{ "id": 8353377, "name": "LUDOVICUS N. KEYZER, a/k/a LUDO KEYZER, JOSEPH KINTZ, ROBIN KINTZ, CARL W. PARKER III, and BARRY NAKELL, Plaintiffs v. AMERLINK, LTD., RICHARD SPOOR, DEBORAH N. MEYER, JOHN MEUSER, MEYER & MEUSER, P.A., AMERICAN DETECTIVE SERVICES, INC., and KENNETH J. JOHNSON, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Keyzer v. Amerlink, Ltd.", "decision_date": "2005-09-20", "docket_number": "No. COA04-1096", "first_page": "284", "last_page": "296", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "173 N.C. App. 284" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "44 F.3d 1345", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 7416127 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1352, 1353" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/44/1345-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 F.3d 505", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11557739 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/194/0505-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 S.E.2d 7", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567352 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0163-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 S.E.2d 715", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "718" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 N.C. App. 638", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523477 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "642" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/61/0638-01" ] }, { "cite": "544 S.E.2d 4", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 N.C. App. 393", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9441495 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/142/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "588 S.E.2d 20", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "27", "parenthetical": "citing Burgess v. Busby, 142 N.C. App. 393, 544 S.E.2d 4 (2001)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 N.C. App. 20", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8955097 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29", "parenthetical": "citing Burgess v. Busby, 142 N.C. App. 393, 544 S.E.2d 4 (2001)" }, { "page": "32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/161/0020-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 711", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2564037 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "355 S.E.2d 819", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "823" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 N.C. App. 610", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12170230 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "615" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/85/0610-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 S.E.2d 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 N.C. App. 20", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11911523 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/123/0020-01" ] }, { "cite": "565 S.E.2d 88", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "95", "parenthetical": "quoting Rule 56(e)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 91", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511494 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "100-01", "parenthetical": "quoting Rule 56(e)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 S.E.2d 135", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "137" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 N.C. App. 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526603 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "190" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/92/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "600 S.E.2d 492", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498", "parenthetical": "quoting Ramsey v. Keever's Used Cars, 92 N.C. App. 187, 190, 374 S.E.2d 135, 137 (1988)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 N.C. App. 737", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8999958 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "745", "parenthetical": "quoting Ramsey v. Keever's Used Cars, 92 N.C. App. 187, 190, 374 S.E.2d 135, 137 (1988)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/165/0737-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 S.E.2d 425", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2488503 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 S.E.2d 339", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "342", "parenthetical": "quoting Collingwood v. G.E. Real Estate Equities, 324 N.C. 63, 66, 376 S.E.2d 425, 427 (1989)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2500046 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "63", "parenthetical": "quoting Collingwood v. G.E. Real Estate Equities, 324 N.C. 63, 66, 376 S.E.2d 425, 427 (1989)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 S.E.2d 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4725743 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "526 S.E.2d 652", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "654", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 458", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155962 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "459", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 S.E.2d 222", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 276", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4691903 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0276-01" ] }, { "cite": "574 S.E.2d 76", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83" }, { "page": "90" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 N.C. App. 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9250748 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468" }, { "page": "479-80" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/155/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 N.C. App. 592", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "476 S.E.2d 130", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 443", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867683, 867689, 867627, 867572, 867647 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0443-03", "/nc/344/0443-01", "/nc/344/0443-02", "/nc/344/0443-05", "/nc/344/0443-04" ] }, { "cite": "463 S.E.2d 553", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "558", "parenthetical": "\"Because we find sufficient evidence to submit the trespass ... to the jury, we conclude it would be error not to submit the factual issues underlying plaintiff's unfair and deceptive trade practices claim as well.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 697", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11917685 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "704", "parenthetical": "\"Because we find sufficient evidence to submit the trespass ... to the jury, we conclude it would be error not to submit the factual issues underlying plaintiff's unfair and deceptive trade practices claim as well.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0697-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 F.3d 806", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11440097 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/306/0806-01" ] }, { "cite": "30 F. Supp. 2d 1182", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 387584 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1203" }, { "page": "1185" }, { "page": "1186" }, { "page": "1203" }, { "page": "1203" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/30/1182-01" ] }, { "cite": "925 F.2d 174", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1789357 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "178" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/925/0174-01" ] }, { "cite": "421 So.2d 109", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9524443 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111", "parenthetical": "consent to enter is valid \"even though consent may have been given under a mistake of facts, or procured by fraiid\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/421/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "828 F. Supp. 745", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3826772 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "757", "parenthetical": "\"where consent was fraudulently induced, but consent was nonetheless given, plaintiff has no claim for trespass\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/828/0745-01" ] }, { "cite": "681 N.Y.S.2d 511", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "case_ids": [ 198209, 198007 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512", "parenthetical": "reporter who gained entry to medical office by posing as potential patient using false identification and insurance cards could not assert consent as defense to trespass claim \"since consent obtained by misrepresentation or fraud is invalid\"" }, { "page": "511" }, { "page": "511" }, { "page": "511" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ad2d/256/0131-01", "/ad2d/256/0134-03" ] }, { "cite": "256 A.D.2d 131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "A.D.2d", "case_ids": [ 198209 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "reporter who gained entry to medical office by posing as potential patient using false identification and insurance cards could not assert consent as defense to trespass claim \"since consent obtained by misrepresentation or fraud is invalid\"" }, { "page": "131" }, { "page": "131" }, { "page": "131" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ad2d/256/0131-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 S.E.2d 524", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "528" }, { "page": "528" }, { "page": "528" }, { "page": "528" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 656", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559739 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "660" }, { "page": "661" }, { "page": "660" }, { "page": "660" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0656-01" ] }, { "cite": "14 S.E.2d 252", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1941, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "256" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "219 N.C. 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624342 ], "year": 1941, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "408" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/219/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 F.3d 1345", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 7416127 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1351-53", "parenthetical": "ABC agents with concealed cameras who obtained consent to enter an ophthalmic clinic by pretending to be patients were not trespassers because, among other things, they \"entered offices open to anyone\"" }, { "page": "1348" }, { "page": "1348-49" }, { "page": "1352", "parenthetical": "emphasis supplied" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/44/1345-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 F.3d 505", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11557739 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517", "parenthetical": "adopting the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Desnick v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 44 F.3d 1345 (1995)" }, { "page": "510" }, { "page": "510-11" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/194/0505-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 S.E.2d 7", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "9", "parenthetical": "defendants did not engage in a voluntary act to invalidate their perceived consent to be on the plaintiffs' property" }, { "page": "9", "parenthetical": "finding liability for trespass when activity on property exceeded scope of consent to enter" }, { "page": "9" }, { "page": "9" }, { "page": "9" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567352 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "167", "parenthetical": "defendants did not engage in a voluntary act to invalidate their perceived consent to be on the plaintiffs' property" }, { "page": "167" }, { "page": "167" }, { "page": "167" }, { "page": "167" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0163-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 S.E.2d 715", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "718" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "61 N.C. App. 638", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523477 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "642" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/61/0638-01" ] }, { "cite": "588 S.E.2d 20", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29", "parenthetical": "citing Kuykendall v. Turner, 61 N.C. App. 638, 642, 301 S.E.2d 715, 718 (1983)" }, { "page": "32" }, { "page": "29" }, { "page": "33" }, { "page": "29" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "161 N.C. App. 20", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8955097 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "32", "parenthetical": "citing Kuykendall v. Turner, 61 N.C. App. 638, 642, 301 S.E.2d 715, 718 (1983)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/161/0020-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1297, "char_count": 31939, "ocr_confidence": 0.739, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.395578819670508e-07, "percentile": 0.7983353469642439 }, "sha256": "f5dd82f7fe4d4e124d91bc160c80596e4ab9f2ae1830cf195e47d5905331fdc8", "simhash": "1:0520e442607bde60", "word_count": 5046 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:45:28.578783+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge MARTIN concurs.", "Judge TYSON concurs in part and dissents in part." ], "parties": [ "LUDOVICUS N. KEYZER, a/k/a LUDO KEYZER, JOSEPH KINTZ, ROBIN KINTZ, CARL W. PARKER III, and BARRY NAKELL, Plaintiffs v. AMERLINK, LTD., RICHARD SPOOR, DEBORAH N. MEYER, JOHN MEUSER, MEYER & MEUSER, P.A., AMERICAN DETECTIVE SERVICES, INC., and KENNETH J. JOHNSON, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "LEVINSON, Judge.\nPlaintiffs appeal from orders dismissing their claims against defendants for invasion of privacy, trespass, unfair or deceptive trade practices, and punitive damages. We affirm.\nPreliminarily, we note that this is a companion case to Keyzer v. Amerlink, 172 N.C. App. 592, \u2014 S.E.2d \u2014 (filed 16 August 2005). The facts of the instant case are summarized, in pertinent part, as follows: Ludovicus Keyzer (Keyzer), a Dutch citizen residing in the Netherlands, purchased a log home kit from Amerlink, Ltd. (Amerlink), a corporation that does business in North Carolina selling log home kits. In February 1999 Keyzer filed suit against Amerlink, asserting claims arising from the log home package sale. Amerlink was represented in this lawsuit by defendants Meyer, Meuser, and Meyer & Meuser, P.A. On 12 September 2001 the parties reached a settlement agreement, which provided in relevant part that: (1) defendants would make two payments to plaintiff totaling $200,000; (2) plaintiff would release defendants from liability on all claims arising from the log home sale; and (3) neither party would reveal the terms of the settlement contract. Defendants Amerlink and Spoor subsequently employed defendants American Detective Services, Inc. (American Detective) and Kenneth Johnson (Johnson) to conduct certain investigations of plaintiffs Barry Nakell (Nakell) and Keyzer, in order to ascertain their compliance with the settlement contract\u2019s confidentiality clause.\nThe present-appeal arises from a lawsuit initiated 11 April 2003 by plaintiffs (Keyzer, Joseph and Robin Kintz, Carl Parker, III, and Barry Nakell). Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants (Amerlink, Richard Spoor, Deborah Meyer, John Meuser, Meyer & Meuser, P.A., American Detective Services, Inc., and Kenneth Johnson), seeking compensatory and punitive damages for invasion of privacy, civil trespass, and unfair or deceptive trade practices. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants\u2019 conduct during their investigation of Nakell and Keyzer, and specifically their interviews of Nakell and Keyzer, had given rise to these claims. By their answers, defendants denied the material allegations of the complaint. Defendants also moved for dismissal of plaintiffs\u2019 claims under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1,\u2018 Rule 12(b)(6) (2003), and for summary judgment under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56 (2003). In response to the parties\u2019 motions, the trial court entered several orders, including the following:\nOrder of 22 September 2003: Dismissal, per Rule 12(b)(6), of all claims by all plaintiffs, brought against Meyer, Meuser, and Meyer & Meuser, P.A. for trespass and punitive damages, and dismissal of claims for invasion of privacy brought by all plaintiffs, with the exception of Keyzer\u2019s privacy claim.\nOrder of 30 January 2004: Summary judgment entered in favor of defendants Meyer, Meuser, and Meyer & Meuser, P.A., on Keyzer\u2019s claim for invasion of privacy.\nOrder of 22 March 2004: Summary judgment entered in favor of American Detective and Johnson, on all of plaintiffs\u2019 claims.\nOrder of 12 April 2004: Summary judgment entered in favor of Amerlinlc and Spoor on all of plaintiffs\u2019 claims.\nPlaintiffs timely appealed from the above orders.\nStandard of Review\nPlaintiffs appeal from the trial court\u2019s dismissal of certain claims under Rule 12(b)(6), and from the court\u2019s award of summary judgment in favor of defendants on other claims. Accordingly, we first review the pertinent standards of review.\nThe standard of review of a court\u2019s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is well established: \u201cThe question before a court considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is whether, if all the plaintiff\u2019s allegations are taken as true, the plaintiff is entitled to recover under some legal theory.\u201d Toomer v. Garrett, 155 N.C. App. 462, 468, 574 S.E.2d 76, 83 (2002). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper \u201c(1) when the complaint on its face reveals that no law supports plaintiff\u2019s claim; (2) when the complaint reveals on its face the absence of fact sufficient to make a good claim; [or] (2) when some fact disclosed in the claim necessarily defeats plaintiff\u2019s claim.\u201d Oates v. JAG, Inc., 314 N.C. 276, 278, 333 S.E.2d 222, 224 (1979). In addition, because \u201cthis appeal is based on [defendant\u2019s] motion to dismiss, we must treat plaintiff\u2019s factual allegations as true.\u201d Lovelace v. City of Shelby, 351 N.C. 458, 459, 526 S.E.2d 652, 654 (2000) (citation omitted).\nRegarding summary judgment orders, Rule 56(c) provides that summary judgment \u201cshall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d On a motion for summary judgment, \u201c[t]he party moving for summary judgment ultimately has the burden of establishing the lack of any triable issue of fact[.]\u201d Pembee Mfg. Corp. v. Cape Fear Constr. Co., 313 N.C. 488, 491, 329 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1985). \u201c \u2018The movant may meet this burden by proving that an essential element of the opposing party\u2019s claim is nonexistent, or by showing through discovery that the opposing party cannot produce evidence to support an essential element of his claim or cannot surmount an affirmative defense which would bar the claim.\u2019 \u201d Roumillat v. Simplistic Enterprises, Inc., 331 N.C. 57, 63, 414 S.E.2d 339, 342 (1992) (quoting Collingwood v. G.E. Real Estate Equities, 324 N.C. 63, 66, 376 S.E.2d 425, 427 (1989)).\nHowever, \u201cfor defendants to prevail on their motion for summary judgment, they [do] not need to negate every element of [plaintiff\u2019s claim]. \u2018If defendant effectively refutes even one element, summary judgment is proper.\u2019 \u201d RD&J Props. v. Lauralea-Dilton Enters., LLC, 165 N.C. App. 737, 745, 600 S.E.2d 492, 498 (2004) (quoting Ramsey v. Keever\u2019s Used Cars, 92 N.C. App. 187, 190, 374 S.E.2d 135, 137 (1988)). \u201cFurther, the nonmoving party may not rely on the mere allegations and denials in his pleadings but must by affidavit, or other means provided in the Rules, set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue of fact for the jury; otherwise, \u2018summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against [the nonmoving party].\u2019 \u201d In re Will of McCauley, 356 N.C. 91, 100-01, 565 S.E.2d 88, 95 (2002) (quoting Rule 56(e)).\nInvasion of Privacy\nPlaintiffs brought claims of invasion of privacy against defendants, on the theory of intrusion into each plaintiff\u2019s seclusion, solitude, or private affairs. Plaintiffs appeal from orders by the trial court that (1) dismissed, under Rule 12(b)(6), all claims of invasion of privacy brought against Meyer, Meuser, and Meyer & Meuser, P.A., except for the claim brought by Keyzer; (2) granted summary judgment for Meyer, Meuser, and Meyer & Meuser, P.A. on Keyzer\u2019s invasion of privacy claim; and (3) granted summary judgment for Amerlink, Spoor, American Detective, and Johnson, on all claims against them for invasion of privacy. Plaintiffs argue that their complaint sufficiently states a claim for relief against Meyer, Meuser, and Meyer & Meuser, P.A., and that the evidence demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact regarding the invasion of privacy claims, both against the other defendants and on Keyzer\u2019s claim against Meyer, Meuser, and Meyer & Meuser, P.A. We disagree.\nThe tort of invasion of privacy by intrusion into seclusion has been recognized in North Carolina and is defined as the intentional intrusion \u2018physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns ... [where] the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.\u2019 The kinds of intrusions that have been recognized under this tort include \u2018physically invading a person\u2019s home or other private place, eavesdropping by wiretapping or microphones, peering through windows, persistent telephoning, unauthorized prying into a bank account, and opening personal mail of another.\u2019\nToomer, 155 N.C. App. at 479-80, 574 S.E.2d at 90 (quoting Miller v. Brooks, 123 N.C. App. 20, 26, 472 S.E.2d 350, 354 (1996), and Hall v. Post, 85 N.C. App. 610, 615, 355 S.E.2d 819, 823 (1987), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 323 N.C. 259, 372 S.E.2d 711 (1988)). Thus, \u201c[generally, there must be a physical or sensory intrusion or an unauthorized prying into confidential personal records to support a claim for invasion of privacy by intrusion.\u201d Broughton v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 161 N.C. App. 20, 29, 588 S.E.2d 20, 27 (2003) (citing Burgess v. Busby, 142 N.C. App. 393, 544 S.E.2d 4 (2001)).\nIn the instant case, plaintiffs\u2019 claims of invasion of privacy are primarily based on their allegations that: (1) plaintiffs Keyzer, Mr. and Mrs. Kintz, and Parker were represented by plaintiff Nakell in their respective litigations with defendant Amerlink; (2) defendants acted in concert to conduct an interview with Nakell in his law office, located in the same building as his residence; (3) during the Nakel interview, defendant-investigator Johnson posed as a disgruntled Amerlink customer and as a potential legal client of Nakell\u2019s; (4) defendants tape-recorded the interview with Nakell without his knowledge; (5) defendants also hired investigators to interview Keyzer at his flower shop in The Netherlands; (6) during these interviews, the investigators asked questions relevant to the litigation between Keyzer and Amerlink, and to the settlement agreement executed by the parties, without revealing their connection to defendants; (7) defendants\u2019 investigation of plaintiffs\u2019 compliance with the confidentiality clause had no legitimate purpose and was based on improper motives; and (8) defendants Meyer, Meuser, and Meyer & Meuser, P.A. acted in violation of the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct.\nHowever, plaintiffs fail to articulate how these allegations, if true, constitute evidence that any of their personal affairs or private concerns were intruded upon. Moreover, none of the plaintiffs produced any evidence, by affidavit or otherwise, that defendants had investigated their personal affairs; had spied on, observed, or otherwise obtained anv information about their private concerns; had actually obtained anv information protected by the attorney-client privilege; had entered personal, non-commercial, areas of any of their houses; or had in any other way involved themselves in any of the plaintiffs\u2019 private or personal lives.\nAs regards defendants Meyer, Meuser, and Meyer & Meuser, P.A., we conclude that plaintiffs\u2019 complaint fails to state a claim for relief for invasion of privacy committed against plaintiffs Nakell, Mr. and Mrs. Kintz, or Parker. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by dismissing plaintiffs\u2019 complaints under Rule 12(b)(6). We further conclude that the court did not err by granting summary judgment for Meyer, Meuser, and Meyer & Meuser, P.A. on plaintiff Keyzer\u2019s claim for invasion of privacy. We note that the parties have presented arguments on whether to apply the law of North Carolina or of the Netherlands to Keyzer\u2019s claim, and we conclude that the result is the same either way. We also conclude that the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment for the other defendants on plaintiffs\u2019 claims for invasion of privacy. This assignment of error is overruled.\nTrespass\nPlaintiff Nakell argues that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of defendants on his claim of civil trespass. We disagree.\n\u201cThe elements of trespass to real property are: (1) possession of the property by the plaintiff when the alleged trespass was committed; (2) an unauthorized entry by the defendant; and (3) damage to the plaintiff from the trespass.\u201d Broughton, 161 N.C. App. at 32, 588 S.E.2d at 29 (citing Kuykendall v. Turner, 61 N.C. App. 638, 642, 301 S.E.2d 715, 718 (1983)).\nIn the instant case, plaintiff argues that defendants\u2019 entry onto his property was unauthorized, and thus was a trespass. The evidence shows that Johnson and another investigator met with plaintiff in his law office after making an appointment by posing as prospective clients. Plaintiff contends that defendants\u2019 misrepresentation of their identities and purpose for visiting rendered \u201cany consent void ab ini- tio.\u201d In support of this proposition, plaintiff cites Blackwood v. Cates, 297 N.C. 163, 254 S.E.2d 7 (1979); Miller v. Brooks, 123 N.C. App. 20, 472 S.E.2d 350 (1996); and Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 517 (4th Cir. 1999). However, these cases do not support plaintiffs contention under the facts of the instant case. Blackwood and Miller merely stand for the proposition that a party\u2019s consent to another\u2019s entry onto his land does not insulate against liability for trespass when the other commits subsequent wrongful acts in excess or abuse of his authority to enter, not a per se rule that a misrepresentation of identify invalidates the consent of the party to whom the misrepresentation was made. Likewise, Food Lion, supra, noted that \u201cconsent gained by misrepresentation is sometimes sufficient\u201d as a defense to a claim of trespass, did not hold in accord with plaintiff\u2019s position, and further bolsters the conclusion that the individual facts of a case determine whether consent given pursuant to a misrepresentation of identify is valid as a defense to a claim of trespass.\nWe observe further that Food Lion adopted in large measure the reasoning of another case, J.H. Desnick v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995), stating that \u201c[w]e like Desnick\u2019s thoughtful analysis about when a consent to enter that is based on misrepresentation may be given effect.\u201d Food Lion, id. We also find the analysis in Desnick useful. The case dealt with reporters who posed as patients of a medical practice in order to obtain information about its procedures, and analyzed the consent issue in light of the aim of the tort of the trespass to protect the inviolability of a person\u2019s property. The Court held:\nThere was no invasion in the present case of any of the specific interests that the tort of trespass seeks to protect. . . . [T]he defendants\u2019 test patients gained entry into the plaintiffs\u2019 premises by misrepresenting their purposes])] . . . But the entry [did] not... infring[e on] the kind of interest of the plaintiffs that the law of trespass protects; it was not an interference with the ownership or possession of land.\nDesnick, 44 F.3d at 1352, 1353. Although not binding on this Court, we find the reasoning of Desnick persuasive. Moreover, this Court took a similar approach in Broughton. In that case, the defendant, a newspaper reporter, obtained permission to enter onto plaintiff\u2019s property by misrepresenting the visit as a \u201csocial\u201d call. The defendant later published a newspaper article that included information gathered during this visit. This Court held that \u201c[p]laintiff has not shown or alleged that [defendant\u2019s] entry onto her land was unauthorized. To the contrary, the evidence was that plaintiff engaged in \u2018social\u2019 conversation with [defendant] and did not ask her to leave the property. Thus, the trial court properly granted summary judgment for defendants ... on the trespass claim.\u201d Applying the reasoning of Broughton to the instant case, we hold that the trial court properly granted summary judgment for defendants on plaintiff\u2019s claim of trespass. Under these facts, the entry complained of was not of the kind that interfered with plaintiff\u2019s ownership or possession of the land; therefore, plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that defendants made an unauthorized entry of the kind to support the tort of trespass. This assignment of error is overruled.\nWe have examined plaintiffs\u2019 remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. We conclude the trial court did not err by dismissing plaintiffs\u2019 claims, and that the court\u2019s order should be\nAffirmed.\nChief Judge MARTIN concurs.\nJudge TYSON concurs in part and dissents in part.", "type": "majority", "author": "LEVINSON, Judge." }, { "text": "TYSON, Judge\nconcurring in part, dissenting in part.\nI concur to affirm the dismissal of plaintiffs\u2019 invasion of privacy claim. The dismissal of plaintiffs\u2019 civil trespass claim and consequently, their unfair or deceptive practices and punitive damages claims should be reversed. I respectfully dissent.\nI. Civil Trespass\nThe majority\u2019s opinion holds defendants did not make an \u201c \u2018unauthorized entry\u2019 of the kind to support the tort of trespass\u201d because \u201cthe entry complained of was not of the kind that interfered with plaintiffs\u2019 ownership or possession of the land.\u201d I disagree.\nIn the bundle of rights that define private property, the greatest stick in the bundle is exclusivity of possession. Exclusivity of possession is the basis that permits the landowner to exclude anyone from his or her property. Hildebrand v. Telegraph Co., 219 N.C. 402, 408, 14 S.E.2d 252, 256 (1941) (\u201cThe word \u2018property\u2019 extends to every aspect of right and interest capable of being enjoyed as such upon which it is practicable to place a money value. The term comprehends not only the thing possessed but also, in strict legal parlance, means the right of the owner to the land; the right to possess, use, enjoy and dispose of it, and the corresponding right to exclude others from its use.\u201d). This exclusivity of possession is the basis for civil and criminal trespass. Id.\n\u201cThe elements of trespass to real property are: (1) possession of the property by the plaintiff when the alleged trespass was committed; (2) an unauthorized entry by the defendant; and (3) damage to the plaintiff from the trespass.\u201d Broughton v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 161 N.C. App. 20, 32, 588 S.E.2d 20, 29 (2003) (citing Kuykendall v. Turner, 61 N.C. App. 638, 642, 301 S.E.2d 715, 718 (1983)). Consent is defined as an \u201c[ajgreement, approval, or permission as to some act or purpose, esp. given voluntarily by a competent person....\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). \u201cConsent to a trespass which is obtained as the result of duress, fraud, or mistake is ineffective to establish a defense to an action for trespass to land.\u201d William S. Haynes, North Carolina Tort Law \u00a7 28-5 (1989).\nPrior precedents have addressed the issue of whether obtaining consent to enter property obtained by fraud revokes consent, and the entry on another\u2019s property becomes unauthorized in a civil trespass case. Our Supreme Court has held consent to enter the lands of another is conditional, not absolute, and can be revoked by subsequent acts or be void ab initio. \u201cOne who enters upon the land of another with the consent of the possessor may, by his subsequent wrongful act in excess or abuse of his authority to enter, become liable in damages as a trespasser.\u201d Blackwood v. Cates, 297 N.C. 163, 167, 254 S.E.2d 7, 9 (1979) (defendants did not engage in a voluntary act to invalidate their perceived consent to be on the plaintiffs\u2019 property) (quoting Smith v. VonCannon, 283 N.C. 656, 660, 197 S.E.2d 524, 528 (1973)). In Smith, our Supreme Court held, \u201c[w]e perceive no basis for a distinction between an involuntary intrusion upon the land of another and an involuntary exceeding of the landowner\u2019s assent to the original entry . . . .\u201d 283 N.C. at 661, 197 S.E.2d at 528.\nThe majority\u2019s opinion asserts Broughton v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., controls its result here. 161 N.C. App. 20, 588 S.E.2d 20 (2003). In Broughton, the plaintiff alleged the reporter misrepresented the purpose of a visit, stating her visit to plaintiff\u2019s home was a \u201csocial call\u201d when in fact, the visit was to gather intelligence for a subsequent negative article about the plaintiff and her divorce. Id. at 32, 588 S.E.2d at 29. This Court held the plaintiff failed to show or allege the reporter was an unauthorized trespasser when the plaintiff engaged in \u201csocial\u201d conversation on the front porch of her home, and plaintiff did not ask the reporter to leave her property. Id. at 33, 588 S.E.2d at 29. Here, plaintiffs, alleged in their complaint defendant\u2019s entry was unauthorized. As N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2003) provides, summary judgment shall be rendered if \u201cthere is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d The issue of consent is a question for the jury.\nThe majority\u2019s opinion further cites Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., as persuasive authority to support its notion that consent procured by fraud is not void or voidable. 194 F.3d 505, 517 (4th Cir. 1999) (adopting the Seventh Circuit\u2019s reasoning in Desnick v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 44 F.3d 1345 (1995)).\nThe Fourth Circuit recognized:\nthe various jurisdictions and authorities in this country are not of one mind in dealing with the issue. Compare Restatement (Second) of Torts, \u00a7 892B(2) (1965) (\u201cif the person consenting to the conduct of another ... is induced [to consent] by the other\u2019s misrepresentation, the consent is not effective for the unexpected invasion or harm\u201d) and Shiffman v. Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 256 A.D.2d 131, 681 N.Y.S.2d 511, 512 (App. Div. 1998) (reporter who gained entry to medical office by posing as potential patient using false identification and insurance cards could not assert consent as defense to trespass claim \u201csince consent obtained by misrepresentation or fraud is invalid\u201d), with Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1351-53 (ABC agents with concealed cameras who obtained consent to enter an ophthalmic clinic by pretending to be patients were not trespassers because, among other things, they \u201centered offices open to anyone\u201d); Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745, 757 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (\u201cwhere consent was fraudulently induced, but consent was nonetheless given, plaintiff has no claim for trespass\u201d); and Martin v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York, 421 So.2d 109, 111 (Ala. 1982) (consent to enter is valid \u201ceven though consent may have been given under a mistake of facts, or procured by fraiid\u201d) (citation omitted).\nId.\nIn Food Lion, Inc., ABC reporters falsified job applications with misrepresented identities and references to secure employment at Food Lion. 194 F.3d at 510. These applications failed to mention their concurrent employment with ABC. Id. The reporters used their positions as purported Food Lion employees to gain access to areas and information not available to the public. Id. at 510-11. The court affirmed the lower court\u2019s decision, holding Food Lion showed a trespass, not by misrepresentation, but by the breach of their duty of loyalty \u201ctriggered by the filming in non-public areas, which was adverse to Food Lion \u2014 was a wrongful act in excess of [the reporters\u2019] authority to enter Food Lion\u2019s premises as employees.\u201d Id. at 518 (citing Blackwood, 297 N.C. at 167, 254 S.E.2d at 9 (finding liability for trespass when activity on property exceeded scope of consent to enter)). Food Lion\u2019s consent for the reporters to enter or remain on the property was \u201cnullified when they tortiously breached their duty of loyalty to Food Lion.\u201d Id. at 519. Here, defendant falsely told plaintiff he was a prospective client to gain entry to his private office, remained after being asked, and specifically denied he worked for defendant while he secretly taped the conversation without plaintiff\u2019s knowledge or consent. The holding in Food Lion supports plaintiffs\u2019 trespass claim here.\nIn Desnick v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., an ABC producer obtained permission from Dr. Desnick to film his offices for a news report after he falsely promised Dr. Desnick the report would be \u201cfair and balanced,\u201d contain no \u201cundercover surveillance,\u201d or involve \u201cambush interviews.\u201d 44 F.3d 1345, 1348. Subsequently, ABC investigators posed as test patients requesting eye examinations. Id. When the news report aired, it alleged Dr. Desnick tampered with equipment to obtain skewed results and recommended unnecessary surgeries. Id. at 1348-49. The Seventh Circuit explained, \u201cthe test patients entered offices that were open to anyone expressing a desire for ophthalmic services and videotaped physicians engaged in professional, not personal, communications with strangers (the testers themselves).\u201d Id. at 1352 (emphasis supplied). The court also recognized and cited Rockwell Graphic Systems, Inc. v. DEV Industries, Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 178 (7th Cir. 1991), which held, \u201cif a competitor gained entry to a business firm\u2019s premises posing as a customer but in fact hoping to steal the firm\u2019s trade secrets\u201d the business owner\u2019s consent would be void and the trespasser would be liable. Id. Plaintiff Nakell\u2019s private law office is not \u201coffices that were open to anyone.\u201d Id.\nIn Medical Laboratory Management v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., the United States District Court for Arizona held Desnick was not controlling or persuasive authority in the State of Arizona. 30 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1203 (D. Ariz., 1998) (\u201c[T]he conclusions reached in Desnick are not supported by the law in Arizona or the Ninth Circuit. . , If the person consenting to the conduct of another is induced to consent by . . . the other\u2019s misrepresentation, the consent is not effective for the unexpected invasion or harm.\u201d (quotation omitted)), aff\u2019d, 306 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2002).\nIn Medical Laboratory Management, an employee of ABC telephoned the plaintiff and misrepresented she was a medical laboratory technician interested in opening a pap smear laboratory in the State of Georgia. 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1185. On that pretext, a meeting was scheduled. Id. The employee of ABC and a cameraman met and also toured the laboratory with the plaintiff and discussed costs, turn around time, and laboratory procedures. Id. ABC used the information obtained during the tour and meeting for a news report on frequent errors in pap smear testing. Id. at 1186.\nIn Shiffman v. Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield, as here, a learned professional was fraudulently solicited for services. 256 A.D.2d 131, 131, 681 N.Y.S.2d 511, 511 (N.Y.A.D., 1998). The reporter misrepresented her identity and the purpose of her visit. Id. The court held, the \u201cimplied consent to enter the premises were legally insufficient since consent obtained by misrepresentation or fraud is invalid. ...\u201d Id.\nThe holdings in Blackwood, Smith, Medical Laboratory Management, and Shiffman support the viability of plaintiffs\u2019 trespass claims. Blackwood, 297 N.C. at 167, 254 S.E.2d at 9; Smith, 283 N.C. at 660, 197 S.E.2d at 528; Medical Laboratory Management, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1203; Shiffman, 256 A.D.2d at 131, 681 N.Y.S.2d at 511. The facts in Broughton axe easily distinguishable and not controlling to those before us. 161 N.C. App. 20, 588 S.E.2d 20.\nHere, defendant Johnson contacted plaintiff Nakell and posed as a potential client. Plaintiff scheduled an appointment for defendant to meet plaintiff at his law office located within his private residence. Defendant obtained consent to enter plaintiff\u2019s private office that is not open to the general public and met with him on the pretext and false assertion that defendant was a dissatisfied customer of Amerlink seeking representation. See Shiffman, 256 A.D.2d at 131, 681 N.Y.S.2d at 511; Medical Laboratory Management, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1203; c.f. Blackwood, 297 N.C. at 167, 254 S.E.2d at 9.\nDefendant lied about the identity of his employer and about the purpose of the visit. When plaintiff Nakell directly asked defendant Johnson if he worked for defendant Amerlink, he again lied and answered in the negative. Defendant recorded the entire meeting without plaintiffs knowledge. Defendant\u2019s sole purpose of seeking the office visit was an attempt to obtain plaintiff\u2019s breach of the nondisclosure agreement so defendant could fraudulently avoid agreed payment thereunder.\nDefendant\u2019s conduct and assertions were fraudulent and deceitful. Plaintiff\u2019s initial and subsequent consent were procured through defendant\u2019s trickery and lies. Throughout defendant\u2019s entire investigation, he fraudulently gained consent to enter plaintiff\u2019s attorney\u2019s property, to meet with plaintiff\u2019s counsel, and with the intent to lure private information out of plaintiff and his attorney to avoid payment on his mediated settlement agreement. Plaintiff\u2019s consent to enter and remain on plaintiff\u2019s property was voided when plaintiff\u2019s consent was derived from defendant\u2019s repeated fraud and deceit. Blackwood, 297 N.C. at 167, 254 S.E.2d at 9 (quoting Smith, 283 N.C. at 660, 197 S.E.2d at 528). Without consent, plaintiff asserts a viable civil trespass claim. The majority\u2019s opinion appears to agree that defendant had no consent to enter or remain on the property, but the majority\u2019s opinion does not explain or cite any authority for its assertion that defendant\u2019s unlawful and unauthorized entry was not \u201cthe kind to support the tort of trespass.\u201d\nIV. Conclusion\nI concur with the majority\u2019s opinion to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s claim against defendants for invasion of privacy. Because plaintiff has asserted a viable civil trespass claim, plaintiff is also entitled to assert unfair and deceptive trade practices and punitive damages claims. Taha v. Thompson, 120 N.C. App. 697, 704, 463 S.E.2d 553, 558 (1995) (\u201cBecause we find sufficient evidence to submit the trespass ... to the jury, we conclude it would be error not to submit the factual issues underlying plaintiff\u2019s unfair and deceptive trade practices claim as well.\u201d), disc. rev. denied, 344 N.C. 443, 476 S.E.2d 130 (1996).\nPlaintiff\u2019s consent to enter and remain on his property was derived by defendant\u2019s fraud or deceit and is void. I vote to reverse the trial court\u2019s dismissal of plaintiff\u2019s civil trespass, unfair and deceptive trade practices, and punitive damages claims. I respectfully dissent.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "TYSON, Judge" } ], "attorneys": [ "Barry Nakellfor plaintiffs-appellanls.", "Anderson, Johnson, Lawrence, Butler & Bock, L.L.P., by Steven C. Lawrence, for defendants-appellees Amerlink, Ltd. and Richard Spoor.", "Cranfill, Sumner & Hartzog, L.L.P., by Richard T. Boyette, Alicia S. Levy, and Meredith T. Black, for defendants-appellees Deborah N. Meyer, John Meuser, and Meyer & Meuser, P.A.", "Nexsen Pruet Adams Kleemeier, PLLC, by Patrick D. Sarsfield, II, for defendants-appellees American Detective Services, Inc., and Kenneth J. Johnson." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LUDOVICUS N. KEYZER, a/k/a LUDO KEYZER, JOSEPH KINTZ, ROBIN KINTZ, CARL W. PARKER III, and BARRY NAKELL, Plaintiffs v. AMERLINK, LTD., RICHARD SPOOR, DEBORAH N. MEYER, JOHN MEUSER, MEYER & MEUSER, P.A., AMERICAN DETECTIVE SERVICES, INC., and KENNETH J. JOHNSON, Defendants\nNo. COA04-1096\n(Filed 20 September 2005)\n1. Privacy\u2014 invasion of \u2014 asking about prior settlement\u2014 testing confidentiality agreement\nPlaintiffs did not articulate how their personal affairs or private concerns were intruded upon by defendants posing as potential clients or interviewing a former client to test compliance with a confidentiality clause in a settlement agreement. The trial court correctly dismissed or granted summary judgment on invasion of privacy claims.\n2. Trespass\u2014 private detectives posing as potential legal clients \u2014 consent to enter\nThe trial court did not err by granting summary judgment for defendants on a civil trespass claim where defendants sent private investigators posing as potential clients to plaintiff attorney\u2019s law office, which was also his home, to ask about a prior suit which had been settled with a confidentiality agreement. Although plaintiff contended that defendants\u2019 misrepresentation of their identities rendered any consent void, the entry complained of was not of the kind that interfered with plaintiff\u2019s ownership or possession of the land.\nJudge Tyson concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nAppeal by plaintiffs from orders entered 22 September 2003, 30 January 2004, 22 March 2004, and 12 April 2004 by Judge John R. Jolly, Jr., in Orange County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 May 2005.\nBarry Nakellfor plaintiffs-appellanls.\nAnderson, Johnson, Lawrence, Butler & Bock, L.L.P., by Steven C. Lawrence, for defendants-appellees Amerlink, Ltd. and Richard Spoor.\nCranfill, Sumner & Hartzog, L.L.P., by Richard T. Boyette, Alicia S. Levy, and Meredith T. Black, for defendants-appellees Deborah N. Meyer, John Meuser, and Meyer & Meuser, P.A.\nNexsen Pruet Adams Kleemeier, PLLC, by Patrick D. Sarsfield, II, for defendants-appellees American Detective Services, Inc., and Kenneth J. Johnson." }, "file_name": "0284-01", "first_page_order": 314, "last_page_order": 326 }