{ "id": 8352018, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. AARON HOWARD YELTON, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Yelton", "decision_date": "2006-01-03", "docket_number": "No. COA04-1544", "first_page": "349", "last_page": "359", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "175 N.C. App. 349" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "590 S.E.2d 853", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12631084 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/590/0853-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 660", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491813, 491529, 491434, 12631086, 491407, 491891, 491575, 491512, 491770 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0660-02", "/nc/357/0660-05", "/nc/357/0660-07", "/se2d/590/0855-01", "/nc/357/0660-08", "/nc/357/0660-01", "/nc/357/0660-03", "/nc/357/0660-06", "/nc/357/0660-04" ] }, { "cite": "586 S.E.2d 488", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "500" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 N.C. App. 443", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8956602 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "460" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/160/0443-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 S.E.2d 39", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "45", "parenthetical": "\"The court's charge on second degree murder was correct, but whether it was or not, is not material on this appeal, because the defendant was convicted of the lesser offense of manslaughter, and there is nothing to show that the verdict of guilty of manslaughter was thereby affected.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "245 N.C. 323", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8610604 ], "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "330-31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/245/0323-01" ] }, { "cite": "242 S.E.2d 512", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512" }, { "page": "515" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 N.C. App. 700", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551792 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "701" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/35/0700-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 S.E.2d 555", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "559" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 583", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2491770 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "591" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0583-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 90-87", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(5)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "549 S.E.2d 897", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "901" }, { "page": "901" }, { "page": "902-03" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 N.C. App. 335", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11437432 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "342" }, { "page": "342" }, { "page": "343" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/145/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(l)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "573 S.E.2d 866", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "868" }, { "page": "869" }, { "page": "869" }, { "page": "869" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 591", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511364 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "595" }, { "page": "596" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0591-01" ] }, { "cite": "562 S.E.2d 432", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 497", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 220135, 220168, 219892, 220053, 220024 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0497-03", "/nc/355/0497-02", "/nc/355/0497-04", "/nc/355/0497-05", "/nc/355/0497-01" ] }, { "cite": "561 S.E.2d 514", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "519-20" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. App. 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9127214 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "255" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/149/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "764 F.2d 1493", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 378004 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1499" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/764/1493-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 S.E.2d 171", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. Williford, 764 F.2d 1493, 1499 (11th Cir. 1985)" }, { "page": "175-76", "parenthetical": "\"Because the evidence of defendant's marijuana possession served the purpose of establishing the chain of circumstances leading up to his arrest for possession of LSD, Rule 404(b) did not require its exclusion as evidence probative only of defendant's propensity to possess illegal drugs.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5305171 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. Williford, 764 F.2d 1493, 1499 (11th Cir. 1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0542-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 S. Ct. 530", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 L. Ed. 2d 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "516 U.S. 994", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 324192, 326433, 325570, 326147, 328450, 325243, 328216, 323051, 328556, 324366, 324911, 327448, 327675, 328317 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/516/0994-10", "/us/516/0994-09", "/us/516/0994-01", "/us/516/0994-14", "/us/516/0994-08", "/us/516/0994-07", "/us/516/0994-12", "/us/516/0994-06", "/us/516/0994-13", "/us/516/0994-05", "/us/516/0994-04", "/us/516/0994-02", "/us/516/0994-03", "/us/516/0994-11" ] }, { "cite": "457 S.E.2d 841", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "853" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790203 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 S.E.2d 501", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "508", "parenthetical": "holding that trial court did not err in admitting testimony that defendant had indicated he might solve his financial difficulties by robbing a bank when \"[t]he testimony at issue did not relate to any prior crime, wrong or act of the defendant\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793201 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "63", "parenthetical": "holding that trial court did not err in admitting testimony that defendant had indicated he might solve his financial difficulties by robbing a bank when \"[t]he testimony at issue did not relate to any prior crime, wrong or act of the defendant\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 S. Ct. 47", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 L. Ed. 2d 79", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "604 S.E.2d 886", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "903", "parenthetical": "concluding that, even if the defendant established certain evidence was improperly admitted, the Court would not reverse because the defendant had not demonstrated prejudice" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3803286 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159", "parenthetical": "concluding that, even if the defendant established certain evidence was improperly admitted, the Court would not reverse because the defendant had not demonstrated prejudice" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0131-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 S.E.2d 791", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "793" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4731290 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "403" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 S.E.2d 48", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" }, { "page": "54", "parenthetical": "emphases omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5306215 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "123 S. Ct. 2087", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 L. Ed. 2d 1074", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "538 U.S. 1040", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9088356, 9088262, 9088423, 9088327, 9088298, 9088395, 9088274, 9088471, 9088313, 9088285, 9088380, 9088253, 9088343, 9088447 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/538/1040-09", "/us/538/1040-02", "/us/538/1040-12", "/us/538/1040-07", "/us/538/1040-05", "/us/538/1040-11", "/us/538/1040-03", "/us/538/1040-14", "/us/538/1040-06", "/us/538/1040-04", "/us/538/1040-10", "/us/538/1040-01", "/us/538/1040-08", "/us/538/1040-13" ] }, { "cite": "572 S.E.2d 108", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 316", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511176 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0316-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 S. Ct. 2694", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 L. Ed. 2d 965", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "530 U.S. 1245", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9433473, 9433442, 9433509, 9433349, 9433253, 9433290, 9433227, 9433548, 9433389, 9433330, 9433365, 9433273, 9433307, 9433407 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/530/1245-12", "/us/530/1245-11", "/us/530/1245-13", "/us/530/1245-07", "/us/530/1245-02", "/us/530/1245-04", "/us/530/1245-01", "/us/530/1245-14", "/us/530/1245-09", "/us/530/1245-06", "/us/530/1245-08", "/us/530/1245-03", "/us/530/1245-05", "/us/530/1245-10" ] }, { "cite": "520 S.E.2d 545", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "554" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155790 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "382 S.E.2d 825", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "827", "parenthetical": "permitting lay testimony of a customs agent who identified a smell coming from a truck as marijuana based on his years of experience smelling marijuana" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 N.C. App. 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520466 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "287", "parenthetical": "permitting lay testimony of a customs agent who identified a smell coming from a truck as marijuana based on his years of experience smelling marijuana" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/95/0283-01" ] }, { "cite": "547 S.E.2d 427", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 396", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135841, 135938, 135760, 135894, 135895 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0396-04", "/nc/353/0396-05", "/nc/353/0396-03", "/nc/353/0396-01", "/nc/353/0396-02" ] }, { "cite": "540 S.E.2d 388", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 N.C. App. 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9441303 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/141/0354-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 961, "char_count": 25579, "ocr_confidence": 0.721, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.550310001126553e-08, "percentile": 0.447958741996155 }, "sha256": "e821adee4de9a66fb50f6c437219aace0e617130624431e3c3116c9625954ca4", "simhash": "1:af6b4d2ed52e5e42", "word_count": 4110 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:29:36.119960+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges MARTIN and BRYANT concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. AARON HOWARD YELTON, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GEER, Judge.\nDefendant Aaron Howard Yelton appeals from convictions for involuntary manslaughter, possession with intent to sell and deliver methamphetamine, and sale and delivery of methamphetamine. These charges arose out of the death of Jason Hodge as a result of ingesting methamphetamine that, the State contended and the jury found, defendant provided to Hodge. On appeal, defendant argues primarily that the trial court erred by allowing lay witness testimony that the substance given to Hodge was methamphetamine and that the trial court violated Rule 404(b) of the Rules of Evidence by admitting evidence of defendant\u2019s statements regarding his prior interactions with Hodge. We conclude that the lay witness\u2019 testimony was rationally based on the witness\u2019 six years of experience with methamphetamine and her perceptions while smoking the substance and was, therefore, admissible under Rule 701 of the Rules of Evidence. We further conclude that the testimony regarding defendant\u2019s prior dealings with Hodge was not offered for a reason prohibited by North Carolina Rule of Evidence 404(b) and, accordingly, was admissible. Because defendant\u2019s remaining arguments regarding the trial are also without merit, we hold that defendant received a trial free of prejudicial error.\nFacts\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show the following facts. On 6 March 2002, Jason Hodge, who had been drinking heavily, arrived at defendant\u2019s home with Ernie Sims and Jesse Hill. Already present at defendant\u2019s house were Amy Alley and several other individuals not relevant to this appeal. Defendant and Hodge went outside. From about five feet away, Alley witnessed defendant hand Hodge an \u201ceightball\u201d of methamphetamine that Hodge then hid in his sock.\nSubsequently, Hodge, Sims, Hill, and Alley all left in Hill\u2019s vehicle and drove to Sims\u2019 trailer. After arriving, Hodge thought he had lost his methamphetamine and became angry. Alley reminded Hodge that he had put it in his sock. Hodge removed the methamphetamine from his sock, and Hodge, Alley, and the others smoked it. Hodge then became increasingly erratic: he yelled, tore off his clothes, struck himself in the head with computer components, and began physically fighting with Sims.\nHodge was eventually forcibly thrown out of the trailer. He pounded on the exterior door; when Sims opened the door, Hodge hit Sims and dragged him into the yard. The others attempted to break up the fight, but no one was able to control Hodge. Hodge was hit repeatedly with a log, a stick, and fists in an effort to subdue him. Even though Hodge continued to fight and resist, two of the men were eventually able to bind Hodge\u2019s wrists and ankles with duct tape. Hodge was then left face-down outside, where he subsequently died. At trial, the forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy on Hodge testified that ingestion of methamphetamine was a proximate cause of his death.\nDefendant was indicted for (1) second degree murder, (2) possession with intent to sell and deliver methamphetamine, and (3) sale and/or delivery of methamphetamine. He was convicted of involuntary manslaughter and of both drug charges. The trial court imposed a sentence of 19 to 23 months for the involuntary manslaughter conviction and a consecutive sentence of 15 to 18 months for the drug convictions. Defendant timely appealed to this Court.\nI\nDefendant first assigns error to the trial court\u2019s admission of Alley\u2019s testimony regarding the nature of the substance exchanged between defendant and Hodge. Defendant contends that Alley\u2019s identification of the substance as methamphetamine constituted impermissible lay opinion testimony.\nRule 701 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence permits lay opinion testimony so long as it is rationally based on the perception of the witness and helpful to a clear understanding of the witness\u2019 testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, N.C.R. Evid. 701 (2003). We review the trial court\u2019s decision to allow the testimony for abuse of discretion. State v. Washington, 141 N.C. App. 354, 362, 540 S.E.2d 388, 395 (2000), disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 396, 547 S.E.2d 427 (2001). Accordingly, we may reverse only upon a showing that the trial court\u2019s admission of Alley\u2019s testimony was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision. Id.\nAlley testified that when she \u201cwalked outside [she] seen [defendant] hand [Hodge] an eightball, and [Hodge] put it in his sock.\u201d She further testified that she later smoked the substance, which she saw Hodge take directly from his sock, and that it was methamphetamine.\nDefendant argues that Alley lacked the requisite personal knowledge to give her opinion regarding what was exchanged between defendant and Hodge because Alley\u2019s understanding of what an \u201ceightball\u201d is originated with other people. Defendant points to the fact that on cross-examination Alley admitted that she did not know how much an \u201ceightball\u201d typically costs or how many grams of methamphetamine are actually in an \u201ceightball\u201d and that she only knew that the item handed to the victim was an \u201ceightball\u201d because \u201cthat\u2019s what [Sims] and them told [her].\u201d Alley\u2019s testimony as a whole, however, indicates no lack of knowledge that the substance was methamphetamine, but only that the particular amount was called an \u201ceightball.\u201d\nAlley\u2019s uncertainty as to the precise weight and cost of an \u201ceightball\u201d is, however, irrelevant. The relevant issues at trial were whether Alley had sufficient personal knowledge of methamphetamine to identify it, whether her conclusion that defendant gave Hodge methamphetamine was rationally based upon her perceptions, and whether her opinion on the issue was helpful either to the jury\u2019s understanding of her testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.\nFirst, the State established that Alley had extensive personal knowledge of methamphetamine. At the time of trial, she had been smoking methamphetamine for six years and was able to describe, in great detail, the method by which one smokes methamphetamine. Second, Alley\u2019s identification of the substance that she smoked \u2014 and that had been received from defendant \u2014 as methamphetamine was based on that personal experience. See State v. Drewyore, 95 N.C. App. 283, 287, 382 S.E.2d 825, 827 (1989) (permitting lay testimony of a customs agent who identified a smell coming from a truck as marijuana based on his years of experience smelling marijuana). With respect to the final element, defendant does not dispute that Alley\u2019s testimony on this issue was helpful for a clear understanding of her testimony or to the determination of a fact in issue. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Alley\u2019s testimony identifying the substance given by defendant to Hodge as methamphetamine.\nII\nDefendant next assigns error to the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion to suppress statements he made during an interrogation by detectives Ron and Philip Bailey. Although defendant admits that at some point during the interrogation, he waived his right to remain silent under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), he asserts that the disputed statements were elicited prior to that waiver and should, therefore, have been suppressed.\nSince defendant has not specifically assigned error to any of the trial court\u2019s findings of fact on this issue, those findings are binding on appeal and our review \u201cis limited to whether the trial court\u2019s findings of fact support its conclusions of law.\u201d State v. Cheek, 351 N.C. 48, 63, 520 S.E.2d 545, 554 (1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1245, 147 L. Ed. 2d 965, 120 S. Ct. 2694 (2000). In any event, we note that even if defendant had properly assigned error to the pertinent findings of fact, those findings would still be binding on appeal as they are supported by the detectives\u2019 testimony. State v. Barden, 356 N.C. 316, 340, 572 S.E.2d 108, 125 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1040, 155 L. Ed. 2d 1074, 123 S. Ct. 2087 (2003).\nThe trial court found that \u201cbefore any interview or discussion with the defendant occurred the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights.\u201d The court thereafter concluded that \u201cno statement was given [by] 11:50 [a.m.]. Then the defendant waived his rights at 11:54, after which questions were asked and statements were given.\u201d These factual findings are binding on appeal and establish a valid waiver under Miranda prior to defendant\u2019s making the disputed statements. The trial court, therefore, did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nIll\nDefendant also assigns error to the trial court\u2019s admission into evidence of five statements elicited from defendant during the same police interrogation on the grounds that they were inadmissible under Rule 404(b) of the Rules of Evidence. It is well-established that Rule 404(b) is a \u201crule of inclusion of relevant evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts by a defendant, subject to but one exception requiring [their] exclusion if [their] only probative value is to show that the defendant has the propensity or disposition to commit an offense of the nature of the crime charged.\u201d State v. Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 278-79, 389 S.E.2d 48, 54 (1990). Thus, \u201c \u2018evidence of other offenses is admissible so long as it is relevant to any fact or issue other than the character of the accused.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 278, 389 S.E.2d at 54 (emphases omitted) (quoting State v. Weaver, 318 N.C. 400, 403, 348 S.E.2d 791, 793 (1986)).\nThe statements challenged by defendant include the following: (1) defendant\u2019s claim that he \u201cnever sold [Hodge] drugs\u201d; (2) defendant\u2019s asking the detectives if they would \u201csell [Hodge] drugs with two people [they] didn\u2019t know\u201d; (3) defendant\u2019s statement that he would have \u201cturned [Hodge] onto some meth if the other two guys were not there\u201d; (4) defendant\u2019s claim he had \u201cturned [Hodge] onto some meth\u201d two to three weeks prior to his death; and (5) defendant\u2019s admission that he would \u201cgive [Hodge] drugs when [Hodge] worked for [defendant].\u201d\nAs a preliminary matter, we note the first two statements could only have exculpated defendant since they suggest defendant did not sell methamphetamine to Hodge on 6 March 2002. Defendant does not suggest, nor can we divine, how these statements could have been prejudicial. State v. Morgan, 359 N.C. 131, 159, 604 S.E.2d 886, 903 (2004) (concluding that, even if the defendant established certain evidence was improperly admitted, the Court would not reverse because the defendant had not demonstrated prejudice), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 163 L. Ed. 2d 79, 126 S. Ct. 47 (2005). Additionally, while the third statement is not necessarily exculpatory, it does not refer to prior crimes, wrongs, or acts and, therefore, falls outside of the scope of Rule 404(b). State v. Thibodeaux, 341 N.C. 53, 63, 459 S.E.2d 501, 508 (1995) (holding that trial court did not err in admitting testimony that defendant had indicated he might solve his financial difficulties by robbing a bank when \u201c[t]he testimony at issue did not relate to any prior crime, wrong or act of the defendant\u201d).\nRegarding the fourth and fifth statements, our Supreme Court has held that \u201c[e]vidence of other crimes committed by a defendant may be admissible under Rule 404(b) if it establishes the chain of circumstances or context of the charged crime. Such evidence is admissible if the evidence of other crimes serves to enhance the natural development of the facts or is necessary to complete the story of the charged crime for the jury.\u201d State v. White, 340 N.C. 264, 284, 457 S.E.2d 841, 853 (internal citations omitted), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 994, 133 L. Ed. 2d 436, 116 S. Ct. 530 (1995). Our Supreme Court has explained further:\n\u201cEvidence, not part of the crime charged but pertaining to the chain of events explaining the context, motive and set-up of the crime, is properly admitted if linked in time and circumstances with the charged crime, or [if it] forms an integral and natural part of an account of the crime, or is necessary to complete the story of the crime for the jury.\u201d\nState v. Agee, 326 N.C. 542, 548, 391 S.E.2d 171, 174 (1990) (quoting United States v. Williford, 764 F.2d 1493, 1499 (11th Cir. 1985)).\nIn this case, defendant\u2019s statements that he had \u201cturned [Hodge] on to some meth\u201d two to three weeks prior to his death and that he would \u201cgive [Hodge] drugs when [Hodge] worked for [defendant]\u201d were, as Agee specified, an integral and natural part of the development of the facts and were necessary to complete the story of defendant\u2019s crimes for the jury. The statements were not offered solely to evidence defendant\u2019s propensity to commit a crime, but rather established the nature of the victim\u2019s relationship with defendant, including the fact that defendant traded Hodge drugs for work. This fact was necessary to meet the State\u2019s burden of proof regarding the charge of sale of a controlled substance.\nBecause the statements helped describe the chain of circumstances leading up to the exchange and provided the context for the charged crime, the trial court did not err in admitting the testimony. See id. at 550, 391 S.E.2d at 175-76 (\u201cBecause the evidence of defendant\u2019s marijuana possession served the purpose of establishing the chain of circumstances leading up to his arrest for possession of LSD, Rule 404(b) did not require its exclusion as evidence probative only of defendant\u2019s propensity to possess illegal drugs.\u201d); State v. Holadia, 149 N.C. App. 248, 255, 561 S.E.2d 514, 519-20 (holding that the trial court did not err under Rule 404(b) in admitting testimony of the victim of an armed robbery regarding defendant\u2019s statement referring to defendant\u2019s prior drug activity with the victim), disc. review denied, 355 N.C. 497, 562 S.E.2d 432 (2002).\nIV\nDefendant next assigns error to the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion at the close of all the evidence to dismiss the State\u2019s charges for insufficient evidence. In addressing a criminal defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence, the trial court must determine whether there is substantial evidence: (1) of each essential element of the offense charged; and (2) of defendant\u2019s being the perpetrator of the offense. State v. Scott, 356 N.C. 591, 595, 573 S.E.2d 866, 868 (2002). Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence necessary to persuade a rational juror to accept a conclusion. Id. at 597, 573 S.E.2d at 869. The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of all reasonable inferences. Id. at 596, 573 S.E.2d at 869. Contradictions and discrepancies do not warrant dismissal, but are for the jury to resolve. Id.\nA. The Controlled Substance Charges\nDefendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver and with the sale and/or delivery of a controlled substance, both in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95 (2003). The first charge has the following elements: (1) possession, (2) of a controlled substance, (3) with the intent to sell or distribute the controlled substance. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95(a)(l); State v. Carr, 145 N.C. App. 335, 342, 549 S.E.2d 897, 901 (2001). The second charge, on the other hand, requires that the State show the transfer of a controlled substance by sale, delivery, or both. Carr, 145 N.C. App. at 342, 549 S.E.2d at 901. Methamphetamine is a \u201ccontrolled substance\u201d under the North Carolina Controlled Substances Act. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 90-87(5), 90-90(3) (2003).\nOn appeal, defendant argues first that the State did not present substantial evidence that the substance defendant delivered to Hodge was methamphetamine. Defendant\u2019s argument, however, assumes that Alley\u2019s testimony is inadmissible. Since we have held that Alley\u2019s identification of the substance as methamphetamine was admissible under Rule 701, that evidence is sufficient to meet the State\u2019s burden of proof regarding this element.\nDefendant next argues that the State failed to offer substantial evidence of a sale. Defendant acknowledges that this Court has defined a \u201csale\u201d in the context of illegal drug transactions as an exchange for money or any other form of consideration. Carr, 145 N.C. App. at 343, 549 S.E.2d at 902-03. While the State presented no evidence that defendant sold Hodge methamphetamine for money on 6 March 2002, the State presented substantial evidence that defendant provided Hodge with methamphetamine in exchange for other consideration on that date.\nDetective Philip Bailey testified that defendant stated in his interview (1) that Hodge worked for defendant in exchange for methamphetamine and (2) that it would be \u201cbad business\u201d to provide Hodge with methamphetamine had Hodge not done work for him. We hold that based on this testimony, a rational juror could have concluded that defendant gave Hodge methamphetamine on 6 March 2002 as payment for work Hodge had previously performed.\nWhile some of the other statements defendant gave detectives were exculpatory and defendant has challenged the credibility of Alley\u2019s testimony, the trial court was required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State when ruling on defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss. Scott, 356 N.C. at 596, 573 S.E.2d at 869. We, therefore, reject defendant\u2019s argument that the trial court erred by not granting his motion to dismiss the controlled substances charges for insufficiency of the evidence.\nB. The Second Degree Murder Charge\nWe next consider defendant\u2019s argument that the trial court erred by not granting his motion to dismiss the charge of second degree murder at the close of all the evidence. Defendant was indicted for second degree murder, but convicted only of involuntary manslaughter. Involuntary manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of second degree murder. State v. Thomas, 325 N.C. 583, 591, 386 S.E.2d 555, 559 (1989).\nDefendant did not assign error regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict of involuntary manslaughter. Instead, defendant argues that the State failed to present substantial evidence that defendant committed second degree murder. We need not address this issue because defendant\u2019s conviction for involuntary manslaughter renders harmless any error in not dismissing the charge of second degree murder.\nThis Court has addressed this issue before. In State v. Graham, 35 N.C. App. 700, 701, 242 S.E.2d 512, 512 (1978), the defendant was charged with the second degree murder of his girlfriend after a heated argument ended with her being shot and killed. The jury was instructed on both second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter and convicted the defendant of voluntary manslaughter. Id. at 705, 242 S.E.2d at 515. On appeal, the defendant assigned error to the trial court\u2019s second degree murder instruction. Id. This Court declined to reach the issue, concluding that a \u201cverdict finding defendant guilty of the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter rendered harmless any errors in the [trial] court\u2019s instructions on the greater offense, absent a showing that the verdict was affected thereby.\u201d Id. Because \u201c[nothing in th[e] record indicate[d] that the challenged instructions on second degree murder in any way affected the verdict rendered finding defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter,\u201d this Court overruled defendant\u2019s alleged error. Id. See also, e.g., State v. Mangum, 245 N.C. 323, 330-31, 96 S.E.2d 39, 45 (1957) (\u201cThe court\u2019s charge on second degree murder was correct, but whether it was or not, is not material on this appeal, because the defendant was convicted of the lesser offense of manslaughter, and there is nothing to show that the verdict of guilty of manslaughter was thereby affected.\u201d); State v. Lassiter, 160 N.C. App. 443, 460, 586 S.E.2d 488, 500 (verdict of voluntary manslaughter rendered harmless any errors in instructing the jury on first degree murder), disc. review denied, 357 N.C. 660, 590 S.E.2d 853 (2003). Because defendant has made no showing that the submission to the jury of the second degree murder charge affected the involuntary manslaughter verdict, we overrule this final assignment of error.\nNo error.\nJudges MARTIN and BRYANT concur.\n. Defendant also assigns error to the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion to dismiss made at the close of the State\u2019s case. By putting on evidence after the State rested its . case, however, defendant waived his right to appeal the denial of the initial motion. N.C.R. App. P. 10(b)(3).\n. Accordingly, we express no opinion on whether the State presented sufficient evidence of this lesser-included offense.", "type": "majority", "author": "GEER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Jay L. Osborne, for the State.", "Deaton, Biggers & Gulden, P.L.L.C., by W. Robinson Deaton, Jr. and Brian D. Gulden, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. AARON HOWARD YELTON, Defendant\nNo. COA04-1544\n(Filed 3 January 2006)\n1. Evidence\u2014 lay opinion \u2014 identification of substance as methamphetamine\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a second-degree murder, possession with intent to sell and deliver methamphetamine, and sale and delivery of methamphetamine case by allowing lay witness testimony that the substance given by defendant to an individual who died was methamphetamine, because: (1) the testimony was admissible under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 701 since it was rationally based on the witness\u2019s six years of experience with methamphetamine and her perceptions while smoking the substance; (2) the witness\u2019s uncertainty as to the precise weight and cost of an \u201ceightball\u201d was irrelevant; a,nd (3) the witness\u2019s testimony was helpful for a clear understanding of her testimony or to the determination of a fact in issue.\n2. Confessions and Incriminating Statements\u2014 motion to suppress \u2014 Miranda rights \u2014 waiver\nThe trial court did not err in second-degree murder, possession with intent to sell and deliver methamphetamine, and sale and delivery of methamphetamine case by denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress statements he made during an interrogation by two detectives, because: (1) the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are binding on appeal since defendant did not specifically assign error to any of the trial court\u2019s findings, and the trial court found that before any interview or discussion with defendant occurred the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights; and (2) the findings established a valid waiver under Miranda prior to defendant\u2019s making the disputed statements.\n3. Evidence\u2014 defendant\u2019s statements \u2014 exculpatory\u2014integral and natural part of development of facts \u2014 chain of circumstances\nThe trial court did not err in a second-degree murder, possession with intent to sell and deliver methamphetamine, and sale and delivery of methamphetamine case by admitting into evidence five statements elicited from defendant during a police interrogation even though defendant contends they violated N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b), because: (1) two of the statements could only have exculpated defendant since they suggest defendant did not sell methamphetamine to the deceased on 6 March 2002, and defendant does not show how these statements could have been prejudicial; (2) while a third statement was not necessarily exculpatory, it did not refer to prior crimes, wrongs, or acts, and -thus, fell outside the scope of Rule 404(b); and (3) regarding the fourth and fifth statements, defendant\u2019s statements that he had turned the deceased on to some meth two to three weeks prior to his death and that he would give drugs to the deceased when he worked for defendant were an integral and natural part of the development of the facts and were necessary to complete the story of defendant\u2019s crimes for the jury.\n4. Drugs\u2014 possession of controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver \u2014 sale and/or delivery of controlled substance \u2014 motion to dismiss \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss at the close of all evidence the charges of possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver, and the sale and/or delivery of a controlled substance, because: (1) as a witness\u2019s identification of the substance as methamphetamine was determined by the Court of Appeals to be admissible under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 701, the evidence was sufficient to meet the State\u2019s burden of proof regarding this element; (2) while the State presented no evidence that defendant sold the deceased methamphetamine for money, the State presented substantial evidence that defendant provided the deceased with methamphetamine in exchange for other consideration on that date; and (3) while some of the other statements defendant gave detectives were exculpatory and defendant has challenged the credibility of a witness\u2019s testimony, the trial court was required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State when ruling on defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss.\n5. Homicide\u2014 second-degree murder \u2014 motion to dismiss\u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nAlthough defendant contends the trial court erred by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss at the close of all evidence the second-degree murder charge, this assignment of error is dismissed because defendant\u2019s conviction for involuntary manslaughter renders harmless any error in not dismissing the charge of second-degree murder.\nAppeal by defendant from judgments entered 11 May 2004 by Judge James U. Downs in Rutherford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 September 2005.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Jay L. Osborne, for the State.\nDeaton, Biggers & Gulden, P.L.L.C., by W. Robinson Deaton, Jr. and Brian D. Gulden, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0349-01", "first_page_order": 383, "last_page_order": 393 }