{ "id": 8320531, "name": "THE KNIGHT PUBLISHING CO., d/b/a The Charlotte Observer, Plaintiff-Appellee v. THE CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG HOSPITAL AUTHORITY, d/b/a CAROLINAS HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Knight Publishing Co. v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority", "decision_date": "2005-08-16", "docket_number": "No. COA04-1252", "first_page": "486", "last_page": "496", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "172 N.C. App. 486" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "196 S.E.2d 770", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "774" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559260 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "500" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "605 S.E.2d 187", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "167 N.C. App. 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8410920 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "156" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/167/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 S.E.2d 465", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "466" }, { "page": "467" }, { "page": "467" }, { "page": "466" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 735", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2499752 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "737" }, { "page": "737-38" }, { "page": "737-38" }, { "page": "737" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0735-01" ] }, { "cite": "210 S.E.2d 199", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 N.C. 215", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564966 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "219" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/286/0215-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-22", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "388 S.E.2d 134", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "136" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5307411 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "591 S.E.2d 514", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "516" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2986294 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 132", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 132.6", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "providing for the inspection and examination of public records" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "412 S.E.2d 7", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "19" }, { "page": "14" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2508375 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "486" }, { "page": "476" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "515 S.E.2d 675", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "685" }, { "page": "693" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132176 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462" }, { "page": "477" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 S.E.2d 35", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "43", "parenthetical": "ruling summary judgment was proper where there was \"no substantial controversy as to the facts[,]\" only as to the \"legal significance of those facts\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 531", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572863 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "545", "parenthetical": "ruling summary judgment was proper where there was \"no substantial controversy as to the facts[,]\" only as to the \"legal significance of those facts\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0531-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 S.E.2d 823", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "829" }, { "page": "830" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 N.C. 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561041 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "533" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/278/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "222 S.E.2d 392", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "399" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 N.C. 343", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569619 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "352" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/289/0343-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 132-1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "et seq." } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 916, "char_count": 25098, "ocr_confidence": 0.746, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.1513231358691206e-07, "percentile": 0.8626848515106479 }, "sha256": "3268b8f971a117c66153766c054cf5fbdf5996eb43a896474e67bc3b3d6c2870", "simhash": "1:4012c966741facd0", "word_count": 3856 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:22:54.702952+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges CALABRIA and ELMORE concur." ], "parties": [ "THE KNIGHT PUBLISHING CO., d/b/a The Charlotte Observer, Plaintiff-Appellee v. THE CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG HOSPITAL AUTHORITY, d/b/a CAROLINAS HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, Defendant-Appellant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McGEE, Judge.\nThe Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority d/b/a, Carolinas Healthcare System (defendant) is a \u201cpublic body and a body corporate and politic\u201d organized and existing under the Hospital Authorities Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E-15 et seq. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E-17(c) (2003). Knight Publishing Co., d/b/a The Charlotte Observer (plaintiff), sent a letter to defendant on 18 October 2002, requesting access to certain records of defendant pursuant to the Public Records Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 132-1 et seq., and the Public Hospital Personnel Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E-257 etseq. Specifically, plaintiff sought (1) the \u201ccurrent compensation (in any form) currently paid to\u201d seventeen of defendant\u2019s existing and former employees; (2) \u201crecords describing the last compensation to\u201d such individuals if they were not currently being paid; (3) \u201c[r]eeords describing the date and amount of the most recent increase or decrease in salary\u201d for the seventeen individuals; (4) \u201c[rjecords describing any additional monetary or other benefits (including but not limited, to retirement benefits, severance package, or pension benefits) paid or promised to\u201d three of the seventeen named individuals; and (5) \u201c[d]ocuments relating to expense reimbursement requests\u201d for these three individuals.\nTen days after receiving plaintiffs request for information, defendant sent a letter to plaintiff explaining that defendant was governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E-257.2, which defendant argued expressly limited to \u201ccurrent salary\u201d the compensation information that a public hospital could release regarding its employees. Defendant thereby only provided plaintiff with: (1) the current salary paid to each current employee of defendant identified by plaintiff; (2) the last salary paid to each former employee of defendant requested by plaintiff; and (3) the dates and amounts of the most recent increase or decrease in salary for the identified individuals. Defendant stated in its letter that the additional information requested by plaintiff did not, \u201cin the opinion of Carolinas Health Care System, fall within the definition of \u2018salary.\u2019 \u201d\nPlaintiff took no further action until 12 January 2004, when plaintiff filed suit against defendant under the Public Records Act and the Public Hospital Personnel Act seeking production of the documents and information it had requested earlier. Plaintiff also sought a declaratory judgment that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 131E-257.2 \u201crequires the disclosure of, among other personnel information, information concerning any retirement benefits or severance pay promised to or received by former . . . employees [of defendant].\u201d Defendant filed its answer to plaintiff\u2019s complaint on 19 February 2004, and plaintiff moved for summary judgment on 26 May 2004.\nIn an order and judgment entered 2 August 2004, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, concluding that the Public Hospital Personnel Act, when read in pari materia with the Public Records Act, did not cover the documents and information requested by plaintiff. The trial court ordered defendant to provide the requested personnel information and documents to plaintiff. Defendant filed and served notice of appeal on 4 August 2004 and moved the trial court to stay the proceedings pending appeal. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion on 16 August 2004. Our Court temporarily stayed the 2 August 2004 order and judgment on 18 August 2004 and granted defendant\u2019s writ of supersedeas on 31 August 2004.\nA summary judgment should be granted \u201cif the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2003). A moving party \u201chas the burden of establishing the lack of any triable issue of fact.\u201d Kidd v. Early, 289 N.C. 343, 352, 222 S.E.2d 392, 399 (1976). As our Supreme Court has stated:\nThe purpose of summary judgment can be summarized as being a device to bring litigation to an early decision on the merits without the delay and expense of a trial where it can be readily demonstrated that no material facts are in issue. Two types of cases are involved: (a) Those where a claim or defense is utterly baseless in fact, and (b) those where only a question of law on the indisputable facts is in controversy and it can be appropriately decided without full exposure of trial.\nKessing v. Mortgage Corp., 278 N.C. 523, 533, 180 S.E.2d 823, 829 (1971). In cases \u201c[w]here there is no genuine issue as to the facts, the presence of important or difficult questions of law is no barrier to the granting of summary judgment.\u201d Id. at 534, 180 S.E.2d at 830.\nIn the present case, defendant does not argue that there are genuine issues of material fact for trial, nor has defendant assigned error on this ground. This is a proper case for summary judgment because a question of law, being the interpretation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E-257.2 and its legal effect on the undisputed facts, was in controversy. See Blades v. City of Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531, 545, 187 S.E.2d 35, 43 (1972) (ruling summary judgment was proper where there was \u201cno substantial controversy as to the facts[,]\u201d only as to the \u201clegal significance of those facts\u201d). While it is undisputed that the information requested from defendant by plaintiff constitutes public records under the Public Records Act, it is disputed whether the information requested is protected from disclosure under the Public Hospital Personnel Act. The specific issue before this Court is what compensation information regarding public hospital employees is a matter of public record.\nUnder the Public Records Act, the public generally has liberal access to public records. Virmani v. Presbyterian Health Services Corp., 350 N.C. 449, 462, 515 S.E.2d 675, 685 (1999). \u201c[I]n the absence of clear statutory exemption or exception, documents falling within the definition of \u2018public records\u2019 in the Public Records [Act] must be made available for public inspection.\u201d News and Observer Publishing Co. v. Poole, 330 N.C. 465, 486, 412 S.E.2d 7, 19 (1992); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 132.6 (2003) (providing for the inspection and examination of public records). \u201cPublic records\u201d are defined as\nall documents, papers, letters, maps, books, photographs, films, sound recordings, magnetic or other tapes, electronic data-processing records, artifacts, or other documentary material, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received pursuant to law or ordinance in connection with the transaction of public business by any agency of North Carolina government or its subdivisions.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 132-l(a) (2003).\nDefendant, in the present case, asserts that its personnel records, including the documents requested by plaintiff, are exempted from the Public Records Act by the Public Hospital Personnel Act, and therefore the trial court erred in ordering defendant to produce the documents requested by plaintiff. The Public Hospital Personnel Act provides the following with regard to the privacy of public hospital employee personnel records:\n(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of G.S. 132-6 or any other general law or local act concerning access to public records, personnel files of employees and applicants for employment maintained by a public hospital are subject to inspection and may be disclosed only as provided by this section. For purposes of this section, an employee\u2019s personnel file consists of any information in any form gathered by the public hospital with respect to an employee and, by way of illustration but not limitation, relating to the employee\u2019s application, selection or nonselection, performance, promotions, demotions, transfers, suspensions and other disciplinary actions, evaluation forms, leave, salary, and termination of employment. As used in this section, \u201cemployee\u201d includes both current and former employees of a public hospital.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E-257.2(a) (2003).\nDefendant argues that the General Assembly intended the Public Hospital Personnel Act to be a statutory exception to the Public Records Act, thereby affording greater privacy protection to public hospitals\u2019 personnel records than to personnel records of other public entities. To determine a statute\u2019s purpose, we must first examine the statute\u2019s plain language. State v. Hooper, 358 N.C. 122, 125, 591 S.E.2d 514, 516 (2004). \u201c \u2018Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction and the courts must construe the statute using its plain meaning.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, 326 N.C. 205, 209, 388 S.E.2d 134, 136 (1990)). Defendant correctly asserts that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 131E-257.2 clearly and unambiguously limits what and when information in the personnel records of public hospitals can be disclosed publicly, notwithstanding the Public Records Act.\nThe Public Hospital Personnel Act is a very specific statute regarding public hospitals. In the section providing for the privacy of public hospital employee personnel records, the statute explicitly provides that \u201cpersonnel files of employees and applicants for employment maintained by a public hospital are subject to inspection .and may be disclosed only as provided by this section.\" N.C.G.S. \u00a7 131E-257.2(a) (emphasis added). The statute then broadly defines an employee\u2019s personnel file as consisting of \u201cany information in any form gathered by the public hospital with respect to an employee and, by way of illustration but not limitation, relating to the employee\u2019s application, selection or nonselection, performance, promotions, demotions, transfers, suspensions and other disciplinary actions, evaluation forms, leave, salary, and termination of employment.\u201d Id. (emphasis added).\nThe plain language of the statute, especially the definition of \u201cpersonnel file,\u201d is virtually identical to the plain language of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-22, and to the definition of \u201cpersonnel file\u201d included therein. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-22 (2003). Our Supreme Court, in evaluating N.C.G.S. \u00a7 126-22, which provides for the privacy of state employee personnel records, concluded that the General Assembly intended for the personnel files of state employees to be exempt from the Public Records Act. News and Observer Publishing Co., 330 N.C. at 476, 412 S.E.2d at 14. Therefore, in the present case, like in News and Observer Publishing Co., \u201c[ujnder the plain meaning of the statutory language, any information satisfying the definition of \u2018personnel file\u2019 is excepted from the Public Records Law.\u201d See id.\nSix types of information \u201cwith respect to each public hospital employee\u201d listed in subsection (b) of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 131E-257.2 are a matter of public record:\n(1) Name.\n(2) Age.\n(3) Date of original employment.\n(4) Current position title, current salary, and the date and amount of the most recent increase or decrease in salary.\n(5) Date of the most recent promotion, demotion, transfer, suspension, separation or other change in position classification.\n(6) The office to which the employee is currently assigned.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E-257.2(b) (2003). Subsection (c) of the statute provides that \u201c[a]ll information contained in a public hospital employees\u2019s personnel file, other than the information made public by subsection (b) of this section, is confidential and shall be open to inspection only\u201d in certain instances. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E-257.2(c) (2003). When read together, these subsections show that not all of the information or documents included in the personnel file of a public hospital employee is public record. Rather, only the information listed in section (b) is public record. Thus, with regard to a public hospital employee\u2019s compensation, only the employee\u2019s \u201ccurrent salary, and the date and amount of the [employee\u2019s] most recent increase or decrease in salary\u201d are public records.\nThe determination that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 131E-257.2 is an exception to the Public Records Act, is supported by the plain language of additional statutes relating to health care facilities. First, the General Assembly explicitly provided that \u201c[t]he purpose of [the Public Hospital Personnel Act] is to protect the privacy of the personnel records of public hospital employees[.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E-257(b) (2003). Second, in the Hospital Licensure Act, the General Assembly enacted a statute to address the confidentiality of personnel information, which provides: \u201cthe personnel files of employees or former employees, and the files of applicants for employment maintained by a public hospital as defined in G.S. 159-39 . . . are not public records as defined by Chapter 132 of the General Statutes.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E-97.1(a) (2003).\nPlaintiff argues that the information it requested from defendant, such as \u201ccontract and payroll documents,\u201d is not included in the definition of \u201cpersonnel file\u201d in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 131E-257.2 because that information is not \u201cgathered\u201d by defendant. Plaintiff further asserts that by using the words \u201cinform\u00e1tion . . . gathered by the public hospital,\u201d see N.C.G.S. \u00a7 131E-257.2(a), the General Assembly intended to exempt from the Public Records Act only \u201cinformation actually collected by the public hospital about its own employees, such as internal performance reviews or evaluations.\u201d Plaintiff thus argues that \u201cpersonnel file,\u201d as it is defined in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 131E-257.2, does not cover \u201ccontract and payroll documents[,]\u201d which \u201crelate to the expenditure of public monies and to the terms and conditions of public employment,\u201d but rather covers only performance information about public hospital employees \u201cfor use in making employment or disciplinary decisions.\u201d\nPlaintiff does not cite any authority supporting its contention. Moreover, plaintiffs narrow definition of \u201cgathered\u201d is not consistent with rules of statutory construction. If a statute \u201ccontains a definition of a word used therein, that definition controls,\u201d but nothing else appearing, \u201cwords must be given their common and ordinary meaning[.]\u201d In re Clayton-Marcus Co., 286 N.C. 215, 219, 210 S.E.2d 199, 203 (1974). Since \u201cgathered\u201d is not defined by the Public Hospital Personnel Act, we must employ its common and ordinary meaning. \u201cGather\u201d is defined as: (1) \u201c[t]o cause to come together; convene[,]\u201d (2) \u201c[t]o accumulate gradually; amass[,]\u201d (3) \u201c[t]o harvest or pick: gather flowers[,}\" or (4) \u201c[t]o collect in one place; assemble.\u201d The American Heritage Dictionary 550 (2d college ed. 1991). Logically, a personnel file, in the \u201ccommonly understood definition of a personnel file,\u201d see Elkin Tribune, Inc. v. Yadkin County Bd. of Commissioners, 331 N.C. 735, 737, 417 S.E.2d 465, 466 (1992), is comprised of information and documents, including employee contracts and payroll documents, which are amassed, accumulated, and collected into one place by the employer. Contrary to plaintiffs argument in this case, the documents it requested from defendant were \u201cgathered\u201d by defendant if the documents were amassed or assembled in an employee\u2019s personnel file.\nThe definition of \u201cgathered\u201d in the present case follows our Supreme Court\u2019s interpretation of \u201cgathered\u201d in Elkin Tribune, Inc. In addressing a question similar to the one before us in the present case, our Supreme Court analyzed N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 153A-98, which provides for the privacy of county employee personnel records. Elkin Tribune, Inc., 331 N.C. 735, 417 S.E.2d 465. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 153A-98 contains almost identical language as is contained in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 131E-257.2. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 153A-98 (2003). The plaintiffs in Elkin Tribune, Inc. argued that a county employee\u2019s application for employment was not included in the personnel file because the applications were sent to the county, not \u201cgathered\u201d by the county. Elkin Tribune, Inc., 331 N.C. at 737-38, 417 S.E.2d at 467. The plaintiffs therefore argued that the applications they sought were not protected from public disclosure by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 153A-98. Elkin Tribune, Inc., 331 N.C. at 737-38, 417 S.E.2d at 467. Our Supreme Court ruled, however, that \u201cgathered\u201d included the applications that were sent to the county. Id. Although not explicitly defining the term \u201cgathered,\u201d the Supreme Court clearly did not interpret \u201cgathered\u201d narrowly, but rather, read \u201cgathered\u201d to mean amassed or collected in one place, which, as discussed above, is how we must now read \u201cgathered\u201d in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 131E-267.2.\nHaving determined, in light of our Supreme Court\u2019s decision in News and Observer Publishing Co., that the General Assembly intended N.C.G.S. \u00a7 131E-257.2 to be a \u201cclear statutory exemption or exception\u201d to the Public Records Act, and having determined, in light of our Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Elkin Tribune, Inc., that the General Assembly intended \u201cgathered\u201d to mean amassed or collected in one place, we now evaluate what compensation-related records are included in a personnel file of a public hospital employee. Defendant contends that \u201c \u2018current salary\u2019 is the only compensation information about a public hospital employee that is public record.\u201d Specifically, defendant argues that the trial court erred in ordering defendant to produce employment contracts, severance agreements, and \u201cany other documents that describe[d] in whole or in part compensation paid (in any form) to [the persons listed in plaintiff\u2019s complaint],\u201d when these documents exceeded the scope of \u201ccurrent salary.\u201d\nPrior to the enactment of the Public Hospital Personnel Act in 1997, the confidentiality of personnel records for public hospital employees was governed by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 131E-97.1, which provided that \u201ctotal compensation,\u201d among other things, was a matter of public record subject to disclosure. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E~97.1(b) (1994). In 1997, the General Assembly repealed this provision in subsection (b) of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 131E-97.1, and enacted the Public Hospital Personnel Act, which, as discussed above, provides that with regard to compensation, only an employee\u2019s \u201c[c]urrent salary, and the date and amount of the most recent increase or decrease in salary\u201d is a matter of public record. We agree with defendant that because \u201c[t]he legislature is always presumed to act with full knowledge of prior and existing law[,]\u201d A&F Trademark, Inc. v. Tolson, 167 N.C. App. 150, 156, 605 S.E.2d 187,192 (2004), making only \u201ccurrent salary,\u201d rather than \u201ctotal compensation,\u201d a matter of public record indicates that the General Assembly deliberately chose to limit public disclosure of a public hospital employee\u2019s compensation to the employee\u2019s current salary.\nThe General Assembly\u2019s deliberate choice not to have \u201ctotal compensation\u201d be a matter of public record is further evidenced by the fact that the General Assembly used the broader term \u201ccompensation\u201d in other sections of the Public Hospital Personnel Act, enacted at the same time as N.C.G.S. \u00a7 131E-257.2. For instance, the General Assembly provided in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 131E-257(b) that part of the purpose of the Public Hospital Personnel Act was \u201cto authorize public hospitals to determine employee compensation[.]\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 131E-257(b). The General Assembly also used \u201ccompensation\u201d in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E-257.1, which provides that \u201c[a] public hospital shall determine the pay, expense allowances, and other compensation of its officers and employeesf.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E-257.1(a) (2003). As defendant asserts, \u201c[i]n the absence of contrary indication, it is presumed that no word of any statute is a mere redundant expression. Each word is to be construed upon the supposition that the Legislature intended thereby to add something to the meaning of the statute.\u201d Transportation Service v. County of Robeson, 283 N.C. 494, 500, 196 S.E.2d 770, 774 (1973). The General Assembly distinguished between \u201ccompensation\u201d and \u201ccurrent salary,\u201d and consciously chose to use the term \u201ccurrent salary\u201d in deciding what parts of a public hospital employee\u2019s personnel file was a matter of public record.\nDefendant contends that the \u201ccommon and ordinary meaning\u201d of \u201csalary\u201d is \u201c[a] fixed compensation for services, paid to a person on a regular basis.\u201d See The American Heritage Dictionary 1085. Plaintiff advocates for a broader reading of \u201ccurrent salary,\u201d arguing that defendant\u2019s reading of \u201csalary\u201d is inconsistent. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that defendant is trying to have \u201cpersonnel file\u201d encompass all forms of compensation, but to narrowly define \u201csalary\u201d as \u201cfixed compensation.\u201d Because subsection (a) of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 131E-257.2 defines \u201cpersonnel file\u201d as consisting of \u201cany information in any form gathered by the public hospital with respect to an employee and, by way of illustration but not limitation, relating to . . . salary,\u201d plaintiff argues that \u201csalary\u201d in section (a) and (b) must be read consistently; i.e., \u201csalary\u201d cannot mean \u201ctotal compensation\u201d in section (a) and mean \u201cfixed compensation\u201d in section (b). We agree. However, the list of items in subsection (a), to which the information in a personnel file must relate, is merely illustrative. The statute explicitly qualifies the list with the phrase: \u201cby way of illustration but not limitation.\u201d Other forms of compensation, such as severance agreements, are documents that would normally be included in what is \u201cthe commonly understood definition of a personnel file.\u201d See Elkin Tribune, Inc., 331 N.C. at 737, 417 S.E.2d at 466. Furthermore, forms of compensation, other than salary, would relate to a public hospital employee\u2019s \u201cselection or nonselection, performance, promotions,\u201d and possibly to the employee\u2019s \u201ctermination of employment.\u201d See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 131E-257.2(a). Therefore, we are not persuaded by plaintiff\u2019s argument that forms of compensation, other than salary, are not part of a public hospital employee\u2019s personnel file.\nPlaintiff also argues that it offends common sense to \u201callow public institutions to avoid revealing how public officials are paid simply by shifting the form of pay from fixed salary to bonuses, lump-sum payments, or other forms of compensation.\u201d However, plaintiff ignores, as we have established above, that the General Assembly deliberately chose to treat public hospitals differently from other public institutions, by excepting personnel records of public hospital employees from the Public Records Act. Defendant asserts that the General Assembly enacted the Public Hospital Personnel Act to strike a balance between the public\u2019s interest in having access to financial information of government entities and the public hospital\u2019s need to compete effectively for qualified personnel with private hospitals that are not subject to public records laws. Whatever the General Assembly\u2019s policy considerations, the language employed by the General Assembly shows that it was concerned about protecting the confidentiality of public hospital personnel information, thereby specifically exempting this information from broad public access. Gf. Virmani, 350 N.C. at 477, 515 S.E.2d at 693 (discussing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E-95 and stating \u201cthe legislature has determined that this right of access is outweighed by the compelling countervailing governmental interest in protecting the confidentiality of the medical peer review process\u201d).\nWe reverse the order of the trial court granting plaintiff summary judgment and remand for entry of an order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant.\nReversed and remanded.\nJudges CALABRIA and ELMORE concur.\n. The plain language of subsection (b) of the statute requires only the information with regard to these six items relating to a public hospital employee be public record. The statute does not require specific documents to be disclosed except as provided in subsection (c).", "type": "majority", "author": "McGEE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Brooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey, & Leonard, L.L.P., by Mark J. Prak, Marcus W. Trathen and Charles E. Coble, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A., by Mark W. Merritt and Blake W. Thomas, for defendant-appellant.", "Linwood L. Jones for North Carolina Hospital Association, amicus curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE KNIGHT PUBLISHING CO., d/b/a The Charlotte Observer, Plaintiff-Appellee v. THE CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG HOSPITAL AUTHORITY, d/b/a CAROLINAS HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, Defendant-Appellant\nNo. COA04-1252\n(Filed 16 August 2005)\nPublic Records\u2014 public hospitals \u2014 salary information\nSummary judgment should have been granted for a public hospital (defendant) seeking to protect all but the current salary information of certain employees from a public records request. The Public Hospital Personnel Act (N.C.G.S. \u00a7 131E-257.2(a)) is very specific; the language used by the General Assembly shows that it was concerned about protecting the confidentiality of public hospital personnel records, thereby exempting the information from broad public access.\nAppeal by defendant from order and judgment entered 2 August 2004 by Judge David S. Cayer in Superior Court, Mecklenburg County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 May 2005.\nBrooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey, & Leonard, L.L.P., by Mark J. Prak, Marcus W. Trathen and Charles E. Coble, for plaintiff-appellee.\nRobinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A., by Mark W. Merritt and Blake W. Thomas, for defendant-appellant.\nLinwood L. Jones for North Carolina Hospital Association, amicus curiae." }, "file_name": "0486-01", "first_page_order": 516, "last_page_order": 526 }