{ "id": 8352756, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANTHONY LEON HOOVER, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Hoover", "decision_date": "2005-11-15", "docket_number": "No. COA05-64", "first_page": "596", "last_page": "601", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "174 N.C. App. 596" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "151 L. Ed. 2d 1002", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1002(b)(3) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). By his failure to challenge the court's ruling, defendant waived his statutory right to a competency hearing under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1002(b" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "534 U.S. 1147", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9256736, 9256996, 9257189, 9256777, 9257356, 9257228, 9257036, 9257136, 9256693, 9256886, 9256920, 9257306, 9256827, 9257276, 9256957, 9256858 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1002(b)(3) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). By his failure to challenge the court's ruling, defendant waived his statutory right to a competency hearing under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1002(b" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/534/1147-02", "/us/534/1147-09", "/us/534/1147-12", "/us/534/1147-03", "/us/534/1147-16", "/us/534/1147-13", "/us/534/1147-10", "/us/534/1147-11", "/us/534/1147-01", "/us/534/1147-06", "/us/534/1147-07", "/us/534/1147-15", "/us/534/1147-04", "/us/534/1147-14", "/us/534/1147-08", "/us/534/1147-05" ] }, { "cite": "546 S.E.2d 575", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "584" }, { "page": "585" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "466" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "558 S.E.2d 156", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158-59", "parenthetical": "internal citations and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "160", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 219980 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174-75", "parenthetical": "internal citations and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "177" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 S.E.2d 123", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C, 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568158 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 S.E.2d 707", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569541, 8569509, 8569477, 8569391, 8569437 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0306-05", "/nc/305/0306-04", "/nc/305/0306-03", "/nc/305/0306-01", "/nc/305/0306-02" ] }, { "cite": "281 S.E.2d 684", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "695" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 N.C. App. 632", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523065 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "648" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/53/0632-01" ] }, { "cite": "539 S.E.2d 675", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "677" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 N.C. App. 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9441216 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "347" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/141/0344-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 S.E.2d 37", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571671 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "495 S.E.2d 916", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "919" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 N.C. App. 626", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11656278 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "629" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/128/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "219 S.E.2d 277", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "279" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 N.C. App. 379", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553868 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380-81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/27/0379-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 S.E.2d 884", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "886", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Smith, 27 N.C. App. 379, 380-81, 219 S.E.2d 277, 279 (1975)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 N.C. App. 628", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551641 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "630", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Smith, 27 N.C. App. 379, 380-81, 219 S.E.2d 277, 279 (1975)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/33/0628-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 609, "char_count": 12543, "ocr_confidence": 0.74, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.618033054398814e-07, "percentile": 0.9814021975798589 }, "sha256": "aeda2e63c3dab978dfb9df499707d4f751eda083ebab096620e17203d2534e6e", "simhash": "1:83a9c56a17ca9f76", "word_count": 2049 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:19:44.302822+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ELMORE and SMITH concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANTHONY LEON HOOVER, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUDSON, Judge.\nDefendant Anthony Leon Hoover was charged with first-degree statutory rape. On 10 January 2003, the court appointed attorney David Liner to represent defendant. Liner withdrew as counsel on 7 October 2003, and the court assigned public defender Elizabeth Toomes as counsel. Toomes moved for an examination of defendant to determine his competency. On 10 May 2004, defendant requested Toomes be removed as his counsel; the court removed Toomes and appointed attorney H.G. Davis to represent defendant. On 13 August 2004, the court allowed Davis to withdraw and granted defendant\u2019s request to represent himself, with public defender Toomes as standby counsel. On 3 August 2004, the court heard and denied a number of motions from defendant, including one to replace Toomes as counsel. At the 16 August 2004 criminal session of the Superior Court in Forsyth County, defendant proceeded pro se and a jury convicted him of first-degree statutory rape. The court sentenced defendant to 312 to 384 months in prison, and he appeals. As discussed below, we see no error.\nThe evidence tended to show that in 1999 the eleven-year-old victim, B.R., lived with her aunt. She accused defendant, her mother\u2019s former live-in boyfriend, of molesting her in November 1998 when he lived with B.R. and her mother. B.R. told her aunt that defendant had come into the room where she was watching television and had intercourse with her, threatening her if she told anyone. Defendant\u2019s evidence showed that he lived with B.R. and her mother only from February through April 1998, and lived at another address during November of that year.\nDefendant first argues that the court erred in denying defendant\u2019s motion to withdraw his waiver of counsel. We do not agree.\nA waiver of counsel or decision to proceed pro se is \u201cgood and sufficient until the trial [is] finally terminated, \u2018unless the defendant himself makes known to the'court that he desires to withdraw the waiver\u2019 \u201d and makes a showing that the change of mind to proceed (with or without an attorney) was for some \u201cgood cause.\u201d State v. Clark, 33 N.C. App. 628, 630, 235 S.E.2d 884, 886 (1977) (quoting State v. Smith, 27 N.C. App. 379, 380-81, 219 S.E.2d 277, 279 (1975)). To hold otherwise would allow a defendant \u201c \u2018to control the course of litigation and sidetrack the trial.\u2019 \u201d Id.\nState v. Jackson, 128 N.C. App. 626, 629, 495 S.E.2d 916, 919, review dismissed as improvidently granted, 349 N.C. 287, 507 S.E.2d 37 (1998). Where \u201c[t]he trial court was aware of [a] defendant\u2019s desire for assistance of counsel, but denied the request based on defendant\u2019s prior waiver[,]\u201d the denial was error and the defendant was entitled to a new trial. State v. Sexton, 141 N.C. App. 344, 347, 539 S.E.2d 675, 677 (2000). Several features of Sexton make it distinguishable from the case before us now. The trial court there failed to complete the AOC form entitled \u201cWaiver of Counsel.\u201d Id. In addition, the defendant in Sexton, who asked to withdraw his waiver on the day of trial, gave the trial court \u201cgood cause,\u201d explaining that the length of sentence he faced had caused him to reconsider his attempt to save money by refusing the assistance of counsel. Id.\nHere, defendant had four counsel appointments and requested change of counsel four times in approximately eighteen months. He sought to withdraw his waiver of counsel two weeks prior to the beginning of trial. The record before us reveals that defendant complained about the performance of his standby counsel Toomes, alleging in a motion that she was providing him ineffective assistance of counsel, which the court treated as a request for the appointment of new counsel. The court denied defendant\u2019s request, stating \u201cyou indicated you wanted to represent yourself, so I\u2019m not going to appoint another lawyer, you either have Ms. Toomes as your standby counsel or no lawyer at all. Do you want Ms. Toomes to stay as your standby counsel?\u201d Defendant responded \u201cyes, I\u2019m going to beat the case anyway.\u201d Unlike the circumstances in Sexton, defendant here failed to clearly state a request to withdraw his waiver of counsel and failed to provide a reason for the delay in requesting the withdrawal constituting \u201cgood cause.\u201d We overrule this assignment of error.\nDefendant next argues that the court abused its discretion by refusing to reopen the trial to permit defendant to introduce additional evidence. We disagree.\nAt the conclusion of the trial, the court asked defendant whether he wished to call any further witnesses or introduce any additional evidence. Defendant said no. Following motions, the charge conference, and the closing arguments, court recessed for the evening. The next morning, defendant\u2019s sister asked the court if an additional witness, Michael Reese, could testify about driving defendant to and from work. The court did- not allow the evidence to be reopened. Defendant contends this ruling was an abuse of the court\u2019s discretion.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1226(b) provides that \u201c[t]he judge in his discretion may permit any party to introduce additional evidence at any time prior to verdict.\u201d Because there is no constitutional right to have one\u2019s case reopened, the decision to reopen a case is strictly within the trial court\u2019s discretion. State v. Shelton, 53 N.C. App. 632, 648, 281 S.E.2d 684, 695 (1981), appeal dismissed, 305 N.C. 306, 290 S.E.2d 707 (1982). Defendant cites State v. Lang for the proposition that \u201cthere is error when the trial court refuses to exercise its discretion in the erroneous belief that it has no discretion as to the question presented.\u201d 301 N.C, 508, 510, 272 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1980). In addition, \u201c[w]here the error is prejudicial, the defendant is entitled to have his motion reconsidered and passed upon as a discretionary matter.\u201d Id. In Lang, however, the jury had requested a transcript of witness testimony while deliberating, which request the trial court refused, believing that it did not have the authority to provide the transcript. Id. Lang is inapposite to the case before us. In addition, defendant fails to show that the court abused its discretion in refusing to reopen the trial to allow Mr. Reese to testify. Because evidence about defendant\u2019s work schedule had already been admitted, defendant fails to show how he was prejudiced by the trial court\u2019s refusal to allow Mr. Reese to testify about driving him to and from work. We overrule this assignment of error.\nDefendant also argues that the court erred in permitting him to waive his right to counsel and allowing him to proceed pro se. We disagree.\nDefendant contends that the court should have inquired into his literacy, competency, and ability to read before permitting him to waive his right to counsel. Our Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that:\na defendant has a right to handle his own case without interference by, or the assistance of, counsel forced upon him against his wishes. However, before allowing a defendant to waive in-court representation by counsel, . . . the trial court must insure that constitutional and statutory standards are satisfied. First, defendant\u2019s waiver of the right to counsel and election to proceed pro se must be expressed clearly and unequivocally. Second, in order to satisfy constitutional standards, the trial court must determine whether defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives his right to counsel. In order to determine whether the waiver meets [this constitutional] standard, the trial court must conduct a thorough inquiry.\nState v. Fulp, 355 N.C. 171, 174-75, 558 S.E.2d 156, 158-59 (2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The constitutional requirements of waiving the right to counsel are satisfied by compliance with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1242, which provides that:\nA defendant may be permitted at his election to proceed in the trial of his case without the assistance of counsel only after the trial judge makes thorough inquiry and is satisfied that the defendant:\n(1) Has been clearly advised of his right to the assistance of counsel, including his right to the assignment of counsel when he is so entitled;\n(2) Understands and appreciates the consequences of this decision; and\n(3) Comprehends the nature of the charges and proceedings and the range of permissible punishments.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1242 (2001). In addition, the Court in Fulp held that the trial court\u2019s failure to \u201cexpressly and specifically state in his findings of fact that he considered defendant\u2019s age, education, familiarity with the English language, mental condition, and the complexity of the crime charged is not of sufficient consequence to warrant reversal of the court\u2019s order.\u201d Fulp, 355 N.C. at 177, 558 S.E.2d at 160 (internal quotation marks omitted). The record reveals that the court fully complied with the statutory requirements before allowing defendant to waive his right to counsel. The court\u2019s findings of fact support its decision to permit defendant to waive his right to counsel and proceed pro se. This assignment of error is without merit.\nIn his final assignment of error, defendant argues that the court erred in determining that he was competent to stand trial. We disagree.\nThe court received a report from a forensic examiner, stating that defendant was competent to stand trial, and the court ruled as such.\nPursuant to the plain language of section 15A-1002(b)(3), the trial court must hold a hearing to determine the defendant\u2019s capacity to proceed i/the question is raised. However, this Court has recognized that a defendant may waive the benefit of statutory or constitutional provisions by express consent, failure to assert it in apt time, or by conduct inconsistent with a purpose to insist upon it.\nState v. King, 363 N.C. 457, 466, 546 S.E.2d 575, 584 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1147, 151 L. Ed. 2d 1002 (2002) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1002(b)(3) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). By his failure to challenge the court\u2019s ruling, defendant waived his statutory right to a competency hearing under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1002(b). Id. at 466, 546 S.E.2d at 585. We overrule this assignment of error.\nNo error.\nJudges ELMORE and SMITH concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUDSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Elizabeth N. Strickland, for the State.", "Lig\u00f3n and Hinton, by Lemuel W. Hinton, for defendant-appeallant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANTHONY LEON HOOVER, Defendant\nNo. COA05-64\n(Filed 15 November 2005)\n1. Constitutional Law\u2014 right to counsel \u2014 motion to withdraw waiver of counsel\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree statutory rape case by denying defendant\u2019s motion to withdraw his waiver of counsel, because defendant failed to clearly state a request to withdraw his waiver of counsel and failed to provide a reason for the. delay in requesting the withdrawal constituting good cause.\n2. Evidence\u2014 denial of motion to introduce additional evidence \u2014 failure to show prejudice\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a first-degree statutory rape case by refusing to reopen the trial to permit defendant to introduce additional evidence, because: (1) evidence about defendant\u2019s work schedule had already been admitted; and (2) defendant failed to show how he was prejudiced by the trial court\u2019s refusal to allow an additional witness to testily about driving him to and from work.\n3. Constitutional Law\u2014 right to counsel \u2014 waiver of counsel \u2014 pro se representation\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree statutory rape case by permitting defendant to waive his right to counsel and allowing him to proceed pro se, because: (1) the trial court fully complied with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1242 before allowing defendant to waive his right to counsel; and (2) the court\u2019s findings of fact support its decision to permit defendant to waive his right to counsel and proceed pro se.\n4. Criminal Law\u2014 competency to stand trial \u2014 waiver of right to competency hearing\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree statutory rape case by determining that defendant was competent to stand trial, because: (1) the court received a report from a forensic examiner stating that defendant was competent to stand trial, and the court ruled as such; and (2) by his failure to challenge the court\u2019s ruling, defendant waived his statutory right to a competency hearing under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1002(b).\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 19 August 2004 by Judge L. Todd Burke in Forsyth County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 September 2005.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Elizabeth N. Strickland, for the State.\nLig\u00f3n and Hinton, by Lemuel W. Hinton, for defendant-appeallant." }, "file_name": "0596-01", "first_page_order": 626, "last_page_order": 631 }