{ "id": 8377492, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF: K.D., Minor Child", "name_abbreviation": "In re K.D.", "decision_date": "2006-07-05", "docket_number": "No. COA05-1027", "first_page": "322", "last_page": "330", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "178 N.C. App. 322" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "610 S.E.2d 403", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "406" }, { "page": "428" }, { "page": "407" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 N.C. App. 423", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8470652 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427-28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/169/0423-01" ] }, { "cite": "608 S.E.2d 813", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "818", "parenthetical": "trial court properly adjudicated juvenile neglected based in part on mother's history of domestic violence, unstable housing, and failure to utilize services offered to her by DSS" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 N.C. App. 638", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8471449 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "647", "parenthetical": "trial court properly adjudicated juvenile neglected based in part on mother's history of domestic violence, unstable housing, and failure to utilize services offered to her by DSS" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/168/0638-01" ] }, { "cite": "521 S.E.2d 121", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "127" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 N.C. App. 387", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11241043 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/135/0387-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 S.E.2d 616", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 612", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4722697, 4725936, 4721340, 4722525, 4724158 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0612-03", "/nc/313/0612-05", "/nc/313/0612-01", "/nc/313/0612-02", "/nc/313/0612-04" ] }, { "cite": "325 S.E.2d 260", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "266" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 N.C. App. 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526819 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "375-76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/72/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "491 S.E.2d 672", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "676" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 505", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11798267 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "511" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0505-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 S. Ct. 193", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 L. Ed. 2d 162", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "528 U.S. 880", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9504320, 9504195, 9504228, 9504166, 9504265, 9504299, 9504139, 9504211, 9504179, 9504246, 9504343, 9504152, 9504281, 9504126 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/528/0880-13", "/us/528/0880-06", "/us/528/0880-08", "/us/528/0880-04", "/us/528/0880-10", "/us/528/0880-12", "/us/528/0880-02", "/us/528/0880-07", "/us/528/0880-05", "/us/528/0880-09", "/us/528/0880-14", "/us/528/0880-03", "/us/528/0880-11", "/us/528/0880-01" ] }, { "cite": "510 S.E.2d 626", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "640" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132217 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 S.E.2d 789", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 230", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2492933, 2490126, 2490832, 2488406, 2492061 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0230-01", "/nc/325/0230-04", "/nc/325/0230-03", "/nc/325/0230-05", "/nc/325/0230-02" ] }, { "cite": "378 S.E.2d 424", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 N.C. App. 460", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8528099 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "466-67" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/93/0460-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8-53.3", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 517", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "519", "parenthetical": "\"[Appellant] may not swap horses after trial in order to obtain a thoroughbred upon appeal.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2566216 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322", "parenthetical": "\"[Appellant] may not swap horses after trial in order to obtain a thoroughbred upon appeal.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 S.E.2d 575", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 659", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2508155 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0659-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 S.E.2d 620", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "624" }, { "page": "624" }, { "page": "624" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 N.C. App. 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520782 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "28" }, { "page": "28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/105/0023-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 824, "char_count": 19604, "ocr_confidence": 0.728, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.7138294534125087e-07, "percentile": 0.702804680890662 }, "sha256": "68624e49aa7ead0f90aaed82693a4aea1e90ff740e50e49c959ad243f0902609", "simhash": "1:b1e9b0ec75064343", "word_count": 3096 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:18:34.747306+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and CALABRIA concur." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF: K.D., Minor Child" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GEER, Judge.\nRespondent mother appeals from the trial court\u2019s orders adjudicating her son K.D. to be neglected and dependent, placing him with an aunt, and relieving the Johnston County Department of Social Services (\u201cDSS\u201d) of further efforts towards reunification. On appeal, respondent mother primarily argues that the trial court violated her psychologist-patient privilege by considering evidence from her psychologist. We hold that respondent mother waived any privilege, and, in any event, the evidence at issue was admissible since this proceeding involves the neglect of a child. With respect to respondent mother\u2019s challenge to the trial court\u2019s adjudication order, we (1) affirm the adjudication of K.D. as neglected because the trial court\u2019s unchallenged findings of fact support its conclusions of law on neglect, but (2) reverse and remand as to the adjudication of K.D. as dependent because the trial court failed to address whether respondent mother was able to provide a suitable alternative childcare arrangement within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-101(9) (2005).\nFactual and Procedural History\nRespondent mother gave birth to her son K.D. in 2002. The identity of the child\u2019s father is unknown. On 9 March 2004, the police brought respondent mother to the emergency room of the Johnston County Mental Health Center (\u201cJCMHC\u201d). While there, she was assessed by staff psychologist Cynthia Koempel, who found that she was showing verbal aggressiveness toward those around her and was threatening the police officer who had escorted her to the emergency room. Respondent mother was involuntarily committed to Holly Hill Hospital later that day because she was threatening to kill herself and was sleeping with knives under her pillow.\nRespondent mother was discharged from Holly'Hill on 17 March 2004, with a diagnosis of adjustment disorder with mixed depression and anxiety. Holly Hill recommended that she continue to receive treatment at JCMHC. Following a subsequent intake assessment at JCMHC, respondent mother was further diagnosed with intermittent explosive disorder, meaning that her inability to resist her aggressive impulses was liable to result in serious assaultive acts or destruction of property without warning. The JCMHC assessment also indicated that she had moderate mental retardation, with school records estimating her IQ to be in the 40 to- 50 range. Following her intake assessment, respondent mother did not attend any of her subsequent recommended appointments at JCMHC. Although she initially claimed transportation problems, she later admitted that her social worker had offered to provide transportation to these and other appointments.\nDSS began working with respondent mother in April 2004 when she was 17 years old and living with her mother, J.T. On 6 April 2004, DSS substantiated respondent mother\u2019s neglect of K.D. based on respondent mother\u2019s history of leaving K.D. at home without ensuring appropriate supervision or telling her family where she was going. After DSS became involved, respondent mother voluntarily placed K.D. with J.T. and moved in with her boyfriend.\nFollowing a physical altercation between respondent mother and the boyfriend, in which the boyfriend sustained a large knife wound, respondent mother began living with other relatives, including, at various times, her maternal grandmother and her sister. Meanwhile, DSS substantiated neglect of K.D. by his grandmother J.T., after DSS became aware he was not being supplied with basic needs, such as adequate clothing, shoes, and hygiene, and after J.T. twice arrived in an intoxicated state to pick K.D. up from daycare. K.D. was subsequently placed back with respondent mother, who was then living with her sister.\nOn 5 May 2004 and 23 July 2004, DSS entered into a case plan with respondent mother in which she agreed to begin treatment at JCMHC; attend parenting classes; ensure proper supervision of K.D. at all times; meet K.D.\u2019s basic food, clothing, and hygiene needs; and take K.D. to all necessary medical appointments. Because of respondent mother\u2019s mental disabilities and retardation, respondent mother\u2019s social worker provided her with a laminated list of emergency phone numbers and an appointment chart.\nRespondent mother failed to comply with most of the requirements of the initial case plan, as well as a follow-up case plan. Specifically, she failed to attend mental health appointments at JCMHC, failed to attend scheduled parenting classes at DSS, and did not maintain stable housing. On the other hand, the court also found that during periods of time when respondent mother was living with relatives, she was able to make sure that K.D.\u2019s basic needs were met and took him to all his medical appointments. The court found, however, that even though the child\u2019s basic needs were at times being met, respondent mother was not able to meet her own basic needs.\nThe court also found that respondent mother \u201cdoes not recognize the inappropriateness of her relationship with her boyfriend that involves physical violence.\u201d A DSS worker described a meeting with respondent mother in which they discussed the possibility of respondent mother attending a support group for women who are victims of domestic violence. Respondent mother asked what domestic violence was, and when it was explained to her, she responded, \u201cWhat\u2019s wrong with that?\u201d Although the social worker attempted to explain the effects of domestic violence on young children, respondent mother repeated that she did not feel there was anything wrong with it.\nAt the end of August 2004, respondent mother agreed to place K.D. with an aunt. K.D.\u2019s daycare reported that following his placement with the aunt, K.D. became \u201ca completely different child\u201d and began talking, eating better, and working towards potty training. K.D. has remained with the aunt.\nIn November 2004, DSS filed a petition alleging that K.D. was a neglected and dependent child. The case was heard on 5 January 2005, at which time respondent mother was about three months pregnant with a second child. After hearing all the evidence, the trial court found that K.D. was neglected and dependent. KD.\u2019s dispositional hearing was held on the same date, and at its conclusion, the court gave custody of K.D. to the aunt and relieved DSS of further efforts towards reunification with respondent mother. The adjudication and dispositional orders were entered on 1 March 2005. Respondent mother filed a timely notice of appeal.\nPsvchologist-Patient Privilege\nRespondent mother contends that the trial court violated her psychologist-patient privilege by considering evidence \u2014 in the form of a letter and testimony \u2014 from Cynthia Koempel of JCMHC. The patient has the burden of establishing the existence of a privilege and of objecting to the disclosure of such privileged information. Adams v. Lovette, 105 N.C. App. 23, 28, 411 S.E.2d 620, 624, aff\u2019d per curiam, 332 N.C. 659, 422 S.E.2d 575 (1992).\nRespondent mother has not preserved this question for appellate review. Under N.C.R. App. P. 10(b)(1), \u201c[i]n order to preserve a question for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling the party desired the court to make if the specific grounds were not apparent from the context.\u201d Although respondent mother objected to various statements that Koempel made during the hearing and to admission of the letter from Koempel to respondent mother\u2019s social worker, she did not object on the basis of privilege. Instead, her objections were based on hearsay and expert qualifications. A party may not assert at trial one basis for objection to the admission of evidence, but then rely upon a different basis on appeal. See State v. Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 322, 372 S.E.2d 517, 519 (1988) (\u201c[Appellant] may not swap horses after trial in order to obtain a thoroughbred upon appeal.\u201d).\nEven apart from the Rules of Appellate Procedure, it is well-established that a failure to object to requested disclosure of privileged information constitutes a waiver of that privilege. Adams, 105 N.C. App. at 28, 411 S.E.2d at 624. In Adams, this Court held that \u201cthe defendant impliedly waived his alleged [physician-patient] privilege because he objected to the request, not on the grounds of privilege, but on the grounds of relevance.\u201d Id. at 29, 411 S.E.2d at 624. Accordingly, here, respondent mother\u2019s failure to object to Koempel\u2019s testimony on the basis of privilege amounted to a waiver of her right to claim the psychologist-client privilege on appeal.\nFinally, our General Assembly has stated repeatedly that the psychologist-patient privilege does not operate to exclude evidence regarding the abuse or neglect of a child. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-310 (2005) (\u201cNo privilege, except the attorney-client privilege, shall be grounds for excluding evidence of abuse, neglect, or dependency in any judicial proceeding (civil, criminal, or juvenile) in which a juvenile\u2019s abuse, neglect, or dependency is in issue . . . .\u201d); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8-53.3 (2005) (\u201cNotwithstanding the provisions of this section, the psychologist-client or patient privilege shall not be grounds for excluding evidence regarding the abuse or neglect of a child . . . See also State v. Knight, 93 N.C. App. 460, 466-67, 378 S.E.2d 424, 427 (under \u00a7 8-53.3, defendant\u2019s statement to psychologist that he had been seduced by underage stepdaughter was not privileged because it related to abuse or neglect of child), disc. review denied, 325 N.C. 230, 381 S.E.2d 789 (1989).\nFurther, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8-53.3 permits the trial judge to compel disclosure of otherwise privileged information \u201cif in his or her opinion disclosure is necessary to a proper administration of justice.\u201d No explicit finding is required since such a finding is implicit in the admission of the evidence. State v. Williams, 350 N.C. 1, 21, 510 S.E.2d 626, 640, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 880, 145 L. Ed. 2d 162, 120 S. Ct. 193 (1999). This assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.\nNeglect\nRespondent mother next argues that the trial court erred by adjudicating K.D. a neglected child. In a non-jury adjudication of abuse, neglect, and dependency, \u201cthe trial court\u2019s findings of fact supported by clear and convincing competent evidence are deemed conclusive, even where some evidence supports contrary findings.\u201d In re Helms, 127 N.C. App. 505, 511, 491 S.E.2d 672, 676 (1997). This Court reviews the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law to determine whether they are supported by the findings of fact. Id.\nRespondent mother specifically assigns error only to the adjudication order\u2019s first and second findings of fact. Her brief, however, contains no arguments challenging the first finding of fact. We, therefore, deem that assignment of error abandoned. N.C.R. App. R 28(a) (\u201cQuestions raised by assignments of error in appeals from trial tribunals but not then presented and discussed in a party\u2019s brief, are deemed abandoned.\u201d). As to the second finding of fact, the only argument in respondent mother\u2019s brief that addresses this finding pertains to the admissibility of evidence from Koempel \u2014 an argument we have already rejected.\nAs for the remaining findings of fact in the adjudication order, respondent mother employs a single assignment of error to challenge all of them generally. It is well-established that \u201c[a] single assignment generally challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support numerous findings of fact... is broadside and ineffective.\u201d Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C. App. 372, 375-76, 325 S.E.2d 260, 266, disc. review denied, 313 N.C. 612, 330 S.E.2d 616 (1985). Respondent mother\u2019s broadside assignment of error is, therefore, inadequate to preserve for review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings of fact. Accordingly, our review as to whether K.D. was correctly adjudicated to be neglected is limited to determining whether the trial court\u2019s findings of fact support its conclusions of law.\nThe Juvenile Code defines a neglected juvenile as:\nA juvenile who does not receive proper care, supervision, or discipline from the juvenile\u2019s parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker; or who has been abandoned; or who is not provided necessary medical care; or who is not provided necessary remedial care; or who lives in an environment injurious to the juvenile\u2019s welfare; or who has been placed for care or adoption in violation of law.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-101(15). With respect to adjudications of neglect, this Court has explained that \u201cthe decision of the trial court must of necessity be predictive in nature, as the trial court must assess whether there is a substantial risk of future abuse or neglect of a child based on the historical facts of the case.\u201d In re McLean, 135 N.C. App. 387, 396, 521 S.E.2d 121, 127 (1999).\nIn this case, the trial court found that respondent mother had a history of leaving K.D. without ensuring he was properly supervised, without advising her family that she was leaving, and without making arrangements for his care. The court further found that (1) despite a history of mental illness, which resulted in hospitalization, respondent mother failed to follow through with needed mental health services; (2) respondent mother, who is mentally retarded, failed to attend parenting classes; (3) respondent mother had not attended domestic violence or anger management classes as suggested by DSS; and (4) respondent mother does not recognize the inappropriateness of physical violence in her relationships. Based on these specific findings, the court entered an ultimate finding that K.D. was neglected because he \u201cis at substantial risk of harm of physical and emotional care as the mother has failed to address the protective issues identified during her involvement with the JCDSS including, but not limited to h[is] mother\u2019s mental health issues, domestic violence issues, anger management issues and parenting issues and lack of stable housing.\u201d\nRespondent mother argues on appeal that these aspects of her life, cited by the trial court as reasons why her son was neglected, all pertain to her own functioning and not to the care provided to the child. We disagree. Respondent mother\u2019s struggles with parenting skills, domestic violence, and anger management, as well as her unstable housing situation, have the potential to significantly impact her ability to provide \u201cproper care, supervision, or discipline\u201d for K.D. See In re M.J.G., 168 N.C. App. 638, 647, 608 S.E.2d 813, 818 (2005) (trial court properly adjudicated juvenile neglected based in part on mother\u2019s history of domestic violence, unstable housing, and failure to utilize services offered to her by DSS). We therefore conclude that the trial court properly adjudicated K.D. to be a neglected juvenile.\nDependency\nRespondent mother also argues that the trial court erred in adjudicating K.D. a-dependent child. A dependent juvenile is one who is:\nin need of assistance or placement because this juvenile has no parent, guardian, or custodian responsible for the juvenile\u2019s care or supervision or whose parent, guardian, or custodian is unable to provide for the care or supervision and lacks an appropriate alternative child care arrangement.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-101(9) (emphasis added). Here, the trial court found that K.D. was dependent because \u201cthe mother is not able to provide proper care and supervision for the juvenile.\u201d On appeal, respondent mother contends that she does not lack an appropriate alternative child care arrangement since she voluntarily placed K.D. with her aunt.\nThis Court has previously held that a trial court failed to make sufficient findings to support an adjudication of dependency when a relative had agreed to take custody of the child in order to prevent him from going into foster care. In re P.M., 169 N.C. App. 423, 427-28, 610 S.E.2d 403, 406 (2005). In P.M., the Court noted that, although the trial court entered findings that the mother was unable to provide for the child\u2019s care and supervision, the trial court \u201cnever addressed the second prong of the dependency definition. The trial court made no finding that respondent lacked \u2018an appropriate alternative child care arrangement.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 428, 610 S.E.2d at 407. We are faced with the same situation here: the trial court\u2019s language in the adjudication order tracks the first prong of the definition of dependency, but ignores the second. We, therefore, reverse as to KD.\u2019s dependency, and remand to the trial court for further findings as to whether K.D. lacks \u201can appropriate alternative child care arrangement.\u201d\nAffirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.\nJudges McGEE and CALABRIA concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "GEER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Jennifer S. O\u2019Connor for petitioner-a-ppellee.", "Leslie C. Rawls for respondent-appellant.", "James D. Johnson, Jr. for guardian ad litem." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF: K.D., Minor Child\nNo. COA05-1027\n(Filed 5 July 2006)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 psychologist-patient privilege \u2014 failure to object on basis of privilege\u2014 waiver\nAlthough respondent mother contends the trial court violated her psychologist-patient privilege in a child neglect case by considering evidence in the form of a letter and testimony of a psychologist, she failed to preserve this question for appellate review, because: (1) although respondent objected to various statements that the psychologist made during the hearing and to admission of the letter from the psychologist to respondent mother\u2019s social worker, she did not object on the basis of privilege but instead based on hearsay and expert qualifications; (2) respondent\u2019s failure to object to the psychologist\u2019s testimony on the basis of privilege amounted to a waiver of her right to claim the psychologist-client privilege on appeal; (3) the psychologist-patient privilege does not operate to exclude evidence regarding the abuse or neglect of a child; and (4) N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8-53.3 permits the trial judge to compel disclosure of otherwise privileged information if in his or her opinion disclosure is necessary to a proper administration of justice.\n2. Child Abuse and Neglect\u2014 neglect \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe trial court did not err by adjudicating a minor child as neglected, because: (1) although respondent mother assigned error to the adjudication order\u2019s first finding of fact, her brief failed to contain any argument challenging the first finding of fact which is thus deemed abandoned under N.C. R. App. P. 28(a); (2) as for the remaining assignments of error in the adjudication order, a single assignment of error generally challenging the sufficiency of evidence to support numerous findings of fact is broadside and ineffective; and (3) respondent\u2019s struggles with her parenting skills, domestic violence, and anger management, as well as her unstable housing situation, have the potential to significantly impact her ability to provide proper care, supervision, or discipline for the minor child.\n3. Child Abuse and Neglect\u2014 dependency \u2014 sufficiency of evidence \u2014 alternative child care arrangement\nThe trial court erred in a child abuse case by adjudicating the minor child as dependent, and the case is remanded for further findings as to whether the mother lacks an appropriate alternative child care arrangement for the child, where the mother had voluntarily placed the child with an aunt. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-101(9).\nAppeal by respondent mother from orders entered 1 March 2005 by Judge Resson Faircloth in Johnston County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 March 2006.\nJennifer S. O\u2019Connor for petitioner-a-ppellee.\nLeslie C. Rawls for respondent-appellant.\nJames D. Johnson, Jr. for guardian ad litem." }, "file_name": "0322-01", "first_page_order": 354, "last_page_order": 362 }