{ "id": 8378561, "name": "VIRGINIA RAUCH, Plaintiff v. URGENT CARE PHARMACY, INC.; R. KEN MASON, JR.; W. RAY BURNS; FIRSTHEALTH OF THE CAROLINAS, INC.; PROFESSIONAL COMPOUNDING CENTERS OF AMERICA, LTD., a/k/a PROFESSIONAL COMPOUNDING CENTERS OF AMERICA, LLP, f/k/a PROFESSIONAL COMPOUNDING CENTERS OF AMERICA, INC., d/b/a PCCA, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Rauch v. Urgent Care Pharmacy, Inc.", "decision_date": "2006-07-18", "docket_number": "No. COA05-472", "first_page": "510", "last_page": "519", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "178 N.C. App. 510" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "617 S.E.2d 662", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633744, 12633741, 12633742, 12633743 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/617/0662-04", "/se2d/617/0662-01", "/se2d/617/0662-02", "/se2d/617/0662-03" ] }, { "cite": "611 S.E.2d 417", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632656, 12632654, 12632655 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/611/0417-03", "/se2d/611/0417-01", "/se2d/611/0417-02" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3795617, 3796867, 3801443, 3801157, 12632651, 12632653, 12632655, 3799888, 12632656, 12632657, 3803351, 3797305 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0322-02", "/nc/359/0322-05", "/nc/359/0322-01", "/nc/359/0322-07", "/se2d/611/0416-01", "/se2d/611/0416-03", "/se2d/611/0417-02", "/nc/359/0322-04", "/se2d/611/0417-03", "/se2d/611/0418-01", "/nc/359/0322-03", "/nc/359/0322-06" ] }, { "cite": "624 S.E.2d 620", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634918 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "623", "parenthetical": "quoting Dep't of Transp. v. Rowe, 351 N.C. 172, 175, 521 S.E.2d 707, 709 (1999); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 1-277; 1A-1, Rule 54(b); 7A-27 (2005" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/624/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 U.S. 310", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6157001 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316" }, { "page": "102" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/326/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "519 S.E.2d 317", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 N.C. App. 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11238795 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/135/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "608 S.E.2d 751", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3796481 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "600 S.E.2d 881", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "885" }, { "page": "885" }, { "page": "885-86", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 N.C. App. 34", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8410703 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37" }, { "page": "38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/166/0034-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-75.4", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(4)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 141", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "146", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he right of immediate appeal of an adverse ruling as to jurisdiction over the person, under [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-277(b)], is limited to rulings on 'minimum contacts' questions, the subject matter of Rule 12(b)(2).\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 575", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571503 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "581", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he right of immediate appeal of an adverse ruling as to jurisdiction over the person, under [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-277(b)], is limited to rulings on 'minimum contacts' questions, the subject matter of Rule 12(b)(2).\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0575-01" ] }, { "cite": "598 S.E.2d 570", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "589" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8995613 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/165/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 S.E.2d 593", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "596", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 603", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572803 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "608", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0603-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 643", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3795078, 3800872, 3801711, 3798065, 3802421, 3795157 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0643-04", "/nc/359/0643-03", "/nc/359/0643-05", "/nc/359/0643-02", "/nc/359/0643-06", "/nc/359/0643-01" ] }, { "cite": "610 S.E.2d 360", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360" }, { "page": "361" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3799435 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "401" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 S.E.2d 526", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527", "parenthetical": "\"A trial judge's order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is interlocutory and not immediately appealable.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 N.C. App. 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523577 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "487", "parenthetical": "\"A trial judge's order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is interlocutory and not immediately appealable.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/54/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 S.E.2d 182", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "184", "parenthetical": "Section 1-277(b) \"does not apply to orders denying motions made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction\" as these orders are \"not determinative of an action.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568484 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "327", "parenthetical": "Section 1-277(b) \"does not apply to orders denying motions made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction\" as these orders are \"not determinative of an action.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "606 S.E.2d 449", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "167 N.C. App. 763", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8414195 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "767-68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/167/0763-01" ] }, { "cite": "606 S.E.2d 359", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "361" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "167 N.C. App. 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8411802 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "507" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/167/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 S.E.2d 559", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"[N]o appeal lies to an appellate court from an interlocutory order unless the order deprives the appellant of a substantial right which he would lose absent a review prior to final determination.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 495", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4756490, 4751086, 4754065, 4759031, 4755005 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"[N]o appeal lies to an appellate court from an interlocutory order unless the order deprives the appellant of a substantial right which he would lose absent a review prior to final determination.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0495-01", "/nc/312/0495-03", "/nc/312/0495-05", "/nc/312/0495-04", "/nc/312/0495-02" ] }, { "cite": "320 S.E.2d 693", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "695-96", "parenthetical": "\"[N]o appeal lies to an appellate court from an interlocutory order unless the order deprives the appellant of a substantial right which he would lose absent a review prior to final determination.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "70 N.C. App. 537", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523458 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "540", "parenthetical": "\"[N]o appeal lies to an appellate court from an interlocutory order unless the order deprives the appellant of a substantial right which he would lose absent a review prior to final determination.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/70/0537-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 1-277", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)", "parenthetical": "\"Any interested party shall have the right of immediate appeal from an adverse ruling as to the jurisdiction of the court over the person or property of the defendant. . . .\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "521 S.E.2d 707", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "709" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155764 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "175" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3790975 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "282", "parenthetical": "quoting Dep't of Transp. v. Rowe, 351 N.C. 172, 175, 521 S.E.2d 707, 709 (1999); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 1-277; 1A-1, Rule 54(b); 7A-27 (2005" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0280-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 S.E.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381" }, { "page": "381" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 N.C. 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629835 ], "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/231/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "250 S.E.2d 279", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288" }, { "page": "288" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "39 N.C. App. 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550498 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "89" }, { "page": "89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/39/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 S.E.2d 25", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "27" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 N.C. App. 787", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553723 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "789" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/46/0787-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 913, "char_count": 23249, "ocr_confidence": 0.738, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.048780123308525e-08, "percentile": 0.37438205856789336 }, "sha256": "0603053817963f7cc9bb8fe4d5ca668340a46d14d52265f96f84d5226a0cbd93", "simhash": "1:38eb5afa1eef379f", "word_count": 3688 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:18:34.747306+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and HUNTER concur." ], "parties": [ "VIRGINIA RAUCH, Plaintiff v. URGENT CARE PHARMACY, INC.; R. KEN MASON, JR.; W. RAY BURNS; FIRSTHEALTH OF THE CAROLINAS, INC.; PROFESSIONAL COMPOUNDING CENTERS OF AMERICA, LTD., a/k/a PROFESSIONAL COMPOUNDING CENTERS OF AMERICA, LLP, f/k/a PROFESSIONAL COMPOUNDING CENTERS OF AMERICA, INC., d/b/a PCCA, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JACKSON, Judge.\nOn 9 January 2003, Virginia Rauch (\u201cplaintiff\u2019) filed a complaint alleging that she developed serious health problems, including fungal meningitis, as a result of receiving injections of contaminated methyl-prednisolone. The contaminated methylprednisolone had been compounded by Urgent Care Pharmacy, Inc. (\u201cUrgent Care\u201d), and sold to FirstHealth of the Carolinas, Inc. (\u201cFirstHealth\u201d) for use in First-Health\u2019s hospital and pain clinic. As alleged by plaintiff, Urgent Care\u2019s compounded methylprednisolone injections had been contaminated with a fungus which caused individuals receiving the injections to contract fungal meningitis and other serious health conditions.\nPlaintiff\u2019s complaint contained multiple claims against defendants Urgent Care and FirstHealth, Urgent Care\u2019s president Ray Burns (\u201cBurns\u201d), Urgent Care\u2019s head pharmacist Ken Mason (\u201cMason\u201d), and Professional Compounding Centers of America, Ltd. (\u201cPCCA\u201d), the seller of raw materials used by Urgent Care in compounding the methylprednisolone. Plaintiff\u2019s claims included: (1) negligence on the part of defendants Urgent Care, Mason, and Burns; (2) liability on the part of defendants Urgent Care, Mason, and Burns under North Carolina General Statutes, section 99B-6; (3) Urgent Care\u2019s breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose; (4) negligence on the part of PCCA; (5) negligence on the part of FirstHealth; (6) FirstHealth\u2019s breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose; and (7) a claim seeking to pierce Urgent Care\u2019s corporate veil and hold defendant Bums liable as Urgent Care\u2019s \u201calter ego.\u201d\nOn 16 January 2003, Urgent Care filed for bankruptcy in South Carolina, and was appointed a bankruptcy trustee. An order lifting the automatic stay of plaintiffs claims against Urgent Care was entered 6 June 2003, permitting plaintiff to move forward with her claims, but limiting her recovery from Urgent Care to the funds available under Urgent Care\u2019s liability insurance policy.\nUpon being served with plaintiff\u2019s complaint, defendant Bums sent a copy of the complaint to the attorneys at Poyner and Spruill, LLP who were representing defendants Bums and Urgent Care in a separate, similar action. Defendant Bums also notified his personal liability insurance carrier of the action. Unbeknownst to defendant Burns or his counsel at Poyner and Spruill, defendant Burns\u2019 personal liability insurance carrier retained attorney Melissa Garrell (\u201cGarrell\u201d) of Teague, Campbell, Dennis and Gorham, LLP. Garrell filed a motion for extension of time to answer for defendant Bums on 24 February 2003, but failed to inform defendant Bums or Poyner and Spruill of her actions. Defendant Bums\u2019 counsel from Poyner and Spruill learned of Garrell\u2019s motion the following day, and shortly thereafter notified Garrell that Poyner and Spruill already was representing defendant Burns in a similar action, and also would be representing him in the present action. Counsel from Poyner and Spruill filed a motion for substitution of counsel on 28 March 2003, and a consent order allowing the motion was entered on 4 April 2003.\nWe note initially that Garrell\u2019s motion for an extension of time to answer does not constitute a general appearance, and does not serve as a waiver of defendant Bums\u2019 objection to the trial court\u2019s exercise of personal jurisdiction over him. See Williams v. Williams, 46 N.C. App. 787, 789, 266 S.E.2d 25, 27 (1980); Swenson v. Thibaut, 39 N.C. App. 77, 89, 250 S.E.2d 279, 288 (1978). Similarly, we note that Poyner and Spruill\u2019s motion for substitution of counsel also does not constitute a general appearance thereby waiving defendant Burns\u2019 objection to personal jurisdiction. When a defendant \u201cinvokes the adjudicatory powers of the court in any other matter not directly related to the questions of jurisdiction, he has made a general appearance and has submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court whether he intended to or not.\u201d Swenson, 39 N.C. App. at 89, 250 S.E.2d at 288. In the present case defendant did not seek any determination on the merits of the case nor did he participate in any actions invoking the adjudicatory powers of the court. Defendant Bums\u2019 motion for substitution of counsel was simply a ministerial action which did not constitute a participation by defendant Bums in the present action or general appearance for purposes of the trial court\u2019s exercising personal jurisdiction over him.\nDefendant Bums answered plaintiffs claims on 30 March 2003, asserting numerous affirmative defenses and moving to dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 claims for multiple reasons, including lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction, and plaintiff\u2019s failure to comply with Rule 9(j) of our Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant Urgent Care answered plaintiff\u2019s claims on 31 July 2003, also asserting numerous affirmative defenses and moving to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s claims for failure to comply with Rule (9)(j). On 11 October 2004, Urgent Care filed a separate motion to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s complaint, and in the alternative Urgent Care sought a grant of partial summary judgment on plaintiff\u2019s warranty claims.\nA hearing on the parties\u2019 motions was held on 11 October 2004. At the hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment for PCCA, and plaintiff\u2019s claims against PCCA were dismissed with prejudice. Defendant Bums\u2019 motion to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s claims on the basis of a lack of personal jurisdiction over defendant Burns and a lack of subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff\u2019s \u201calter ego\u201d claim was also granted. The trial court found that due to Urgent Care being in bankruptcy proceedings, the bankruptcy trustee was the proper party to bring a claim to pierce Urgent Care\u2019s corporate veil and hold defendant Bums liable as its alter ego, thus plaintiff lacked standing to bring the claim herself. The trial court also found that defendant Urgent Care is a \u201chealth care provider\u201d subject to the provisions of Article IB of Chapter 90 of the North Carolina General Statutes, but that it was not a merchant or a seller of goods subject to the warranty provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. Plaintiff\u2019s claims alleging Urgent Care\u2019s breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose were dismissed with prejudice as the trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Urgent Care. On 6 December 2004, plaintiff dismissed her claims against defendant FirstHealth with prejudice.\nFollowing the orders entered by the trial court, arising out of the 11 October 2004 hearing, the only claims remaining for trial included plaintiff\u2019s claims for negligence against defendants Urgent Care and Mason, and the liability of defendants Urgent Care and Mason under North Carolina General Statutes, section 99B-6. On 9 December 2004 plaintiff gave notice of her appeal from the trial court\u2019s orders granting PCCA\u2019s motion for summary judgment, granting defendant Burns\u2019 motions to dismiss based on a lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction, and granting partial summary judgment for Urgent Care on plaintiffs implied warranties claims. Plaintiff subsequently withdrew her appeal of the granting of summary judgment of PCCA, thus the issues on appeal only concern plaintiffs appeals regarding defendants Urgent Care and Burns.\nAn interlocutory order is one which is \u201cmade during the pendency of an action, which does not dispose of the case, but leaves it for further action by the trial court in order to settle and determine the entire controversy.\u201d Veazey v. Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 362, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950). In contrast, a final judgment, which is immediately appealable, \u201cdisposes of the cause as to all the parties, leaving nothing to be judicially determined between them in the trial court.\u201d Id. at 361-62, 57 S.E.2d at 381. An interlocutory order is\nappealable before entry of a final judgment if (1) the trial court certifies there is \u201cno just reason to delay the appeal of a final judgment as to fewer than all of the claims or parties in an action\u201d or (2) the order \u201c \u2018affects some substantial right claimed by the appellant and will work an injury to him if not corrected before an appeal from the final judgment.\u2019 \u201d\nMcCutchen v. McCutchen, 360 N.C. 280, 282, 624 S.E.2d 620, 623 (2006) (quoting Dep\u2019t of Transp. v. Rowe, 351 N.C. 172, 175, 521 S.E.2d 707, 709 (1999); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 1-277; 1A-1, Rule 54(b); 7A-27 (2005). In the instant case, the trial court orally certified its ruling as immediately appealable at the 11 October 2004 hearing, however the record on appeal does not contain the trial court\u2019s Rule 54 certification in the form of a written order. Thus, we must determine whether defendants have a substantial right which would be lost absent an immediate review by this Court. See Robins & Weill v. Mason, 70 N.C. App. 537, 540, 320 S.E.2d 693, 695-96, disc. review denied, 312 N.C. 495, 322 S.E.2d 559 (1984) (\u201c[N]o appeal lies to an appellate court from an interlocutory order unless the order deprives the appellant of a substantial right which he would lose absent a review prior to final determination.\u201d); see also, VisionAIR, Inc. v. James, 167 N.C. App. 504, 507, 606 S.E.2d 359, 361 (2004).\nWe note that plaintiff\u2019s appeal of the trial court\u2019s dismissal of her claims against defendant Burns based on a lack of personal jurisdiction is not interlocutory, and is immediately appealable and reviewable by this Court. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-277(b) (2005) (\u201cAny interested party shall have the right of immediate appeal from an adverse ruling as to the jurisdiction of the court over the person or property of the defendant. . . .\u201d); Robinson v. Gardner, 167 N.C. App. 763, 606 S.E.2d 449, disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 322, 611 S.E.2d 417 (2005). However, plaintiff\u2019s appeal of the trial court\u2019s dismissal of her alter ego claim against defendant Bums based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not immediately appealable pursuant to section l-277(b), and therefore is interlocutory. See Teachy v. Coble Dairies, Inc., 306 N.C. 324, 327, 293 S.E.2d 182, 184 (1982) (Section 1-277(b) \u201cdoes not apply to orders denying motions made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction\u201d as these orders are \u201cnot determinative of an action.\u201d); Shaver v. Construction Co., 54 N.C. App. 486, 487, 283 S.E.2d 526, 527 (1981) (\u201cA trial judge\u2019s order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is interlocutory and not immediately appealable.\u201d).\nPlaintiff acknowledges that her appeal of the orders granting the remaining motions of defendants Burns and Urgent Care is interlocutory, in that claims against defendants Mason and Urgent Care for negligence are still pending; however, plaintiff has asked this Court to allow for an immediate appeal from the interlocutory orders which plaintiff believes affect a substantial right. In the alternative, plaintiff has asked this Court, in its discretion, to treat plaintiff\u2019s appeal as a petition for a writ of certiorari pursuant to Rule 21 of our Rules of Appellate Procedure, thereby allowing- us to address the appeal on its merits.\nRule 21 of our appellate rules provides that a \u201cwrit of certiorari may be issued in appropriate circumstances by either appellate court to permit review of the judgments and orders of trial tribunals when ... no right of appeal from an interlocutory order exists . . ..\u201d N.C. R. App. P. 21(a)(1) (2005). Our rules specify that a petition for writ of certiorari to this Court must be filed with the clerk of the Court of Appeals, and the petition must contain the following:\na statement of the facts necessary to an understanding of the issues presented by the application; a statement of the reasons why the writ should issue; and certified copies of the judgment, order or opinion or parts of the record which may be essential to an understanding of the matters set forth in the petition.\nN.C. R. App. P. 21(b), (c) (2005). Plaintiff\u2019s sole statement in her brief fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 21. \u201cThe North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure are mandatory and \u2018failure to follow these rules will subject an appeal to dismissal.\u2019 \u201d Viar v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Transp., 359 N.C. 400, 401, 610 S.E.2d 360, 360 (citation omitted), reh\u2019g denied, 359 N.C. 643, 617 S.E.2d 662 (2005). Further, \u201c[i]t is not the role of the appellate courts ... to create an appeal for an appellant.\u201d Id. at 402, 610 S.E.2d at 361. Thus we decline to exercise our discretion and deny plaintiffs petition for writ of certiorari.\nPlaintiff argues the trial court\u2019s dismissal of her claims against' defendants Urgent Care and Burns affects a substantial right in that overlapping factual issues between the dismissed claims and the remaining claims create the potential for inconsistent verdicts which could result from two trials on the same factual issues. In Green v. Duke Power Co., our Supreme Court held that \u201c \u2018the right to avoid the possibility of two trials on the same issues can be ... a substantial right.\u2019 \u201d 305 N.C. 603, 608, 290 S.E.2d 593, 596 (1982) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).\nPlaintiff argues that inconsistent verdicts could result if different juries were to hear the \u201cmyriad of factual issues common to all of the claims.\u201d In Stetser v. TAP Pharm. Prods. Inc., however, we held that \u201c[a]n inconsistent verdict can only occur if the same issue is involved in two trials.\u201d 165 N.C. App. 1, 29, 598 S.E.2d 570, 589 (2004). Here, plaintiff contends that the factual issues involved are common to all of plaintiff\u2019s claims, thus there is the potential for inconsistent verdicts if multiple trials are held on all of the claims. However, claims alleging negligence and liability under North Carolina General Statutes, section 99B-6, and claims seeking to pierce a corporate veil and alleging a breach of implied warranties are very different, and require different evidence to satisfy the very different elements of each claim. A finding of liability under one claim and not another is not necessarily an inconsistent verdict, as the various claims do not involve the same issues, and each requires that different elements be proved. Although some of the factual issues would be the same in the trying of each of the trials, the legal issues would not.\nTherefore, we hold plaintiff has not shown that she possibly would be subjected to two trials on the same issue or that inconsistent verdicts likely would result were she to be involved in multiple trials. Accordingly, as plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that a substantial right is affected, we hold plaintiff\u2019s appeal is interlocutory and not immediately appealable. We therefore dismiss as interlocutory plaintiff\u2019s appeal of the orders granting defendant Urgent Care\u2019s motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiff\u2019s warranty claims, and the order dismissing plaintiff\u2019s alter ego claim against defendant Burns for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.\nOur review of the dismissal of plaintiffs claim against defendant Burns for a lack of personal jurisdiction is limited to a determination as to whether or not defendant Burns had sufficient \u201cminimum contacts\u201d with North Carolina to subject him to jurisdiction by the courts of this state. See Love v. Moore, 305 N.C. 575, 581, 291 S.E.2d 141, 146 (1982) (\u201c[T]he right of immediate appeal of an adverse ruling as to jurisdiction over the person, under [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-277(b)], is limited to rulings on \u2018minimum contacts\u2019 questions, the subject matter of Rule 12(b)(2).\u201d); Robinson, 167 N.C. App. at 767-68, 606 S.E.2d at 452.\nOur Courts have adopted a two-part test to determine whether a court in this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. The court first must determine whether our \u201clong-arm\u201d statute authorizes jurisdiction over the defendant. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-75.4 (2005). If the statute does authorize jurisdiction, the court next must \u201cdetermine whether the court\u2019s exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant is consistent with due process.\u201d Tejal Vyas, LLC v. Carriage Park Ltd. P\u2019ship, 166 N.C. App. 34, 37, 600 S.E.2d 881, 885 (2004), aff\u2019d, 359 N.C. 315, 608 S.E.2d 751 (2005). North Carolina\u2019s long-arm statute provides that personal jurisdiction over defendant Burns is proper under the following provisions:\n(4) Local Injury; Foreign Act. \u2014 In any action for wrongful death occurring within this State or in any action claiming injury to person or property within this State arising out of an act or omission outside this State by the defendant, provided in addition that at or about the time of the injury either:\na. Solicitation or services activities were carried on within this State by or on behalf of the defendant;\nb. Products, materials or thing processed, serviced or manufactured by the defendant were used or consumed, within this State in the ordinary course of trade; ....\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-75.4(4) (2005).\n\u201c \u2018When personal jurisdiction is alleged to exist pursuant to the long-arm statute, the question of statutory authority collapses into one inquiry \u2014 whether defendant has the minimum contacts with North Carolina necessary to meet the requirements of due process.\u2019 \u201d Tejal, 166 N.C. App. at 38, 600 S.E.2d at 885 (quoting Hiwassee Stables, Inc. v. Cunningham, 135 N.C. App. 24, 27, 519 S.E.2d 317, 320 (1999)). Our primary determination thus is whether defendant Burns had \u201c \u2018certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend \u201ctraditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 90 L. Ed. 95, 102 (1945)). A defendant will be found to have sufficient minimum contacts with North Carolina when he has\npurposefully availed [himself] of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state and invoked the benefits and protections of the laws of .North Carolina. The relationship between the defendant and the forum state must be such that the defendant should \u201creasonably anticipate being haled into\u201d a North Carolina court. The facts of each case determine whether the defendant\u2019s activities in the forum state satisfy due process.\nId. at 38-39, 600 S.E.2d at 885-86 (internal citations omitted).\nIn the instant case, we hold defendant Bums did not have sufficient minimum contacts with the state of North Carolina, such that a court in our state could exercise personal jurisdiction over him individually without violating his due process rights. Defendant Burns signed and submitted defendant Urgent Care\u2019s 2002 application to the North Carolina Board of Pharmacy, seeking privileges for Urgent Care to conduct pharmacy business in this state, however he signed the application in his capacity as president of defendant Urgent Care. There is no evidence in the record which suggests that defendant Burns participated in the filling of any prescriptions or compounding activities at Urgent Care during 2002 when the contaminated methyl-prednisolone injections were compounded. Similarly, defendant Burns had no direct involvement with the day-to-day operations of defendant Urgent Care in 2002. He also had no contact with anyone in North Carolina regarding Urgent Care\u2019s compounding methylpred-nisolone injections, and in fact, was unaware that Urgent Care was compounding the dmg until after Urgent Care was notified about the possible contamination. Defendant Burns then spoke, via telephone, to physicians and other individuals in North Carolina regarding the investigation and the recall of the contaminated injections, however he did so in his capacity as president of defendant Urgent Care. Defendant Burns also does not own any real or personal property in this state, nor has he lived here since he was eighteen years old. The evidence does suggest that he may have visited the state for personal reasons prior to 2002, and that during such visit he delivered Urgent Care\u2019s application to the North Carolina Pharmacy Board.\nAfter a thorough review of the record, we hold there is competent evidence to support the trial court\u2019s conclusion that defendant Burns did not engage in the requisite minimum contacts to satisfy the Due Process Clause. U.S. Const, amend. V and amend. XIV, \u00a7 1. Therefore, we hold the trial court acted properly in granting defendant\u2019s motions to dismiss, therefore plaintiff\u2019s assignment of error is overruled.\nDismissed in part; affirmed in part.\nJudges McGEE and HUNTER concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JACKSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "The McLeod Law Firm, P.A., by William W. Ay cock, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.", "Poyner & Spruill, LLP, by Timothy W. Wilson, for Urgent Care Pharmacy, Inc. and W. Ray Bums, defendant-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "VIRGINIA RAUCH, Plaintiff v. URGENT CARE PHARMACY, INC.; R. KEN MASON, JR.; W. RAY BURNS; FIRSTHEALTH OF THE CAROLINAS, INC.; PROFESSIONAL COMPOUNDING CENTERS OF AMERICA, LTD., a/k/a PROFESSIONAL COMPOUNDING CENTERS OF AMERICA, LLP, f/k/a PROFESSIONAL COMPOUNDING CENTERS OF AMERICA, INC., d/b/a PCCA, Defendants\nNo. COA05-472\n(Filed 18 July 2006)\n1. Jurisdiction\u2014 motions for extension of time and substitution of counsel \u2014 not general appearances\nMotions for an extension of time to answer and for substitution of counsel were not general appearances which waived an objection to personal jurisdiction. Defendant did not seek any determination on the merits nor did he participate in any actions invoking the adjudicatory powers of the court.\n2. Appeal and Error\u2014 appealability \u2014 interlocutory order\u2014 oral certification \u2014 reviewed for loss of substantial right\nAn interlocutory order was reviewed for the loss of a substantial right where the trial court orally certified its ruling as immediately appealable but the record contains no written certification order.\n3. Appeal and Error\u2014 appealability \u2014 lack of personal jurisdiction \u2014 lack of subject matter jurisdiction\nThe trial court\u2019s dismissal of plaintiffs claims based on a lack of personal jurisdiction was immediately appealable. However, the dismissal of plaintiffs alter ego claim based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction was not immediately appealable, and her request to treat her appeal as a petition for certiorari was denied because the request did not comply with N.C. Appellate Rule 21.\n4. Appeal and Error\u2014 appealability \u2014 same factual issues, different legal issues \u2014 no substantial right\nPlaintiff did not show that she would lose a substantial right without an immediate appeal based on inconsistent verdicts where there would be a correspondence between the factual issues but not the legal issues.\n5. Jurisdiction\u2014 minimum contacts \u2014 president of company\u2014 contacts insufficient\nNonresident defendant pharmacy president did not have sufficient minimum contacts with North Carolina such that a court in North Carolina could exercise personal jurisdiction over him individually without violating his due process rights in a negligence and products liability action.\nAppeal by plaintiff from judgment and orders entered 15 November 2004 and orders entered 29 November 2004 by Judge Mark E. Klass in Hoke County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 February 2006.\nThe McLeod Law Firm, P.A., by William W. Ay cock, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.\nPoyner & Spruill, LLP, by Timothy W. Wilson, for Urgent Care Pharmacy, Inc. and W. Ray Bums, defendant-appellees." }, "file_name": "0510-01", "first_page_order": 542, "last_page_order": 551 }