{ "id": 8376797, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. STEVEN LEWIS BROOKS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Brooks", "decision_date": "2006-06-20", "docket_number": "No. COA05-935", "first_page": "211", "last_page": "217", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "178 N.C. App. 211" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "346 S.E.2d 638", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "645" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 590", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4772035 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "599-600" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0590-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 S.E.2d 450", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 37", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5305037 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 S.E.2d 604", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "608" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 N.C. App. 246", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526755 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/92/0246-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8-97", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-72", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)(2)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 S.E.2d 492", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 118", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4696811, 4687500, 4687992, 4693465, 4688638 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0118-04", "/nc/314/0118-05", "/nc/314/0118-02", "/nc/314/0118-01", "/nc/314/0118-03" ] }, { "cite": "327 S.E.2d 298", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "300" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 N.C. App. 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523096 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/74/0110-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 S.E.2d 331", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "333", "parenthetical": "reversing conviction for breaking or entering where a defendant entered with consent, and the record \"fail[ed] to disclose that the defendant after entry committed acts sufficient to render the implied consent void ab initio.\"'" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 N.C. App. 99", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8547578 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "102", "parenthetical": "reversing conviction for breaking or entering where a defendant entered with consent, and the record \"fail[ed] to disclose that the defendant after entry committed acts sufficient to render the implied consent void ab initio.\"'" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/45/0099-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 S.E.2d 784", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "785" }, { "page": "785" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 N.C. App. 59", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550540 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "60" }, { "page": "60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/44/0059-01" ] }, { "cite": "256 S.E.2d 683", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "686" }, { "page": "687" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 652", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573566 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "657" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0652-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 S.E.2d 603", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2568524, 2572173, 2572243, 2570966, 2569014 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0123-03", "/nc/321/0123-05", "/nc/321/0123-04", "/nc/321/0123-02", "/nc/321/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 S.E.2d 261", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 N.C. App. 299", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12168400 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/84/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-54", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 S.E.2d 699", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "703" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564026 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "126" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 S.E.2d 920", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "925" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 65", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867565 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0065-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 669, "char_count": 12308, "ocr_confidence": 0.769, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.925172831580244e-07, "percentile": 0.8469329679066231 }, "sha256": "f11fe4944e15a10e1ff5dc74078b09c3b6852c76be6b03a92af3afc21af6b55e", "simhash": "1:136b716466f75955", "word_count": 2035 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:18:34.747306+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges TYSON and ELMORE concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. STEVEN LEWIS BROOKS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McCullough, Judge.\nSteven Lewis Brooks (defendant) appeals from conviction and judgment for felonious breaking or entering and felonious larceny. We hold that defendant received a fair trial, free from prejudicial error.\nFacts\nOn 18 August 2004 between 10:00 a.m. and 11:30 a.m., defendant and Janice Perkins entered the law offices of Grace Holt Tisdale & Clifton in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. The law firm is open to people seeking legal representation, and it is arranged so that people visiting the firm may enter the reception area. The firm\u2019s lawyers generally meet with clients in conference rooms, and access to the attorneys\u2019 offices is by permission only.\nAttorney Michael Grace noticed Perkins, who had been a client in a previous criminal case. As Perkins had been told that she should not return to the firm after that case, Grace told her that she should not be there. A legal assistant witnessed defendant walking in the hallway from the back of the firm, and she asked defendant if she could help him. Defendant answered that he was looking for a lawyer and asked if attorney Mireille Clough was available. Upon receiving a negative response, defendant sat in a chair outside of Clough\u2019s office. Defendant then moved towards the firm\u2019s bathroom, and approximately one minute thereafter, exited the law firm.\nAttorney Mireille Clough returned to the firm between 11:45 a.m. and noon, after being in court that morning. She placed a bag in one of the chairs in her office, retrieved some files, and left for court again. When she returned later in the day, Clough observed that her day planner and a wallet containing her credit cards were missing from her bag. She contacted her credit card company and was informed that her credit card had recently been used at a nearby Food Lion grocery store.\nAttorney Donald Tisdale testified that he observed defendant exiting Clough\u2019s office at 1:30 p.m. on 18 August 2004. Upon noticing Tisdale, defendant asked whether Clough had returned from lunch. Tisdale replied that he would see if Clough had returned and then walked to his office to put something down. By the time Tisdale returned, defendant was gone.\nThe police procured a video of defendant and Perkins using Clough\u2019s credit card at the nearby Food Lion. Officers also seized four credit card receipts which indicated that Clough\u2019s credit card had been used at the Food Lion. While driving to interview a witness, Detective Gregory Dorn noticed Perkins on the porch of a home on Waughtown Street. Detective Dorn detained Perkins, entered the home, and found defendant sitting in the living room. Perkins accompanied Dorn, and other officers, to a location approximately one-quarter to one-half mile from the home, where the officers performed a search and located Clough\u2019s day planner. The police also found Clough\u2019s credit cards in a planter at the home on Waughtown Street.\nDefendant was arrested. He confessed to entering the law office though, according to defendant, he diverted the attention of the secretary while Perkins stole Clough\u2019s personal items. Defendant further admitted to purchasing sixteen cases of beer and nine cartons of cigarettes with Clough\u2019s credit cards.\nA Forsyth County jury convicted defendant of felonious breaking or entering and felonious larceny. The trial court sentenced defendant as an habitual felon to between 100 and 129 months of imprisonment. Defendant now appeals.\nLegal Discussion\nL\nIn his first argument on appeal defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motions to dismiss the charges of felonious breaking and entering and felonious larceny. This contention lacks merit.\nA trial court should deny a motion to dismiss if, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and giving the State the benefit of every reasonable inference, \u201cthere is substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense charged and of the defendant being the perpetrator of the offense.\u201d State v. Crawford, 344 N.C. 65, 73, 472 S.E.2d 920, 925 (1996). \u201cSubstantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u201d Id. \u201c[T]he rule for determining the sufficiency of evidence is the same whether the evidence is completely circumstantial, completely direct, or both.\u201d State v. Wright, 302 N.C. 122, 126, 273 S.E.2d 699, 703 (1981).\nA. Felonious Breaking or Entering\nPursuant to section 14-54(a) of the General Statutes, \u201c[a]ny person who breaks or enters any building with intent to commit any felony or larceny therein shall be punished as a Class H felon.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-54(a) (2005). Thus, \u201c[t]he essential elements of felonious breaking or entering are (1) the breaking or entering (2) of any building (3) with the intent to commit any felony or larceny therein.\u201d State v. White, 84 N.C. App. 299, 301, 352 S.E.2d 261, 262, cert. denied, 321 N.C. 123, 361 S.E.2d 603 (1987). The present defendant challenges only whether there was sufficient evidence of an illegal entry on his part.\n\u201c[A]n entry, even if with felonious intent, cannot be punished when it is with the owner\u2019s consent.\u201d State v. Boone, 297 N.C. 652, 657, 256 S.E.2d 683, 686 (1979). Our Supreme Court has held that, where a defendant \u201centered [a] store at a time when it was open to the public [, h]is entry was ... with the consent, implied if not express, of the owner[, and could not] serve as the basis for a conviction for felonious entry.\u201d Id. at 659, 256 S.E.2d at 687.\nHowever, the subsequent conduct of the entrant may render the consent to enter void ab initio. State v. Speller, 44 N.C. App. 59, 60, 259 S.E.2d 784, 785 (1979); see also State v. Winston, 45 N.C. App. 99, 102, 262 S.E.2d 331, 333 (1980) (reversing conviction for breaking or entering where a defendant entered with consent, and the record \u201cfail[ed] to disclose that the defendant after entry committed acts sufficient to render the implied consent void ab initio.\u201d'). This Court has upheld a conviction for breaking or entering where a defendant entered a store during normal business hours, but subsequently secreted himself in a portion of the store which was not open to the public and remained concealed there so that he could perpetrate a theft after the store closed. Speller, 44 N.C. App. at 60, 259 S.E.2d at 785. Specifically, we held that defendant\u2019s actions in \u201c[g]oing into an area not open to the public and remaining hidden there past closing hours made the entry through the front door open for business unlawful.\u201d Id.\nIn the instant case, the evidence tended to show that defendant entered a law office which was open to members of the public seeking legal assistance. The firm had a reception area where members of the public were generally welcome and also areas beyond this reception area which were not open to the public. When defendant entered the reception area of the firm, he did so with implied consent from the firm. However, defendant took action which rendered this consent void ab initio when he went into areas of the firm that were not open to the public so that he could commit a theft, and when he misinformed a member of the firm as to the reason for his presence in these areas. Therefore, defendant illegally entered the firm.\nAccordingly, the State introduced substantial evidence to satisfy the breaking or entering element of felonious breaking or entering. The trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss this charge.\nB. Felonious larceny\nLarceny is the taking and carrying away of the property of another without the owner\u2019s consent with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property. State v. Coats, 74 N.C. App. 110, 112, 327 S.E.2d 298, 300, cert. denied, 314 N.C. 118, 332 S.E.2d 492 (1985). The crime of larceny is a felony, without regard to the value of the property in question, if the larceny is committed pursuant to a breaking or entering in violation of section 14-54 of the General Statutes. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-72(b)(2) (2005).\nDefendant argues that the trial court should have dismissed the felonious larceny charge because there was no evidence of a breaking or entering on his part. As we have already indicated, the evidence permitted a jury finding that defendant illegally entered the law firm. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the felonious larceny charge.\nII.\nIn his second argument on appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred by admitting the videos from the Food Lion into evidence because the prosecution failed to properly authenticate these items of evidence. Even assuming arguendo that the tapes were not properly admitted in evidence, we conclude that defendant was not prejudiced by their admission.\nAt issue are State\u2019s Exhibits 18 and 20, both of which contained video footage of defendant and Perkins using Clough\u2019s credit card to purchase beer and cigarettes at a Food Lion. The footage was taken from the Food Lion\u2019s surveillance cameras. Exhibit 20 showed multiple scenes from different cameras within the store. The footage contained in Exhibit 20 was edited by the police to produce Exhibit 18. Both videos were shown to the jury; Exhibit 18 was shown in its entirety; but Exhibit 20 was only partially shown. Defendant contends that the exhibits were improperly shown to the jury because the State did not establish that the videotapes fairly and accurately illustrated the events filmed.\nIt is true that videotapes are admissible as evidence only when a proper foundation has been established. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8-97 (2005); State v. Cannon, 92 N.C. App. 246, 254, 374 S.E.2d 604, 608 (1988), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 326 N.C. 37, 387 S.E.2d 450 (1990). However, not all trial errors require reversal and \u201c[defendant has the burden of showing that he was prejudiced by the admission of . . . evidence.\u201d State v. Wingard, 317 N.C. 590, 599-600, 346 S.E.2d 638, 645 (1986). Indeed, an error is not prejudicial unless \u201cthere is a reasonable possibility that, had the error in question not been committed, a different result would have been reached at the trial . . . .\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443 (2005).\nIn the instant case, we hold that the admission of the videotapes showing defendant and his accomplice purchasing beer and cigarettes on the victim\u2019s stolen credit card was not prejudicial given the admittance of defendant\u2019s statement in which he confessed to using the victim\u2019s credit card to purchase beer and cigarettes at the Food Lion. Specifically, defendant stated, \u201cWe went to Food Lion[;] we got some beer on the credit cards . . . .\u201d Later when asked by a detective what he and his accomplice bought at Food Lion, defendant stated, \u201c[b]eer and cigarettes.\u201d In light of defendant\u2019s confession, there is no reasonable possibility that, had the challenged video exhibits not been admitted, a different result would have been reached at the trial.\nDefendant\u2019s assignments of error are overruled.\nNo error.\nJudges TYSON and ELMORE concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "McCullough, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Brent D. Kiziah, for the State.", "Appellate Defender Staple Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Matthew W\u00fansche, for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. STEVEN LEWIS BROOKS\nNo. COA05-935\n(Filed 20 June 2006)\n1. Burglary and Unlawful Breaking or Entering\u2014 entry beyond public area \u2014 initial consent void ab initio\nAn entry with the owner\u2019s consent cannot be punished, even if it is with felonious intent, but subsequent conduct can render the consent void ab initio. The trial court here correctly denied motions to dismiss charges of felonious breaking or entering and felonious larceny where defendant entered a law firm which had a reception area open to the public, went beyond that area to commit a theft, and lied to a member of the firm about his reason for being there.\n2. Evidence\u2014 videotapes not authenticated \u2014 activity admitted by defendant \u2014 admission not prejudicial\nThere was no prejudicial error in the admission of videotapes that may not have been properly authenticated where defendant admitted the activity shown on the tapes.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 13 April 2005 by Judge Thomas D. Haigwood in Forsyth County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 March 2006. .\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Brent D. Kiziah, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Staple Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Matthew W\u00fansche, for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0211-01", "first_page_order": 243, "last_page_order": 249 }