019CONNOR, Buyers, in consideration of Buyers\u2019 agreeing to complete the closing subject to this agreement, rather than wait for certain repairs to be completed by Seller on the house being sold hereby agrees, covenants and promises Buyers as follows:\n1. Seller at her expense shall cause the repairs listed on Exhibit A to be made to the house, some of which have already been started.\n2. The foundation footing for that portion of the house that has been formed and poured onto the ground and over tree stumps shall be repaired and/or replaced at Seller\u2019s expense so that the foundation for the entire house meets standards of the North Carolina Building Code and good residential construction standards.\n3. The sum of $4,000.00 for the foundation work and $200.00 for the other repairs shall be escrowed by Philo, Spivey & Henning, P.A. at closing from Seller\u2019s net sales proceeds to be applied to these expenses. If the expenses of the repairs exceeds the sum being escrowed, Seller shall pay for any and all additional costs.\nThe record on appeal does not include Exhibit A to the Agreement. The parties have not specified what additional repairs other than the foundation were subject to the Agreement. Despite the repairs being incomplete, plaintiffs relied on the Agreement and agreed to close on the property.\nOn 13 January 2003, plaintiffs filed a verified complaint alleging defendant had breached the Agreement by failing to complete the repairs. Defendant answered and admitted the parties entered into the Agreement, but denied she failed to perform her obligations in accordance with the terms of the Agreement. Defendant also asserted the affirmative defenses of performance of the contract and laches.\nPlaintiffs moved the trial court for summary judgment on 28 January 2004. Attached to their motion were sworn affidavits by both plaintiffs and Mr. Don Bates (\u201cMr. Bates\u201d). Plaintiffs\u2019 affidavits both stated generally that they have been \u201cdamaged by the breach of the repair agreement by the Defendant\u201d and sought $14,500.00 in damages and $2,900.00 in attorney\u2019s fees and costs.\nMr. Bates\u2019s affidavit, stated: (1) he had worked in the residential homebuilding and construction industry for twenty-eight years; (2) he had personal knowledge \u201cof the repair work sought by the Plaintiffs in the above-captioned action;\u201d and (3) the cost of the repairs would be $14,500.00 in labor and materials.\nOn 30 January 2004, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment alleging no issues of material fact exist and she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. She attached her own affidavit, which stated in pertinent part:\n6. That following closing, on or about December 9, 2000, a report from a qualified civil engineer had been obtained by my real estate broker, Larry Davis, regarding the necessary work to repair the foundation mentioned in the Escrow Agreement. Copy of this report is attached as Exhibit \u201c2.\u201d\n7. Following the receipt Of this report, Mr. Larry Davis obtained an estimate to perform the necessary work from Shayne Boatwright in the amount of $5,500.00. At the time of the estimate, in late 2000 or early or [sic] 2001, Mr. Boatwright was able to perform the work during the spring of 2001 and as far as I know, no action was undertaken by Plaintiffs or their attorney to authorized [sic] the work to be performed at any time during the year 2001.1 did not refuse to pay for the work required to be done at any time and in fact, authorized Mr. Davis to have the work performed.\nI have no further information regarding what has transpire [d] with regard to this escrow account except for copy of letter [sic] received on or about May 29, 2002 from my attorney. This letter is attached as Exhibit \u201c3\u201d and includes a copy of a letter from Plaintiff\u2019s then-attorney, the holder of the escrow monies outlining the fact that some of the monies placed into escrow had been expended, namely $200.00 for other repairs which was proper under the Escrow Agreement and $475.00 for the engineering report attached hereinabove dated December 9, 2000.\nThe trial court granted plaintiffs\u2019 motion and awarded damages in the amount of $14,500.00, plus attorney\u2019s fees. Defendant appeals solely the trial court\u2019s grant of plaintiffs\u2019 motion for summary judgment.\nII. Issues\nThe issues on appeal are whether the trial court properly granted plaintiffs summary judgment on: (1) the merits of plaintiffs\u2019 claim; and (2) defendant\u2019s defense of laches.\nIII. Standard of Review\nOur review of a trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment is well-established. Summary judgment is appropriate \u201cif the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2003); see also Oliver v. Roberts, 49 N.C. App. 311, 314, 271 S.E.2d 399, 401 (1980), cert. denied, - N.C. -, 276 S.E.2d 283 (1981).\nIn deciding the motion, \u201c \u2018all inferences of fact . . . must be drawn against the movant and in favor of the party opposing the motion.\u2019 \u201d Caldwell v. Deese, 288 N.C. 375, 378, 218 S.E.2d 379, 381 (1975) (quoting 6 Moore\u2019s Federal Practice \u00a7 56-15[3], at 2337 (2d ed. 1971); accord, United States v. Diebald, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 8 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1968)).\n\u201cThe party moving for summary judgment has the burden of establishing the lack of any triable issue.\u201d Collingwood v. G.E. Real Estate Equities, 324 N.C. 63, 66, 376 S.E.2d 425, 427 (1989) (citing Caldwell, 288 N.C. 375, 218 S.E.2d 379). Once the moving party meets its burden, then the non-moving party must \u201cproduce a forecast of evidence demonstrating that the plaintiff will be able to make out at least a prima facie case at trial.\u201d Id. (citing Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 276 S.E.2d 325 (1981)). In opposing a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party \u201cmay not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1; Rule 56(e) (2003); see also Nasco Equipment Co. v. Mason, 291 N.C. 145, 149, 229 S.E.2d 278, 281 (1976).\nWe review de novo a trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment. Va. Electric & Power Co. v. Tillett, 80 N.C. App. 383, 385, 343 S.E.2d 188, 191 (citation omitted), cert. denied, 317 N.C. 715, 347 S.E.2d 457 (1986). \u201cUnder a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew[] and freely substitu\u00ed [es] its own judgment for [that of] the\u201d trial court. Mann Media, Inc. v. Randolph Cty. Planning Bd., 356 N.C. 1, 13, 565 S.E.2d 9, 17 (2002) (quotation omitted).\nIV. Breach of Contract\nDefendant argues the trial court erred by granting plaintiffs\u2019 motion for summary judgment on their claim for breach of contract. We disagree.\nA party asserting breach of contract must show: (1) existence of a valid contract; and (2) breach of the terms of that contract. Poor v. Hill, 138 N.C. App. 19, 26, 530 S.E.2d 838, 843 (2000) (citing Jackson v. California Hardwood Co., 120 N.C. App. 870, 871, 463 S.E.2d 571, 572 (1995)). The existence of the Agreement is not disputed by either party. Further, defendant does not claim plaintiffs failed to perform their obligations under the Agreement. See Boyd v. Watts, 73 N.C. App. 566, 570, 327 S.E.2d 46, 49 (a party asserting breach of contract must have first performed his promise or offered to do so in order to preserve his rights under the contract (citations omitted)), disc. rev. allowed, 314 N.C. 114, 332 S.E.2d 479 (1985), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 316 N.C. 622, 342 S.E.2d 840 (1986). The issue here is whether defendant breached the terms of the contract.\n\u201cIt is a well-settled principle of legal construction that \u2018[i]t must be presumed the parties intended what the language used clearly expresses, and the contract must be construed to mean what on its face it purports to mean.\u2019 \u201d Hagler v. Hagler, 319 N.C. 287, 294, 354 S.E.2d 228, 234 (1987) (quoting Indemnity Co. v. Hood, 226 N.C. 706, 710, 40 S.E.2d 198, 201 (1946) (citations omitted)).\nWhen a court is called upon to interpret, it seeks to ascertain the intent of the parties at the moment of execution. To ascertain this intent, the court looks to the language used, the situation of the parties, and objects to be accomplished. Presumably the words which the parties select were deliberately chosen and are to be given their ordinary significance.\nBriggs v. Mills, Inc., 251 N.C. 642, 644, 111 S.E.2d 841, 843 (1960) (citations omitted); see also Corbin v. Langdon, 23 N.C. App. 21, 25, 208 S.E.2d 251, 254 (1974) (\u201cWhere the language is clear and unambiguous, the court is obliged to interpret the contract as written, and cannot, under the guise of construction, \u2018reject what parties inserted ....\u2019\u201d (quotation and internal citation omitted)). \u201cUnder the general rules of contract construction, where an agreement is clear and unambiguous, no genuine issue of material fact exists and summary judgment is appropriate.\u201d Carolina Place Joint Venture v. Flamers Charburgers, Inc., 145 N.C. App. 696, 699, 551 S.E.2d 569, 571 (2001) (citing Corbin, 23 N.C. App. at 27, 208 S.E.2d at 255).\nThe pertinent provision of the Agreement states, \u201cSeller at her expense shall cause the repairs listed on Exhibit A to be made to the house, some of which have already started.\u201d (Emphasis supplied). Defendant contends the Agreement \u201cdoes not require me ... to do anything with respect to repairs to the foundation footing, other than deposit the sum of $4,000.00 in Plaintiff\u2019s [sic] attorneys^] escrow account and be responsible for any and all additional costs.\u201d She asserts that \u201call things required to be performed under . . . the agreement have been fully performed.\u201d However, defendant acknowledges that \u201c[s]o far as I know, no repairs have been prepared by anyone to the subject premises . . . .\u201d\nThe specific language chosen and agreed to by the parties was: \u201cshall cause the repairs ... to be made.\u201d Interpreting that language under its \u201cordinary significance\u201d and \u201cconstrued to mean what on its face it purports to mean\u201d requires defendant to do more than just pay for the repairs; she must fully complete them as well. Briggs, 251 N.C. at 644, 111 S.E.2d at 843; Hagler, 319 N.C. at 294, 354 S.E.2d at 234. Under the specific terms of the Agreement, defendant has not \u201ccaused\u201d the completion of the repairs and is in breach.\nDefendant offered pleadings and evidence suggesting she attempted to perform her obligations under the Agreement. Her affidavit stated she authorized and agreed to pay Mr. Boatwright to com-, p\u00edete the repairs, but never received authorization from plaintiffs. Defendant further asserts that she could not have done more without being in possession of the premises.\nUnder the terms of the Agreement, defendant was obligated to complete the repairs. Defendant does not allege plaintiffs prevented or frustrated her performance. Plaintiffs\u2019 activities did not rise to the level of discharge by prevention. Propst Construction Co. v. Dept. of Transportation, 56 N.C. App. 759, 762, 290 S.E.2d 387, 388 (1982) (\u201cThe doctrine of prevention is that \u2018one who prevents the performance of a condition, or makes it impossible by his own act, will not be permitted to take advantage of the nonperformance.\u2019 In order to excuse nonperformance, the conduct on the part of the party who allegedly prevented performance \u2018must be wrongful, and ... in excess of his legal rights.\u2019 \u201d (internal citations and quotations omitted)).\n\u201cNon-performance of a valid contract is a breach thereof. . . unless the person charged . . . shows some valid reason which may excuse the non-performance; and the burden of doing so rests upon him.\u201d Blount-Midyette v. Aeroglide Corp., 254 N.C. 484, 488,119 S.E.2d 225, 228 (1961) (quotation omitted). The Agreement was entered into by the parties on 21 November 2000. Plaintiffs commenced this action on 13 January 2003. Defendant\u2019s one attempt at performance over the course of two years cannot discharge her obligation.\nOur review of the pleadings and evidence supporting plaintiffs\u2019 motion for summary judgment discloses a sufficient factual basis to support their claim of breach of contract. Plaintiffs supplied the trial court with the valid and enforceable Agreement, including each parties\u2019 obligations, and alleged \u201c[defendant has willfully and without justifiable excuse refused to perform the terms of the agreement . . . .\u201d and the \u201cagreement has not been adhered to with the repairs being made . . . .\u201d Defendant admits the repairs have not been completed. Plaintiffs satisfactorily showed the trial court that defendant has not performed her obligation.\nAfter de novo review of the matter, we hold: (1) plaintiffs proffered sufficient pleadings and evidence to show defendant breached the Agreement and no genuine issues of material fact exist; and (2) defendant did not \u201cset forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(e).\nIn consideration for plaintiffs agreeing to close on the real property prior to completion of agreed upon necessary repairs, defendant promised to \u201ccause the repairs ... to be made to the house.\u201d Plaintiffs fully performed their obligations under the Agreement. Defendant admits the repairs have been completed. We hold the trial court properly granted plaintiffs\u2019 motion for summary judgment. See Carolina Place Joint Venture, 145 N.C. App. at 699, 551 S.E.2d at 571 (\u201cUnder the general rules of contract construction, where an agreement is clear and unambiguous, no genuine issue of material fact exists and summary judgment is appropriate.\u201d). This assignment of error is overruled.\nV. Laches\nDefendant contends issues of fact exist concerning her defense of laches against plaintiffs\u2019 claim. We disagree.\nWe previously held, \u201c[1] aches is an equitable defense and is not available in an action at law.\u201d City-Wide Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Alamance County, 132 N.C. App. 533, 537, 513 S.E.2d 335, 338 (1999) (citations omitted), disc. rev. denied and appeal dismissed, 350 N.C. 826, 537 S.E.2d 815 (1999). When a \u201c[pjlaintiff\u2019s claims are legal in nature, not equitable[,]\u201d laches cannot support judgment for the defendant. Id.\nPlaintiffs initially sought specific performance and in the alternative, damages, for defendant\u2019s breach of the Agreement. The trial court\u2019s summary judgment awarded plaintiffs\u2019 damages, a legal remedy, not specific performance. The defense of laches is not applicable. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to plaintiffs on the defense of laches. This assignment of error is overruled.\nVI. Conclusion\nPlaintiffs and defendant entered into a binding, enforceable, and unambiguous Agreement. Plaintiffs performed their obligation under the Agreement. Despite having over two years to perform her duty, defendant did not complete the repairs and breached the Agreement. Defendant was not prevented, excused, or discharged from performing her obligation.\nPlaintiffs were awarded damages, a legal remedy. Defendant\u2019s defense of laches is inapplicable to the facts at bar. Plaintiffs\u2019 motion for summary judgment was properly granted. The trial court\u2019s judgment is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJudge McGEE concurs.\nJudge GEER concurs in part and dissents in part.", "type": "majority", "author": "TYSON, Judge." }, { "text": "GEER, Judge,\nconcurring in part and dissenting in part.\nI agree with the majority that since plaintiffs seek no equitable relief in this case, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to plaintiffs on the defense of laches. I believe, however, that issues of fact remain regarding whether defendant breached the parties\u2019 agreement and, therefore, respectfully dissent.\nThe parties\u2019 agreement provided in its entirety:\nCATHERINE BARKER as Seller of the lands being conveyed this date to DIANE CATER, LYNNE O\u2019CONNOR and KATHLEEN C. O\u2019CONNOR, Buyers, in consideration of Buyers\u2019 agreeing to complete the closing subject to this agreement, rather than wait for certain repairs to be completed by Seller on the house being sold hereby agrees, covenants and promises Buyers as follows:\n1. Seller at her expense shall cause the repairs listed on Exhibit A to be made to the house, some of which have already been started.\n2. The foundation footing for that portion of the house that has been formed and poured onto the ground and over tree stumps shall be repaired and/or replaced at Seller\u2019s expense so that the foundation for the entire house meets standards of the North Carolina Building Code and good residential construction standards.\n3. The sum of $4,000.00 for the foundation work and $200.00 for the other repairs shall be escrowed by Philo, Spivey & Henning, P.A. at closing from Seller\u2019s net sales proceeds to be applied to these expenses. If the expenses of the repairs exceeds the sum being escrowed, Seller shall pay for any and all additional cost.\nThe record on appeal does not include Exhibit A to the agreement and the parties have not specified what repairs other than the foundation were subject to the agreement.\nIn support of their motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs submitted their own affidavits with each stating only generally \u201c[t]hat she has been damaged by the breach of the repair agreement by the Defendant\u201d and seeking $14,500.00 in damages and. $2,900.00 in attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. The affidavits supplied no facts whatsoever about the breach apart from the conclusory claim that the agreement was breached. Plaintiffs also submitted the affidavit of Don Bates, who stated (1) that he had worked in the residential Homebuilding and construction industry for 28 years, (2) that he had personal knowledge \u201cof the repair work sought by the Plaintiffs in the above-captioned action,\u201d and (3) that the cost of the repair would be $14,500.00 in labor and materials. Thus, Mr. Bates\u2019 affidavit supplied no information about any breach of contract either. In short, plaintiffs sought summary judgment based on their bare assertion that defendant breached the agreement and based on evidence of their damages.\nDefendant responded with her own affidavit, which stated in pertinent part:\n6. That following closing, on or about December 9, 2000, a report from a qualified civil engineer had been obtained by my real estate broker, Larry Davis, regarding the necessary work to repair the foundation mentioned in the Escrow Agreement. Copy of this report is attached as Exhibit \u201c2\u201d.\n7. Following the receipt of this report, Mr. Larry Davis obtained an estimate to perform the necessary work from Shayne Boatwright in the amount of $5,500.00. At the time of the estimate, in late 2000 or early or [sic] 2001, Mr. Boatwright was able to perform the work during the spring of 2001 and as far as I know, no action was undertaken by Plaintiffs or their attorney to authorized [sic] the work to be performed at any time during the year 2001. I did not refuse to pay for the work required to be done at any time and in fact, authorized Mr. Davis to have the work performed.\nI have no further information regarding what has transpire[d] with regard to this escrow account except for copy of letter [sic] received on or about May 29, 2002 from my attorney. This letter is attached as \u00c9xhibit \u201c3\u201d and includes a copy of a letter from Plaintiffs then-attorney, the holder of the escrow monies outlining the fact that some of the monies placed into escrow had been expended, namely $200.00 for other repairs which was proper under the Escrow Agreement and $475.00 for the engineering report attached hereinabove dated December 9, 2000.\nThe North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure provide that summary judgment shall be granted \u201cif the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d N.C.R. Civ. P. 56(c). In deciding the motion, \u201c \u2018all inferences of fact. . . must be drawn against the movant and in favor of the party opposing the motion.\u2019 \u201d Caldwell v. Deese, 288 N.C. 375, 378, 218 S.E.2d 379, 381 (1975) (quoting 6 James W. Moore et al., Moore\u2019s Federal Practice \u00a7 56-15[3], at 2337 (2d ed. 1971)).\nThe party moving for summary judgment has the burden of establishing the lack of any triable issue. Collingwood v. General Elec. Real Estate Equities, Inc., 324 N.C. 63, 66, 376 S.E.2d 425, 427 (1989). Once the moving party meets its burden, then the non-moving party must \u201cproduce a forecast of evidence demonstrating that the plaintiff will be able to make out at least a prima facie case at trial.\u201d Id. In opposing a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party \u201cmay not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.\u201d N.C.R. Civ. P. 56(e).\nOn appeal, this Court\u2019s task is to determine, on the basis of the materials presented to the trial court, whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Oliver v. Roberts, 49 N.C. App. 311, 314, 271 S.E.2d 399, 401 (1980), cert. denied, 276 S.E.2d 283 (1981). A trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion for summary judgment is reviewed de novo as the trial court rules only on questions of law. Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. Tillett, 80 N.C. App. 383, 384-85, 343 S.E.2d 188, 191, cert. denied, 317 N.C. 715, 347 S.E.2d 457 (1986).\nIn this case, the parties agree that a valid contract existed. The primary question before this Court is whether a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether defendant breached that contract. The agreement specified that \u201cSeller at her expense shall cause the repairs listed on Exhibit A to be made to the house\u201d; that \u201c[t]he foundation footing . . . shall be repaired and/or replaced at Seller\u2019s expense\u201d; and that Seller would place $4,200.00 in escrow to be applied to the cost of the foundation work and other repairs, with Seller being responsible for any additional sums necessary to complete the repairs. In response to plaintiffs\u2019 conclusory assertion that defendant breached that agreement, defendant submitted her own affidavit stating that she paid $4,200.00 into the escrow account; that she obtained (1) a report specifying the work necessary to repair the foundation and (2) an estimate from Shayne Boatwright of $5,500.00 for completion of that work; that Mr. Boatwright was available to perform the work; and that defendant authorized that the work be done. Defendant asserts that plaintiffs did not, however, authorize Mr. Boatwright to do the work.\nWhen the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to defendant, as the non-moving party, I believe that it supports a finding that defendant had located a contractor and authorized that the work be done. Since defendant was no longer in possession of the premises, it is difficult to see what more defendant could do to comply with the agreement.\nThe majority suggests that defendant has failed to offer evidence that plaintiffs interfered with defendant\u2019s causing the repairs to be made. Defendant\u2019s affidavit, however, states: \u201c[N]o action was undertaken by Plaintiffs or their attorney to authorize [] the work to be performed at any time during the year 2001.\u201d The majority does not explain how repairs could be performed on plaintiffs\u2019 property without plaintiffs\u2019 authorization. Given the brevity of plaintiffs\u2019 eviden-tiary showing, defendant\u2019s affidavit should be sufficient to defeat summary judgment.\nI believe that the majority substitutes itself for the jury when it asserts that \u201c [defendant's one attempt at performance over the course of two years cannot discharge her obligation.\u201d A reasonable jury could decide that defendant\u2019s efforts in obtaining a report identifying the repairs necessary, locating a contractor to perform the work, authorizing the contractor to begin work, and notifying plaintiffs was sufficient to comply with her obligations under the agreement. It is not for this Court to make that determination especially given the almost non-existent nature of plaintiffs\u2019 evidentiary showing.\nWhile undoubtedly there is more to this story, plaintiffs chose not to present their version of the facts and their theory of their claim to the trial court. Neither plaintiffs\u2019 summary judgment materials nor their brief on appeal demonstrate why defendant\u2019s actions constituted as a matter of law a breach of the agreement. Simply asserting that a breach has occurred, without adding any factual details to support such a claim, should be insufficient to establish entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on a breach of contract claim when the defendant has offered evidence suggesting that no breach occurred.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "GEER, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Ronald, Stephen Patterson, for plaintiffs-appellees.", "Creighton W. Sossomon, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DIANNE CATER and LYNNE O'CONNOR, Plaintiffs v. CATHERINE BARKER (now McKeon), Defendant\nNo. COA04-795\n(Filed 16 August 2005)\n1. Vendor and Purchaser\u2014 real estate escrow agreement\u2014 repairs\nLanguage in an real estate escrow agreement that defendant would \u201ccause\u201d repairs to be made to the building meant that summary judgment was correctly awarded to plaintiffs on an action for damages when the repairs were not completed, even though defendant offered an affidavit that she had authorized and agreed to pay for the work. Reading the escrow language with its ordinary meaning, defendant must fully complete the repairs rather than merely pay for them.\n2. Laches\u2014 damages \u2014 defense not applicable\nThe defense of laches was not applicable to an action in which damages were awarded for failing to complete repairs to a building under an escrow agreement.\nJudge Geer concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 18 March 2004 by Judge Zoro J. Guice, Jr., in Macon County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 2 February 2005.\nRonald, Stephen Patterson, for plaintiffs-appellees.\nCreighton W. Sossomon, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0441-01", "first_page_order": 471, "last_page_order": 482 }