{ "id": 8353953, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF: T.R.P., Minor Child", "name_abbreviation": "In re T.R.P.", "decision_date": "2005-10-04", "docket_number": "No. COA04-1356", "first_page": "541", "last_page": "550", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "173 N.C. App. 541" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "613 S.E.2d 298", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632948 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "300", "parenthetical": "holding that when defects in a petition raise a question of the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction over the action, the issue may properly be raised for the first time on appeal" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/613/0298-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 S.E.2d 623", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "624" }, { "page": "623" }, { "page": "624" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 N.C. App. 432", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11711175 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/126/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 S.E. 822", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1902, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "822", "parenthetical": "holding that the phrase \" 'sworn and subscribed to' \" is defective as a verification" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 N.C. 27", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11272447 ], "year": 1902, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "28", "parenthetical": "holding that the phrase \" 'sworn and subscribed to' \" is defective as a verification" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/130/0027-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 S.E.2d 435", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "437", "parenthetical": "quoting In re Green, 67 N.C. App. at 504, 313 S.E.2d at 195" }, { "page": "437" }, { "page": "437" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 N.C. App. 285", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525216 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288", "parenthetical": "quoting In re Green, 67 N.C. App. at 504, 313 S.E.2d at 195" }, { "page": "288" }, { "page": "288" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/109/0285-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 S.E.2d 921", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "923" }, { "page": "923" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "70 N.C. App. 690", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524491 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/70/0690-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 N.C. App. 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9006115 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "568", "parenthetical": "holding that when defects in a petition raise a question of the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction over the action, the issue may properly be raised for the first time on appeal" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/170/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 S.E.2d 193", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "195" }, { "page": "194" }, { "page": "194-95" }, { "page": "195" }, { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 N.C. App. 501", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526723 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "504" }, { "page": "503" }, { "page": "504" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/67/0501-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 S.E.2d 169", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 N.C. App. 550", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358582 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "554", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/88/0550-01" ] }, { "cite": "581 S.E.2d 793", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "795", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "795" }, { "page": "795", "parenthetical": "emphasis omitted" }, { "page": "795", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 N.C. App. 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9188012 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "443", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "443" }, { "page": "444" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/158/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 S.E.2d 876", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "880" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "255 N.C. 423", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570063 ], "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "429" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/255/0423-01" ] }, { "cite": "448 S.E.2d 862", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "863" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "116 N.C. App. 643", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525280 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "645" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/116/0643-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 S.E.2d 921", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "923" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "70 N.C. App. 690", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524491 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "692-93" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/70/0690-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 894, "char_count": 24368, "ocr_confidence": 0.738, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.7045490190184248e-07, "percentile": 0.7014169551970019 }, "sha256": "8b491e4dcf703420f89baeaf5fc99fe4e898c9e78ef07675c2f9dcaf6e3ea94b", "simhash": "1:bba8c65677d75cd4", "word_count": 3920 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:45:28.578783+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge McGEE concurs.", "Judge LEVINSON dissents in a separate opinion." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF: T.R.P., Minor Child" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, Judge.\nRenee Browe (\u201crespondent-mother\u201d) appeals a custody review order (\u201cOrder\u201d) entered on 16 June 2004 as to the minor child (\u201cTRP\u201d). The issues before the Court are: (I) Whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the Order, because the initial juvenile petition was not verified as required by law, and (II) whether the trial court erred in ordering the physical custody of the minor child to her father, Ronnie Parks (\u201cParks\u201d), when it failed to make findings that the minor child would receive proper care and supervision in a safe home.\nOn 21 April 2003, respondent-mother and her live-in boyfriend, Michael Russell (\u201cRussell\u201d), were charged with operating a methamphetamine laboratory in the bathroom of their home. Both pled guilty to several felony charges and received probationary sentences.\nRespondent-mother and her three children had been living with Russell for several months prior to the discovery of the laboratory. At the time of the discovery of the laboratory by police, TRP was present in the home. The chemicals used in the methamphetamine laboratory were found to be volatile and explosive, and a danger to the three children living in the home.\nOn 22 August 2003, Wilkes County Department of Social Services (\u201cDSS\u201d) filed a Juvenile Petition (\u201cPetition\u201d) alleging that TRP, a minor child, was a neglected juvenile, in that the juvenile \u201cdoes not receive proper care, supervision, or discipline from the juvenile\u2019s parent\u201d and \u201clives in an environment injurious to the juvenile\u2019s welfare.\u201d Furthermore, DSS recommended that it would be in TRP\u2019s best interest for DSS to have physical and legal custody of the child and for TRP to be placed with her maternal aunt.\nAlthough the Petition was not verified by an authorized representative of DSS, it was notarized by Linda Garrett and submitted to the trial court. On 23 February 2004, the trial court, finding that it had jurisdiction over the case, concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that TRP was in a state of neglect. The trial court placed legal and physical custody of the minor child with DSS after concluding it would be in TRP\u2019s best interest. The trial court also ordered that Parks submit to a mental health evaluation before being allowed overnight visits with TRP.' Additionally, the trial court ordered that respondent-mother sign all releases and consent forms required by DSS and be more cooperative with DSS.\nOn 24 May 2004, a review hearing was held pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-906 for the purposes of reviewing the custodial status of TRP. The trial court found that respondent-mother was more cooperative with DSS, but was currently pregnant with Russell\u2019s child, unemployed, and living in a mobile home owned by Russell\u2019s family. The trial court also found that Russell was currently incarcerated due to probation violations. Additionally, the trial court found that Parks was cooperative with DSS, receiving counseling, and had passed seven drug tests. The trial court also found that Parks had a full-time and part-time job.\nOn 16 June 2004, the trial court entered an Order concluding that it would be in the best interest of TRP to remain in the legal and physical custody of DSS. However, the trial court also concluded that \u201cit appears that return of the child to her father\u2019s home is in her best interest in the near future[.]\u201d Additionally, the trial court concluded that when school started, TRP\u2019s physical custody would be transferred to Parks upon the express conditions that: (1) he continue counseling, (2) remain alcohol and drug free, and (3) submit to DSS a written plan for daycare. Respondent-mother appeals from this Order.\nIn her first assignment of error, respondent-mother contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the review order since the initial juvenile petition was not verified as required by law. We agree.\n\u201cJurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of an action is the most critical aspect of the court\u2019s authority to act. Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the power of the court to deal with the kind of action in question[, and] ... is conferred upon the courts by either the North Carolina Constitution or by statute.\u201d\nIn re McKinney, 158 N.C. App. 441, 443, 581 S.E.2d 793, 795 (2003) (citations omitted). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-200(a) confers on the trial court exclusive, original jurisdiction \u201cover any case involving a juvenile who is alleged to be abused, neglected, or dependent.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-200(a) (2003). \u201c \u2018[0]nce jurisdiction of a court attaches it exists for all time until the cause is fully and completely determined.\u2019 \u201d In the Matter of Arends, 88 N.C. App. 550, 554, 364 S.E.2d 169, 171 (1988) (citation omitted) (holding that the trial court had continuing jurisdiction over all subsequent custody orders once the trial court acquired jurisdiction); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-201 (2003).\n\u201c[A] court\u2019s inherent authority does not allow it to act where it would otherwise lack jurisdiction.\u201d In re McKinney, 158 N.C. App. at 443, 581 S.E.2d at 795. \u201c \u2018A court cannot undertake to adjudicate a controversy on its own motion . . . before a court may act there must be some appropriate application invoking the judicial power of the court with respect to the matter in question.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 444, 581 S.E.2d at 795 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). For this reason, a defense based upon lack of subject matter jurisdiction \u201ccannot be waived and may be asserted at any time. Accordingly, the appellants may raise the issue of jurisdiction over the matter for the first time on appeal although they initially failed to raise the issue before the trial court.\u201d In re Green, 67 N.C. App. 501, 504, 313 S.E.2d 193, 195 (1984) (citations omitted), see also In re Z.T.B., 170 N.C. App. 564, 568, 613 S.E.2d 298, 300 (2005) (holding that when defects in a petition raise a question of the trial court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction over the action, the issue may properly be raised for the first time on appeal).\nThe dissent contends that as respondent-mother appeals from a review order and not the initial custody order in this matter, the right to challenge subject matter jurisdiction has been waived, citing Sloop v. Friberg, 70 N.C. App. 690, 320 S.E.2d 921 (1984). However, Sloop does not hold that failure to appeal a complete lack of subject jurisdiction for an initial adjudication of abuse, neglect, or dependency bars a respondent from raising the lack of jurisdiction when appealing from a subsequent review of that determination. Rather, Sloop states that \u201cthe question of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any point in the proceeding, and . . . such jurisdiction cannot be conferred by waiver, estoppel or consent.\u201d Id. at 692-93, 320 S.E.2d at 923. The Court noted that the defendant in Sloop did not point to any substantive deficiencies in jurisdiction and found that general subject matter jurisdiction existed. Id. at 693, 320 S.E.2d at 923. Sloop held that the issue raised was merely whether such jurisdiction was \u201cproperly exercised according to the statutory requirements in [that] particular case.\" Id. Sloop further stated that \u201c[a]n absolute want of subject matter jurisdiction might constitute a fatal deficiency,\u201d but that grounds were available to deny a subsequent motion attacking jurisdiction in the unique case of a party who had originally agreed to a consent judgment that had been entered and acquiesced to for several years. Id.\nSuch cases are readily distinguishable from the instant case, which does not involve a consent judgment entered at the behest of both parties, but rather concerns adversarial State action to remove a child from its parent on the grounds of dependency, neglect, or abuse. Here, respondent-mother raises a substantive challenge to the trial court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction in this case, based on the lack of verification of the original petition. \u201cIn juvenile actions, the requirement' that petitions be verified is \u2018essential to both the validity of the petition and to establishing the jurisdiction of the court.\u2019 \u201d In re Triscari Children, 109 N.C. App. 285, 288, 426 S.E.2d 435, 437 (1993) (quoting In re Green, 67 N.C. App. at 504, 313 S.E.2d at 195). As a verified petition is necessary to invoke the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter for a dependency, neglect, or abuse proceeding, the court\u2019s lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and can be raised at any time. See Triscari, 109 N.C. App. at 288, 426 S.E.2d at 437. Because the court may not \u201c \u2018adjudicate a controversy on its own motion\u2019 \u201d without an \u201c \u2018appropriate application invoking the judicial power of the court,\u2019 \u201d McKinney, 158 N.C. App. at 444, 581 S.E.2d at 795 (citation omitted), this Court must review the initial custody order to determine whether the trial court properly obtained jurisdiction over the matter.\n\u201cIn the absence of a statutory requirement or rule of court to the contrary, it is ordinarily not necessary to the validity of a petition that it be signed or verified.\u201d In re Green, 67 N.C. App. at 503, 313 S.E.2d at 194. \u201cOn the other hand, where it is required by statute that the petition be signed and verified, these essential requisites must be complied with before the petition can be used for legal purposes.\u201d Id. at 503, 313 S.E.2d at 194-95.\nA juvenile action, including a proceeding in which a juvenile is alleged to be abused or neglected, is commenced by the filing of a petition. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-405 (2003). The pleadings relevant to an abuse, neglect, and dependency action are the petition, and it is specifically required by statute that \u201cthe petition shall be drawn by the director, verified before an official authorized to administer oaths, and filed by the clerk, recording the date of filing.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-403(a) (2003).\nIn Green, this Court held that \u201cthe failure of the petitioner to sign and verily the petition before an official authorized to administer oaths rendered the petition fatally deficient and inoperative to invoke the jurisdiction of the court[.]\u201d Green, 67 N.C. App. at 504, 313 S.E.2d at 195. Additionally, Green stated:\nThe Juvenile Code requisites that the petition be signed and verified are therefore essential to both the validity of the petition and to establishing the jurisdiction of the court. The primary purpose to be served by signature and verification on the part of the petitioner is to obtain the written and sworn statement of the facts alleged in such official and authoritative form as that it may be used for any lawful purpose, either in or out of a court of law. Under the Juvenile Code, these requirements also serve to invoke the jurisdiction of the court.\nId. (citation omitted). As discussed supra, in In re Triscari Children, 109 N.C. App. at 288, 426 S.E.2d at 437, this Court affirmed Green and held that verified pleadings in juvenile proceedings are necessary to invoke the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter.\nVerification requires a petitioner to attest \u201cthat the contents of the pleading verified are true to the knowledge of the person making the verification[.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 11(b) (2003). Verification is defined as \u201c[a] notarial act in which a notary certifies that a signer, whose identity is personally known to the notary or proven on the basis of satisfactory evidence, has, in the notary\u2019s presence, voluntarily signed a document and taken an oath or affirmation concerning the document.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 10A-3(9) (2003) (emphasis added). Our Supreme Court has held that notarization is insufficient to constitute verification. See Martin v. Martin, 130 N.C. 27, 28, 40 S.E. 822, 822 (1902) (holding that the phrase \u201c \u2018sworn and subscribed to\u2019 \u201d is defective as a verification).\nHere, the Petition was notarized, the notarization reading \u201c[sjworn and subscribed to before me.\u201d However, the Petition was neither signed nor verified by the director or an authorized representative of the director. Thus, the Petition requesting the juvenile be adjudicated neglected was not in compliance with the statute requiring that all Petitions be verified pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-403, and the trial court, therefore, lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate this matter.\nDSS, however, relying on In re Mitchell, 126 N.C. App. 432, 485 S.E.2d 623 (1997), argues the failure to sign the Petition is not fatal, because the trial court obtained jurisdiction by issuance and service of process. They contend that as the issuance and service of process were proper, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to enter the initial custody order finding TRP neglected.\nSuch reliance on Mitchell is misplaced. Mitchell does not hold that petition formalities are unnecessary to obtain jurisdiction, but rather discusses a further procedural requirement to establish subject matter jurisdiction in a juvenile action. Id. at 433, 485 S.E.2d at 624. The dispositive issue in Mitchell was whether the trial court had obtained jurisdiction when a summons was not issued, and the question of the verification of the petition was not before the Court. Id. at 433, 485 S.E.2d at 623. The Court in Mitchell recognized that a properly filed petition was the necessary, first step in the trial court obtaining jurisdiction, stating that, \u201c[a] juvenile action, including a proceeding in which a juvenile is alleged to be abused or neglected, is commenced by the filing of a petition.\u201d Id. at 433, 485 S.E.2d at 624. Hence, without a properly filed petition, the trial court cannot have jurisdictional authority to issue a summons. Id. As Mitchell addressed the failure to properly issue a summons rather than the formalities required of a juvenile petition, it is not controlling in this matter.\nWe share the dissent\u2019s concerns for the welfare of TRP, and would caution DSS to be observant as to the statutory requirements for the filing of juvenile petitions so as to avoid future errors of this nature. However, we are bound by the requirements established by our legislature and the prior decisions of this Court, which reflect a need to ensure that petitions to remove a child from the custody of their guardians be filed only when the underlying facts have been verified by the appropriate authorities. Therefore, under Green and Triscari, the failure of the director to sign and verify the Petition before the notary rendered the Petition fatally deficient and inoperative to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. As there is no evidence in the record suggesting later filings sufficient to invoke jurisdiction as to the review order, the trial court erred in proceeding on the matter due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction.\nAs the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the contested Order, we do not reach respondent-mother\u2019s remaining assignment of error.\nBecause the Petition was not duly verified as required by law, we conclude that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, the Order of the trial court must be vacated and the case dismissed.\nVacated and dismissed.\nJudge McGEE concurs.\nJudge LEVINSON dissents in a separate opinion.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, Judge." }, { "text": "LEVINSON, Judge\ndissenting.\nI respectfully disagree with the holding of the majority. The respondent\u2019s failure to appeal the 15 March 2004 adjudication and disposition order bars her challenge to the trial court\u2019s jurisdiction to enter the 16 June 2004 custody review order at issue. Accordingly, I dissent from the majority\u2019s holding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the custody review order.\nThe majority holds that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the order of adjudication and disposition, on the grounds that the original petition alleging neglect did not contain a verified signature of an authorized representative of Wilkes County DSS. However, respondent did not appeal the adjudication and disposition order placing custody of T.R.P. with Wilkes County DSS. Rather, she appeals only the review order entered several months after the adjudication, which ordered that, when T.R.P.\u2019s father met certain conditions, the child would be placed in his custody within a few months. Respondent thus attempts to raise the issue of the court\u2019s jurisdiction over the original adjudication proceeding for the first time on appeal, not from the adjudication and disposition order, but from a later order entered on custody after a proper hearing.\nRespondent does not question the trial court\u2019s general jurisdiction over custody review or its authority to review dispositional orders. Her only ground for challenging the court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction is that the petition in the earlier adjudication lacked a necessary signature. A similar issue was addressed by this Court in Sloop v. Friberg, 70 N.C. App. 690, 320 S.E.2d 921 (1984). In Stoop, the defendant challenged the trial court\u2019s exercise of jurisdiction over a custody determination only after the court had entered various custody orders over a period of years. This Court held:\n[Defendant] first challenges the district court\u2019s exercise, beginning in 1980, of subject matter jurisdiction^] ... It is true that the question of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any point in the proceeding, and that such jurisdiction cannot be conferred by waiver, estoppel or consent. . . . However, the district courts of this State do undoubtedly possess general subject matter jurisdiction over child custody disputes. ... The real question under the Act is whether such jurisdiction is properly exercised according to the statutory requirements in this particular case. . . . The court\u2019s 1980 findings relative to the jurisdictional prerequisites . .. appear sufficient on their face to justify exercising jurisdiction. [Defendant] does not, on this appeal, point to any substantive deficiencies therein. He chose to withdraw his appeal in 1980 and to acquiesce in the judgment for several years. Accordingly, we hold that he has failed to preserve his objection and the assignment is without merit.\nSloop, 70 N.C. App. at 692-93, 320 S.E.2d at 923. See also, Ward v. Ward, 116 N.C. App. 643, 645, 448 S.E.2d 862, 863 (1994) (\u201cPlaintiff\u2019s sole contention on appeal is that [the trial court] lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the [orders] . . . plaintiff has waived his right to challenge the validity of both orders on the grounds asserted, because he could have presented the same challenges in his initial appeals which were dismissed\u201d). Thus:\n.An absolute want of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be taken advantage of at any stage of the proceedings^ but] . . . \u201cobjection to jurisdiction based on any ground other than lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter, such as . . . irregularity in the method by which jurisdiction of the particular case was obtained, is usually waived by failure to raise the objection at the first opportunity, or in due or seasonable time, or within the time prescribed by statute.\u201d 21 C.J.S., Courts, \u00a7 110.\nPulley v. Pulley, 255 N.C. 423, 429, 121 S.E.2d 876, 880 (1961).\nI would apply the reasoning of the cases discussed above in resolving this issue. Here, respondent (1) does not challenge the court\u2019s general jurisdiction over custody review or allege jurisdictional infirmities specifically associated with the custody review proceedings and/or the resulting order, and (2) did not appeal the earlier adjudication and disposition order. She cannot, therefore, bring a belated challenge to the court\u2019s jurisdiction to enter the earlier order on abuse, neglect or dependency by attacking the present order on appeal. This collateral attack on the authority of the court to act cannot be sustained.\nThe majority opinion relies upon appellate authorities concerning jurisdiction that are inapposite to the current appeal. While the black-letter law concepts contained in these cases cannot be seriously questioned, it is significant that all of them involve jurisdictional deficiencies in proceedings and orders that were the subject of a direct appeal. My research has not revealed any authority that supports the majority\u2019s application of the law concerning subject matter jurisdiction. Moreover, the majority holding does not comport with concepts concerning judicial finality, and leaves the trial court and this child in a legal quagmire: while the order on appeal is vacated, the majority must necessarily leave the 15 March 2004 order on adjudication and disposition intact; indeed, that order is not before this Court and we are without authority to disturb it. In my view, even if the review order on appeal is reversed on some valid grounds, the earlier adjudication and disposition order unambiguously continues the child within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. One can only wonder what the trial court is now to do, given the fact that there is a child within its jurisdiction who still needs its assistance and protection. Presumably, under the holding of the majority, the trial court is presently without the authority to do anything. But, according to the undisturbed adjudication and disposition order, the juvenile court is statutorily obligated to enter appropriate orders consistent with the ongoing needs of the child.\nAbsent relief from our Supreme Court, county social services entities that have supervisory responsibilities for children within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court might wish to reexamine the petition^) which triggered their courts\u2019 jurisdiction. Indeed, children who have been in foster care for many years may need to be returned to their parents unless new petitions and associated nonsecure custody orders are issued. Like respondent-mother in the present case who did not take an appeal until she became dissatisfied with the court\u2019s decision to place the child with father, the majority holding allows interested persons in juvenile proceedings to acquiesce in the actions of the juvenile court until they become dissatisfied with the same \u2014 and then attempt to undo what they could and should have done by taking a direct appeal months and years earlier. This is, in my view, the inevitable result of the majority\u2019s misapplication of the phrase, \u201cjurisdiction . . . can be raised at any time.\u201d\nI would reject not only respondent\u2019s argument that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the custody review order on appeal, but also the remaining arguments she sets forth in her brief. The order on appeal should therefore be affirmed in all respects.\n. DSS also argues, in the alternative, that the trial court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction also arises from its obligation to hold a review hearing because T.R.P. was removed from the parent\u2019s care. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-906(a) (2003) (\u201cIn any case where custody is removed from a parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker the court shall conduct a review hearing within 90 days from the date of the disposition hearing and shall conduct a review hearing within six months thereafter.\u201d). The majority has not addressed this argument. I have not addressed this argument because I would con- ' elude that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction for the reasons discussed in this dissenting opinion.", "type": "dissent", "author": "LEVINSON, Judge" } ], "attorneys": [ "Paul W. Freeman, Jr. for petitioner-appellee Wilkes County Department of Social Services.", "Sherrie Hodges for Guardian ad Litem.", "Robert W. Ewing for respondent-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF: T.R.P., Minor Child\nNo. COA04-1356\n(Filed 4 October 2005)\nChild Support, Custody, and Visitation\u2014 subject matter jurisdiction \u2014 failure to duly verify initial juvenile petition\nThe trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter a child custody review order entered on 16 June 2004, and the order is vacated and dismissed because: (1) the initial juvenile petition was not duly verified as required by law when the petition was notarized but the petition was neither signed nor verified by the DSS director or an authorized representative of the director; and (2) a defense based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be asserted at any time.\nJudge Levinson dissenting.\nAppeal by respondent-mother from an order entered 16 June 2004 by Judge Edgar B. Gregory in Wilkes County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 June 2005.\nPaul W. Freeman, Jr. for petitioner-appellee Wilkes County Department of Social Services.\nSherrie Hodges for Guardian ad Litem.\nRobert W. Ewing for respondent-appellant." }, "file_name": "0541-01", "first_page_order": 571, "last_page_order": 580 }