{ "id": 8377893, "name": "PEARL A. WILKINS, Petitioner v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY, Respondent", "name_abbreviation": "Wilkins v. North Carolina State University", "decision_date": "2006-07-05", "docket_number": "No. COA05-1253", "first_page": "377", "last_page": "381", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "178 N.C. App. 377" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "359 N.C. 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3798499, 12632542 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0382-01", "/se2d/610/0199-01" ] }, { "cite": "623 S.E.2d 315", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634606 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "317", "parenthetical": "\"[i]n determining whether an agency erred in interpreting a statute, this Court employs a de novo standard of review\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/623/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "398 S.E.2d 466", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470" }, { "page": "470", "parenthetical": "rejecting an interpretation of a statute that rendered its language superfluous" }, { "page": "578" }, { "page": "469", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 573", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2493346 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "578" }, { "page": "578" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0573-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 S.E.2d 134", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "136" }, { "page": "136-37" }, { "page": "136-37" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5307411 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209" }, { "page": "209" }, { "page": "209" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "610 S.E.2d 366", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373" }, { "page": "391" }, { "page": "372" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "175 N.C. App. 309", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8351920 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "311", "parenthetical": "\"[i]n determining whether an agency erred in interpreting a statute, this Court employs a de novo standard of review\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/175/0309-01" ] }, { "cite": "599 S.E.2d 888", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "894-95" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 649", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2987357 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "659" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0649-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-7.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c2)" }, { "page": "(c2)" }, { "page": "(c2)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 422, "char_count": 9512, "ocr_confidence": 0.766, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.2878312954546474e-07, "percentile": 0.7858971700666718 }, "sha256": "0b67ce35a5e237b3dd7e9a4a929d9a7c04e6c098dbaf3ec8996eed717952e725", "simhash": "1:8bdc9366fd7ca9c2", "word_count": 1521 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:18:34.747306+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and STEPHENS concur." ], "parties": [ "PEARL A. WILKINS, Petitioner v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY, Respondent" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, Judge.\nNorth Carolina State University (\u201cNCSU\u201d) appeals from judgment of the trial court concluding that Pearl A. Wilkins (\u201cpetitioner\u201d) was entitled to priority consideration for a vacant position at NCSU. NCSU contends the trial court erred in its interpretation of the dis-positive statute. We agree and therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court.\nPetitioner worked for NCSU in the Animal Science Department from January 1979 to June 1990. She returned to NCSU as an administrative billing assistant in the Communication Technologies Department in February 1993. Petitioner was eventually promoted to the position of \u201cTelecom Project Manager/Telecom Analyst II.\u201d In May 2002, NCSU notified petitioner of an impending reduction in force (\u201cRIF\u201d) from her position. Her RIF became effective in June 2002. In December 2002, a \u201cTelecom Analyst I\u201d position became vacant. Petitioner applied for the position, but NCSU hired another former employee who had also been reduced in force. The employee hired had approximately four years of state service at the time of his RIF. Petitioner had more than ten years of general state service at the time of her RIF, but she had less than ten years of service in the specific position of a telecommunications analyst.\nPetitioner subsequently brought this action in the Office of Administrative Hearings, arguing that, as an RIF employee with more than ten years of service, she was entitled to priority consideration for the vacant position pursuant to section 126-7.1 of the North Carolina General Statutes. Section 126-7.1 provides in pertinent part as follows:\n(c2) If the applicants for reemployment for a position include current State employees, a State employee with more than 10 years of service shall receive priority consideration over a State employee having less than 10 years of service in the same or related position classification. This reemployment priority shall be given by all State departments, agencies, and institutions with regard to positions subject to this Chapter.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-7.1(c2) (2006). Petitioner\u2019s case eventually came before the trial court, which agreed that petitioner was entitled to priority consideration pursuant to section 126-7.1(c2) and entered judgment accordingly. NCSU appeals.\nNCSU contends the trial court erred in its interpretation of section 126-7.1(c2). NCSU argues that the phrase \u201cin the same or related position classification\u201d applies to both State employees with less than ten years of experience and those with more than ten years of experience. Thus, under NCSU\u2019s interpretation of section 126-7.1(c2), only those State employees with more than ten years of experience in the same or related position classification as the position to which they are applying would receive priority consideration over State employees with less than ten years of experience. Because petitioner had less than ten years of experience as a \u201cTelecom Analyst,\u201d the position for which she was applying, NCSU contends she was not entitled to priority consideration over the RIF employee with less than ten years of State service.\nAs the central dispute in this case centers on statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Env\u2019t & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 358 N.C. 649, 659, 599 S.E.2d 888, 894-95 (2004); Good Hope Hosp., Inc. v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Health & Human Serv., 175 N.C. App. 309, 311, 623 S.E.2d 315, 317 (2006) (\u201c[i]n determining whether an agency erred in interpreting a statute, this Court employs a de novo standard of review\u201d).\n\u201cThe primary rule of statutory construction is to effectuate the intent of the legislature.\u201d In re Estate of Lunsford, 359 N.C. 382, 392, 610 S.E.2d 366, 373 (2005). \u201c \u2018[W]here the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction and the courts must construe the statute using its plain meaning.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 391, 610 S.E.2d at 372 (quoting Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C. 205, 209, 388 S.E.2d 134, 136 (1990)). \u201cBut where a statute is ambiguous, judicial construction must be used to ascertain the legislative will.\u201d Burgess, 326 N.C. at 209, 388 S.E.2d at 136-37. It is well established that \u201ca statute must be construed, if possible, to give meaning and effect to all of its provisions.\u201d HCA Crossroads Residential Ctrs. v. N.C. Dept. of Human Res., 327 N.C. 573, 578, 398 S.E.2d 466, 470 (1990).\nHere, the statute provides that \u201ca State employee with more than 10 years of service shall receive priority consideration over a State employee having less than 10 years of service in the same or related position classification.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-7.1(c2). From the wording of the statute, it is unclear whether the phrase \u201cin the same or related position classification\u201d applies to both State employees with more and less than ten years of service, or only to a State employee having less than ten years of service. Because the statute is ambig\u00faous, we must employ judicial construction in order to devise the intent of the legislature in drafting the statute. Burgess, 326 N.C. at 209, 388 S.E.2d at 136-37.\nThe trial court ruled that the phrase \u201cin the same or related position classification\u201d refers to the \u201c \u2018State employee having less than 10 years of service\u2019 \u201d but does not refer to the \u201c \u2018State employee with more than 10 years of service.\u2019 \u201d Under the trial court\u2019s reading, a State employee with more than ten years of service, regardless of the particular position, should receive priority consideration over another State employee with less than ten years of service in the same or related position classification. Under such a scheme, a State employee with nine years of general experience, but only one year of specific experience in the same or related position classification, would be entitled to priority consideration over a State employee with nine years of specific experience in the vacant position. However, this interpretation renders the phrase \u201cin the same or related position classification\u201d entirely superfluous. If the legislature had truly intended for State employees with more than ten years of service to receive priority consideration over others with less than ten years of service, it could have eliminated the phrase \u201cin the same or related position classification\u201d altogether while achieving the same effect. The statute would then read \u201c[i]f the applicants for reemployment for a position include current State employees, a State employee with more than 10 years of service shall receive priority consideration over a State employee having less than 10 years of service.\u201d Because the trial court\u2019s interpretation renders the phrase \u201cin the same or related position classification\u201d redundant and meaningless, we conclude the trial court erred in its reading of the statute. See HCA Crossroads Residential Ctrs., 327 N.C. at 578, 398 S.E.2d at 470 (rejecting an interpretation of a statute that rendered its language superfluous).\nPetitioner argues the trial court properly construed the statute employing the doctrine of the last antecedent. Under this doctrine, \u201crelative and qualifying words, phrases, and clauses ordinarily are to be applied to the word or phrase immediately preceding and, unless the context indicates a contrary intent, are not to be construed as extending to or including others more remote.\u201d Id. at 578, 398 S.E.2d at 469 (emphasis added). \u201cThis doctrine is not an absolute rule, however, but merely one aid to the discovery of legislative intent.\u201d Id. Strict application of the doctrine of the last antecedent to the statutory language at issue here would render the phrase \u201cin the same or related position classification\u201d meaningless and therefore does not serve to illuminate legislative intent. We reject petitioner\u2019s argument.\nIn conclusion, we hold the phrase \u201cin the same or related position classification\u201d in section 126-7.1(c2) applies to both State employees with more and less than ten years of service. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-7.1(c2). Because petitioner did not have more than ten years of service in the same or related position classification as the position to which she applied, she was not entitled to priority consideration for the vacant position pursuant to section 126-7.1(c2). The trial court erred in determining otherwise. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court.\nReversed.\nJudges McGEE and STEPHENS concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Schiller & Schiller, PLLC, by David G. Schiller, Kathryn H. Schiller, and Marvin Schiller, for 'petitioner-appellee.", "Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Q. Shant\u00e9 Martin, for respondent-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "PEARL A. WILKINS, Petitioner v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY, Respondent\nNo. COA05-1253\n(Filed 5 July 2006)\nPublic Officers and Employees\u2014 rehiring after reduction in force \u2014 priority\u2014years of service\nA state employee with more than ten years of general service with the State who was subjected to a reduction in force did not have a priority under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 126-7.1(c2) over another employee who had also been reduced in force with approximately four years of state service. The trial erroneously held that the statutory phrase \u201cin the same or related position classification\u201d applies to employees with less than ten years of service but not to employees with more than ten years of service.\nAppeal by respondent from judgment entered 14 June 2005 by Judge Abraham Penn Jones in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29 March 2006.\nSchiller & Schiller, PLLC, by David G. Schiller, Kathryn H. Schiller, and Marvin Schiller, for 'petitioner-appellee.\nAttorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Q. Shant\u00e9 Martin, for respondent-appellant." }, "file_name": "0377-01", "first_page_order": 409, "last_page_order": 413 }