{ "id": 8353149, "name": "NELLO L. TEER COMPANY, Plaintiff v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Nello L. Teer Co. v. North Carolina Department of Transportation", "decision_date": "2006-02-07", "docket_number": "No. COA04-1615", "first_page": "705", "last_page": "711", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "175 N.C. App. 705" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "619 S.E.2d 503", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633960, 12633961 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/619/0503-01", "/se2d/619/0503-02" ] }, { "cite": "315 S.E.2d 97", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "99" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 N.C. App. 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527501 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/68/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 S.E.2d 397", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "401" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 N.C. App. 115", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12122361 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120-21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/140/0115-01" ] }, { "cite": "580 S.E.2d 74", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"Defendant's appeal, however, does not raise the issue of sovereign immunity. Instead, it requires application of the statute of limitations . . . .\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 N.C. App. 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9186340 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"Defendant's appeal, however, does not raise the issue of sovereign immunity. Instead, it requires application of the statute of limitations . . . .\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/158/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "554 S.E.2d 629", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "633", "parenthetical": "distinguishing between arguments based on sovereign immunity and the statute of limitations" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138533 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334", "parenthetical": "distinguishing between arguments based on sovereign immunity and the statute of limitations" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "416 S.E.2d 4", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e follow the maxims of statutory construction that words of a statute are not to be deemed useless or redundant and amendments are presumed not to be without purpose.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2497813 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e follow the maxims of statutory construction that words of a statute are not to be deemed useless or redundant and amendments are presumed not to be without purpose.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "889 S.W.2d 418", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10006931 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "425" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/889/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "670 N.E.2d 9", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 8209112 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "19", "parenthetical": "\"When a statute contains language which is deleted by the legislature, we presume that the legislature intended the deletion to represent a change in the law.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ne2d/670/0009-01" ] }, { "cite": "425 S.E.2d 440", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "446" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 N.C. App. 711", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525479 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "720" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/108/0711-01" ] }, { "cite": "251 S.E.2d 457", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "461" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 503", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567817 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "509" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0503-01" ] }, { "cite": "523 S.E.2d 672", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "676", "parenthetical": "quoting Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Neill, 296 N.C. 503, 509, 251 S.E.2d 457, 461 (1979)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155827 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323", "parenthetical": "quoting Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Neill, 296 N.C. 503, 509, 251 S.E.2d 457, 461 (1979)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "351 S.E.2d 293", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 685", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4735252 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0685-01" ] }, { "cite": "339 S.E.2d 439", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 N.C. App. 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521499 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/79/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 S.E.2d 630", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "631" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 N.C. App. 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525788 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/75/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 A.2d 662", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "667" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 N.J. 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J.", "case_ids": [ 1931846 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj/61/0190-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 S.E.2d 849", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "857" }, { "page": "857" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2512874 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-135.3", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 S.E.2d 640", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "644", "parenthetical": "holding that when the plaintiff failed to comply with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-135.3 (Supp. 1981), the trial court should have dismissed the case \"for lack of jurisdiction\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564203 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "575", "parenthetical": "holding that when the plaintiff failed to comply with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-135.3 (Supp. 1981), the trial court should have dismissed the case \"for lack of jurisdiction\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 S.E.2d 703", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "705" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "241 N.C. 461", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8612253 ], "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/241/0461-01" ] }, { "cite": "577 S.E.2d 632", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 676", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511269, 1511307, 1511226, 1511611, 1511293 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0676-01", "/nc/356/0676-02", "/nc/356/0676-05", "/nc/356/0676-03", "/nc/356/0676-04" ] }, { "cite": "573 S.E.2d 517", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "519" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 N.C. App. 426", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9250425 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "429" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/154/0426-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 51", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3788533 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0051-01" ] }, { "cite": "603 S.E.2d 134", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "137-38" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 N.C. App. 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8411312 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/166/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 S.E.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 N.C. 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629835 ], "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/231/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 136-29", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 14, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(c)" }, { "page": "(c)" }, { "parenthetical": "emphases added" }, { "page": "(d)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "(d)" }, { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 785, "char_count": 15415, "ocr_confidence": 0.735, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1737576557623328e-07, "percentile": 0.771513319888534 }, "sha256": "87f0f3a975e637c6e0a83630bcca00b6f4526326f888a0fc49c173b0d66bff0f", "simhash": "1:dba8c8b8f2ed1c0e", "word_count": 2524 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:29:36.119960+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges CALABRIA and ELMORE concur." ], "parties": [ "NELLO L. TEER COMPANY, Plaintiff v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GEER, Judge.\nDefendant North Carolina Department of Transportation (\u201cDOT\u201d) appeals from the order of the trial court that allowed plaintiff Nello L. Teer Company (\u201cTeer\u201d) to amend its complaint to add a verification and denied DOT\u2019S motion to dismiss. DOT argues that it is entitled to bring this interlocutory appeal because the trial court\u2019s ruling implicates its sovereign immunity. Even assuming, without deciding, that a failure to comply with the statutory requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 136-29 (2005) violates the State\u2019s sovereign immunity, the effect of the General Assembly\u2019s amendment to \u00a7 136-29 in 1987 was to make the time limitations in that statute a statute of limitations and not a condition precedent to suit. As such, any failure to comply with \u00a7 136-29\u2019s time limits does not implicate the State\u2019s sovereign immunity, but rather requires application of the law governing statutes of limitations. Accordingly, we dismiss DOT\u2019s appeal.\nTeer won a contract from DOT for the construction of certain road improvements to Interstate 85 from the Orange County line east to Cole Mill Road in Durham. The construction was complete on 6 June 1999, and DOT paid the final estimate for the work done on 17 May 2003. On 15 July 2003, Teer submitted a verified claim to DOT seeking an adjustment to the final estimate and payment in accordance with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 136-29(a). The State Highway Administrator evaluated the claim and, in a letter dated 3 November 2003, denied Teer\u2019s claim for additional compensation.\nOn 11 December 2003, Teer filed an unverified complaint against DOT for the additional compensation in Wake County Superior Court. On 12 February 2004, DOT filed an answer that asserted a defense of sovereign immunity generally, but did not specifically address the failure of Teer to verify its complaint under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 136-29(c). On 25 May 2004, after the time limitation in \u00a7 136-29(c) had run, DOT filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based on Teer\u2019s failure to file a verification within the time prescribed by the statute. In response, Teer filed a motion, pursuant to Rule 15 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, for leave to amend its complaint to add a verification.\nA hearing was held on the two motions before Judge Howard E. Manning, Jr. on 11 August 2004. In his order entered 31 August 2004, Judge Manning denied DOT\u2019s. motion to dismiss, granted Teer\u2019s motion to amend its complaint, and ordered that the verification relate back to the date the complaint was originally filed. DOT filed a notice of appeal from the trial court\u2019s order on 16 September 2004. Teer has moved to dismiss that appeal as interlocutory.\nAn interlocutory order is an order made during the pendency of an action that does not dispose of the case, but rather requires further action by the trial court to finally determine the rights of all the parties involved in the controversy. Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 362, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950). Generally, there is no right to appeal from an interlocutory order unless (1) the trial court made the required certification under Rule 54 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, or (2) the order affects a substantial right that would be lost without immediate review. Eckard v. Smith, 166 N.C. App. 312, 316, 603 S.E.2d 134, 137-38 (2004), aff\u2019d per curiam, 360 N.C. 51, 619 S.E.2d 503 (2005).\nDOT argues that the trial court\u2019s ruling on the two motions affects DOT\u2019s sovereign immunity. Our appellate courts have consistently recognized that \u201c[w]here the appeal from an interlocutory order raises issues of sovereign immunity . . . such appeals affect a substantial right sufficient to warrant immediate appellate review.\u201d Peverall v. County of Alamance, 154 N.C. App. 426, 429, 573 S.E.2d 517, 519 (2002), disc. review denied, 356 N.C. 676, 577 S.E.2d 632 (2003). DOT contends, without citing any authority, that its \u201cappeal is squarely based upon the defense of sovereign immunity. Allowing Teer to proceed with its suit without compliance with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 136-29, which must be strictly construed, violates NCDOT\u2019s sovereign immunity.\u201d\nWe do not find this assertion as obvious as DOT does. We note that the State has waived its sovereign immunity with respect to claims against DOT arising from construction contracts by enacting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 136-29. We also acknowledge that because \u201cacts permitting suit are in derogation of the sovereign right of immunity, . . . they should be strictly construed.\u201d Floyd v. N.C. State Highway & Pub. Works Comm\u2019n, 241 N.C. 461, 464, 85 S.E.2d 703, 705 (1955).\nNonetheless, it does not necessarily follow that, once an act permits suit, any failure to comply with that statute gives rise to a defense of sovereign immunity as opposed to simply no recovery or other defenses, such as a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a failure to exhaust administrative remedies, or a violation of the statute of limitations. See, e.g., Middlesex Constr. Corp. v. State, 307 N.C. 569, 575, 299 S.E.2d 640, 644 (1983) (holding that when the plaintiff failed to comply with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-135.3 (Supp. 1981), the trial court should have dismissed the case \u201cfor lack of jurisdiction\u201d). At the very least, DOT\u2019s proposition \u2014 fundamental to its right to bring this interlocutory appeal \u2014 requires citation of authority. We need not, however, resolve this question since even if we assume, without deciding, that DOT has a right to appeal, its argument regarding the trial court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction \u2014 the lynchpin for its invocation of sovereign immunity \u2014 fails.\nDOT\u2019s analysis presumes that the failure to file a verified complaint within the time limitation set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 136-29 deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction because the time limit is a condition precedent and not a statute of limitations. As our Supreme Court has explained, \u201c[ordinary statutes of limitation are clearly procedural, affecting only the remedy directly and not the right to recover,\u201d while \u201ca condition precedent establishes a time period in which suit must be brought in order for the cause of action to be recognized.\u201d Boudreau v. Baughman, 322 N.C. 331, 340-41, 368 S.E.2d 849, 857 (1988). With respect to conditions precedent, if the plaintiff does not file suit within the specified time frame, \u201cthe plaintiff \u2018literally has no cause of action. The harm that has been done is damnum absque injuria \u2014 a wrong for which the law affords no redress.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 341, 368 S.E.2d at 857 (quoting Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 199, 293 A.2d 662, 667 (1972)). Thus, although conditions precedent and statutes of limitations both involve time limitations, they are different in that a condition precedent must be met before the court acquires jurisdiction, whereas a violation of a statute of limitations does not implicate the court\u2019s power to hear the case.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 136-29(c) specifies:\nAs to any portion of a claim that is denied by the State Highway Administrator, the contractor may, in lieu of the procedures set forth in subsection (b) of this section, within six months of receipt of the State Highway Administrator\u2019s final decision, institute a civil action for the sum he claims to be entitled to under the contract by filing a verified complaint and the issuance of a summons in the Superior Court of Wake County or in the superior court of any county where the work under the contract was performed. The procedure shall be the same as in all civil actions except that all issues shall be tried by the judge, without a jury.\nId. (emphases added). In arguing that this statute involves a condition precedent, DOT relies upon C. W. Matthews Contracting Co. v. State, 75 N.C. App. 317, 330 S.E.2d 630 (1985) and E.F. Blankenship Co. v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Transp., 79 N.C. App. 462, 339 S.E.2d 439 (1986), aff\u2019d per curiam by evenly divided court, 318 N.C. 685, 351 S.E.2d 293 (1987).\nDOT is correct that in C.W. Matthews, 75 N.C. App. at 319, 330 S.E.2d at 631, this Court held that the requirements under \u00a7 136-29 \u201care conditions precedent\u201d that \u201cmust be satisfied to vest the trial court with jurisdiction to hear the action.\u201d Similarly, in E.F. Blankenship, 79 N.C. App. at 464, 339 S.E.2d at 440-41, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a complaint filed without a verification\u2014 even though the plaintiff subsequently filed an amended complaint with a verification \u2014 because the filing of a verification within six months was \u201ca condition precedent to bringing this action in superior court.\u201d\nBoth opinions, however, construed a prior version of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 136-29, which expressly provided that its time requirements were conditions precedent to bringing an action. The statute, as it existed at the time of those two opinions, read in pertinent part:\nThe submission of the claim to the State Highway Administrator within the time and as set out in subsection (a) of this section and the filing of an action in the superior court within the time as set out in subsection (b) of this section . . . shall be a condition precedent to bringing such an action under this section and shall not be a statute of limitations.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 136-29(d) (1986) (emphasis added), amended by 1987 Sess. Laws ch. 847, sec. 3.\nIn 1987, the year following E.F Blankenship, the statute was amended to its current version. As part of that amendment, the General Assembly removed the language specifying that the time limitations constituted conditions precedent and not statutes of limitations. Traditional principles of statutory construction provide that \u201c \u2018[i]n construing a statute with reference to an amendment, it is presumed that the Legislature intended either (1) to change the substance of the original act or (2) to clarify the meaning of it.\u2019 \u201d Spruill v. Lake Phelps Volunteer Fire Dep\u2019t, Inc., 351 N.C. 318, 323, 523 S.E.2d 672, 676 (2000) (quoting Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Neill, 296 N.C. 503, 509, 251 S.E.2d 457, 461 (1979)). This Court has further explained that \u201c[wjhile the presumption is that the legislature intended to change the law through its amendments, where the language of the original statute is ambiguous such amendments may be deemed, not as a change in the law, but as a clarification in the language expressing that law.\u201d N.C. Elec. Membership Corp. v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Econ. and Cmty. Dev., 108 N.C. App. 711, 720, 425 S.E.2d 440, 446 (1993).\nHere, the pre-1987 version of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 136-29(d) was clear and unambiguous. There was nothing to clarify; the plain language of the statute spoke for itself. Thus, we hold that the General Assembly, in 1987, intended to change the law. As other jurisdictions have recognized, if the legislature deletes specific words or phrases from a statute, it is presumed that the legislature intended that the deleted portion should no longer be the law. See, e.g., Joe v. Lebow, 670 N.E.2d 9, 19 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (\u201cWhen a statute contains language which is deleted by the legislature, we presume that the legislature intended the deletion to represent a change in the law.\u201d); State v. Eversole, 889 S.W.2d 418, 425 (Tex. App. 1994) (\u201c[W]hen the legislature amends a particular statute and omits certain language of the former statute in its amended version, the legislature specifically intended that the omitted portion is no longer the law. Every word excluded from a statute must be presumed to have been excluded for a reason.\u201d).\nWe find the reasoning of these and similar decisions persuasive and hold that the General Assembly, by deleting the provision specifying that the time limitations were conditions precedent, expressed its intent that the time limits would cease to be conditions precedent and, instead, would constitute statutes of limitations. Any other conclusion would mean that this aspect of the 1987 amendment was without purpose, and it is well established in this State that amendments are presumed not to be without purpose. Town of Pine Knoll Shores v. Evans, 331 N.C. 361, 366, 416 S.E.2d 4, 7 (1992) (\u201c[W]e follow the maxims of statutory construction that words of a statute are not to be deemed useless or redundant and amendments are presumed not to be without purpose.\u201d).\nSince the time limitations of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 136-29 are not conditions precedent, the question before the trial court was whether Teer\u2019s claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Our appellate courts have specifically recognized that a statute of limitations defense does not implicate the State\u2019s sovereign immunity. See Estate of Fennell v. Stephenson, 354 N.C. 327, 334, 554 S.E.2d 629, 633 (2001) (distinguishing between arguments based on sovereign immunity and the statute of limitations); Fowler v. Worsley, 158 N.C. App. 128, 129 n.1, 580 S.E.2d 74, 75 n.1 (2003) (\u201cDefendant\u2019s appeal, however, does not raise the issue of sovereign immunity. Instead, it requires application of the statute of limitations . . . .\u201d).\nOrders denying motions to dismiss based upon the statute of limitations are interlocutory and not immediately appealable. Thompson v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 140 N.C. App. 115, 120-21, 535 S.E.2d 397, 401 (2000). Likewise, appeals from orders allowing motions to amend are interlocutory and subject to dismissal. Howard v. Ocean Trail Convalescent Center, 68 N.C. App. 494, 496, 315 S.E.2d 97, 99 (1984). Since DOT has not identified any other substantial right that would be lost if this Court does not review the denial of its motion to dismiss or the granting of the motion to amend, we dismiss this appeal. Apart from our holding regarding N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 136-29, we express no opinion as to the merits of DOT\u2019S appeal of the trial court\u2019s order.\nAppeal dismissed.\nJudges CALABRIA and ELMORE concur.\n. That version of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 136-29(b) provided for the filing of a verified complaint in superior court within six months of receipt of the State Highway Administrator\u2019s decision.", "type": "majority", "author": "GEER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Vandeventer Black, LLP, by David P. Ferrell, Patrick A. Genzler, and Norman W. Shearin, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Fred Lamar and Assistant Attorney General Steven A. Armstrong, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "NELLO L. TEER COMPANY, Plaintiff v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Defendant\nNo. COA04-1615\n(Filed 7 February 2006)\nAppeal and Error\u2014 appealability \u2014 road construction \u2014 complaint verification \u2014 statute of limitations \u2014 conditions precedent\nAn appeal was dismissed as interlocutory where plaintiff brought an unverified complaint seeking additional compensation in a road construction contract, plaintiff\u2019s motion to amend its complaint to add the verification was granted after the statute of limitations had run, with the verification relating back to the date the complaint was filed, and DOT appealed from that order. The General Assembly amended N.C.G.S. \u00a7 136-29 to delete the provision specifying that time limits were conditions precedent, and thus expressed its intent that the time limits would cease to be conditions precedent and would constitute statutes of limitation. Orders denying motions to dismiss based upon the statute of limitations are interlocutory and not immediately appealable.\nAppeal by defendant from order entered 31 August 2004 by Judge Howard E. Manning, Jr. in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 June 2005.\nVandeventer Black, LLP, by David P. Ferrell, Patrick A. Genzler, and Norman W. Shearin, for plaintiff-appellee.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Fred Lamar and Assistant Attorney General Steven A. Armstrong, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0705-01", "first_page_order": 739, "last_page_order": 745 }