{ "id": 8352555, "name": "MMR HOLDINGS, LLC, and TOWN & COUNTRY FORD, INC., Petitioners v. CITY OF CHARLOTTE and the CHARLOTTE ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, Respondents", "name_abbreviation": "MMR Holdings, LLC v. City of Charlotte", "decision_date": "2005-11-15", "docket_number": "No. COA04-1618", "first_page": "540", "last_page": "546", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "174 N.C. App. 540" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "612 S.E.2d 431", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632829 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/612/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "546 S.E.2d 109", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 267", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135721, 135755, 135901, 135758 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0267-02", "/nc/353/0267-04", "/nc/353/0267-03", "/nc/353/0267-01" ] }, { "cite": "531 S.E.2d 879", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "881" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 N.C. App. 693", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11081355 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "695" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/138/0693-01" ] }, { "cite": "610 S.E.2d 255", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "258", "parenthetical": "consulting a dictionary in determining the plain and ordinary meaning of \"building\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 N.C. App. 587", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8471893 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "590", "parenthetical": "consulting a dictionary in determining the plain and ordinary meaning of \"building\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/169/0587-01" ] }, { "cite": "597 A.2d 421", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 Md. 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Md.", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 Md. App. 602", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Md. App.", "case_ids": [ 4372377 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "628" }, { "page": "1092" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md-app/87/0602-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 S.E.2d 70", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "74" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 N.C. App. 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11238567 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/132/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 S. Ct. 1548", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "36 L. Ed. 2d 303", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "411 U.S. 911", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9891, 10053, 10282, 10222, 9719, 9823 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/411/0911-01", "/us/411/0911-03", "/us/411/0911-02", "/us/411/0911-05", "/us/411/0911-04", "/us/411/0911-06" ] }, { "cite": "192 S.E.2d 290", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "292", "parenthetical": "\"In construing any statute or ordinance the court will avoid an interpretation which would lead to absurd results.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 N.C. 272", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564291 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "275", "parenthetical": "\"In construing any statute or ordinance the court will avoid an interpretation which would lead to absurd results.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/282/0272-01" ] }, { "cite": "594 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "20" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2986939 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "538 S.E.2d 621", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "622" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 N.C. App. 784", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12135955 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "786" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/140/0784-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 S.E.2d 28", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2534314, 2537066, 2536085, 2534232, 2536670 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0071-01", "/nc/336/0071-04", "/nc/336/0071-05", "/nc/336/0071-03", "/nc/336/0071-02" ] }, { "cite": "439 S.E.2d 199", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 N.C. App. 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. 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App.", "case_ids": [ 11651162 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "501" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/129/0499-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 821, "char_count": 16312, "ocr_confidence": 0.74, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.2028415556273744 }, "sha256": "7d08a7984c90990fb065b7fea6a9178e4e1b08f4d46fc29ac4050e0b83bcede1", "simhash": "1:f77c8e5b1f041cf2", "word_count": 2667 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:19:44.302822+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges CALABRIA and ELMORE concur." ], "parties": [ "MMR HOLDINGS, LLC, and TOWN & COUNTRY FORD, INC., Petitioners v. CITY OF CHARLOTTE and the CHARLOTTE ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, Respondents" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GEER, Judge.\nThe sole issue raised in this appeal by petitioners MMR Holdings, LLC and Town & Country Ford, Inc. (collectively \u201cT&C\u201d) is the proper construction of the word \u201cfacade\u201d in the zoning ordinance of the City of Charlotte. Because both the Charlotte Zoning Board of Adjustment (the \u201cBoard\u201d) and the superior court defined the term \u201cfacade\u201d in a manner that is at odds with the term\u2019s plain and ordinary meaning, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.\nFacts\nT&C has operated an automobile dealership for many years on leased property in Charlotte, North Carolina currently owned by MMR Holdings, LLC. One of the features of T&C\u2019s dealership is a large sign stating the name of the dealership, which stretches across the top of a 40-foot deep, eight-foot thick canopy attached to the front of the dealership building. The canopy has been in place since the late 1970s and extends the width of the building.\nA provision of the City\u2019s zoning ordinance specifically prohibits roof signs. Charlotte, N.C., Code \u00a7 13.105 (2004). It is undisputed that the sign on T&C\u2019s canopy violates this prohibition. The City\u2019s zoning ordinance, however, permits nonconforming roof signs erected prior to 1. February 1988 \u2014 as T&C\u2019s sign was \u2014 to remain until there are \u201c[structural or nonstructural alterations excluding routine maintenance and repair of the facade of the principal building that exceed 50% of the facade\u2019s area.\u201d At that time, any non-conforming sign must be removed or brought into compliance with the ordinance. Charlotte, N.C., Code \u00a7 13.112(l)(a), ,112(l)(b)(3) (2004).\nIn spring 2003, T&C remodeled portions of the interior and exterior of its dealership. Among other changes, this remodel included the complete replacement of the Plexiglas surrounding the canopy with new lukabond paneling. Subsequent to T&C\u2019s remodel, the Zoning Code Enforcement Inspector cited T&C for violating the prohibition on roof signs. The inspector took the position that T&C\u2019s remodel constituted an alteration of more than 50% of the facade of the principal building and, therefore, voided the legal nonconforming status of T&C\u2019s sign. The inspector ordered T&C to remove the sign.\nT&C appealed the citation to the Board. The Board found in pertinent part:\n3. A facade is defined in The American Heritage Dictionary as \u201ca face of a building; especially, such a face that is given distinguishing treatment. The face or front part of anything!;] especially, an artificial or false front.\u201d\n4. A canopy is defined in Section 13.102 of the [City\u2019s zoning ordinance] as \u201ca permanent structure other than an awning made of cloth, metal or other material attached or unattached to a building for the purpose of providing shelter to patrons or automobiles, or as a decorative feature on a building wall.\u201d\n5. The extreme width of the canopy attached to [T&C\u2019s] building separates the glass front of the building from the new artificial or false front on which [T&C] has placed the new signage.\n6. The front of the canopy to [T&C\u2019s] building is the facade of the building.\n(Emphases added.) Based upon these findings, the Board concluded that T&C lost its \u201clegal nonconforming status . . . when it structurally altered more than 50%\u201d of the front of the canopy during T&C\u2019s remodel. The Board, therefore, affirmed the inspector\u2019s decision.\nPursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-388 (2003), T&C filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Mecklenburg County Superior Court, seeking review of the Board\u2019s decision. The court granted T&C\u2019s petition, concluded that the Board\u2019s construction of the word \u201cfacade\u201d in the City\u2019s ordinance was not unreasonable, and affirmed the Board\u2019s decision. T&C filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.\nDiscussion\nTo review the decision of a zoning board, a superior court must determine what type of error the petitioner asserts. In re Willis, 129 N.C. App. 499, 501, 500 S.E.2d 723, 725 (1998). When the petitioner claims that the municipality\u2019s conclusions were either unsupported by the evidence or arbitrary and capricious, the appropriate standard of review is the \u201cwhole record\u201d test. Id. On the other hand, if the petitioner correctly contends that the agency\u2019s decision was based on an error of law, de novo review is required. Id.\nOn an appeal from a superior court\u2019s review of a zoning board decision, the scope of our review is limited to determining whether the trial court exercised the appropriate standard of review and, if so, deciding if the trial court did so properly. Harding v. Bd. of Adjustment of Davie County, 170 N.C. App. 392, 395, 612 S.E.2d 431, 434 (2005). Our standard of review is the same as that of the superior court. Id.\nHere, the outcome of the case turns on the proper construction of the word \u201cfacade\u201d and, therefore, involves solely a question of law that we consider de novo. Tucker v. Mecklenburg County Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 148 N.C. App. 52, 55, 557 S.E.2d 631, 634 (2001), aff\u2019d in part per curiam, disc, review improvidently allowed in part, 356 N.C. 658, 576 S.E.2d 324 (2003). The essential goal in construing an ordinance is to determine the intent of the municipality\u2019s legislative body. Knight v. Town of Knightdale, 164 N.C. App. 766, 769, 596 S.E.2d 881, 884 (2004). Accordingly, the rules applicable to the construction of statutes also apply to the construction of municipal ordinances. Id.\nWhen a word is not otherwise defined in an ordinance, we should give the term \u201cits plain and ordinary meaning.\u201d Ayers v. Bd. of Adjustment for Town of Robersonville, 113 N.C. App. 528, 531, 439 S.E.2d 199, 201, disc. review denied, 336 N.C. 71, 445 S.E.2d 28 (1994). Courts \u201care permitted to look beyond the language of [an] ordinance only when it contains some ambiguity.\u201d Procter v. City of Raleigh Bd. of Adjustment, 140 N.C. App. 784, 786, 538 S.E.2d 621, 622 (2000).\nThe word \u201cfacade\u201d is not defined in the City\u2019s zoning ordinance and the parties do not assert its use is ambiguous. In order to determine the term\u2019s plain and ordinary meaning, the Board referred to a dictionary. As set out in its findings of fact, the Board adopted an edited version of the definition included in The American Heritage Dictionary. The full definition of \u201cfacade\u201d contained in American Heritage is:\n1. Architecture. A face of a building; especially, such a face that is given distinguishing treatment: \u201cPink classical facades peeled off and showed the mud beneath\u201d (Graham Greene). 2. The face or front part of anything; especially, an artificial or false front: \u201cOf most famous people we know only the imposing facade\u201d (Edith Hamilton).\nThe American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 468 (10th ed. 1981).\nOf the two definitions set out in the American Heritage, the Boaxd bypassed the first, which applies to architecture, in favor of the second. Based upon the second definition, the Board concluded that the front of T&C\u2019s canopy was an \u201cartificial or false front\u201d and was, therefore, the facade of the entire building. The first definition relating to architecture was, however, more applicable to a decision regarding what portion of a building constitutes its facade. Moreover, the explanatory sentence \u2014 edited out by the Board \u2014 uses the term in the context of a physical structure: \u201cPink classical facades peeled off and showed the mud beneath.\u201d\nBy contrast, the second definition, which was relied upon by the Board in reaching its decision, defines facade more generally as the \u201cface or front part of anything.\u201d Unlike the first definition, it does not specifically relate to buildings or architecture. Indeed, the corresponding explanatory sentence \u2014 omitted by the Board \u2014 suggests that using the term to designate an \u201cartificial or false front,\u201d critical language for the Board\u2019s decision, is inapposite in the building or architectural context: \u201cOf most famous people we know only the imposing facade.\u201d The second more generally applicable definition of \u201cfacade\u201d frequently is used in a metaphorical, rather than physical, sense. The Board\u2019s reliance on the second definition rather than the architectural definition was unreasonable. Reference to Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary (\u201cWebster\u2019s\u201d') supports our view that American Heritage\u2019s first definition is more pertinent to the proper construction of the ordinance. Webster\u2019s defines \u201cfacade\u201d as \u201cthe front of a building [;] ... a face ... of a building that is given emphasis by special architectural treatment . . . .\u201d Webster\u2019s Third New Int\u2019l Dictionary 811 (1968).\nApplied to T&C\u2019s dealership, the definitions in both American Heritage and Webster\u2019s suggest that the facade is at least the entire side of the building to which the canopy, being the special or distinguishing architectural treatment, is attached. Given these definitions, a facade cannot be merely the front of any special architectural treatment, as the Board found. We, therefore, conclude it was error for the Board to determine that the facade of T&C\u2019s entire building consisted solely of the eight-foot thick strip across the front of T&C\u2019s canopy.\nThe definitions of both \u201cface\u201d and \u201cfront\u201d support our determination that the Board\u2019s definition of facade was unreasonable. Both words feature prominently in the American Heritage and Webster\u2019s definitions of \u201cfacade.\u201d \u201cFace\u201d is defined as:\n[A] front, upper, or outer surface or a surface presented to view or regarded as principal: as a: the front of anything having two or four sides \u2014 opposed to back; usu. distinguished from side b: the facade esp. of a building ....\nId. Similarly, \u201cfront\u201d is defined as something that confronts or faces forward, including \u201ca face of a building; esp: the face that contains the principal entrance . . . .\u201d Id. at 914. Thus, the \u201cface\u201d or \u201cfront\u201d of a building includes the principal side that is presented to view or contains the principal entrance. Indeed, even the City notes in its brief that T&C has a canopy \u201cattached to the glass front\u201d of its building. (Emphasis added.)\nWe also observe that other portions of the City\u2019s ordinance use the terms \u201cfacade\u201d and \u201ccanopy\u201d in a manner that counsels against affirming the Board\u2019s interpretation of the words in this case. A court \u201cdoes not read segments of a statute in isolation. Rather, we construe statutes in pari materia, giving effect, if possible, to every provision.\u201d Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 358 N.C. 160, 188, 594 S.E.2d 1, 20 (2004).\nUse of the term \u201cfacade\u201d throughout the rest of the ordinance suggests an intention that the word be construed more broadly than as merely the front of a canopy. For example, in a section addressing urban design standards, the ordinance states that all \u201cbuildings fronting directly on a street shall be designed so that the first floor street facade of the building(s) along all streets includes clear glass windows and doors ... .\u201d Charlotte, N.C., Code \u00a7 9.1209(1)(a) (2004) (emphases added). Several subsections later the ordinance states that a \u201cblank wall [can be] a facade\u201d and that emergency exit doors may be located on facades only if the doors are \u201cdecorative and part of the overall building design.\u201d Charlotte, N.C., Code \u00a7 9.1209(l)(d), (f). Similarly, in a section addressing multifamily dwellings, the ordinance states that certain buildings \u201cmust have the building elevation facing the street as a front architectural facade with an entrance doorway.\u201d Charlotte, N.C., Code \u00a7 9.303(18)(f)(iv) (2004) (emphasis added). The requirements in these sections that facades have windows, doorways, and decorative architecture cannot be reconciled with the Board\u2019s interpretation in this case that the facade includes the decorative architecture, but not the dealership\u2019s glass front and entranceway.\nBy comparison, the ordinance\u2019s further use of the term \u201ccanopy\u201d never demonstrates any intention by the City to have it subsume the term \u201cfacade.\u201d In another section, the ordinance states that canopies \u201cand similar appurtenances are encouraged at the entrances to buildings . . ..\u201d Charlotte, N.C., Code \u00a7 10.804(l)(c) (2004) (emphasis added). Thus, a \u201ccanopy\u201d in \u00a7 10.804(l)(c) is an appurtenance to the face of a building \u2014 not a facade in and of itself. Indeed, even the ordinance chapter addressed in this appeal states that \u201c[c]anopies and awnings shall not be calculated in the total square footage of a building wall.\u201d Charlotte, N.C., Code \u00a7 13.108(2) (2004). The Board\u2019s interpretation would require removing a building\u2019s \u201cfacade\u201d from the calculation of a building wall\u2019s square footage since under the Board\u2019s definition, the facade would merely be the front of the canopy, which is explicitly excluded from the calculation. We do not think this odd result was intended by the City when passing the ordinance. Variety Theatres, Inc. v. Cleveland County, 282 N.C. 272, 275, 192 S.E.2d 290, 292 (1972) (\u201cIn construing any statute or ordinance the court will avoid an interpretation which would lead to absurd results.\u201d), appeal dismissed, 411 U.S. 911, 36 L. Ed. 2d 303, 93 S. Ct. 1548 (1973).\nWhile we have rejected the Board\u2019s interpretation of the word \u201cfacade\u201d in the decision below, we recognize that one of the functions of a board of adjustment is to interpret its own local zoning ordinance, and its interpretations are owed some deference. Whiteco Outdoor Adver. v. Johnston County Bd. of Adjustment, 132 N.C. App. 465, 470, 513 S.E.2d 70, 74 (1999). We, therefore, decline to consider T&C\u2019s position that its \u201cfacade\u201d included all faces of the building that the public can see. While that is a reasonable interpretation of the word \u201cfacade,\u201d it would equally be reasonable to limit \u201cfacade\u201d to the front of the building. We remand this case to the superior court to remand to the Board to determine in the first instance what reasonable definition of \u201cfacade\u201d is most consistent with the City\u2019s intention in passing the ordinance and with the use of the word \u201cfacade\u201d throughout the ordinance. Cf. Coscan Washington, Inc. v. Maryland-Nat\u2019l Capital Park & Planning Comm\u2019n, 87 Md. App. 602, 628, 590 A.2d 1080, 1092 (holding that a planning board was reasonable in its chosen definition of \u201cfacade\u201d), cert. denied, 324 Md. 324, 597 A.2d 421 (1991). Once the Board has defined \u201cfacade\u201d in this manner, it may then determine which of the walls of T&C\u2019s dealership are part of the facade and whether more than 50% of the facade was altered in T&C\u2019s remodel.\nReversed and remanded.\nJudges CALABRIA and ELMORE concur.\n. We note that the Board also addressed citations regarding the number and location of flags at T&C\u2019s dealership. The Board\u2019s determinations on those issues have not, however, been appealed to this Court.\n. While not an exclusive solution, this Court has referred to dictionaries to help determine the plain and ordinary meaning of words in statutes and ordinances that are unambiguous and otherwise undefined. See Nash-Rocky Mount Bd. of Educ. v. Rocky Mount Bd. of Adjustment, 169 N.C. App. 587, 590, 610 S.E.2d 255, 258 (2005) (consulting a dictionary in determining the plain and ordinary meaning of \u201cbuilding\u201d); Patel v. Stone, 138 N.C. App. 693, 695, 531 S.E.2d 879, 881 (consulting a dictionary in determining the plain and ordinary meaning of \u201cright\u201d), disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 267, 546 S.E.2d 109 (2000).", "type": "majority", "author": "GEER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "James, McElroy & Diehl, P.A., by Richard B. Fennell, for petitioners-appellants.", "Office of the City Attorney, by Assistant City Attorney Terrie V. Hagler-Gray, for respondents-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MMR HOLDINGS, LLC, and TOWN & COUNTRY FORD, INC., Petitioners v. CITY OF CHARLOTTE and the CHARLOTTE ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, Respondents\nNo. COA04-1618\n(Filed 15 November 2005)\nZoning\u2014 definition of facade \u2014 alteration of nonconforming sign\nAn order that a nonconforming sign be removed because more of the facade of the building had been altered than a city zoning ordinance allowed was remanded for determination of a reasonable definition of \u201cfacade\u201d consistent with the city\u2019s intent in passing the ordinance and with the use of the word throughout the ordinance. The zoning board of adjustment may then determine the extent of facade alteration in this case.\nAppeal by petitioners from order entered 1 September 2004 by Special Superior Court Judge Albert Diaz in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 17 August 2005.\nJames, McElroy & Diehl, P.A., by Richard B. Fennell, for petitioners-appellants.\nOffice of the City Attorney, by Assistant City Attorney Terrie V. Hagler-Gray, for respondents-appellees." }, "file_name": "0540-01", "first_page_order": 570, "last_page_order": 576 }