{ "id": 8379264, "name": "CARTER-HUBBARD PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff v. WRMC HOSPITAL OPERATING CORPORATION, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Carter-Hubbard Publishing Co. v. WRMC Hospital Operating Corp.", "decision_date": "2006-08-01", "docket_number": "No. COA05-420", "first_page": "621", "last_page": "635", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "178 N.C. App. 621" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 66-152", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(2)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 S.E.2d 632", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "634" }, { "page": "634" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 N.C. App. 358", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521236 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360-61" }, { "page": "360-61" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/78/0358-01" ] }, { "cite": "551 S.E.2d 852", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "855" }, { "page": "855" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 N.C. App. 567", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11435704 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "570" }, { "page": "570" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/144/0567-01" ] }, { "cite": "559 F. Supp. 4", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3546571 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "6" }, { "page": "6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/559/0004-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 132-1.2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(1)(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "488 S.E.2d 826", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 557", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139488, 139640, 139494 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0557-03", "/nc/346/0557-01", "/nc/346/0557-02" ] }, { "cite": "480 S.E.2d 53", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 N.C. App. 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11866285 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/125/0174-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 S.E.2d 582", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "586", "parenthetical": "quoting 82 C.J.S. General and Specific Statutes \u00a7 369 (1953)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "268 N.C. 624", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564406 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "628-29", "parenthetical": "quoting 82 C.J.S. General and Specific Statutes \u00a7 369 (1953)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/268/0624-01" ] }, { "cite": "398 S.E.2d 40", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "42" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 N.C. App. 603", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527319 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "606" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/100/0603-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 S.E.2d 158", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790160 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 S.E.2d 386", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562180 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239-40" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "441 S.E.2d 589", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "592", "parenthetical": "quoting In Re Banks, 295 N.C. 236, 239-40, 244 S.E.2d 386, 389 (1978)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 N.C. App. 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527215 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115", "parenthetical": "quoting In Re Banks, 295 N.C. 236, 239-40, 244 S.E.2d 386, 389 (1978)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/114/0110-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 S.E.2d 435", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 195", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4763743 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "210", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0195-01" ] }, { "cite": "591 S.E.2d 514", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "516", "parenthetical": "\"Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction and the courts must construe the statute using its plain meaning.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2986294 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125", "parenthetical": "\"Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction and the courts must construe the statute using its plain meaning.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "480 S.E.2d 681", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "683", "parenthetical": "\"If the language of the statute is clear and is not ambiguous, we must conclude that the legislature intended the statute to be implemented according to the plain meaning of its terms.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 468", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53883 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472", "parenthetical": "\"If the language of the statute is clear and is not ambiguous, we must conclude that the legislature intended the statute to be implemented according to the plain meaning of its terms.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0468-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 S.E.2d 7", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "In the absence of clear statutory exemption or exception, documents falling within the definition of \"public records\" in the Public Records Act must be made available for public inspection." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2508375 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "In the absence of clear statutory exemption or exception, documents falling within the definition of \"public records\" in the Public Records Act must be made available for public inspection." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "515 S.E.2d 675", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "685", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132176 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 132-1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "596 S.E.2d 431", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 N.C. App. 459", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8898259 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/164/0459-01" ] }, { "cite": "539 S.E.2d 274", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135640 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "524 S.E.2d 386", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "388" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 N.C. App. 320", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11239477 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/136/0320-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 132-9", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "616 S.E.2d 602", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633597 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "605" }, { "parenthetical": "citation and internal brackets omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/616/0602-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 S.E.2d 834", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "836", "parenthetical": "\"[Our courts] are without power to create provisions and limitations not contained in the language of the statute itself' (citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "132 N.C. App. 777", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11240453 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "780", "parenthetical": "\"[Our courts] are without power to create provisions and limitations not contained in the language of the statute itself' (citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/132/0777-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 S.E.2d 793", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "804", "parenthetical": "\"It is always presumed that the [Legislature acted with care and deliberation and with full knowledge of prior and existing law\" (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 641", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563176 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "658", "parenthetical": "\"It is always presumed that the [Legislature acted with care and deliberation and with full knowledge of prior and existing law\" (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0641-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997 N.C. Sess. Laws 238", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 345", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "437 S.E.2d 910", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "911-12", "parenthetical": "noting it is appropriate to consider \"circumstances surrounding the enactment of the act with an eye towards the evil sought to be remedied when determining the legislative intent\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "113 N.C. App. 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521758 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262", "parenthetical": "noting it is appropriate to consider \"circumstances surrounding the enactment of the act with an eye towards the evil sought to be remedied when determining the legislative intent\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/113/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 N.C. App. 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8320531 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "489" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/172/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "480 S.E.2d 53", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "55", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "125 N.C. App. 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11866285 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "178-79", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "179" }, { "page": "178" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/125/0174-01" ] }, { "cite": "591 S.E.2d 514", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "516", "parenthetical": "\"Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction and the courts must construe the statute using its plain meaning\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2986294 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125", "parenthetical": "\"Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction and the courts must construe the statute using its plain meaning\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 132-1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1150, "char_count": 34416, "ocr_confidence": 0.751, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.0690420705576435e-07, "percentile": 0.8571507450820491 }, "sha256": "1defb896feda0a9e4b1468ba724b51c216f3b3243cfcc3574fbd95d3ba20cf5c", "simhash": "1:09b99e67df6b6e90", "word_count": 5375 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:18:34.747306+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge HUDSON concurs.", "Judge CALABRIA concurring in part and dissenting in part in a separate opinion." ], "parties": [ "CARTER-HUBBARD PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff v. WRMC HOSPITAL OPERATING CORPORATION, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BRYANT, Judge.\nWilkes Regional Medical Center Hospital Operating Corporation (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals the trial court\u2019s order granting summary judgment in favor of Carter-Hubbard Publishing Company, Inc. (\u201cplaintiff\u2019). Plaintiff appeals the trial court\u2019s denial of motions to amend the complaint and to tax costs and attorney fees against defendant. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.\nPlaintiff publishes the Wilkes Journal Patriot, a major news source for the citizens of Wilkes County. Defendant is the governing body of Wilkes Regional Medical Center (\u201cWRMC\u201d), a public hospital owned by the Town of North Wilkesboro. In 2004, defendant purchased Dr. Nicholas Cirillo\u2019s (\u201cDr. Cirillo\u201d) medical practice. This purchase took place because \u201cDr. Cirillo was the only gastroenterologist located in Wilkes County, and WRMC [wanted] to assure the continued availability of gastroenterological services to [WRMC\u2019s] patients.\u201d Subsequently, plaintiff requested a copy of defendant\u2019s purchase agreement with Dr. Cirillo (the \u201ccontract\u201d). Defendant refused to provide the contract, contending that the contract amounted to \u201ccompetitive health care information\u201d under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E-97.3 and, therefore, was not subject to disclosure. Plaintiff believed, under the North Carolina Public Records Act, defendant was required to disclose the contract.\nOn 8 September 2004, plaintiff filed suit, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 132-9, seeking an order compelling defendant to disclose the contract. On 25 October 2005, defendant filed an Answer stating the contract was not subject to disclosure because it was considered \u201ccompetitive health care information\u201d within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E-97.3. On 20 January 2005, at a hearing held in Wilkes County Superior Court, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, concluding that the contract did not contain \u201ccompetitive health care information\u201d and \u201cshould be produced in its entirety.\u201d Defendant moved to stay the court\u2019s order pending appeal. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion and ordered defendant to produce the contract. Defendant filed a Petition for Writ of Su-persedeas with this Court on 25 January 2005. On 16 February 2005, we granted defendant\u2019s motion and stayed the trial court\u2019s order pending appeal.\nOn review of a motion for summary judgment, this Court considers whether \u201cthe pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that any party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2005). In this case, there were no genuine issues of material fact and summary judgment was appropriate. However, we consider de novo whether the trial court properly concluded that plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hlasnick v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 136 N.C. App. 320, 323, 524 S.E.2d 386, 388, aff\u2019d in part on other grounds, 353 N.C. 240, 539 S.E.2d 274 (2000).\nIn its order the trial court stated: \u201cThe contract in question does not contain \u2018competitive health care information\u2019 within the meaning of [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7] 131E-97.3 . . . and should be pro-ducedf.]\u201d In this appeal we decide whether the trial court erred in finding the contract at issue is a public record and granting summary judgment for plaintiff. Therefore, in this case of first impression, we determine whether a public hospital\u2019s contract to purchase a medical practice should be considered \u201ccompetitive health care information\u201d and therefore exempt from the Public Records Act. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E-97.3 (2005).\nUnder the Public Records Act, our Legislature granted liberal access to public records. See McCormick v. Hanson Aggregates Southeast, Inc., 164 N.C. App. 459, 596 S.E.2d 431 (2004); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 132-1(b), 132-6 (2005) (defining public records as \u201cthe property of the people\u201d and allowing examination of public records).\n\u201cPublic records\u201d include:\nall documents, papers, letters, maps, books, photographs, films, sound recordings, magnetic or other tapes, electronic data-processing records, artifacts, or other documentary material, regardless of form or characteristics, made or received pursuant to law or ordinance in connection with the transaction of public business by any agency of North Carolina government or its subdivisions[.]\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 132-1(a) (2005). \u201cAbsent clear statutory exemption or exception, documents falling within the definition of \u2018public records\u2019 in the Public Records Law must be made available for public inspection.\u201d Virmani v. Presbyterian Health Servs. Corp., 350 N.C. 449, 462, 515 S.E.2d 675, 685 (1999) (citation omitted). Exceptions and exemptions to the Public Records Act must be construed narrowly. See News & Observer Publ\u2019g Co. v. Poole, 330 N.C. 465, 412 S.E.2d 7 (1992) (In the absence of clear statutory exemption or exception, documents falling within the definition of \u201cpublic records\u201d in the Public Records Act must be made available for public inspection.); see also Three Guys Real Estate v. Harnett County, 345 N.C. 468, 472, 480 S.E.2d 681, 683 (1997) (\u201cIf the language of the statute is clear and is not ambiguous, we must conclude that the legislature intended the statute to be implemented according to the plain meaning of its terms.\u201d); State v. Hooper, 358 N.C. 122, 125, 591 S.E.2d 514, 516 (2004) (\u201cWhere the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction and the courts must construe the statute using its plain meaning.\u201d) (internal quotations and citations omitted).\nDefendant argues the contract at issue amounts to \u201ccompetitive health care information\u201d and is therefore exempt from the public records statute. We note that our legislature has exempted from the definition of \u201cpublic record\u201d what it refers to as \u201ccompetitive health care information.\u201d\nInformation relating to competitive health care activities by or on behalf of hospitals and public hospital authorities shall be confidential and not a public record under Chapter 132 of the General Statutes; provided that any contract entered into by or on behalf of a public hospital or public hospital authority, as defined in G.S. 159-39, shall be a public record unless otherwise exempted by law, or the contract contains competitive health care information[.]\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 131E-97.3 (2005).\nDefendant contends the legislature has linked the term \u201ccompetitive health care information\u201d with the term \u201cconfidential commercial information\u201d in determining what is protected under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 131E-97.3 (2005). Defendant therefore urges this court to take a very broad view of the term. However, \u201ccompetitive health care information\u201d is not specifically defined in our statute. \u201cHealth care\u201d is defined in the American Heritage Dictionary as \u201c[t]he prevention, treatment, and management of illness and the preservation of well-being through the services offered by the medical and allied health professions.\u201d The American Heritage College Dictionary 626 (3rd ed. 1997). Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E-99 \u201ccompetitive health care information\u201d includes \u201cfinancial terms\u201d of a contract and any \u201chealth care information directly related to financial terms in a contract.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E-99 (2005). North Carolina General Statutes, Section 131E-99 is the only statute that gives some indication of what the legislature intended by its use of the term \u201ccompetitive health care information.\u201d\n\u201cThe cardinal principle of statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature is controlling. In ascertaining the legislative intent courts should consider the language of the statute, the spirit of the statute, and what it seeks to accomplish.\u201d State ex rel. Util. Comm\u2019n v. Public Staff, 309 N.C. 195, 210, 306 S.E.2d 435, 444 (1983) (citations omitted). \u201c \u2018Other indicia considered by this Court in determining legislative intent are the legislative history of an act and the circumstances surrounding its adoption[.]\u2019 \u201d County of Lenoir v. Moore, 114 N.C. App. 110, 115, 441 S.E.2d 589, 592 (1994) (quoting In Re Banks, 295 N.C. 236, 239-40, 244 S.E.2d 386, 389 (1978)), aff\u2019d, 340 N.C. 104, 455 S.E.2d 158 (1995). When multiple statutes address a single matter or subject, they must be construed together, in pari materia, to determine the legislature\u2019s intent. Whittington v. N.C. Dept. of Human Res., 100 N.C. App. 603, 606, 398 S.E.2d 40, 42 (1990). Statutes in pari materia must be harmonized, \u201cto give effect, if possible, to all provisions without destroying the meaning of the statutes involved.\u201d Id. Where there is one statute dealing with a subject in general and comprehensive terms, and another dealing with a part of the same subject in a more minute and definite way, the two should be read together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect to a consistent legislative policy; but, to the extent of any necessary repugnancy between them, the special statute, or the one dealing with the common subject matter in a minute way, will prevail over the general statute[.]\u201d Food Stores v. Bd. of Alcoholic Control, 268 N.C. 624, 628-29, 151 S.E.2d 582, 586 (1966) (quoting 82 C.J.S. General and Specific Statutes \u00a7 369 (1953)).\nUnder a prior version of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 131E-97.3 any contract entered into by a public hospital (whether or not it contained competitive healthcare information) was a public record unless otherwise exempted.\nInformation relating to competitive health care activities by or on behalf of hospitals shall be confidential and not a public record under Chapter 132 of the General Statutes; provided that any contract entered into by or on behalf of a public hospital, as defined in G.S. 59-39, shall be a public record unless otherwise exempted by law.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E-97.3 (1994) (emphasis added). Thereafter the statute was amended and in its current version allows a contract entered into by a public hospital to be exempt from the public records requirement only if the contract contains competitive health care information. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 131E-97.3 (2005). Because N.C.G.S. \u00a7 131E-99 appears to be one of the few statutes to guide us as to what the legislature intended by using the N.C.G.S. \u00a7 131E-97.3 term \u201ccompetitive health care information,\u201d we construe these two statutes together. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E-99 limits as confidential and not a public record, only that information relating to \u201cfinancial terms and other competitive health care information directly related to financial terms\u201d in a health care services contract. Such language, while arguably applicable to financial terms of a contract involving the \u201cprevention, treatment, and management of illness\u201d does not encompass the acquisition of a medical practice. Further, the contracts under this statute are between the hospital and those who pay the hospital as opposed to employees or potential employees.\nThe financial terms and other competitive health care information directly related to the financial terms in a health care services contract between a hospital or a medical school and a managed care organization, insurance company, employer, or other payer is confidential and not a public record under Chapter 132 of the General Statutes. . . .\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 131E-99 (2005).\nReading these two statutes together the contract terms that are not financial nor financially related would not be considered competitive health care information and therefore would not be exempt. Unlike the price lists in Wilmington Star-News, which specified costs and reimbursement rates of medical services to customers, and which \u201ca reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the price lists constituted trade secrets,\u201d the contract here is a contract with a public hospital to purchase a medical practice. There is nothing in the record to suggest that other hospitals or entities were competing for Dr. Cirillo\u2019s medical practice, and therefore nothing to suggest this contract contained \u201cfinancial terms\u201d or health care information directly related to financial terms such that this contract should be kept confidential.\nDefendants cite contract terms such as price, assets and liabilities, future obligations (e.g. performance bonuses) and other financial information as \u201ccompetitive health care information.\u201d Defendants claim disclosure of such information would place the hospital at a future competitive disadvantage, impair the ability to acquire future confidential information and is a type of information that would not customarily be released between two non-public entities. Defendants argue that the public may be outraged at learning the purchase price without understanding future profit implications.\nWe decline defendant\u2019s offer to more broadly define the term \u201ccompetitive health care information.\u201d Defendant\u2019s definition is based on competitive business aspects of public hospital operations, aspects which, unless they involve trade secret information, are also likely subject to disclosure. We do not think the legislature intended such business dealings \u2014 which do not involve trade secret information nor competitive price lists \u2014 to be kept confidential. We do not read N.C.G.S. \u00a7 131E-97.3 nor 131E-99 separately or in para materia to require such secrecy.\nWilmington Star-News v. New Hanover Reg\u2019l Med. Ctr., 125 N.C. App. 174, 480 S.E.2d 53, appeal dismissed, 346 N.C. 557, 488 S.E.2d 826 (1997), analyzed the prior version of this statute. In Wilmington Star-News this Court held a public hospital and HMO were not entitled to the benefit of the statutory exemption from disclosing price lists in a contract between the public hospital and the HMO. Id. The price lists were not property of a private person within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 132-1.2(1)(b), therefore the information was not exempted from disclosure. Id.\nWe recognize that this holding arguably may adversely affect public hospitals\u2019 ability to compete with nongovernmental entities but we consider that question an appropriate legislative issue. As to any arguable competitive disadvantage to [the public hospital], we consider appropriate the succinct observation of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, \u201cdisclosure of prices charged the Government is a cost of doing business with the Government.\u201d Racal-Milgo Gov\u2019t Sys. v. Small Business Admin., 559 F. Supp. 4, 6 (D.C. 1981).\nWilmington Star-News at 182, 480 S.E.2d at 57 (emphasis added).\nEven though the statute changed such that contracts between public hospitals and HMOs were not automatically considered public record, such public hospital contracts are nevertheless subject to the determination of whether they contain \u201ccompetitive health care information\u201d before any exemption applies. Moreover, the spirit of the public records statute survives \u2014 public records are the \u201cproperty of the people\u201d; and the language of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia is equally applicable \u2014 \u201cdisclosure of prices charged the Government is a cost of doing business with the Govemment[.]\u201d Racal-Milgo Gov\u2019t Sys. v. Small Business Admin., 559 F. Supp. 4, 6 (D.C. 1981). Therefore, after careful review of the record on appeal, including review of the contract previously viewed by the trial court in camera, we hold that the trial court properly determined the contract \u201cdoes not contain competitive health care information\u201d and therefore should be disclosed to the public.\nCross-Assignments\nPlaintiff raises two cross-assignments of error: (1) the trial court erred in denying its motion to amend the complaint to allege violations by the defendant of the North Carolina\u2019s Open Meeting Law; and (2) the trial court erred in denying plaintiffs request to tax costs and attorney fees against the defendant. On appeal, we review both a trial court\u2019s denial of a motion to amend a complaint and a trial court\u2019s denial of costs and fees under an abuse of discretion standard. See Thorpe v. Perry-Riddick, 144 N.C. App. 567, 570, 551 S.E.2d 852, 855 (2001); Martin v. Hare, 78 N.C. App. 358, 360-61, 337 S.E.2d 632, 634 (1985). An abuse of discretion occurs \u201cwhere a court\u2019s ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d Thorpe, 144 N.C. App. at 570, 551 S.E.2d at 855.\nAs to the denial of the motion to amend, the trial court declared no reason for the denial of the motion. We may, however, examine any \u201capparent reasons for such denial.\u201d Hare, 78 N.C. App. at 360-61, 337 S.E.2d at 634. It is evident from the transcript that defendant was not giv\u00e9n notice of the purported open meetings law violation and, therefore, was not prepared to respond to it. As such, the trial court\u2019s denial of plaintiff\u2019s motion did not amount to an abuse of discretion. Likewise, the record reveals no abuse of discretion in the trial court\u2019s denial of costs and fees.\nAffirmed.\nJudge HUDSON concurs.\nJudge CALABRIA concurring in part and dissenting in part in a separate opinion.\n. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 132-1.2:\nConfidential information. Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to require or authorize a public agency or its subdivision to disclose any information that:\n(1) Meets all of the following conditions:\na. Constitutes a \u201ctrade secret\u201d as defined in G.S. 66-152(3).\nb. Is the property of a private \u201cperson\u201d as defined in G.S. 66-152(2).\nc. Is disclosed or furnished to the public agency in connection with the owner\u2019s performance of a public contract or in connection with a bid, application, proposal, industrial development project, or in compliance with laws, regulations, rules, or ordinances of the United States, the State, or political subdivisions of the State.\nd. Is designated or indicated as \u201cconfidential\u201d or as a \u201ctrade secret\u201d at the time of its initial disclosure to the public agency.\n(2) Reveals an. account number for electronic payment as defined in G.S. 147-86.20 and obtained pursuant to Articles 6A or 6B of Chapter 147 of the General Statutes or G.S. 169-32.1.\n(3) Reveals a document, file number, password, or any other information maintained by the Secretary of State pursuant to Article 21 of Chapter 130A of the General Statutes.\n(4) Reveals the electronically captured image of an individual\u2019s signature, date of birth, drivers license number, or a portion of an individual\u2019s social security number if the agency has those items because they are on a voter registration document.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 132-1.2 (2006); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 26 (2005) (\u201cProtection of Confidential Information\u201d).\n. This section protects the property of a private person which property constitutes trade secret information as defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 66-152(2).", "type": "majority", "author": "BRYANT, Judge." }, { "text": "CALABRIA, Judge,\nconcurring in part and dissenting in part.\nI fully concur with the portion of the majority\u2019s opinion dealing with plaintiff\u2019s cross-assignments of error. However, I must respectfully dissent from the majority\u2019s narrow interpretation of the scope of the \u201ccompetitive health care information\u201d exemption under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E-97.3 (2005), despite the absence of any words of limitation in the plain language of the applicable statute. Because N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E-97.3 establishes that the General Assembly sought to place public and private hospitals on equal terms in negotiating contracts containing any type of competitive health care information, my approach would be to interpret N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E-97.3 more broadly to effectuate our Legislature\u2019s intent.\nUnder the Public Records Act, our Legislature has generally granted liberal access to public records. See, e.g., Knight Publ\u2019g v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 172 N.C. App. 486, 489, 616 S.E.2d 602, 605 (2005). Thus, \u201c[i]n the absence of [a] clear statutory exemption or exception, documents falling within the definition of \u2018public records\u2019 in the Public Records Act must be made available for public inspection.\u201d Id. (citation and internal brackets omitted) (emphasis added). See also N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 132-1(b), 132-6 (2005) (defining public records as \u201cthe property of the people\u201d and allowing examination of public records).\nOur Legislature has created a clear statutory exemption from the definition of \u201cpublic record\u201d for what it refers to as \u201ccompetitive health care information\u201d:\nInformation relating to competitive health care activities by or on behalf of hospitals and public hospital authorities shall be confidential and not a public record under Chapter 132 of the General Statutes-, provided that any contract entered into by or on behalf of a public hospital or public hospital authority, as defined in G.S. 159-39, shall be a public record unless otherwise exempted by law, or the contract contains competitive health care information[.]\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E-97.3 (2005).\nIn this case of first impression, we are asked to consider the scope of \u201ccompetitive health care information.\u201d Defendant argues the contract at issue amounts to \u201ccompetitive health care information.\u201d In support of this argument, defendant produced, inter alia, an affidavit of the President and Chief Operating Officer of WRMC, Ted Chapin (\u201cChapin\u201d). Chapin stated,\nIf a private provider were allowed to have access to the terms and conditions of the contracts of a public hospital such as WRMC, the private provider would have a substantial competitive advantage when negotiating for physician practices based on having superior information. If the substantive provisions of an existing contract were available to a different physician practice during subsequent negotiations, WRMC would be at a competitive disadvantage during the negotiations. Essentially, WRMC would be negotiating against itself, based upon its prior contracts. By contrast, a private health care provider which does not have to disclose the contents of its contracts would not be constrained during negotiations by any of the terms in prior or existing contracts.\nPlaintiff counters, via its affidavit of Julius C. Hubbard, Jr. (\u201cHubbard\u201d), the Vice President of Carter-Hubbard, that:\nIf public funds are utilized to purchase a physician\u2019s practice, the public has the right to know how those funds are being spent. Year-end profits and losses of Wilkes Regional Medical Center will certainly be influenced by the expenditure of funds for acquisition of physician\u2019s practices and the public has a right to know how those funds have been spent. To hide behind the guise of \u201ccompetitive health care information\u201d as justification for providing that information is to deprive the citizens of Wilkes County . . . information to Which they are justly entitled.\nIn order to interpret our Legislature\u2019s intent, it is necessary to begin with the plain language of the statute. State v. Hooper, 358 N.C. 122, 125, 591 S.E.2d 514, 516 (2004) (\u201cWhere the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction and the courts must construe the statute using its plain meaning\u201d) (citations omitted). The plain language of the statute exempts from the term \u201cpublic record\u201d contracts that include \u201ccompetitive health care information.\u201d \u201cCompetitive\u201d is derived from the term \u201ccompetition.\u201d \u201cCompetition\u201d means \u201c[t]he effort or action of two or more commercial interests to obtain the same business from third parties.\u201d Blacks Law Dictionary 7th Edition (1999). \u201cHealthcare\u201d means \u201c[t]he prevention, treatment, and management of illness and the preservation of well-being through the services offered by the medical and allied health professions.\u201d The American Heritage College Dictionary 3rd Edition (1997).\nPursuant to the plain language of the statute, I would hold the contract at issue amounts to \u201ccompetitive health care information.\u201d The contract relates to \u201chealthcare\u201d in that the purchase of Dr. Cirillo\u2019s private practice ensured the \u201cprevention, treatment, and management\u201d of gastroenterological services to Wilkes County residents. Likewise, the agreement is \u201ccompetitive\u201d in that public and private hospitals commonly compete in the marketplace to obtain physician practices. The contract remains \u201ccompetitive\u201d even in the absence of specific evidence in the record that hospitals were directly competing for Dr. Cirillo\u2019s particular practice because of the impact the release of the specific terms of the contract would have on future negotiations of WRMC by placing WRMC in an inferior negotiating position for health care services compared to private hospitals. Thus, the contract at issue is within the scope of the exemption stated in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E-97.3.\nThis plain language analysis is further supported by the history of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E-97.3. See Cochran v. North Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 113 N.C. App. 260, 262, 437 S.E.2d 910, 911-12 (1994) (noting it is appropriate to consider \u201ccircumstances surrounding the enactment of the act with an eye towards the evil sought to be remedied when determining the legislative intent\u201d).\nA prior version of this statute read:\nInformation relating to competitive health care activities by or on behalf of hospitals shall be confidential and not a public record under Chapter 132 of the General Statutes; provided that any contract entered into by or on behalf of a public hospital, as defined in G.S. 59-39, shall be a public record unless otherwise exempted by law. \u25a0\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E-97.3 (1994) (emphasis added).\nUnder this prior version of the statute, this Court held,\nThe plain language of this section exempts certain information from the Public Records Act when two requirements are met: (1) The material must relate to competitive health care; and (2) the material must not be a contract executed with a public hospital.\nWilmington Star News, Inc. v. New Hanover Regional Medical Center v. PHP, Inc., 125 N.C. App. 174, 178-79, 480 S.E.2d 53, 55 (1997) (emphasis added). Thus, under the prior version of this statute, if a contract was \u201centered into ... by or on behalf of a public hospital\u201d it would be considered a public record, unless otherwise exempted. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E-97.3 (1994).\nIn a case analyzing the prior version of the statute, this Court held that price lists in a contract between a public hospital and a private HMO were subject to disclosure under the North Carolina Public Records Act. Wilmington Star News, Inc., 125 N.C. App. at 179, 480 S.E.2d at 55. Because the price lists were included in a contract executed with a public hospital, under the plain language of the prior statute, the price lists were not exempt from the Public Records Act. Id.\nAt the time of the Wilmington case, the Legislature had already enacted N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E-99 of the Hospital Licensure Act, entitled \u201cConfidentiality of health care contracts.\u201d Ch. 713, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 345. The version in effect at the time of the Wilmington case stated:\nThe financial terms or other competitive health care information in a contract related to the provision of health care between a hospital and a managed care organization, insurance company, employer, or other payer is confidential and not a public record under Chapter 132 of the General Statutes.\nCh. 713, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 345 (emphasis added). However, this Court was unable to rely on N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E-99 in the Wilmington case because, at the time, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E-99 \u201cspecifically provided that [it shall] not affect any litigation pending prior to ratification on 21 June 1996 and shall expire on 1 June 1997.\u201d Wilmington Star News, Inc., 125 N.C. App. at 178, 480 S.E.2d at 55.\nSubsequently, in 1997, the Legislature amended \u00a7 131E-99 to read:\nThe financial terms and other competitive health care information directly related to the financial terms in a health care services contract between a hospital or a medical school and a managed care organization, insurance company, employer, or other payer is confidential and not a public record under Chapter 132 of the General Statutes.\nAn Act Pertaining to Confidentiality of Healthcare Contracts, ch. 123, 1997 N.C. Sess. Laws 238 (emphasis added). The Legislature also removed the expiration date set forth in the earlier version. See ch. 123, 1997 N.C. Sess. Laws 238. Accordingly, as of May 1997, contracts between public hospitals and private HMOs were exempt from disclosure under this separate provision.\nIn 2001, the Legislature amended \u00a7 131E-97.3 to its current version. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E-97.3 (2005). Prior to the amendment, all contracts of public hospitals constituted public records unless otherwise exempted. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E-97.3 (1994). As stated previously, contracts between public hospitals and HMOs were already exempt under the separate provision of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E-99. However, the Legislature amended the statute to also exempt contracts of public hospitals that contain \u201ccompetitive health care information.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E-97.3.\nAmicus Curiae North Carolina Press Association (\u201cPress Association\u201d) argues that exemptions to the Public Records Act must be narrowly construed and that \u201c \u2018competitive health care information\u2019 as used by the General Assembly reaches only financial information that relates directly to the provision of health care services on a competitive basis to HMOs and similar entities.\u201d While I agree with the Press Association\u2019s contention that generally our courts interpret exemptions to the Public Records Act narrowly, I disagree with the Press Association regarding our Legislature\u2019s intent in using the term \u201ccompetitive health care information.\u201d If our Legislature intended to give information categorized as \u201ccompetitive health care information\u201d this narrow meaning, it would be redundant to enact N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E-97.3 since this particular exemption already existed in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E-99. See State v. Benton, 276 N.C. 641, 658, 174 S.E.2d 793, 804 (1970) (\u201cIt is always presumed that the [Legislature acted with care and deliberation and with full knowledge of prior and existing law\u201d (citations omitted)).\nTo the contrary, the plain language of these statutes indicates that they are not equivalent. North Carolina General Statute \u00a7 131E-99 is a narrow statute that enumerates specific financial terms and other competitive health care information relating to financial terms as exempt from public record status. Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E-99, only contracts between certain enumerated entities are exempt and the information at issue must be financial terms or other competitive health care information directly related to financial terms in a \u201chealth care services contract.\u201d On the other hand, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E-97.3 states no limitations on either the parties to the contract (except that the contract must be by or on behalf of a public hospital or public hospital authority) or the type of contract, and there is no evidence in the language of the statute or our review of the scant legislative history that our Legislature intended to include these constraints. If the Legislature intended to include such constraints it would have done so explicitly as it did when it changed the language of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E-99 from \u201cfinancial terms or other competitive health care information in a contract...\u201d to \u201cfinancial terms and other competitive health care information directly related to the financial terms[.]\" (Emphasis added). Because of the absence of any of the constraints our Legislature included in other statutory exemptions, I would hold that \u201ccompetitive health care information\u201d in-eludes all contracts that \u201crelat[e] to competitive health care activities\u201d by or on behalf of a public hospital or public hospital authority. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 131E-97.3(a). See also Gibbons v. Cole, 132 N.C. App. 777, 780, 513 S.E.2d 834, 836 (1999) (\u201c[Our courts] are without power to create provisions and limitations not contained in the language of the statute itself\u2019 (citation omitted)).\nFor reasons previously mentioned, I would hold that the purchase of a medical practice is a competitive health care activity, and thus, the contract at issue is \u201ccompetitive health care information.\u201d In contrast, other hospital contracts such as a pure construction contract would not amount to a contract regarding competitive health care information because a construction contract does not directly relate to \u201c[t]he prevention, treatment, and management of illness and the preservation of well-being through the services offered by medical and allied health professions.\u201d The American Heritage College Dictionary 3rd Edition (1997). For the foregoing reasons, I would remand to the trial court for entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "CALABRIA, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Willardson, Lipscomb & Miller, LLP, by John S. Willardson, for plaintiff-appellee.", "McElwee Firm, PLLC, by John M. Logsdon, for defendant-appellant.", "The Bussian Law Firm, PLLC, by John A. Bussian, for North Carolina Press Association, amicus curiae.", "Linwood L. Jones for North Carolina Hospital Association, amicus curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CARTER-HUBBARD PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff v. WRMC HOSPITAL OPERATING CORPORATION, Defendant\nNo. COA05-420\n(Filed 1 August 2006)\n1. Public Records\u2014 hospital\u2019s contract to purchase medical practice \u2014 not competitive health care information\nA public hospital\u2019s contract to purchase the practice of the only gastroenterologist in the county was not exempt from the Public Records Act as containing competitive health care information, and the trial court correctly granted summary judgment for plaintiff newspaper. The legislature did not intend to keep confidential dealings such as this, which do not involve trade secret information or competitive price lists. N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 131E-97.3, 131E-99.\n2. Pleadings\u2014 denial of motion to amend \u2014 no abuse of discretion\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff\u2019s motion to amend its complaint to allege a violation of the Open Meetings Law where defendant was not given notice of the purported violation and was not prepared to respond to it. There was likewise no abuse of discretion in the denial of costs and fees.\nJudge Calabria concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nAppeal by defendant from an order entered 24 January 2005 by Judge James M. Webb in Wilkes County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 2 November 2005.\nWillardson, Lipscomb & Miller, LLP, by John S. Willardson, for plaintiff-appellee.\nMcElwee Firm, PLLC, by John M. Logsdon, for defendant-appellant.\nThe Bussian Law Firm, PLLC, by John A. Bussian, for North Carolina Press Association, amicus curiae.\nLinwood L. Jones for North Carolina Hospital Association, amicus curiae." }, "file_name": "0621-01", "first_page_order": 653, "last_page_order": 667 }