{ "id": 8301855, "name": "In the Matter of: B.C.D.", "name_abbreviation": "In re B.C.D.", "decision_date": "2006-05-16", "docket_number": "No. COA05-1123", "first_page": "555", "last_page": "559", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "177 N.C. App. 555" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "219 S.E.2d 566", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "567-68" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 N.C. App. 576", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8555142 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "577" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/27/0576-01" ] }, { "cite": "436 S.E.2d 122", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "124" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2527406 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "136" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 S.E.2d 232", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2508082 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "273 S.E.2d 699", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "703" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564026 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "126" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "610 S.E.2d 454", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "459", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Wright, 302 N.C. 122, 126, 273 S.E.2d 699, 703 (1981)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 N.C. App. 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8470314 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Wright, 302 N.C. 122, 126, 273 S.E.2d 699, 703 (1981)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/169/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "561 S.E.2d 245", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "255-56", "parenthetical": "internal citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 320", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 219909 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "336", "parenthetical": "internal citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0320-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 S.E.2d 920", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "925" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 65", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867565 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0065-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-401.14", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 569, "char_count": 9929, "ocr_confidence": 0.747, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.20226700475587572 }, "sha256": "c3cbfc01a654115e53a1f2fae9b437fdaa4adcc1e36972df80e169fc15326a4b", "simhash": "1:0f6c662e004ab568", "word_count": 1586 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:32:29.259677+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WYNN and ELMORE concur." ], "parties": [ "In the Matter of: B.C.D." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "LEVINSON, Judge.\nRespondent (B.C.D.) appeals from a juvenile adjudication order adjudging him to be delinquent for violating North Carolina\u2019s Ethnic Intimidation Statute. We affirm.\nThe pertinent facts may be summarized as follows: On 2 August 2004, Tasha Hall, an African-American Assistant Principal at Central Cabarrus High School, checked her electronic mail box and found a message which stated, in pertinent part, that:\nYou are nothing but a filthy n[-] and you need to be fired. If you ever suspend somebody for saying the verbal phrase \u201cn[-]\u201d the KKK will show up on your door step! This is a promise not a threat. So what are you going to do about it b[-]? Not a damn thing but follow my instructions!!!!!!! Bye, you stupid a[ \u2014 \u25a0] p[iece] of s[ \u2014 ], greasy a[ \u2014 ] stinky f[-] N[ \u2014 \u2014]! KKK\nHall alerted the school principal of her receipt of the e-mail, and requested a transfer from the Superintendent of Cabarrus County Schools due to safety concerns. In court, Hall testified that, as an African-American, she feared that physical harm would come to herself, her family or her property. Custodians escorted Hall to her car in the evenings. Hall stopped bringing her children to after-school games or events, and she remained especially cautious of her surroundings in the parking lot, ensuring that she parked within view of security cameras.\nWith the help of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, school officials traced the subject e-mail to the account of the respondent\u2019s grandmother. Hall previously suspended respondent for using racial slurs, including the word \u201cn[-]\u201d, towards other students on the school bus.\nThe respondent testified that he sent the e-mail from his grandparents\u2019 computer in June 2004, but delayed its delivery until 31 July 2004. When questioned about the e-mail, respondent told his family that the e-mail was sent as a \u201cjoke\u201d to protest a prior disciplinary action by Hall. Respondent argued that while he and his white friend were suspended for using racial epithets on the school bus, the two black girls with whom they were arguing were not. Respondent further testified that the e-mail was not intended to scare Hall, and that racial animus was not the motivation for the e-mail. Rather, according to respondent, Hall was simply the school administrator who suspended the respondent, and Hall happened to be African-American.\nThe trial court concluded that respondent unlawfully and willfully threatened Hall because of her race in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-401.14, and subsequently imposed probation under the supervision of the court counselor for six months. Respondent now appeals, contending the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss at the close of all the evidence because there was insufficient evidence that (1) he threatened to assault or damage the property of Hall, and (2) he sent the subject e-mail to Hall because of her race.\nWe first address respondent\u2019s argument that there was insufficient evidence that he threatened to assault or damage the property of Tasha Hall. We disagree.\nWhen ruling on a motion to dismiss, \u201cthe trial court must determine only whether there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense charged and of the defendant being the perpetrator of the offense.\u201d State v. Crawford, 344 N.C. 65, 73, 472 S.E.2d 920, 925 (1996).\nEvidence is substantial if it is relevant and adequate to convince a reasonable mind to accept a conclusion. In considering a motion to dismiss, the trial court must analyze the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and give the State the benefit of every reasonable inference from the evidence. The trial court must also resolve any contradictions in the evidence in the State\u2019s favor. The trial court does not weigh the evidence, consider evidence unfavorable to the State, or determine any witness\u2019 credibility.\nState v. Robinson, 355 N.C. 320, 336, 561 S.E.2d 245, 255-56 (2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). \u201c \u2018[T]he rule for determining the sufficiency of evidence is the same whether the evidence is completely circumstantial, completely direct, or both.\u2019 \u201d State v. Crouse, 169 N.C. App. 382, 389, 610 S.E.2d 454, 459 (2005) (quoting State v. Wright, 302 N.C. 122, 126, 273 S.E.2d 699, 703 (1981)).\nNorth Carolina\u2019s Ethnic Intimidation Statute, codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-401.14 (2005), provides, in pertinent part, that:\n(a) If a person shall, because of race, color, religion, nationality, or country of origin, assault another person, or damage or deface the property of another person, or threaten to do any such act, he shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.\nThe instant case requires us to construe this statute. \u201cStatutory interpretation properly begins with an examination of the plain words of the statute.\u201d Correll v. Division of Social Services, 332 N.C. 141, 144, 418 S.E.2d 232, 235 (1992). In interpreting statutory language, \u201cit is presumed the General Assembly intended the words it used to have the meaning they have in ordinary speech[.]\u201d Nelson v. Battle Forest Friends Meeting, 335 N.C. 133, 136, 436 S.E.2d 122, 124 (1993). When the plain meaning is unambiguous, a court should go no further in interpreting the statute than its ordinary meaning. Id.\nBy its terms, G.S. \u00a7 14-401.14 proscribes personal assaults, damaging or defacing property, or threatening to do either, because of an individual\u2019s race, color, religion, nationality or country of origin. The. offense of assault has no statutorily prescribed definition. However, an assault is defined at common law as either \u201ca show of violence causing a reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm[]\u201d or \u201can intentional offer or attempt by force or violence to do injury to the person of another.\u201d State v. Thompson, 27 N.C. App. 576, 577, 219 S.E.2d 566, 567-68 (1975). In ordinary usage, a threat is defined as \u201c[a] communicated intent to inflict harm or loss on another or another\u2019s property,\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1519 (8th Ed. 2004), or \u201c[a]n indication of an impending danger or harm[,]\u201d Webster\u2019s II New College Dictionary 1176 (3rd Ed. 2005). Thus, a threat constitutes an expressed intent to harm at some point in the future. Accordingly, the respondent could be adjudged delinquent for a violation of G.S. \u00a7 14-401.14 if he communicated an intent to inflict bodily harm on Hall or to damage her property at some point in the future.\nThe subject e-mail, by its own terms, plainly and directly communicated an intent to inflict harm to Hall. The e-mail was sent to an African-American person and was signed \u201cKKK\u201d, and promised that persons would \u201cshow up on [Hall\u2019s] door step\u201d unless she refrained from suspending students who use the term \u201cn[-].\u201d Consequently, because there was sufficient evidence that the respondent threatened to assault Hall in violation of G.S. \u00a7 14-401.14, this assignment of error is overruled.\nWe next address respondent\u2019s argument that there was insufficient evidence that the e-mail was sent for a racially motivated purpose. This argument is without merit.\nRespondent testified that he sent the e-mail to Hall in protest of her alleged differing treatment against him as compared with others who were African-American. The email contained the racial epithet, \u201cfilthy n[-]\u201d, and stated that the KKK would retaliate against Hall if she suspended another student who uses the term, \u201cn[-].\u201d Based upon all the evidence of record, we conclude the State presented substantial evidence that respondent sent the e-mail to Hall for racially motivated reasons.\nThis assignment of error is overruled.\nAffirmed.\nJudges WYNN and ELMORE concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "LEVINSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Letitia C. Echols, for the State.", "George Wiseman for juvenile-respondent." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In the Matter of: B.C.D.\nNo. COA05-1123\n(Filed 16 May 2006)\n1. Juveniles\u2014 unlawfully and willfully threatening an individual based on race \u2014 motion to dismiss \u2014 sufficiency of evidence \u2014 threat to assault\nThe trial court did not err by denying a juvenile\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of unlawfully and willfully threatening an individual based on her race in violation of the Ethnic Intimidation Statute under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-401.14 even though the juvenile contends there was insufficient evidence that the juvenile threatened to assault or damage the property of an African-American assistant principal, because: (1) a threat constitutes an expressed intent to harm at some point in the future; and (2) the pertinent email, by its own terms, plainly and directly communicated an intent to inflict harm to the assistant principal when it was sent to an African-American person and was signed \u201cKKK,\u201d and promised that persons would show up at her doorstep unless she refrained from suspending students who use the derogatory term for African-Americans.\n2. Juveniles\u2014 unlawfully and willfully threatening an individual based on race \u2014 motion to dismiss \u2014 sufficiency of evidence \u2014 racially motivated purpose\nThe trial court did not err by denying a juvenile\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of unlawfully and willfully threatening an individual based on her race in violation of the Ethnic Intimidation Statute under N.C.G.S: \u00a7 14-401.14 even though the juvenile contends there was insufficient evidence that the juvenile sent an email to an African-American assistant principal for a racially motivated purpose, because: (1) the juvenile testified that he sent the email in protest of the assistant principal\u2019s treatment against him as compared with others who were African-American; and (2) the email contained a racial epithet and stated that the KKK would retaliate against her if she suspended another student who uses the derogatory term for African-Americans.\nAppeal by respondent-juvenile from an adjudication order entered 8 April 2005 by Judge Michael G. Knox in Cabarrus County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 28 March 2006.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Letitia C. Echols, for the State.\nGeorge Wiseman for juvenile-respondent." }, "file_name": "0555-01", "first_page_order": 589, "last_page_order": 593 }