{ "id": 8321394, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF: J.B.", "name_abbreviation": "In re J.B.", "decision_date": "2005-08-16", "docket_number": "No. COA04-901", "first_page": "747", "last_page": "758", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "172 N.C. App. 747" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "580 S.E.2d 395", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "399", "parenthetical": "finding that the court unlawfully delegated its authority under this statute when the court conditioned its order placing respondent in residential treatment dependent on a counselor deeming such placement necessary" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 N.C. App. 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9187123 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "292", "parenthetical": "finding that the court unlawfully delegated its authority under this statute when the court conditioned its order placing respondent in residential treatment dependent on a counselor deeming such placement necessary" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/158/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "569 S.E.2d 683", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "279" }, { "page": "686" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 N.C. App. 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9249504 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "280" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/153/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "567 S.E.2d 227", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229", "parenthetical": "citations and internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 N.C. App. 733", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9082328 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "737-38", "parenthetical": "citations and internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/151/0733-01" ] }, { "cite": "546 S.E.2d 407", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "412" }, { "page": "412" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 N.C. App. 461", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11435166 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "466" }, { "page": "468" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/143/0461-01" ] }, { "cite": "515 S.E.2d 719", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "721", "parenthetical": "upholding a special probationary condition restricting a juvenile's access to television for a one year period" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 N.C. App. 433", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11220066 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434", "parenthetical": "upholding a special probationary condition restricting a juvenile's access to television for a one year period" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/133/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "589 S.E.2d 894", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "895" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "162 N.C. App. 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8915796 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/162/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 S.E.2d 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "833" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4755941 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 S.E.2d 84", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 670", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551143, 551390, 551342, 551375 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0670-01", "/nc/347/0670-02", "/nc/347/0670-03", "/nc/347/0670-04" ] }, { "cite": "493 S.E.2d 797", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "802" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "128 N.C. App. 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11652448 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/128/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 U.S. 528", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12027325 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/403/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 S.E.2d 879", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "275 N.C. 517", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559163 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/275/0517-01" ] }, { "cite": "260 S.E.2d 591", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "607" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 640", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573829 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "666" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0640-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 S.E.2d 481", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "93 N.C. App. 34", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527781 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/93/0034-01" ] }, { "cite": "540 S.E.2d 313", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135912 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 S.E.2d 861", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "872", "parenthetical": "citing the current statute's predecessor statute N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-646" }, { "page": "873-74", "parenthetical": "citing In re Vinson, 298 N.C. 640, 260 S.E.2d 591 (1979); In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 169 S.E.2d 879 (1969), aff'd. sub. nom., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S. Ct. 1976 (1971)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 532", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569752 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "551", "parenthetical": "citing the current statute's predecessor statute N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-646" }, { "page": "553", "parenthetical": "citing In re Vinson, 298 N.C. 640, 260 S.E.2d 591 (1979); In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 169 S.E.2d 879 (1969), aff'd. sub. nom., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S. Ct. 1976 (1971)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0532-01" ] }, { "cite": "567 S.E.2d 227", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229" }, { "page": "229" }, { "page": "229" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "151 N.C. App. 733", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9082328 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "736-37" }, { "page": "737" }, { "page": "738" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/151/0733-01" ] }, { "cite": "546 S.E.2d 407", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "412" }, { "page": "412", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "143 N.C. App. 461", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11435166 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "466" }, { "page": "468" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/143/0461-01" ] }, { "cite": "515 S.E.2d 719", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "721", "parenthetical": "citing In re Groves, 93 N.C. App. 34, 376 S.E.2d 481 (1989)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "133 N.C. App. 433", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11220066 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434", "parenthetical": "citing In re Groves, 93 N.C. App. 34, 376 S.E.2d 481 (1989)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/133/0433-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1124, "char_count": 27185, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5502016603487503e-07, "percentile": 0.6745018725029915 }, "sha256": "82a02e437b31400634aed615932dccc990e3a7fdacb3efcce714dbccf2c1989c", "simhash": "1:deebf53d94ee0e26", "word_count": 4405 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:22:54.702952+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge HUNTER concurs.", "Judge JACKSON dissents." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF: J.B." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CALABRIA, Judge.\nJ.B., a juvenile, appeals a disposition order for twelve months\u2019 supervised probation following his adjudication for the offense of involuntary manslaughter. We affirm.\nOn 11 November 2003, J.B., age fifteen, and his cousin (the \u201cvictim\u201d) were hunting with two teenage friends. J.B., who was armed with a twelve-gauge shotgun, and the victim, who was unarmed, decided to separate from their friends and continue hunting as a pair. When the victim failed to return from the hunting trip, a search started that evening. The victim was found dead the following day with a shotgun wound to his face. Law enforcement officers determined the victim was shot by someone standing upright at a distance of approximately fifteen to eighteen feet. Near the victim\u2019s body was a large, white rock that looked out of place.\nOn 13 November 2003, law enforcement officers interviewed J.B., who told them that, shortly after he and the victim had paired off, the victim left to find their friends. Thereafter, J.B. thought he heard an animal and turned and fired his shotgun. When J.B. discovered he had shot the victim, J.B. panicked, ran back through the woods, and discarded the shotgun along the way. On the evening of 13 November 2003, J.B. returned to the area to help law enforcement officers find his shotgun.\nOn 14 November 2003, law enforcement officers asked J.B. to accompany them to the scene to re-enact the shooting. When asked about his location relative to the victim when he fired his shotgun, J.B. said he was seated and much further away than eighteen feet. An officer told J.B. that the evidence was inconsistent with J.B.\u2019s version of events, and J.B. began to cry. J.B. then changed his recounting of how he shot the victim.\nJ.B. stated he and the victim paired off from their friends, entered the woods, and sat down together. While seated, the victim lit a cigarette. When the victim passed the cigarette to J.B., J.B. put it out and broke it, causing the victim to become \u201ca little bit ill.\u201d Although the victim initially got up and walked away, he returned and began circling J.B., who was still seated. The victim said something J.B. could not hear or did not recall, although J.B. admitted the two were not \u201cfussing.\u201d The victim then picked up a large rock, which J.B. said the victim appeared to be about to throw at him in a \u201cgoofing around\u201d manner. J.B. decided to also \u201cgoof around\u201d by leveling his shotgun and pulling the trigger. J.B. was surprised when the gun went off, and as soon as he realized the victim had been shot, J.B. panicked and ran away. J.B. soon returned, however, gathered his clothing and shotgun, ran back through the woods, and threw the shotgun in some vines and bushes along the way. As soon as he arrived home, J.B. took a shower, picked pecans with his grandmother outside, and accompanied his father on an errand. J.B. participated in the ensuing search for the victim, but he did not disclose to anyone the victim\u2019s fate or whereabouts. At J.B.\u2019s delinquency proceeding, his stepmother testified, in relevant part, that J.B. was a high school student taking a special studies skills class and exhibited learning difficulties since the fifth or sixth grade. J.B.\u2019s high school principal testified that, aside from a two-day suspension for a tobacco-related incident on school property, J.B. was not a problem at school and had an excellent attendance record up until the victim\u2019s death.\nAt the delinquency proceedings, the trial court received into evidence a memo written by Doctor Heather Scheffler (\u201cDr. Scheffler\u201d), a licensed clinical psychologist specializing in childhood learning disorders, who started treating J.B. in March 2001. Accprding to the memo, the age-equivalents for J.B.\u2019s IQ ranged from seven years, two months to thirteen years, six months with an average of ten years, eight months, and his IQ was 73. Dr. Scheffler further indicated J.B. had \u201cdifficulty in comprehending things, especially complex social interactions, on an age-appropriate level.\u201d Dr. Scheffler diagnosed J.B. with the inattentive form of Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder. Following the shooting incident, Dr. Scheffler started counseling J.B. weekly.\nOn 18 November 2003, the State filed a petition alleging J.B. was a delinquent juvenile for the shooting death of the victim. On 19 December 2004, the Harnett County District Attorney\u2019s Office filed a motion to transfer the case to superior court upon a finding of probable cause for the charge of involuntary manslaughter. On 16 January 2004, the matter came before the Harnett County District Court as a probable cause hearing on the State\u2019s involuntary manslaughter charge and a transfer hearing on the State\u2019s motion to have J.B. tried in superior court as an adult. The judge denied the State\u2019s transfer motion, and J.B., with the assistance of counsel, signed a transcript of admission for the offense of involuntary manslaughter. The court accepted the admission and proceeded to disposition.\nThe court placed J.B. on twelve months\u2019 probation, under the supervision of a juvenile court counselor, subject to compliance with, inter alia, the special probationary conditions that:\n(1) J.B. visit and place flowers on the victim\u2019s grave site on the anniversaries of the victim\u2019s birth and death dates;\n(2) J.B. wear a necklace around his neck with a picture of the victim; and\n(3) J.B. not participate in school functions/activities such as football, prom/dances.\nJ.B. appeals, asserting the trial court abused its discretion in ordering these probationary conditions because the evidence was insufficient to indicate these conditions were in his and the State\u2019s best interests. We disagree.\nWhen a trial court places a delinquent juvenile on probation pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2506(8) (2004), the court has the authority to impose conditions of probation \u201cthat are related to the needs of the juvenile and . . . reasonably necessary to ensure that the juvenile will lead a law-abiding life.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2510(a) (2004). Under this authority, the court may impose specifically enumerated conditions, including \u201c[t]hat the juvenile satisfy any other conditions determined appropriate by the court.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2510(a)(14) (2004). \u201cIn deciding the conditions of probation, the trial judge is free to fashion alternatives which are in harmony with the individual child\u2019s needs.\u201d In re McDonald, 133 N.C. App. 433, 434, 515 S.E.2d 719, 721 (1999) (upholding a special probationary condition restricting a juvenile\u2019s access to television for a one year period). The trial court\u2019s discretion must nevertheless \u201cbe exercised within the stated goals and purposes of the Juvenile Code.\u201d In re Schrimpsher, 143 N.C. App. 461, 466, 546 S.E.2d 407, 412 (2001). That is, \u201cthe record must show that the condition [of probation] is fair and reasonable, related to the needs of the child, . . . calculated to promote the best interest of the juvenile in conformity with the avowed policy of the State in its relation with juveniles . . . [and] sufficiently specific to be enforced.\u201d Id., 143 N.C. App. at 468, 546 S.E.2d at 412. On appeal, we will not disturb a trial court\u2019s ruling regarding a juvenile\u2019s disposition absent an abuse of discretion, which occurs \u201cwhen the trial court\u2019s ruling is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d In re Robinson, 151 N.C. App. 733, 737-38, 567 S.E.2d 227, 229 (2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). With these principals in mind, we turn to J.B.\u2019s contentions.\nInitially, J.B. cites In re M.E.B., 153 N.C. App. 278, 569 S.E.2d 683 (2002), where this Court reversed the trial court\u2019s imposition of a special condition of probation requiring the juvenile \u201cto wear a sign around her neck, 12\" x 12\" with the words \u2014 I AM A JUVENILE CRIMINAL \u2014 written in large letters\u201d whenever she was outside her residence. Id., 153 N.C. App. at 280, 569 S.E.2d at 279. J.B. fails to include any argument as to how M.E.B. offers instruction in the instant case. Moreover, we observe that our holding in M.E.B. was predicated on concerns of \u201copening] the juvenile\u2019s records to public display\u201d and impermissibly forcing the juvenile to a de facto form of house arrest where, in order to evade public ridicule, the juvenile was forced to sequester herself in her residence for the length of her probation. Id. at 282, 569 S.E.2d at 686.\nNone of the instant case\u2019s special probationary conditions implicate either of these concerns, which were central to our holding in M.E.B. Specifically, nothing in the probation conditions require publicizing J.B.\u2019s records nor do the conditions present J.B. with the choice of staying at home or enduring public ridicule. The requirement that J.B. wear a necklace with the victim\u2019s picture does not include any specific location in which it must be displayed. Notably absent is any requirement for the picture to be displayed publicly as opposed to being enclosed, for example, in a locket that could be worn underneath J.B.\u2019s clothing. Accordingly, our holding in M.E.B. does not control the probationary conditions in the instant case.\nJ.B. next directs this Court\u2019s attention to certain statements of the trial court. Specifically, J.B. cites to Dr. Scheffler\u2019s evidence regarding his educational development and contrasts it with the following exchange:\nCourt:- \u2014 I\u2019ve heard all this \u2014 I don\u2019t consider [J.B.] slow. I mean I\u2019ve heard what you said about his intellectual \u2014 you know, but that has not crossed my mind. What he did afterwards \u2014 after this happened doesn\u2019t indicate he\u2019s intellectually slow. I mean what he did, if you think about it \u2014 I mean what he did, if he was an adult in a different fact situation, if we were talking \u2014 you know, he could be facing murder charges because of the fact \u2014 what he came by, took the weapon, took everything so he wouldn\u2019t be implicated and he went off and\u2014\nMr. Harrop: But there\u2019s other facts, Judge. I mean\u2014\nCourt: Oh, I know that. That\u2019s what I\u2019m saying.\nThis colloquy discloses that the trial court was cognizant of Dr. Scheffler\u2019s findings concerning J.B.\u2019s below average cognitive functioning; however, when the trial court fashioned J.B.\u2019s probationary conditions, it did not afford this evidence as much weight as the other evidence of J.B.\u2019s actions prior to, during, and after his delinquent act. J.B. does little more than argue the trial court should have accepted his evidence as opposed to the State\u2019s evidence. This argument is not supported by the Code, which instead provides that \u201c[t]he court may consider any evidence . . . [it] finds to be relevant, reliable, and necessary to determine the needs of the juvenile and the most appropriate disposition.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2501(a) (2004) (emphasis added). We, therefore, conclude that the trial court properly considered the evidence before it.\nJ.B.\u2019s final argument is that the trial court did not take into account his individual needs in determining the conditions of probation. With respect to the first two challenged conditions, that J.B. wear a necklace with a picture of the victim and that J.B. visit the victim\u2019s grave site with flowers twice a year, J.B. asserts the trial court could not impose these conditions \u201cunless his therapist concurred that th[ese conditions] would be therapeutic and not cause further emotional damage to [him].\u201d J.B. cites no authority for the proposition that a trial court is required to consult with a therapist or receive a therapist\u2019s permission prior to imposing a probationary condition. Indeed, such a pre-requisite would violate N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2506, which \u201cdoes not contemplate the court vesting its discretion [to fashion dispositional alternatives] in another person or entity,\u201d and instead provides that \u201cthe court, and the court alone, must determine which dispositional alternatives to utilize with each delinquent juvenile.\u201d See In re Hartsock, 158 N.C. App. 287, 292, 580 S.E.2d 395, 399 (2003) (finding that the court unlawfully delegated its authority under this statute when the court conditioned its order placing respondent in residential treatment dependent on a counselor deeming such placement necessary).\nWith respect to the final condition, that J.B. not participate in school functions or activities such as football or prom dances, J.B. asserts that these activities were his means to interact with individuals his own age. However, J.B. concedes that the evidence before the trial court, both concerning the delinquent act itself and the testimony from Dr. Scheffler, indicates his prior problems with complex social interactions on an age-appropriate level. The trial court did not prohibit all opportunities for social interaction: J.B. is free to interact with individuals his own age in structured environments, such as in school during regular hours or at his family\u2019s church where J.B. has been attending youth group functions for several years. The prohibited extracurricular functions and activities involve less-structured, complex interactions of the type that are most likely to pose the greatest danger for inappropriate or delinquent conduct by J.B.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the conditions of probation imposed by the trial court in the instant case.\nAffirmed.\nJudge HUNTER concurs.\nJudge JACKSON dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "CALABRIA, Judge." }, { "text": "JACKSON, Judge,\ndissenting.\nFor the reasons stated below, I must respectfully dissent from the majority\u2019s decision to affirm the conditions of probation imposed by the trial court.\nJuvenile dispositions in delinquency proceedings are controlled by Chapter 7B, section 2500, of the North Carolina General Statutes. \u201cThe purpose of [these] dispositions in juvenile actions is to design an appropriate plan to meet the needs of the juvenile and to achieve the objectives of the State in exercising jurisdiction.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7b-2500; In re Brownlee, 301 N.C. 532, 551, 272 S.E.2d 861, 872 (1981) (citing the current statute\u2019s predecessor statute N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-646), distinguished on other grounds by Bailey v. State, 353 N.C. 142, 158, 540 S.E.2d 313, 323 (2002). Accordingly, the court must select a disposition \u201cdesigned to protect the public\u201d and \u201cto meet the needs and best interests of the juvenile\u201d based on:\n(1) the seriousness of the offense;\n(2) the need to hold the juvenile accountable;\n(3) the importance of protecting the public safety;\n(4) the degree of culpability indicated by circumstances of the particular case; and\n(5) the rehabilitative and treatment needs of the juvenile indicated by a risk and needs of the assessment.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2501(c). Chapter 7B, section 2510(a)(14) of the North Carolina General Statutes further provides that \u201c[t]he court may impose conditions of probation that are related to the needs of the juvenile and that are reasonably necessary to ensure that the juvenile will lead a law-abiding life, including [requiring] the juvenile to satisfy any other conditions determined appropriate by the court.\u201d This Court previously has stated that when the court is determining what conditions of probation are appropriate, the trial judge has authority to \u201cfashion alternatives which are in harmony with the individual child\u2019s needs.\u201d In re McDonald, 133 N.C. App. 433, 434, 515 S.E.2d 719, 721 (1999) (citing In re Groves, 93 N.C. App. 34, 376 S.E.2d 481 (1989)). In making its decision concerning the juvenile\u2019s disposition, the court also must exercise \u201cits juvenile jurisdiction\u201d in weighing the State\u2019s best interests. In re Brownlee, 301 N.C. 532, 553, 272 S.E.2d 861, 873-74 (1981) (citing In re Vinson, 298 N.C. 640, 260 S.E.2d 591 (1979); In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 169 S.E.2d 879 (1969), aff\u2019d. sub. nom., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S. Ct. 1976 (1971)).\nAlthough our Juvenile Code has granted broad authority to the courts in fashioning appropriate dispositions for juveniles, that discretion is not without limitation. In re Schrimpsher, 143 N.C. App. 461, 466, 546 S.E.2d 407, 412 (2001). \u201c[T]his discretion must be exercised within the stated goals and purposes of the Juvenile Code.\u201d Id.\nIn this case, when balancing J.B.\u2019s needs with the State\u2019s best interest, the record tends to show that actually it would be adverse to his needs and not in his best interest to require him to visit the victim\u2019s grave site or to wear a necklace with the victim\u2019s picture affixed inside. I agree with the State\u2019s contention that accountability is one of the goals of the juvenile justice system; however, it also is a goal of the juvenile justice system to \u201cmeet the needs of the juvenile\u201d in providing an appropriate plan for rehabilitating the juvenile. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2500(2005). \u201c[T]he record must show that the condition is fair and reasonable, related to the needs of the child, and calculated to promote the best interest of the juvenile in conformity with the avowed policy of the State in its relation with juveniles.\u201d In re Schrimpsher, 143 N.C. App. at 468, 546 S.E.2d at 412 (citation omitted). See also In re Robinson, 151 N.C. App. 733, 736-37, 567 S.E.2d 227, 229 (2002).\nAbsent an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, its ruling may not be disturbed on appeal. In re Robinson, 151 N.C. App. 733, 737, 567 S.E.2d 227, 229 (2002). \u201c \u2018 \u201cAn abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court\u2019s ruling \u2018is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u2019 \u201d \u2019 \u201d In re Robinson, 151 N.C. App. at 738, 567 S.E.2d at 229(quoting Chicora Country Club, Inc. v. Town of Erwin, 128 N.C. App. 101, 109, 493 S.E.2d 797, 802 (1997), disc. rev. denied, 347 N.C. 670, 500 S.E.2d 84 (1998) (quoting White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985)). It is also well settled that \u201c[t]he dispositional order shall be in writing and shall contain appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2512. See also In re Ferrell, 162 N.C. App. 175, 177, 589 S.E.2d 894, 895 (2004).\nHere, \u201cthe findings of fact in the dispositional order do not support the trial court\u2019s decision\u201d to require J.B. to visit the victim\u2019s grave site. The evidence further fails to support the court\u2019s finding that wearing a necklace with the victim\u2019s picture affixed inside would be in J.B.\u2019s best interests. It is, therefore, my opinion that the juvenile court abused its discretion. The record indicates that J.B. (1) was in grief counseling and is continuing to grieve; (2) was the victim\u2019s cousin and likely sees the victim\u2019s family frequently; (3) has an 82 IQ with a below average functional range; (4) has age-equivalents ranging from 7 years, 2 months, to 13 years, 6 months with an average of 10 years, 8 months; (5) probably will need continued involvement in therapy based on J.B.\u2019s adjustment and the potential of his becoming a risk to himself \u2014 rather than to others; (6) has difficulty in comprehension, especially in complex social interactions; (7) is in the clinical range on Hyperactivity, Conduct Problems, Depression, and Withdrawal and is in the borderline range for Anxiety; and (8) has Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder and had difficulty in school beginning around the fifth or sixth grade.\nIn determining J.B.\u2019s conditions for probation, the juvenile court explained to him the seriousness of his actions and the importance of taking responsibility for those actions.\nCourt: I\u2019ve heard ad nauseam about what you\u2019ve gone through. But what you\u2019ve gone through compares nothing to what the [victim\u2019s] family has gone through. Do you understand that?\nJuvenile: Yes, sir.\nCourt: And what they\u2019ve gone through is because of your actions and your actions alone .... And because of your stupidity \u2014 which is what is was \u2014 plainly stupidity \u2014 [the victim] is not going to graduate from high school, he ain\u2019t going to no prom, he ain\u2019t going to get married, ain\u2019t going to have no children. None of those things. Because of your stupidity .... Do you understand that?\nJuvenile: Yes, sir.\nCourt: And I hope you appreciate \u2014 truly appreciate what you\u2019ve done. You call it an accident. I don\u2019t. That ain\u2019t no accident .... And just so you\u2019ll know where I\u2019m coming from, the fact that you shot your cousin, then ran away, and then returned to retrieve property so you wouldn\u2019t be implicated and did nothing to notify\u2014 that\u2019s just cold-hearted. That is just absolutely cold-hearted. And I think you forfeit any right to participate in any high school functions because of that behavior. [The victim] has given it up for the rest of his life. He doesn\u2019t get to do any of that. So, I think for two years, it wouldn\u2019t hurt you at all.\u201d\nWhile it was within the juvenile court\u2019s authority to consider J.B.\u2019s accountability or lack thereof, the juvenile court also was required to consider all of his individual needs when \u201cfashioning alternatives\u201d for the conditions of probation. The juvenile court focused on J.B.\u2019s \u201ccrime\u201d to the exclusion of his needs; however, both necessarily must be considered pursuant to the requirements of the North Carolina General Statutes. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2501.\nThe juvenile court tended to ignore the undisputed evidence directly related to J.B.\u2019s needs in designing a plan to fit this juvenile\u2019s best interests, although the judge explicitly acknowledges such evidence exists:\nCourt: I think both parties are correct in that I\u2019ve got to consider the protection of the public and the needs of the juvenile considering all these factors to transfer it. And so I will find that . . . the juvenile falls in the below average range as far as his intellectual functioning. That the evidence that I heard is that he thinks as someone who is two to three years younger than his actual physical age. I didn\u2019t hear any direct evidence concerning the maturity of the juvenile .... He has no prior record .... Been no prior attempts to rehabilitate the juvenile.\nAfter considering the seriousness of the crime, the juvenile court found that out of \u201call the evidence . . . [J.B.\u2019s] not a danger to society or is not a danger to the public.\u201d The juvenile court further stated in direct contradiction of its statements noted supra:\nCourt: \u2014I\u2019ve heard all this \u2014 I don\u2019t consider [the juvenile] slow. I mean I\u2019ve heard what you said about his intellectual \u2014 you know, but that has not crossed my mind. What he did afterwards \u2014 after this happened doesn\u2019t indicate he\u2019s intellectually slow.\nThe record was clear, however, that J.B.\u2019s IQ was below average functional range and J.B. has had difficulty in school beginning around the fifth or sixth grade. Doctor Heather Scheffler (\u201cDr. Scheffler\u201d), a clinical psychologist with an emphasis in pediatrics and with experience in conducting assessments, consulting with school systems regarding children with needs, and providing therapy for childhood and adolescent disorders, such as Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, learning disorders, depression, and anxiety, diagnosed J.B. with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder in 2001, a diagnosis which was not made in anticipation of this dispositional hearing, but rather done after his parents requested a psychological evaluation to complement a planned school-based psycho-educational evaluation. Moreover, the juvenile court gave no consideration to Dr. Sheffler\u2019s findings that J.B. had problems with hyperactivity, conduct, depression, withdrawal, and anxiety nor did it give any consideration that he was in grief counseling when it determined that he must wear a necklace around his neck and visit the victim\u2019s grave site. The juvenile court should have considered all of the evidence when determining the individualized needs of J.B. and balancing those needs against the objectives of the state.\nThe record further indicated that the juvenile court compared J.B.\u2019s actions to those of an adult when determining his conditions of probation.\nCourt: I mean what he did, if you think about it \u2014 I mean what he did, if he was an adult in a different fact situation, if we were talking \u2014 you know, he could be facing murder charges because of the fact \u2014 what he came by, took the weapon, took everything so he wouldn\u2019t be implicated and he went off. . .\nCounsel: But there\u2019s other facts, Judge. I mean\u2014\nCourt: Oh, I know that. That\u2019s what I\u2019m saying.\n\u201cDisposition of a juvenile, however, involves a philosophy far different from adult sentencing .... [A] delinquent child is not a \u2018criminal.\u2019 The inference is that a juvenile\u2019s disposition is not intended to be a punishment but rather an attempt to rehabilitate him.\u201d In re Vinson, 298 N.C. 640, 666, 260 S.E.2d 591, 607 (1979). Therefore, it is irrelevant what the court would have done were J.B. an adult and it was inappropriate for the court to take into consideration what it would have done if he were to be punished and treated as an adult.\nBased on the record before the court containing the special individualized needs of this juvenile, and for the reasons stated above, I would find the court erred in requiring J.B. to visit the victim\u2019s grave site and to wear a necklace with the victim\u2019s picture affixed inside.\nAccordingly, I must dissent from the majority\u2019s opinion.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JACKSON, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Gayl M. Manthei, for the State.", "Susan J. Hall for juvenile-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF: J.B.\nNo. COA04-901\n(Filed 16 August 2005)\nJuveniles\u2014 delinquency \u2014 special probationary conditions\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering a juvenile to have twelve months\u2019 supervised probation following his adjudication for the offense of involuntary manslaughter with the special probationary conditions that he visit and place flowers on' the victim\u2019s grave site on the anniversaries of the victim\u2019s birth and death dates, that he wear a necklace around his neck with a picture of the victim, and that he not participate in school functions/activities such as football and prom/dances, because: (1) nothing in the probation conditions require publicizing the juvenile\u2019s records nor do the conditions present the juvenile with the choice of staying at home or enduring public ridicule; (2) the requirement that the juvenile wear a necklace with the victim\u2019s picture does not include any specific location in which it must be displayed; (3) the trial court was cognizant of a psychologist\u2019s findings concerning the juvenile\u2019s below average cognitive functioning and properly considered it; (4) the juvenile cites no authority for the proposition that a trial court is required to consult with a therapist or receive a therapist\u2019s permission prior to imposing a probationary condition, and such a prerequisite would violate N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2506; and (5) the trial court did not prohibit all opportunities for social interaction, but instead prohibited extracurricular functions and activities involving less structured complex interactions of the type that are most likely to pose the greatest danger for inappropriate or delinquent conduct by the juvenile.\nJudge Jackson dissenting.\nAppeal by juvenile from order entered 16 January 2004 by Judge Jim Love, Jr., in Harnett County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 2 February 2005.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Gayl M. Manthei, for the State.\nSusan J. Hall for juvenile-appellant." }, "file_name": "0747-01", "first_page_order": 777, "last_page_order": 788 }