{ "id": 8301232, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. PRINCE V. ALEXANDER", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Alexander", "decision_date": "2006-04-18", "docket_number": "No. COA05-971", "first_page": "281", "last_page": "285", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "177 N.C. App. 281" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "286 S.E.2d 357", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "361" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 N.C. App. 568", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527659 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/55/0568-01" ] }, { "cite": "558 S.E.2d 463", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "473" }, { "parenthetical": "holding that testimony by the witness regarding information he received from an anonymous informant was proper nonhearsay evidence admitted to explain his subsequent actions" }, { "page": "473" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 220002 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87" }, { "page": "87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0073-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 437, "char_count": 8347, "ocr_confidence": 0.744, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0943310706784682e-07, "percentile": 0.7608256311468352 }, "sha256": "64989990914bd7a65930d050891387145d6ad8412e988960f48a0634f4f43d5c", "simhash": "1:403316ea723b684f", "word_count": 1301 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:32:29.259677+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUDSON and BRYANT concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. PRINCE V. ALEXANDER" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, Judge.\nPrince V. Alexander (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals from judgment of the trial court entered consistent with a jury verdict finding defendant guilty of robbery with a dangerous weapon. Defendant contends the trial court committed plain error in admitting hearsay evidence, and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to object to such evidence. For the reasons stated herein, we find no error in the judgment of the trial court.\nOn the morning of 23 September 2002, Sylvia Gyimah (\u201cGyimah\u201d) was working as a cashier at Carlton\u2019s 76 Service, a gasoline station located in Charlotte, North Carolina. Gyimah was alone in the store when defendant entered. Gyimah testified she recognized defendant because he was a customer and she had observed him outside the station spending time with friends. Gyimah stated that defendant was \u201c[n]ormally . . . around the store.\u201d Gyimah did not know defendant\u2019s name, however, at that time. When defendant entered the store, Gyimah greeted him, but he did not reply. As defendant passed her, he touched Gyimah\u2019s shoulder and she turned in response. When she turned, defendant pointed a gun at Gyimah\u2019s face and told her \u201cto give him the money, or else he was going to shoot [her].\u201d Gyimah opened the cash register and store safe, and defendant removed all of the cash, approximately $175.00. Defendant then left the store. Defendant\u2019s fingerprints were found on the interior glass of the gasoline station\u2019s front door.\nOfficer Chris Dozier (\u201cOfficer Dozier\u201d) of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department testified that, during his investigation of the robbery, one of the detectives in his unit informed him of an individual named Norbert Plaud (\u201cPlaud\u201d) who claimed to have information regarding the crime. Officer Dozier met with Plaud, who gave him a partial name of \u201cVaughntray\u201d and a description. Using this information, Officer Dozier \u201clooked up the photograph of... the individual who [he] thought it may be based on his description and the name.\u201d \u201cVaughntray\u201d is defendant\u2019s middle name. Officer Dozier presented Plaud with a photograph of defendant. After speaking with Plaud, Officer Dozier \u201c[a]t this point [had] a suspect in mind [and] created a photograph lineup in order to show the victim.\u201d When shown the photographic lineup of six faces, Gyimah \u201calmost immediate [ly]\u201d selected defendant\u2019s photograph as the person who robbed the gasoline station.\nDefendant testified that he lived near the gasoline station and was \u201cfreely in and out\u201d of the store \u201cbasically every day.\u201d Defendant stated that he recognized Gyimah, having seen her at the gasoline station \u201cmany times.\u201d Defendant could not remember his whereabouts on the day of the robbery, but denied robbing the store.\nUpon consideration of the evidence, the jury found defendant guilty of robbery with a dangerous weapon. The trial court sentenced defendant to seventy-two to ninety-six months imprisonment. Defendant appeals.\nIn related assignments of error, defendant argues the trial court committed plain error in admitting the testimony of Officer Dozier regarding information allegedly supplied by Plaud. Defendant also assigns plain error to Officer Dozier\u2019s testimony regarding information given to him by one of the detectives in his unit. Defendant contends the evidence was inadmissible hearsay and violated his confrontation rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 23 of the North Carolina Constitution. Defendant concedes that he did not object to the testimony, and that this Court\u2019s review is therefore limited to that of plain error.\nHearsay is \u201ca statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 801(c) (2005). \u201cOut-of-court statements that are offered for purposes other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted are not considered hearsay.\u201d State v. Gainey, 355 N.C. 73, 87, 558 S.E.2d 463, 473 (2002). \u201cSpecifically, statements are not hearsay if they are made to explain the subsequent conduct of the person to whom the statement was directed.\u201d Id.\nIn the present case, Officer Dozier testified he was contacted by one of the detectives in his unit, who told him there was an individual who claimed to have \u201csome information that may be important to one of [his] cases.\u201d Officer Dozier then spoke with Plaud. As a result of speaking with Plaud, he suspected defendant\u2019s involvement in the crime and therefore included his photograph in the lineup he presented to Gyimah.\nWe conclude Officer Dozier\u2019s testimony regarding his interaction with the detective and Plaud was nonhearsay and proper to explain his subsequent actions. It was not admitted to prove that the information Plaud offered was \u201cimportant\u201d or that someone named \u201cVaughntray\u201d committed the crime. Rather, the testimony explained how Officer Dozier had received information leading him to form a reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in the robbery, which in turn justified his inclusion of defendant\u2019s photograph in the lineup. See id. (holding that testimony by the witness regarding information he received from an anonymous informant was proper nonhearsay evidence admitted to explain his subsequent actions); State v. Gray, 55 N.C. App. 568, 573, 286 S.E.2d 357, 361 (1982) (holding that testimony by a police officer regarding information supplied to him by a fellow officer was not hearsay, in that it was not admitted to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but rather that the officer \u201chad received information which would justify his forming a reasonable suspicion that [the] defendant was involved in criminal activity\u201d).\nDefendant also asserts that Officer Dozier\u2019s testimony violated his constitutional right to confrontation. This argument, however, is not properly before this Court, as defendant did not object to this testimony. \u201cConstitutional issues not raised and passed upon at trial will not be considered for the first time on appeal.\u201d Gainey, 355 N.C. at 87, 558 S.E.2d at 473. Even if defendant had properly objected, the admission of nonhearsay raises no Confrontation Clause concerns. See id. Accordingly, we overrule these assignments of error.\nBy further assignments of error, defendant argues that his counsel\u2019s failure to object to Officer Dozier\u2019s testimony constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. We have already determined, however, that the testimony was nonhearsay evidence properly admitted by the trial court, and that its admission did not constitute a violation of defendant\u2019s confrontation rights. As such, defense counsel\u2019s failure to object to the testimony cannot constitute the basis of an ineffective assistance claim. These assignments of error are overruled.\nIn conclusion, we find no error in the judgment of the trial court.\nNo error.\nJudges HUDSON and BRYANT concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Anne M. Middleton, for the State.", "Public Defender Isabel Scott Day, by Assistant Public Defender Julie Ramseur Lewis, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. PRINCE V. ALEXANDER\nNo. COA05-971\n(Filed 18 April 2006)\n1. Evidence\u2014 hearsay \u2014 conversations leading to lineup \u2014 not introduced for truth of guilt\nAn officer\u2019s testimony in an armed robbery prosecution about conversations with others was not hearsay because it was introduced to explain defendant\u2019s inclusion in a photographic lineup, rather than for the truth of defendant\u2019s guilt. There was no plain error.\n2. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 right to confrontation \u2014 no objection at trial\nDefendant did not preserve for appeal a Confrontation Clause issue where he did not object at trial. Moreover, the testimony (about conversations which led to a photographic lineup) was not hearsay and raised no Confrontation Clause concerns.\n3. Constitutional Law\u2014 failure to object \u2014 effective assistance of counsel\nDefense counsel\u2019s failure to object to testimony which was not hearsay and did not violate defendant\u2019s confrontation rights was not ineffective assistance of counsel.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 8 March 2005 by Judge Richard D. Boner in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 March 2006.\nAttorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Anne M. Middleton, for the State.\nPublic Defender Isabel Scott Day, by Assistant Public Defender Julie Ramseur Lewis, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0281-01", "first_page_order": 315, "last_page_order": 319 }