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  "name": "BETTY L. GRANT, Executrix of the Estate of Tommy J. Grant, Plaintiff v. HIGH POINT REGIONAL HEALTH SYSTEM, Defendant",
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    "judges": [
      "Judges TYSON and BRYANT concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "BETTY L. GRANT, Executrix of the Estate of Tommy J. Grant, Plaintiff v. HIGH POINT REGIONAL HEALTH SYSTEM, Defendant"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "McCullough, Judge.\nOn 6 February 2004, plaintiff filed an action against defendant in Guilford County Superior Court. There are two divisions of the Guilford County Superior Court: the Greensboro Division and the High Point Division. Plaintiff filed her action in the Greensboro Division, and defendant filed a motion to transfer the case to the High Point Division. The trial court denied the motion without prejudice. The court specifically noted that defendant could renew the motion on the basis of justice and the convenience of witnesses pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-83(2) (2003) after the filing of its answer. From the denial of its motion, defendant now appeals. We conclude that the appeal must be dismissed as interlocutory.\nAn order \u201cis either interlocutory or the final determination of the rights of the parties.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 54(a) (2003). A final judgment \u201cdisposes of the cause as to all the parties, leaving nothing to be judicially determined between them in the trial court[,]\u201d while an interlocutory order \u201cdoes not dispose of the case, but leaves it for further action by the trial court in order to settle and determine the entire controversy.\u201d Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 362, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381, reh\u2019g denied, 231 N.C. 744, 59 S.E.2d 429 (1950).\nIn general, there is no right to appeal from an interlocutory order. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 54(b) (2003); Jeffreys v. Raleigh Oaks Joint Venture, 115 N.C. App. 377, 379, 444 S.E.2d 252, 253 (1994). There are two significant exceptions to this rule. First, an interlocutory order is immediately appealable \u201cwhen the trial court enters \u2018a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties\u2019 and the trial court certifies in the judgment that there is no just reason to delay the appeal.\u201d Jeffreys, 115 N.C. App. at 379, 444 S.E.2d at 253 (quoting Rule 54(b)). Second, an interlocutory order may be immediately appealed if \u201cthe order deprives the appellant of a substantial right which would be jeopardized absent a review prior to a final determination on the merits.\u201d Southern Uniform Rentals v. Iowa Nat\u2019l Mutual Ins. Co., 90 N.C. App. 738, 740, 370 S.E.2d 76, 78 (1988). Whether an interlocutory appeal affects a substantial right is determined on a case-by-case basis. McCallum v. N.C. Coop. Extension Serv., 142 N.C. App. 48, 50, 542 S.E.2d 227, 231, appeal dismissed, disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 452, 548 S.E.2d 527 (2001). This Court has previously held that:\nA substantial right is \u201cone which will clearly be lost or irremediably adversely affected if the order is not reviewable before final judgment.\u201d The right to immediate appeal is \u201creserved for those cases in which the normal course of procedure is inadequate to protect the substantial right affected by the order sought to be appealed.\u201d Our courts have generally taken a restrictive view of the substantial right exception. The burden is on the appealing party to establish that a substantial right will be affected.\nTurner v. Norfolk S. Corp., 137 N.C. App. 138, 142, 526 S.E.2d 666, 670 (2000) (citations omitted). \u201cWhen an appeal is interlocutory, the statement [of the grounds for review in an appellant\u2019s brief] must contain sufficient facts and argument to support appellate review on the ground that the challenged order affects a substantial right.\u201d N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(4) (2005).\nIn the present case, defendant admits that the trial court\u2019s order is interlocutory, but insists that a substantial right is involved. Specifically, defendant contends that a venue determination is involved. It is true that the \u201cright to venue established by statute is a substantial right,\u201d the denial of which is \u201cimmediately appealable.\u201d Gardner v. Gardner, 300 N.C. 715, 719, 268 S.E.2d 468, 471 (1980). The applicable statutory right to venue provides that \u201cthe action must be tried in the county in which the plaintiffs or the defendants, or any of them, reside at its commencement_\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-82 (2003) (emphasis added). Quite differently, the subject of the present appeal is the \u201cproper place of trial\u201d within a county. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-42(c) (2003) (emphasis added).\nThe statute which governs the \u201cproper place of trial\u201d within a county states that \u201c[a]ll laws, rules, and regulations ... in force and effect in determining the proper venue as between the superior courts of the several counties of the State shall apply for the purpose of determining the proper place of trial as between . . . divisions within [a] county . ...\u201d Id. However, the statute does not go so far as to make venue proper only in the \u201cproper place of trial.\u201d\nWe are unpersuaded that a trial court\u2019s denial of a motion to transfer proceedings to a \u201cproper place of trial\u201d within a county necessarily affects a substantial right if venue is proper in the county in which the action was filed. Moreover, other than its argument that a venue ruling is immediately appealable, defendant has made no argument that the denial of its motion affected a substantial right. As such, we conclude that defendant\u2019s appeal is interlocutory, does not affect a substantial right, and must be dismissed.\nDismissed as interlocutory.\nJudges TYSON and BRYANT concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "McCullough, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Kennedy, Kennedy, Kennedy & Kennedy, L.L.P., by Harvey L. Kennedy and Harold L. Kennedy, III, for plaintiff appellee.",
      "Sharpless & Stavola, P.A., by Joseph P. Booth, III, for defendant appellant."
    ],
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    "head_matter": "BETTY L. GRANT, Executrix of the Estate of Tommy J. Grant, Plaintiff v. HIGH POINT REGIONAL HEALTH SYSTEM, Defendant\nNo. COA04-1439\n(Filed 16 August 2005)\nAppeal and Error\u2014 appealability \u2014 interlocutory order\u2014 proper place of trial \u2014 substantial right not affected\nDefendant\u2019s appeal from the trial court\u2019s denial without prejudice of its motion to transfer the case from one division to another in a county with two divisions of court is dismissed as an appeal from an interlocutory order, because: (1) the subject of the present appeal is the proper place of trial within a county under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-4(c), and a trial court\u2019s denial of a motion to transfer proceedings to a proper place of trial within a county does not affect a substantial right when venue is proper in the county in which the action was filed; and (2) other than its argument that a venue ruling is immediately appealable, defendant has made no argument that the denial of its motion affected a substantial right.\nAppeal by defendant from order entered 14 June 2004 by Judge Anderson Cromer in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 June 2005.\nKennedy, Kennedy, Kennedy & Kennedy, L.L.P., by Harvey L. Kennedy and Harold L. Kennedy, III, for plaintiff appellee.\nSharpless & Stavola, P.A., by Joseph P. Booth, III, for defendant appellant."
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  "file_name": "0852-01",
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