{ "id": 8300939, "name": "THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR, Plaintiff v. K.E. KRISPEN CULBERTSON, Attorney, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "North Carolina State Bar v. Culbertson", "decision_date": "2006-04-04", "docket_number": "No. COA05-1076", "first_page": "89", "last_page": "97", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "177 N.C. App. 89" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "354 S.E.2d 501", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 N.C. 398", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4746154 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/319/0398-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 S.E.2d 60", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "65" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 N.C. App. 531", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8359318 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "539-40" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/82/0531-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 82-28", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "429 S.E.2d 716", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 756", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2547016 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0756-01" ] }, { "cite": "421 S.E.2d 163", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "167" }, { "page": "167" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 N.C. App. 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527776 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552" }, { "page": "552" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/107/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "524 U.S. 116", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11181665 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121", "parenthetical": "\"We granted certiorari... to resolve a Circuit split concerning the availability of a general maritime survival action in cases of death on the high seas.\"" }, { "page": "108", "parenthetical": "\"We granted certiorari... to resolve a Circuit split concerning the availability of a general maritime survival action in cases of death on the high seas.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/524/0116-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 F.3d 768", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 1269543 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/253/0768-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 F.3d 1150", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 199946 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/119/1150-01" ] }, { "cite": "496 U.S. 91", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12121937 ], "weight": 11, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Marshall, J. and Brennan, J., concurring" }, { "parenthetical": "Marshall, J. and Brennan, J., concurring" }, { "page": "121" }, { "page": "1702", "parenthetical": "O'Connor, J., Rehnquist, C.J. and Scalia, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "111" }, { "page": "1697", "parenthetical": "Marshall, J. and Brennan, J., concurring" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis supplied" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/496/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "24 F.3d 754", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 10509699 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "756" }, { "page": "756" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/24/0754-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 F. Supp. 2d 427", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9461506 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "437", "parenthetical": "Evidence that actual consumers were harmed by the communication \"is only required where the ad at issue contains a truthful statement that is nonetheless misleading and is not required where the ad is inherently misleading.\"" }, { "page": "437" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/173/0427-01" ] }, { "cite": "860 F.2d 602", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 655806 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "606" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/860/0602-01" ] }, { "cite": "471 U.S. 626", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6206937 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "652-53" }, { "page": "673" }, { "page": "652-53" }, { "page": "673" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/471/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 U.S. 191", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11304478 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203" }, { "page": "74" }, { "page": "202" }, { "page": "73" }, { "page": "203" }, { "page": "74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/455/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "433 U.S. 350", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6179472 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" }, { "page": "824-25" }, { "page": "383" }, { "page": "835" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/433/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "534 S.E.2d 653", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "654" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 N.C. App. 827", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9498023 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "829" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/139/0827-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 S.E.2d 298", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570336, 8570284, 8570444, 8570383, 8570419 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0294-02", "/nc/298/0294-01", "/nc/298/0294-05", "/nc/298/0294-03", "/nc/298/0294-04" ] }, { "cite": "255 S.E.2d 328", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 N.C. App. 567", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550641 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/41/0567-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 S.E.2d 648", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "652", "parenthetical": "citing Boehm v. Board of Podiatry Examiners, 41 N.C. App. 567, 255 S.E.2d 328, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 294, 259 S.E.2d 298 (1979)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 N.C. App. 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521208 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "178", "parenthetical": "citing Boehm v. Board of Podiatry Examiners, 41 N.C. App. 567, 255 S.E.2d 328, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 294, 259 S.E.2d 298 (1979)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/62/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "286 S.E.2d 89", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98" }, { "page": "98-99", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "98-99" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 627", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570279 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "643" }, { "page": "643" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0627-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 84-28", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(h)" }, { "page": "(b)(2)" }, { "page": "(c)(5)" }, { "page": "(c)", "parenthetical": "Misconduct by an attorney shall be grounds for disbarment; suspension up to five years, censure, reprimand or admonition." } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 807, "char_count": 19448, "ocr_confidence": 0.754, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1927509695867352e-07, "percentile": 0.7740024611473487 }, "sha256": "ca1ef815d2202b35684a9acf36458116c6b19e1bd6e2dddc8978f60d8433e4f0", "simhash": "1:dc29d41847aecade", "word_count": 3096 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:32:29.259677+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McCULLOUGH and ELMORE concur." ], "parties": [ "THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR, Plaintiff v. K.E. KRISPEN CULBERTSON, Attorney, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TYSON, Judge.\nK.E. Krispen Culbertson, Attorney (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals from order and admonition of the Disciplinary Hearing Committee of the North Carolina State Bar (\u201cDHC\u201d) admonishing him for using false or misleading communications in violation of the North Carolina Revised Rules of Professional Conduct. We affirm.\nI. Background\nDefendant is a duly licensed and practicing attorney in Greensboro and was admitted to practice as a member of the North Carolina State Bar (\u201cState Bar\u201d) in 1991. In November 2004, the State Bar filed a complaint against defendant alleging he violated the North Carolina Revised Rules of Professional Conduct. The complaint alleged defendant\u2019s law office letterhead contained an asterisk beside his name. Below defendant\u2019s name is printed another asterisk and the phrase, \u201cPublished in Federal Reports, 3d Series\u201d surrounded by parentheses. The complaint also alleged defendant is described on the firm\u2019s website as \u201calso one of the elite percentage of attorneys to be published in Federal Law Reports \u2014 the large law books that contain the controlling caselaw [sic] of the United States.\u201d\nThis matter was heard before the DHC on 27 January 2005. The DHC concluded as follows:\n2. Culbertson\u2019s conduct, as set out above, constitutes grounds for discipline pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 84-28(a) & (b)(2) as follows:\n(a) By using letterhead stationery that indicates that he is published in Federal Reports, 3d Series when only opinions issued by the Court are published in the Federal Reports, Culbertson used letterhead that made a false or misleading communication about the lawyer in violation of Revised Rules 7.1 and 7.5.\n(b) By maintaining a website that states that \u201c[he] is also one of the elite percentage of attorneys to be published in Federal Law Reports \u2014 the large law books that contain the controlling caselaw [sic] of the United States\u201d when only opinions of the Court are published in the Federal Reports, Culbertson maintained a website that made a false or misleading communication about the lawyer in violation of Revised Rules 7.1.\nThe DHC concluded and ordered, \u201cCulbertson\u2019s conduct warrants discipline because Culbertson\u2019s choice of the misleading language on his letterhead and website was intentional. However, because Culbertson\u2019s violation of the rules was a minor violation, it warrants only an admonition,\u201d Defendant appeals.\nII.Issues\nDefendant argues the DHC erred by: (1) concluding his statements that he was \u201cpublished in Federal Law Reports, 3d Series\u201d were false or misleading; and (2) issuing an admonition rather than a less serious sanction.\nIII.Standard of Review\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 84-28(h) (2005) provides, \u201cThere shall be an appeal of right by either party from any final order of the Disciplinary Hearing Commission to the North Carolina Court of Appeals.\u201d The standard for judicial review of attorney discipline cases is the \u201cwhole record\u201d test. N.C. State Bar v. DuMont, 304 N.C. 627, 643, 286 S.E.2d 89, 98 (1982). This test requires the reviewing court to:\nconsider the evidence which in and of itself justifies or supports the administrative findings and . . . also [to] take into account the contradictory evidence or evidence from which conflicting inferences can be drawn. . . . Under the whole record test there must be substantial evidence to support the findings, conclusions and result. . . . The evidence is substantial if, when considered as a whole, it is such that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\nId. at 643, 286 S.E.2d at 98-99 (citations omitted). \u201cUnder the \u2018whole record\u2019 test, [this Court] cannot substitute our judgment for the Committee\u2019s in choosing between two reasonably conflicting views of the evidence.\u201d N.C. State Bar v. Frazier, 62 N.C. App. 172, 178, 302 S.E.2d 648, 652 (1983) (citing Boehm v. Board of Podiatry Examiners, 41 N.C. App. 567, 255 S.E.2d 328, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 294, 259 S.E.2d 298 (1979)). We review questions of law de novo. Harris v. Ray Johnson Constr. Co., 139 N.C. App. 827, 829, 534 S.E.2d 653, 654 (2000).\nIV.Revised Rules of Professional Conduct\nAn attorney\u2019s violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct constitutes misconduct and is grounds for discipline. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 84-28(b)(2) (2005). Rule 7.1 of the North Carolina State Bar Revised Rules of Professional Conduct (2005) provides, \u201cA lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer\u2019s services.\u201d Under this rule, a communication is false or misleading if it \u201ccontains a material misrepresentation of fact or law.\u201d Rule 7.5(a) the North Carolina State Bar Revised Rules of Professional Conduct (2005) states, \u201cA lawyer shall not use a firm name, letterhead, or other professional designation that violates Rule 7.1.\u201d\nV. \u201cFalse or Misleading\u201d Communication\nDefendant argues the DHC erred by concluding his statements on his firm letterhead and website that he was \u201cPublished in Federal Law Reports, 3d Series\u201d were false or misleading. He asserts the evidence shows the statements were not false or misleading and are constitutionally protected speech. We disagree.\nA. First Amendment\nIn Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 365, 53 L. Ed. 2d 810, 824-25 (1977), the United States Supreme Court held advertising by lawyers is a form of commercial speech entitled to protection by the First Amendment. Five years later, the Supreme Court stated:\nTruthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to the protections of the First Amendment. But when the particular content or method of the advertising suggests that it is inherently misleading or when experience has proved that in fact such advertising is subject to abuse, the States may impose appropriate restrictions. Misleading advertising may be prohibited entirely.\nIn re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203, 71 L. Ed. 2d 64, 74 (1982).\nB. Extrinsic Evidence\nAt the DHC hearing, defendant introduced evidence of a detailed survey conducted by a Wake Forest University political science professor that asked members of the general public whether the phrase, \u201cPublished in Federal Reports, 3d\u201d on an attorney\u2019s letterhead was misleading. Defendant also introduced a study performed by a Duke University English and anthropology professor which analyzed how the general public would interpret the word, \u201cpublish.\u201d Defendant argues the DHC failed to consider this evidence of whether the public would actually be misled by the language and erred in relying on its judgment to determine whether this language was false or misleading.\nWhere the possibility of public deception is self-evident, the DHC is not required to survey the public to determine whether the communication has a tendency to mislead. Zauderer v. Office of Dis ciplinary Counsel of The Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 652-53, 85 L. Ed. 2d 652, 673 (1985); Accountant\u2019s Soc. of Virginia v. Bowman, 860 F.2d 602, 606 (4th Cir. 1988); see also Farrin v. Thigpen, 173 F. Supp. 2d 427, 437 (M.D.N.C. 2001) (Evidence that actual consumers were harmed by the communication \u201cis only required where the ad at issue contains a truthful statement that is nonetheless misleading and is not required where the ad is inherently misleading.\u201d). We must determine whether the DHC correctly concluded defendant\u2019s statements are \u201cinherently misleading.\u201d Farrin, 173 F. Supp. 2d at 437.\nC. Inherently Misleading\nIn Joe Conte Toyota, Inc. v. Louisiana Motor Vehicle Comm\u2019n, 24 F.3d 754, 756 (5th Cir. 1994), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit discussed the meaning of \u201cinherently misleading.\u201d\nThe Court in In re R.M.J. suggested that \u201cinherently\u201d misleading advertising may be banned outright, but \u201cpotentially\u201d misleading advertising may not. In attempting to understand the distinction, we derive additional guidance from a later commercial speech case, Peel v. Attorney Disciplinary Commission, 496 U.S. 91, 110 S. Ct. 2281, 110 L. Ed. 2d 83 (1990).\nA statement is \u201cinherently\u201d misleading when, notwithstanding a lack of evidence of actual deception in the record, \u201cthe particular method by which the information is imparted to consumers is inherently conducive to deception and coercion.\u201d Id. (Marshall, J. and Brennan, J., concurring). Included is \u201ccommercial speech that is devoid of intrinsic meaning.\u201d Id. (Marshall, J. and Brennan, J., concurring). In her dissent, Justice O\u2019Connor added that \u201cinherently misleading\u201d means \u201cinherently likely to deceive the public.\u201d Id. at 121, 110 S. Ct. at 1702 (O\u2019Connor, J., Rehnquist, C.J. and Scalia, J., dissenting). Citing In re R.M.J., Justice Marshall noted that states may prohibit actually or inherently misleading commercial speech entirely. Id. at 111, 110 S. Ct. at 1697 (Marshall, J. and Brennan, J., concurring).\nId. The court held, \u201cFrom all of this we conclud\u00e9 that a statement is actually or inherently misleading when it deceives or is inherently likely to deceive.\u201d Id. (emphasis supplied).\nD. \u201cPublished\u201d\nThe Federal Reports are the official publications of the United States Courts of Appeal. The published opinions and other official documents of the Courts of Appeal are printed in hardcover book form. The set of books consists of serial volumes. As additional decisions and other written documents are selected for publication, volumes are bound. The parties and names of the attorneys representing before the Court are identified as such. Opinions contained within the Federal Reporters are also published by legal search engines on the internet. See www.lexis.com;www.westlaw.com.\nWith the exception of per curiam opinions, one of the judges of the Court is identified as the author of the opinion. Other judges on the panel who heard and ruled upon the case are also noted. These judges may author concurring or dissenting opinions which follow the majority\u2019s opinion. Those judges who write separate opinions are also identified as authors.\nDefendant argues he was \u201cpublished\u201d in the Federal Reporter because he submitted two briefs to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and language and arguments from his briefs were paraphrased and summarized in the Court\u2019s opinions. See Ficker v. Curran, 119 F.3d 1150 (4th Cir. 1997); S.E.C. v. Dunlap, 253 F.3d 768 (4th Cir. 2001).\nWebster\u2019s Dictionary defines \u201cpublish\u201d as \u201cto make generally known,\u201d \u201cto make public announcement of,\u201d \u201cto place before the public,\u201d \u201cto produce or release for publication,\u201d \u201cto issue the work (of an author),\u201d \u201cto put out an edition,\u201d or \u201cto have one\u2019s work accepted for publication.\u201d Webster\u2019s New Collegiate Dictionary 952 (9th ed. 1991). Defendant\u2019s name and his appearance as counsel for a party is \u201cpublished\u201d in the court\u2019s official reporter. While defendant may believe this fact allows him to assert he is \u201cpublished\u201d in the official court\u2019s reports, nowhere in either opinion is he credited or cited by the court. Defendant is not a judge on any of the United States Courts of Appeal and did not author any of the opinions contained in those volumes.\nDefendant\u2019s statements are also inherently misleading because they are likely to deceive the general public. Joe Conte Toyota, 24 F.3d at 756. A member of the general public could easily be led to believe from defendant\u2019s assertions on his firm letterhead and website that he authored the opinion contained in the Federal Reporter.\nDefendant\u2019s statements on his website are inherently misleading in other respects. First, defendant\u2019s statement professes he is a member of an \u201celite percentage\u201d of attorneys who have been \u201cpublished\u201d in the Federal Reporter. Admission to practice before the United States Courts of Appeal does not depend upon a licensed attorney\u2019s ability. Any licensed attorney who is in good standing may move to be admitted upon application to appear before these courts. Fed. R. App. P. 46(a) (2005) (\u201cAn attorney is eligible for admission to the bar of a court of appeals if that attorney is of good moral and professional character and is admitted to practice before the Supreme Court of the United States, the highest court of a state, another United States court of appeals, or a United States district court[.]\u201d).\nSecond, defendant\u2019s statement on his website states that the Federal Reporters are \u201cthe large law books that contain the controlling caselaw [sic] of the United States.\u201d The opinions of a federal Court of Appeals are controlling precedent on the cases before it and on the cases heard within the Circuit in which the Court sits, but are not the \u201ccontrolling caselaw [sic] of the United States.\u201d The Supreme Court of the United States routinely reviews and decides cases reaching conflicting interpretations of the law from the United States Courts of Appeal. See, e.g., Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co., 524 U.S. 116, 121, 141 L. Ed. 2d 102, 108 (1998) (\u201cWe granted certiorari... to resolve a Circuit split concerning the availability of a general maritime survival action in cases of death on the high seas.\u201d).\nIn Bates, the Supreme Court recognized that advertising by professionals poses special risks of deception \u201cbecause the public lacks sophistication concerning legal services, misstatements that might be overlooked or deemed unimportant in other advertising may be found quite inappropriate in legal advertising.\u201d 433 U.S. at 383, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 835. The Supreme Court in In re R.M.J. later stated, \u201c[t]he public\u2019s comparative lack of knowledge, the limited ability of the professions to police themselves, and the absence of any standardization in the \u2018product\u2019 renders advertising for professional services especially susceptible to abuses that the States have a legitimate interest in controlling.\u201d 455 U.S. at 202, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 73.\nBecause defendant\u2019s statements are inherently misleading, the DHC was not required to consider extrinsic evidence of whether the public was actually misled. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652-53, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 673. Substantial evidence in the record supports DHC\u2019s conclusion that defendant\u2019s statements published on his letterhead and website asserting he is \u201cPublished in the Federal Law Reports\u201d are false or misleading. DuMont, 304 N.C. at 643, 286 S.E.2d at 98-99. Defendant\u2019s statutory and First Amendment rights were not violated by the DHC\u2019s disciplining him for using misleading advertising. In re RM.J., 455 U.S. at 203, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 74. This assignment of error is overruled.\nVI. Discipline\nDefendant argues the DHC erred by ordering the issuance of an admonition as opposed to a less serious sanction. We disagree.\nThe DHC\u2019s choice of discipline is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. North Carolina State Bar v. Nelson, 107 N.C. App. 543, 552, 421 S.E.2d 163, 167 (1992), aff'd, 333 N.C. 756, 429 S.E.2d 716 (1993). As noted in the DHC\u2019s order, \u201cAn admonition is a written form of discipline imposed in cases in which an attorney has committed a minor violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 84-28(c)(5) (2005). An admonition is a lesser form of discipline the DHC may impose for a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 84-28(c) (Misconduct by an attorney shall be grounds for disbarment; suspension up to five years, censure, reprimand or admonition.).\nDefendant contends an admonition was improper because there was no showing of actual public harm. Such a showing is not required. The DHC\u2019s disciplinary action and sanction issued were within the statutory limits of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 82-28. \u201cThis Court [has] stated that \u2018so long as the punishment imposed is within the limits allowed by the statute this Court does not have the authority to modify or change it.\u2019 \u201d Nelson, 107 N.C. App. at 552, 421 S.E.2d at 167 (quoting N.C. State Bar v. Whitted, 82 N.C. App. 531, 539-40, 347 S.E.2d 60, 65 (1986), aff'd, 319 N.C. 398, 354 S.E.2d 501 (1987)). Defendant failed to show the DHC abused its discretion in admonishing him for his conduct. This assignment of error is overruled.\nVII. Conclusion\nThe DHC did not err in concluding defendant\u2019s statements on his letterhead and website were false and misleading communications under the North Carolina Revised Rules of Professional Conduct, Rules 7.1 and 7.5. No showing is made that the DHC abused its discretion in admonishing defendant for his violations of these Rules. The DHC\u2019s order is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJudges McCULLOUGH and ELMORE concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "TYSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "David R. Johnson, for plaintiff-appellee.", "K.E. Kri'spen Culbertson, defendant-appellant, pro se." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR, Plaintiff v. K.E. KRISPEN CULBERTSON, Attorney, Defendant\nNo. COA05-1076\n(Filed 4 April 2006)\n1. Attorneys\u2014 disciplinary hearing \u2014 inherently misleading communications \u2014 letterhead and website\nThe whole record test revealed that the Disciplinary Hearing Committee of the North Carolina State Bar (DHC) did not err by concluding that defendant attorney\u2019s statements on his letterhead and website that he was \u201cpublished in Federal Law Reports, 3d series\u201d were false and misleading communications under the North Carolina Revised Rules of Conduct, Rules 7.1 and 7.5, because: (1) contrary to defendant\u2019s assertion, where the possibility of public deception is self-evidence, DHC is not required to survey the public to determine whether the communication has a tendency to mislead; (2) while defendant\u2019s name and his appearance as counsel for a party is \u201cpublished\u201d in the official court\u2019s reports, nowhere in the opinions is he credited or cited by the court, and defendant did not author any of the opinions contained in the volumes; (3) defendant\u2019s statements are inherently misleading since a member of the general public could easily be led to believe from defendant\u2019s assertions on his firm letterhead and website that he authored the opinion contained in the federal reporter; (4) defendant\u2019s statements that he is a member of an elite percentage of attorneys who have been published in the federal reporter are inherently misleading since admission to practice before the United States Court of Appeals does not depend upon a licensed attorney\u2019s ability; and (5) defendant\u2019s statement on his website that the federal reporters are the large law books that contain the controlling case law of the United States is inherently misleading when the United States Supreme Court routinely reviews and decides cases reaching conflicting interpretations on the law from the United States Court of Appeals.\n2. Attorneys\u2014 disciplinary hearing \u2014 admonition\u2014inherently misleading communications on letterhead and website\nThe Disciplinary Hearing Committee of the North Carolina State Bar (DHC) did not abuse its discretion by ordering the issuance of an admonition as opposed to a less serious sanction for defendant attorney who used false or misleading communications on his letterhead and website, because: (1) contrary to defendant\u2019s contention, no showing of actual public harm is required; (2) DHC\u2019s disciplinary action and sanction was issued within the statutory limits of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 82-28; and (3) the Court of Appeals has stated that so long as the punishment imposed is within the limits allowed by the statute, it does not have authority to modify or change it.\nAppeal by defendant from order entered 11 March 2005 and admonition entered 8 April 2005 by Hearing Committee Chair Elisabeth Bunting for the Disciplinary Hearing Commission of the North Carolina State Bar. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 March 2006.\nDavid R. Johnson, for plaintiff-appellee.\nK.E. Kri'spen Culbertson, defendant-appellant, pro se." }, "file_name": "0089-01", "first_page_order": 123, "last_page_order": 131 }