{ "id": 8352349, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ALONZO PRESTON DENT", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Dent", "decision_date": "2005-11-15", "docket_number": "No. COA05-60", "first_page": "459", "last_page": "469", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "174 N.C. App. 459" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "614 S.E.2d 274", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633106 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "276-77" }, { "page": "277" }, { "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/614/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "592 S.E.2d 687", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2986515 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 80", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4696125 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 L. Ed. 2d 77", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "479 U.S. 836", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6340738, 6341187, 6339651, 6340166, 6341416, 6339181, 6341774, 6340368, 6339954, 6340948, 6338904, 6339482, 6339803, 6341597, 6338527 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/479/0836-10", "/us/479/0836-12", "/us/479/0836-05", "/us/479/0836-08", "/us/479/0836-13", "/us/479/0836-03", "/us/479/0836-15", "/us/479/0836-09", "/us/479/0836-07", "/us/479/0836-11", "/us/479/0836-02", "/us/479/0836-04", "/us/479/0836-06", "/us/479/0836-14", "/us/479/0836-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 465", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 111", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4694881 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0111-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 L. Ed. 442", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "448" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 U.S. 18", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6156993 ], "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "25-26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/333/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 U.S. 385", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3455321 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1868, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396" }, { "page": "833" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/73/0385-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 S.E.2d 486", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "489-90", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. 385, 396, 18 L. Ed. 830, 833 (1868)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 N.C. 258", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4749394 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "263", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. 385, 396, 18 L. Ed. 830, 833 (1868)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/319/0258-01" ] }, { "cite": "567 S.E.2d 124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511319 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "136" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-258.4", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "prohibiting the wilful throwing, emitting, or projecting of bodily fluids or excrement at any person who is an employee of the State or a local government by \"[a]ny person in the custody of... any local confinement facility (as defined in G.S. 153A-217, or G.S. 153A-230.1)\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-258.3", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "prohibiting the taking, holding, or carrying away of any hostages by \"any person in the custody of any local confinement facility (as defined by G.S. 153A-217)\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-258.2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "prohibiting the possession of a dangerous weapon by \"any person under the custody of any local confinement facility as defined in G.S. 153A-217\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 611", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3795543 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "614" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0611-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 10, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(e)(9)" }, { "page": "(e)(9)" }, { "page": "(e)(9)" }, { "page": "(e)(9)" }, { "page": "(e)(9)" }, { "page": "(e)(9)" }, { "page": "(e)(9)" }, { "page": "(e)(9)" }, { "page": "(e)(9)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "461 S.E.2d 655", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "662", "parenthetical": "concluding that police captain's statements during fingerprinting that he would talk with the defendant later and answer any of the defendant's questions at that time were not intended or expected to elicit an incriminating response" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793199 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "581", "parenthetical": "concluding that police captain's statements during fingerprinting that he would talk with the defendant later and answer any of the defendant's questions at that time were not intended or expected to elicit an incriminating response" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "149 L. Ed. 2d 305", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "532 U.S. 931", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9315009, 9314948, 9314725, 9314661, 9314695, 9314631, 9314793, 9314822, 9315113, 9314863, 9315060, 9314585, 9314909 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/532/0931-11", "/us/532/0931-10", "/us/532/0931-05", "/us/532/0931-03", "/us/532/0931-04", "/us/532/0931-02", "/us/532/0931-06", "/us/532/0931-07", "/us/532/0931-13", "/us/532/0931-08", "/us/532/0931-12", "/us/532/0931-01", "/us/532/0931-09" ] }, { "cite": "446 U.S. 291", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6182222 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301" }, { "page": "308" }, { "page": "301" }, { "page": "308" }, { "page": "301-02" }, { "page": "308" }, { "page": "300-02" }, { "page": "307-08" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/446/0291-01" ] }, { "cite": "533 S.E.2d 168", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199", "parenthetical": "citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297, 308 (1980)" }, { "page": "199" }, { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 684963 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "406", "parenthetical": "citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297, 308 (1980)" }, { "page": "406" }, { "page": "406" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "575 S.E.2d 818", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "820" }, { "page": "821" }, { "page": "822-23" }, { "page": "823" }, { "page": "823-25" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 N.C. App. 119", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9189854 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121" }, { "page": "127-28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/156/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "595 S.E.2d 381", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "406" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 243", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2987693 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "280" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687" }, { "page": "693" }, { "page": "694" }, { "page": "698" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 S.E.2d 241", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "248" }, { "page": "248" }, { "page": "249" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 553", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4753359 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "561-62" }, { "page": "563" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0553-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 960, "char_count": 25083, "ocr_confidence": 0.761, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.505585636006486e-08, "percentile": 0.4866565579692098 }, "sha256": "fc463700330d49c5b83c3cc196e2a5084a882612e099ea74c0ea04755b0a8922", "simhash": "1:286bf620ae3a105e", "word_count": 3981 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:19:44.302822+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUDSON and ELMORE concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ALONZO PRESTON DENT" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "SMITH, Judge.\nAlonzo Preston Dent (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals his convictions for possession of a controlled substance on the premises of a local confinement facility and obtaining habitual felon status. For the reasons discussed herein, we hold that defendant received a trial free of prejudicial error.\nAt trial, the State\u2019s evidence tended to show the following: On 7 August 2003, Winston-Salem Police Department Officer E.D. Bradshaw (\u201cOfficer Bradshaw\u201d) noticed defendant driving a vehicle in the Washington Park neighborhood of Winston-Salem, North Carolina. Believing defendant\u2019s driving privileges were revoked, Officer Bradshaw stopped defendant\u2019s vehicle and requested defendant to provide a valid driver\u2019s license and vehicle registration. Although defendant provided valid registration for the vehicle, he admitted he did not have a driver\u2019s license or driving privileges in North Carolina. Officer Bradshaw then arrested defendant for driving while license revoked. While searching defendant, Officer Bradshaw noticed the smell of \u201cburnt marijuana about [defendant\u2019s] person[.]\u201d He also found approximately $800.00 in cash and an unwrapped cigar in defendant\u2019s pockets. Officer Bradshaw did not find any marijuana on defendant\u2019s person during the search. When Officer Bradshaw asked defendant \u201cseveral times\u201d whether \u201che had any marijuana,\u201d defendant answered negatively.\nDefendant was transported to the Forsyth County Law Enforcement and Detention Center. Prior to entering the building, Officer Bradshaw again asked defendant whether he was in possession of any controlled substances. Defendant replied he was not, and he was taken inside the building. After entering the lobby of the magistrate\u2019s office, Officer Bradshaw and Winston-Salem Police Department Officer L.T. Patterson (\u201cOfficer Patterson\u201d) took defendant into a nearby search room. Once inside the search room, Officer Bradshaw informed defendant that he would be \u201cstrip searched.\u201d Defendant then stated that he had \u201cresidue\u201d in his right sock. When the officers removed defendant\u2019s sock, they found approximately 1.1 grams of marijuana inside.\nDefendant was subsequently indicted for possession of a controlled substance on the premises of a local confinement facility and obtaining habitual felon status. Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the possession charge, arguing that the term \u201clocal confinement facility\u201d did not encompass the search room or lobby of the magistrate\u2019s office. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion, and the case proceeded to trial on 18 August 2004. On 19 August 2004, the jury found defendant guilty of possession of a controlled substance on the premises of a local confinement facility. Defendant thereafter pled guilty to obtaining habitual felon status. After concluding defendant had six prior record points and a prior felony record III, the trial court sentenced defendant to a total of seventy to ninety-three months imprisonment. Defendant appeals.\nThe issues on appeal are whether: (I) defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial; (II) the trial court erred by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss; and (III) the trial court erred in instructing the jury.\nDefendant first argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Defendant asserts he is entitled to a new trial because his trial counsel failed to move to suppress his inculpatory statement to law enforcement officers as well as the evidence seized during the search of his person. We disagree.\n\u201cWhen a defendant attacks his conviction on the basis that counsel was ineffective, he must show that his counsel\u2019s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.\u201d State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 561-62, 324 S.E.2d 241, 248 (1985). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must satisfy the following two-part test:\nFirst, the defendant must show that counsel\u2019s performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the \u201ccounsel\u201d guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel\u2019s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.\nStrickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984). When reviewing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, our appellate courts \u201cengage [] in a presumption that [the] trial counsel\u2019s representation [wa]s within the boundaries of acceptable professional conduct.\u201d State v. Roache, 358 N.C. 243, 280, 595 S.E.2d 381, 406 (2004). \u201cThe fact that counsel made an error, even an unreasonable error, does not warrant reversal of a conviction unless there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel\u2019s errors, there would have been a different result in the proceedings.\u201d Braswell, 312 N.C. at 563, 324 S.E.2d at 248. \u201cThus, if a reviewing court can determine at the outset that there is no reasonable probability that in the absence of counsel\u2019s alleged errors the result of the proceeding would have been different, then the court need not determine whether counsel\u2019s performance was actually deficient.\u201d Id. at 563, 324 S.E.2d at 249. In the instant case, because we conclude there was no meritorious basis to support suppression of defendant\u2019s statements or the marijuana found on his person, we conclude defendant\u2019s trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to move to suppress the evidence.\nThe record reflects that immediately prior to being strip searched, defendant informed the officers that he had \u201cresidue\u201d in his right sock. Defendant contends that this inculpatory statement as well as the evidence seized pursuant to it were inadmissible at trial because they were a product of \u201ccustodial interrogation\u201d held without first advising him of his Miranda rights. We do not agree.\nIn State v. Phelps, the defendant was arrested on two outstanding warrants and transported to \u201cthe county jail.\u201d 156 N.C. App. 119, 121, 575 S.E.2d 818, 820 (2003). Although no contraband was found during a search incident to his arrest, on the way to the jail a law enforcement officer \u201cexplained to [the defendant] that he needed to let [the officer] know . . . before [they] went past the jail doors if he had any kind of illegal substances or weapons on him, that it was an automatic felony no matter what it was ....\u201d Id. The defendant thereafter confessed to possession of cocaine. Both the law enforcement officer\u2019s comments and the defendant\u2019s inculpatory statement were made prior to the defendant being advised of his Miranda rights. On appeal, it was determined that the officer \u201cknew or should have known that his statement was reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response\u201d from the defendant, and thus the defendant\u2019s Miranda rights were violated. Id. at 123, 575 S.E.2d at 821. However, with respect to the cocaine seized following the \u201cinterrogation,\u201d it was held that because the defendant\u2019s statement was not a product of coercion, evidence seized subsequently and pursuant to the statement was admissible and would not qualify as \u201cfruit of the poisonous tree.\u201d Id. at 124-26, 575 S.E.2d at 822-23. We concluded that \u201ceven if a Miranda violation had occurred, the crack cocaine was . . . admissible.\u201d Id. at 126, 575 S.E.2d at 823.\nAs in Phelps, the transcript in the instant case reflects that, while in custody but prior to being advised of his Miranda rights, defendant was told several times that discovery of any controlled substance on his person after he arrived at the Forsyth County Law Enforcement and Detention Center would result in a felony charge. However, unlike in Phelps, defendant made no incriminating statement in response to these custodial statements. Instead, defendant made his incriminating statement after he arrived at the Detention Center and just prior to being strip searched.\nWhen examining the circumstances surrounding an alleged custodial interrogation, courts focus on the suspect\u2019s perceptions rather than the intent of law enforcement officers. State v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 364, 406, 533 S.E.2d 168, 199 (2000) (citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297, 308 (1980)), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 931, 149 L. Ed. 2d 305 (2001). Generally, \u201c[t]he term \u2018interro-. gation\u2019 is not limited to express questioning by law enforcement officers, but also includes \u2018any words or actions on the part of the police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.\u2019 \u201d Golphin, 352 N.C. at 406, 533 S.E.2d at 199 (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 308). \u201cHowever, because \u2018the police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.\u2019 \u201d Golphin, 352 N.C. at 406, 533 S.E.2d at 199 (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 301-02, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 308)) (emphasis in original).\nIn the case sub judice, after being asked. to explain \u201cwhat happened inside the search room[,]\u201d Officer Bradshaw testified as follows:\nAfter I informed [defendant] that we were going to be completing a strip search of him inside the search room, myself and, at the time, Corporal Patterson, [defendant] advised me that he had some, quote, residue in his right sock.\nAs detailed above, defendant had rebuffed several prior attempts by the law enforcement officers to elicit information regarding defendant\u2019s possession of a controlled substance. At the time defendant made his statement, the officers were merely informing him of the extent of their then-impending search. There is no indication that the officers\u2019 comments at that time \u201cwere . . . intended nor reasonably expected to elicit an incriminating response from defendant.\u201d State v. Vick, 341 N.C. 569, 581, 461 S.E.2d 655, 662 (1995) (concluding that police captain\u2019s statements during fingerprinting that he would talk with the defendant later and answer any of the defendant\u2019s questions at that time were not intended or expected to elicit an incriminating response). Instead, we conclude that the officers\u2019 comments qualify as those \u201cnormally attendant to arrest and custody,\u201d and are thus not considered as questions or interrogation for purposes of Miranda. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-02, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 307-08 (concluding that \u201c \u2018[interrogation,\u2019 as conceptualized in the Miranda opinion, must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself[,]\u201d and that \u201cthe term \u2018interrogation\u2019 under Miranda\u201d does not extend to \u201cwords or actions on the part of the police . . . normally attendant to arrest and custody\u201d). Therefore, any incriminating statement made by defendant and any evidence seized following these comments were properly admissible at trial. In light of the foregoing, and because defendant is unable to demonstrate a \u201creasonable probability that, but for [his] counsel\u2019s [failure to move to suppress the evidence], the result of the proceeding would have been different[,]\u201d Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, we hold that defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Accordingly, we reject defendant\u2019s first argument.\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the charge of possession of a controlled substance on the premises of a local confinement facility. Although he concedes that the magistrate\u2019s office, its lobby, and its search rooms are each located inside the Forsyth County Law Enforcement and Detention Center, defendant contends that the legislature did not intend N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95(e)(9) to apply in these areas. We disagree.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95(e)(9) (2003) provides that \u201c[a]ny person who [possesses a controlled substance] on the premises of a penal institution or local confinement facility shall be guilty of a Class H felony.\u201d In support of his contention, defendant notes that while N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95(e)(9) does not define the term \u201clocal confinement facility,\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 153A-217 (2003) provides the following definition for the term:\n\u201cLocal confinement facility\u201d includes a county or city jail, a local lockup, a regional or district jail, a juvenile detention facility, a detention facility for adults operated by a local government, and any other facility operated by a local government for confinement of persons awaiting trial or serving sentences ....\nThus, defendant asserts that because the magistrate is an officer of the district court and the magistrate\u2019s office is separate from \u201cthe actual housing where the inmates would be sleeping and conducting their daily activities,\u201d reading N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95(e)(9) to include the area at issue leads to an absurd result not contemplated by the legislature. We do not agree.\nIt is well established that the \u201cprimary endeavor\u201d of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent. See State v. Beck, 359 N.C. 611, 614, 614 S.E.2d 274, 276-77 (2005). Where a statute\u2019s language is clear and unambiguous, the court should give its words their plain and definite meaning. Id. at 614, 614 S.E.2d at 277. However, where a statute is ambiguous, courts will construe the statute to \u201cascertain the legislative will[,]\u201d mindful that \u201cwhere a literal inteipretation of the language of a statute will lead to absurd results, or contravene the manifest purpose of the Legislature, . . . the reason and purpose of the law shall control and the strict letter thereof shall be disregarded.\u201d Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).\nAlthough we note that other statutes prohibit certain actions by individuals in \u201cthe custody of any\u201d local confinement facility, see, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-258.2 (prohibiting the possession of a dangerous weapon by \u201cany person under the custody of any local confinement facility as defined in G.S. 153A-217\u201d), N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-258.3 (prohibiting the taking, holding, or carrying away of any hostages by \u201cany person in the custody of any local confinement facility (as defined by G.S. 153A-217)\u201d), and N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-258.4 (prohibiting the wilful throwing, emitting, or projecting of bodily fluids or excrement at any person who is an employee of the State or a local government by \u201c[a]ny person in the custody of... any local confinement facility (as defined in G.S. 153A-217, or G.S. 153A-230.1)\u201d), we also note that, by its plain language, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95(e)(9) is not restricted solely to those individuals in custody of a local confinement facility or those actions occurring at a particular section of the facility. Instead, unlike N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 14-258.2, 14-258.3, and 14-258.4, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95(e)(9) clearly extends to \u201cany person\u201d possessing a controlled substance at a local confinement facility, and the scope of its coverage expressly includes the \u201cpremises\u201d of such facilities.\nBlack\u2019s Law Dictionary notes that \u201cpremises\u201d is \u201can elastic and inclusive term\u201d when used to refer to \u201cestates and property,\u201d in that \u201cit does not have one definite and fixed meaning; its meaning is to be determined by its context and is dependent on the circumstances in which used[.]\u201d (6th ed. 1990). In the context of criminal law, \u201c[t]he term as used in a search warrant includes land, buildings, and appurtenances thereto.\u201d Id. In the case at bar, testimony at trial tended to show that, in order to enter the area of the Forsyth County Law Enforcement and Detention Center at issue, law enforcement officers must first proceed through a locked vehicle gate and then check their weapons and identify themselves via an intercom system. The secured lobby of the facility contains three temporary \u201cholding cells,\u201d as well as access to the area where jail personnel and more permanent cells are located. Only law enforcement officers and those individuals in custody or under \u201cspecial arrangements\u201d are allowed to enter the area. While the room in which defendant was searched is \u201cjust on the other side of the door\u201d allowing entry into the magistrate\u2019s lobby, it is nevertheless a secured room where law enforcement officers detain and search those individuals who are to be taken before the magistrate.\nOur Supreme Court has. consistently held that criminal statutes are generally construed narrowly against the State and in favor of the accused. See, e.g., State v. Hearst, 356 N.C. 132, 136, 567 S.E.2d 124, 128 (2002). However, this rule is not violated \u201c \u2018by permitting the words of [a] statute to have their full meaning, or the more extended of two meanings, . . . but the words should be taken in such a sense, bent neither one way nor the other, as will best manifest the legislative intent.\u2019 \u201d State v. Raines, 319 N.C. 258, 263, 354 S.E.2d 486, 489-90 (1987) (quoting United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. 385, 396, 18 L. Ed. 830, 833 (1868)). Thus, \u201c[t]he canon in favor of strict construction [of criminal statutes] is not an inexorable command to override common sense and evident statutory purpose.... Nor does it demand that a statute be given the \u2018narrowest meaning\u2019; it is satisfied if the words are given their fair meaning in accord with the manifest intent of the lawmakers.\u201d United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25-26, 92 L. Ed. 442, 448 (1948).\nIn light of the foregoing, and giving the word \u201cpremises\u201d in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95(e)(9) its plain meaning, we conclude that the legislature intended to cover that portion of the Forsyth County Law Enforcement and Detention Center at issue in the instant case. The legislative intent in making possession of a controlled substance on the premises of a local confinement facility felonious is clear: to deter and prevent drug possession among those individuals present at local confinement facilities. By including the term \u201con the premises of\u2019 in its description of the restricted area, the legislature plainly intended that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95(e)(9) should extend beyond the bounds of the \u201clockup\u201d area of a local confinement facility, including to those secured areas in which arrestees are temporarily detained for search, booking, and other purposes. Therefore, the trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of possession of a controlled substance on the premises of a local confinement facility. Accordingly, we reject defendant\u2019s second argument.\nDefendant next argues the trial court erred in its jury instructions. Although defendant concedes he failed to object to this alleged error at trial, he now asserts the trial court committed plain error by instructing the jury that \u201c[t]he Forsyth County Detention Center is a local confinement facility.\u201d We disagree.\n\u201cA prerequisite to [an appellate court\u2019s] engaging in a \u2018plain error\u2019 analysis is the determination that the instruction constitutes \u2018error\u2019 at all.\u201d State v. Torain, 316 N.C. 111, 116, 340 S.E.2d 465, 468, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 836, 93 L. Ed. 2d 77 (1986). Once we have determined that the trial court erred, \u201c \u2018before deciding that an error by the trial court amounts to \u201cplain error,\u201d [we] must be convinced that absent the error the jury probably would have reached a different verdict.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting State v. Walker, 316 N.C. 33, 39, 340 S.E.2d 80, 83 (1986)).\nIn the case sub judice, defendant contends that the trial court\u2019s instruction preempted the jury\u2019s determination and that \u201c[t]he real question needing to be decided by the jury was not whether the Forsyth County Detention Center was a local confinement facility, but rather, whether the magistrate\u2019s office where [defendant] was searched and the marijuana was found, located in the Forsyth County Detention Center, was a local confinement facility.\u201d However, we believe defendant mischaracterizes the facts of this case. The Forsyth County Law Enforcement and Detention Center is a multiple-use building which includes, among other things, a jail, the sheriff\u2019s office, and the magistrate\u2019s office. As discussed above, law enforcement officers discovered marijuana on defendant\u2019s person not while he was in the magistrate\u2019s office, but while he was in a secured area of the Forsyth County Law Enforcement and Detention Center provided for the detention and search of individuals awaiting appearance before the magistrate. The determination of whether this area was \u201con the premises of a local confinement facility\u201d involved the interpretation of the bounds of a statute, which is a question of law for the trial court, not a question of fact for the jury. As the trial court made a proper determination regarding the applicability of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95(e)(9) to the facts of the instant case, we conclude the trial court did not err in instructing the jury. Therefore, we reject defendant\u2019s final argument.\nIn light of the foregoing, we hold that defendant received a trial free of prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nJudges HUDSON and ELMORE concur.\n. Although he concurred in this determination as well as the determination regarding the violation of the defendant\u2019s Miranda rights, Judge Hunter argued in dissent that the Phelps majority was incorrect in concluding that the trial court\u2019s erroneous admission of the defendant\u2019s incriminating statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and that the controlled substance was also admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine. 156 N.C. App. at 127-28, 575 S.E.2d at 823-25. On review, our Supreme Court agreed with Judge Hunter, reversing per curiam the majority\u2019s decision \u201c[f]or the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion[.]\u201d State v. Phelps, 358 N.C. 142, 592 S.E.2d 687 (2004). Therefore, our reliance on Phelps is limited to those conclusions reached by the entire panel as well as Judge Hunter\u2019s determinations regarding the prejudicial impact of the evidence.", "type": "majority", "author": "SMITH, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Victoria L. Voight, for the State.", "Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Gharlesena Elliott Walker, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ALONZO PRESTON DENT\nNo. COA05-60\n(Filed 15 November 2005)\n1. Constitutional Law\u2014 effective assistance of counsel\u2014 failure to move to suppress inculpatory statement and evidence\nDefendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel in a possession of a controlled substance on the premises of a local confinement facility case based on his counsel\u2019s failure to move to suppress his inculpatory statement to law enforcement officers as well as the evidence seized during the search of his person, because: (1) there was no meritorious basis to support suppression of defendant\u2019s statements or the marijuana found on his person; (2) the officers\u2019 comments qualify as those normally attendant to arrest and custody, and are thus not considered as questions or interrogation for purposes of Miranda; and (3) defendant is unable to demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for his counsel\u2019s failure to move to suppress the evidence, the result of the proceeding would have been different.\n2. Drugs\u2014 possession of marijuana \u2014 premises of local confinement facility \u2014 secured search area\nThe trial court properly denied defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss a charge of possession of a controlled substance on the premises of a local confinement facility in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(e)(9) where the evidence tended to show that defendant possessed marijuana in a secured area of the Forsyth County Law Enforcement and Detention Center provided for the detention and search of individuals awaiting an appearance before the magistrate.\n3. Drugs\u2014 instructions \u2014 local confinement facility\nThe trial court did not commit plain error in a possession of a controlled substance on the premises of a local confinement facility case by instructing the jury that the Forsyth County Law Enforcement and Detention Center is a local confinement facility, because: (1) the county law enforcement and detention center is a multiple-use building which includes, among other things, a jail, the sheriffs office, and the magistrate\u2019s office; (2) officers discovered marijuana on defendant\u2019s person not while he was in the \u25a0magistrate\u2019s office, but while he was in a secured area of the center provided for the detention and search of individuals awaiting appearance before the magistrate; (3) the determination of whether this area was on the premises of a local confinement facility involved the interpretation of the bounds of a statute, which is a question of law for the trial court, not a question of fact for the jury; and (4) the trial court made a proper determination regarding the applicability of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(e)(9) to the facts of this case.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 19 August 2004 by Judge L. Todd Burke in Forsyth County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 September 2005.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Victoria L. Voight, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Gharlesena Elliott Walker, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0459-01", "first_page_order": 489, "last_page_order": 499 }