{ "id": 8235133, "name": "TOMMY LAMPROS MEGREMIS, Plaintiff-Appellee v. JUNE FAYE WRIGHT MEGREMIS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Megremis v. Megremis", "decision_date": "2006-08-15", "docket_number": "No. COA05-1387", "first_page": "174", "last_page": "183", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "179 N.C. App. 174" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "617 S.E.2d 662", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633744, 12633741, 12633742, 12633743 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/617/0662-04", "/se2d/617/0662-01", "/se2d/617/0662-02", "/se2d/617/0662-03" ] }, { "cite": "537 S.E.2d 495", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 599", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132032, 132322, 132100, 132262, 132248 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0599-03", "/nc/350/0599-01", "/nc/350/0599-04", "/nc/350/0599-05", "/nc/350/0599-02" ] }, { "cite": "512 S.E.2d 468", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 N.C. 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N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-21(e" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/105/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 643", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3795078, 3800872, 3801711, 3798065, 3802421, 3795157 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0643-04", "/nc/359/0643-03", "/nc/359/0643-05", "/nc/359/0643-02", "/nc/359/0643-06", "/nc/359/0643-01" ] }, { "cite": "596 S.E.2d 285", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "290", "parenthetical": "citing Griffin, 348 N.C. at 279-80, 500 S.E.2d at 438-39" }, { "page": "290" }, { "page": "290-91" }, { "page": "290" }, { "page": "290-91" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 N.C. App. 602", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. 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Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(e)" }, { "page": "(e)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 896, "char_count": 22480, "ocr_confidence": 0.754, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5636311648076712e-07, "percentile": 0.6773385243695675 }, "sha256": "2f2f99ef7c2757e41e8e9e9ca84d09aa7aa237ee2b83681803af681e77e965f7", "simhash": "1:828d5626766facf2", "word_count": 3614 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:27:33.869735+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ELMORE and STEELMAN concur." ], "parties": [ "TOMMY LAMPROS MEGREMIS, Plaintiff-Appellee v. JUNE FAYE WRIGHT MEGREMIS, Defendant-Appellant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McGEE, Judge.\nTommy Lampros Megremis (plaintiff) and June Faye Wright Megremis (defendant) (collectively the parties) were married 25 October 1981. At the time of the relevant proceedings in this action, plaintiff was a medical doctor trained in obstetrics and gynecology. Defendant did not complete her undergraduate education, and had not worked outside of the marital home since approximately 1986, after the birth of the parties\u2019 first child. Plaintiff filed a complaint 8 May 2003 seeking child custody, equitable distribution, and injunctive relief. Defendant filed an answer 5 August 2003 and asserted counterclaims for child custody, child support, postseparation support, alimony, and equitable distribution. The- relevant facts and procedural history of the matter are set forth below.\nThe trial court conducted an equitable distribution pretrial conference 22 March 2004. By the resulting pretrial order filed 8 April 2004, the parties were ordered to participate in a mediated settlement conference. The parties complied with the court-ordered settlement conference, but were unable to resolve any pending issues. A trial on the remaining issues was scheduled for 1 June 2004.\nBy motion dated 30 April 2004, defendant requested a continuance of the trial from the 1 June 2004 calendar. Defendant\u2019s motion was based upon her belief that additional appraisals were necessary, as well as her need to evaluate additional discovery. Defendant\u2019s motion was denied by order filed 10 May 2004. In the same order, defendant was awarded postseparation support and temporary child support. Through no action of the parties, the case was calendared for 7 June 2004. Defendant filed a second motion to continue. Defendant\u2019s second motion to continue was based on allegations that plaintiff had failed to comply with discovery. Plaintiff conceded this failure in his response. Defendant\u2019s second motion to continue was denied.\nPrior to the scheduled 7 June 2004 court date, plaintiff\u2019s counsel met with defendant\u2019s attorney of record, Robert P. Hanner, II, (Hanner) and attempted to negotiate a settlement on the remaining issues. Plaintiff\u2019s counsel drafted proposed settlement documents, which defendant refused to execute.\nDefendant filed a third motion to continue on 8 June 2004, on the ground that her treating physician did not believe she was mentally stable enough to proceed with a trial. The trial court did not rule upon defendant\u2019s third motion because it did not reach the case during its 7 June 2004 term of court. The case was then scheduled for trial on 7 September 2004. On that date, the trial court heard two matters: (1) defendant\u2019s fourth motion to continue, dated 16 August 2004, and (2) Hanner\u2019s motion to withdraw as defendant\u2019s counsel. In support of her motion to continue, defendant presented testimony from her psychiatrist, who opined that defendant\u2019s \u201csituational depression and anxiety\u201d made it difficult for defendant to be prepared for trial on that date. In support of his motion to withdraw, Hanner stated he could no longer properly represent defendant because of a \u201cvery difficult time communicating\u201d and \u201ca lack of understanding.\u201d Hanner stated defendant was not able to comprehend his explanations of \u201crelatively basic principles\u201d and opined that defendant had \u201clost confidence in [his] ability to represent her.\u201d By order filed 22 September 2004, the trial court granted Hanner\u2019s motion to withdraw and, \u201cin the interest of justice,\u201d allowed defendant\u2019s motion to continue, and set the trial for all issues for 8 November 2004. The trial court ordered that defendant was not entitled to any additional continuances or postponements.\nThe trial court also ordered the parties and their counsel to. appear in court on 4 October 2004 to enter into a final pretrial equitable distribution order (ED pretrial order). Defendant appeared in court on 4 October 2004 but was unprepared to sign the ED pretrial order. The trial court allowed defendant additional time to review and sign the ED pretrial order. After substantial revisions, defendant executed the ED pretrial order on 8 October 2004.\nAt the commencement of the trial on 8 November 2004, defendant appeared pro se. Attorney Peter K. Thompson (Thompson) observed the first two days of the trial. On the third day, he made a formal appearance as defendant\u2019s counsel and represented defendant throughout the remainder of the trial.\nThe trial court entered an order 3 March 2005 that, inter alia, distributed the parties\u2019 marital and divisible assets, sanctioned defendant for willful obstruction and unreasonable delay of the equitable distribution proceeding, and denied and dismissed with prejudice defendant\u2019s claim for alimony. In the 3 March 2005 order, the trial court concluded the appropriate sanction was for defendant to pay the amount of plaintiff\u2019s attorney\u2019s fees that were caused by defendant\u2019s willful delay and obstruction of the equitable distribution case. The trial court found that amount to be $27,946.99. The trial court concluded the appropriate method of payment was for plaintiff to receive a credit against the distributive award payment that plaintiff was required to pay to defendant. Defendant appeals.\nThe record contains eighteen assignments of error, which collectively challenge twenty-three findings of fact and eleven conclusions of law. Defendant brings forward portions or all of thirteen assignments of error, which we will address as three issues. To the extent they are not argued in defendant\u2019s brief, defendant\u2019s remaining assignments of error are deemed abandoned. N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6). The issues on appeal are whether: (I) the trial court\u2019s imposition of sanctions under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-21(e) violated defendant\u2019s right to due process; (II) the trial court erred in sanctioning defendant under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-21(e); and (III) the trial court erred in denying defendant\u2019s request for alimony. For the reasons below, we affirm the trial court\u2019s order in part and reverse in part.\nI. Due Process\nDefendant first argues the trial court violated her constitutionally protected right to due process by imposing sanctions without adequate notice and opportunity to be heard on the issue. (Brief p 9) N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-21(e) (2005) governs sanctions in equitable distribution proceedings. The statute provides:\n(e) Upon motion of either party or upon the court\u2019s own initiative, the court shall impose an appropriate sanction on a party when the court finds that:\n(1) the party has willfully obstructed or unreasonably delayed, or has attempted to obstruct or unreasonably delay, discovery proceedings, including failure to make discovery pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 37, or has willfully obstructed or unreasonably delayed or attempted to obstruct or unreasonably delay any pending equitable distribution proceeding, and\n(2) the willful obstruction or unreasonable delay of the proceedings is or would be prejudicial to the interests of the opposing party.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-21(e).\n\u201cNotice and opportunity to be heard prior to depriving a person of his property are essential elements of due process of law which is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitutionf.]\u201d McDonald\u2019s Corp. v. Dwyer, 338 N.C. 445, 448, 450 S.E.2d 888, 891 (1994). \u201cWhether a party has adequate notice is a question of law.\u201d Trivette v. Trivette, 162 N.C. App. 55, 58, 590 S.E.2d 298, 302 (2004). \u201cIn order to pass constitutional muster, the person against whom sanctions are to be imposed must be advised in advance of such charges[.]\u201d Griffin v. Griffin, 348 N.C. 278, 280, 500 S.E.2d 437, 439 (1998). \u201cMoreover, a party has a due process right to notice both (1) of the fact that sanctions may be imposed, and (2) the alleged grounds for the imposition of sanctions.\u201d Zaliagiris v. Zaliagiris, 164 N.C. App. 602, 609, 596 S.E.2d 285, 290 (2004) (citing Griffin, 348 N.C. at 279-80, 500 S.E.2d at 438-39), disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 643, 617 S.E.2d 662 (2005).\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-21(e) is silent as to what type of notice is required under the statute and how far in advance notice must be given to a party facing sanctions. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-21(e). Under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 11, a motion requesting sanctions must be served within the period prescribed by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 6(d), not later than five days before the hearing on the Rule 11 motion. Taylor v. Taylor Products, Inc., 105 N.C. App. 620, 629, 414 S.E.2d 568, 575 (1993) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 6(d) (1990), overruled on other grounds by Brooks v. Giesey, 334 N.C. 303, 318, 432 S.E.2d 339, 347 (1993). N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-21(e) includes conduct sanctioned under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 37, as well as a separate, more general, sanctions provision specific to an equitable distribution proceeding. Under Rule 37, a trial court may impose sanctions, including attorney\u2019s fees, upon a party for discovery violations. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 37(b) (2005). Our Court has held that a party sanctioned under Rule 37 had ample notice of sanctions where the moving party\u2019s written discovery motion clearly indicated the party was seeking sanctions under Rule 37. Smitheman v. National Presto Industries, 109 N.C. App. 636, 640, 428 S.E.2d 465, 468, disc. review denied, 334 N.C. 166, 432 S.E.2d 366 (1993). Moreover, at a hearing on the discovery motion, the sanctioned party was given the opportunity to explain to the trial court any justification for the party\u2019s delinquency in responding to discovery. Id. at 641, 428 S.E.2d at 468. See also Adair v. Adair, 62 N.C. App. 493, 496, 303 S.E.2d 190, 192 (applying the five-days\u2019 notice requirement of Rule 6(d) to Rule 37 sanctions, where the trial court entered sanction of default judgment), disc. review denied, 309 N.C. 319, 307 S.E.2d 162 (1993). In the present case, plaintiff filed no written motion seeking sanctions. The trial court did not hold a separate hearing on the issue of sanctions, but rather addressed sanctions as part of the larger equitable distribution trial.\nPlaintiff contends the issue of defendant\u2019s obstruction was addressed in the ED pretrial order, and that the language of the ED pretrial order \u201crecite[d] the operative language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-21(e)[.]\u201d However, a review of the record shows that the language cited by plaintiff appears in the \u00c9D pretrial order as a distributional factor, and not as a grounds for sanctions. As the ED pretrial order does not specify sanctions or cite the sanctions statute, we do not find the ED pretrial order sufficiently notified defendant that she might face sanctions. Therefore we agree with defendant that plaintiff did not make a written request for sanctions.\nWe further agree with defendant that she was not otherwise notified in advance of trial that she might face sanctions. Plaintiff contends defendant received notice of sanctions at the 7 September 2004 hearing on Hanner\u2019s motion to withdraw and defendant\u2019s motion to continue. However, a review of the transcript shows that, while plaintiffs counsel did state at the hearing that defendant\u2019s conduct \u201camounted] to an effort to postpone\u201d the trial further, he did not mention sanctions, the statute, or any of the operative language of the statute. We find this insufficient to constitute notice of the fact that sanctions might be imposed. See Zaliagiris, 164 N.C. App. at 609, 596 S.E.2d at 290 (citing Griffin, 348 N.C. at 279-80, 500 S.E.2d at 438-39).\nDefendant concedes that plaintiff\u2019s counsel orally addressed the issue of sanctions during his opening statement at trial. In his opening statement, plaintiff\u2019s counsel forecast evidence of defendant\u2019s conduct that plaintiff contended was \u201ca willful obstruction and delay of the equitable distribution trial and which should subject [defendant] to sanctions.\u201d Plaintiff asked the trial court \u201cto consider the delay and obstruction of [defendant] . . . under [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7] 50-21(e)[.]\u201d As noted above, there was no separate hearing on the issue of sanctions. The trial court heard evidence on sanctions as part of the larger equitable distribution trial.\nDefendant and Thompson took part in the trial, objecting to plaintiff\u2019s evidence on the issue of sanctions and presenting evidence to rebut plaintiff\u2019s assertion of willful obstruction and unreasonable delay. Plaintiff contends this participation by defendant shows that defendant received ample notice and opportunity to be heard. We disagree.\nIn a proceeding for sanctions under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-21(e), \u201c[t]he fact that [a] party against whom sanctions are imposed took part in the hearing \u2018and did the best [the party] could do without knowing in advance the sanctions which might be imposed does not show a proper notice was given.\u2019 \u201d Zaliagiris, 164 N.C. App. at 609, 596 S.E.2d at 290 (quoting Griffin, 348 N.C. at 280, 500 S.E.2d at 439). Defendant attempts to analogize to the facts of Zaliagiris, in which our Court held that the trial court erred in summarily recasting an assessment of expert witness costs as a sanction, without notice to the sanctioned party that the party would be made subject to such a sanction. Zaliagiris, 164 N.C. App. at 609-10, 596 S.E.2d at 290-91. Although the facts of the present case differ slightly from Zaliagiris, we find that, like the sanctioned party in Zaliagiris, defendant in the present case did not have notice in advance of the trial that sanctions might be imposed against her. See id. at 609, 596 S.E.2d at 290. Consequently, we conclude the trial court violated defendant\u2019s due process right to proper notice. We reverse the award of sanctions. See id. at 609-10, 596 S.E.2d at 290-91.\nII. Sanctions\nBecause we hold that defendant did not have proper notice of sanctions, we need not address whether, had defendant been given proper notice, it was permissible under these facts to impose sanctions under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-21(e). See Zaliagiris, 164 N.C. App. at 609 n.5, 596 S.E.2d at 291 n.5.\nIII. Alimony\nDefendant argues the trial court committed reversible error in denying defendant\u2019s claim for alimony. Specifically, defendant argues the trial court erred in (1) failing to consider plaintiff\u2019s earning capacity and (2) determining plaintiff\u2019s reasonable needs and expenses. For the reasons below, we affirm the portion of the trial court\u2019s order denying defendant\u2019s claim for alimony.\n\u201cThe decision to award alimony is a matter within the trial [court\u2019s] sound discretion and is not reviewable on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion.\u201d Alvarez v. Alvarez, 134 N.C. App. 321, 323, 517 S.E.2d 420, 422 (1999). Under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.3A(a) (2005), a trial court\nshall award alimony to the dependent spouse upon a finding that one spouse is a dependent spouse, that the other spouse is a supporting spouse, and that an award of alimony is equitable after considering all relevant factors, including those set out in subsection (b) of this section.\nSubsection (b) enumerates sixteen factors, including the relative earnings and earning capacities of the parties and the relative needs of the parties. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.3A(b)(2), (13) (2005).\nDefendant argues the trial court failed to consider plaintiff\u2019s earning capacity as required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-16.3A(b)(2) in making its alimony determination. Ordinarily, alimony is determined by a party\u2019s actual income at the time of the alimony order. Kowalick v. Kowalick, 129 N.C. App. 781, 787, 501 S.E.2d 671, 675 (1998) (citing Wachacha v. Wachacha, 38 N.C. App. 504, 507-08, 248 S.E.2d 375, 377-78 (1978)). It is well.established that a trial court may consider a party\u2019s earning capacity only if the trial court finds the party acted in bad faith. See, e.g., Kowalick, 129 N.C. App. at 787, 501 S.E.2d at 675 (citing Wachacha, 38 N.C. App. at 507-08, 248 S.E.2d at 377-78). Defendant acknowledges this well-established rule, but asks our Court to revisit our interpretation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-16.3A(b)(2) requiring that bad faith be demonstrated before considering earning capacity. Defendant argues our case law conflicts with the public policy of the State and the language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-16.3A. We are not persuaded by defendant\u2019s argument and decline to revisit the well-established earning capacity rule. We reiterate our Supreme Court\u2019s holding in Conrad v. Conrad, 252 N.C. 412, 418, 113 S.E.2d 912, 916 (1960) that, \u201c[t]o base an [alimony] award on capacity to earn rather than actual earnings, there should be a finding based on evidence that [a party] was failing to exercise [the] capacity to earn because of a disregard of [the] marital obligation to provide reasonable support\u201d for the other spouse.\nIn the present case, the trial court found that \u201c[t]here is no evidence that [plaintiff] [was] intentionally depressing his income or in any way acting in bad faith.\u201d In support of this ultimate finding of no bad faith, the trial court found that plaintiff\u2019s reduction in income was attributable to the fact that plaintiff\u2019s patients were not happy with his services and were choosing other doctors. Defendant concedes this finding is supported by the evidence presented. However, defendant argues the trial court erred by \u201cignoring\u201d plaintiff\u2019s testimony that his bedside manner was affected by the stress of the divorce proceedings, a fact defendant contends weighs against the trial court\u2019s ultimate finding of no bad faith. We are not persuaded by defendant\u2019s argument. It is well settled that \u201cit is within a trial court\u2019s discretion to determine the weight and credibility that should be given to all evidence that is presented during trial.\u201d Phelps v. Phelps, 337 N.C. 344, 357, 446 S.E.2d 17, 25 (1994). \u201c \u2018The trial court must itself determine what pertinent facts are actually established by the evidence before it, and it is not for an appellate court to determine de novo the weight and credibility to be given to evidence disclosed by the record on appeal.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Coble v. Coble, 300 N.C. 708, 712-13, 268 S.E.2d 185, 189 (1980)). Accordingly, we uphold the trial court\u2019s determination of no bad faith on the part of plaintiff, based upon the evidence presented at trial.\nDefendant also argues the trial court erred in finding plaintiffs reasonable needs and expenses. In determining entitlement to alimony, the trial court must consider the relative needs of the parties. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-16.3A(a),(b)(13). \u201cThe determination of what constitutes the reasonable needs and expenses of a party in an alimony action is within the discretion of the trial [court].\u201d Whedon v. Whedon, 58 N.C. App. 524, 529, 294 S.E.2d 29, 32, disc. review denied, 306 N.C. 752, 295 S.E.2d 764 (1982). In the present case, the trial court found plaintiff\u2019s reasonable needs and expenses amounted to $7,108.94 per month. This is the same amount plaintiff reported as his anticipated expenses in an amended financial affidavit submitted to the trial court. Given this evidence before the trial court, we perceive no abuse of the trial court\u2019s discretion in determining plaintiff\u2019s reasonable needs and expenses.\nDefendant argues an abuse of discretion is evident because of an inconsistency between the trial court\u2019s order of postseparation support and the alimony order. Defendant\u2019s argument on this issue is without merit. Our Court has held that a trial court\u2019s rulings regarding postseparation support are neither conclusive nor binding in the alimony context. See Wells v. Wells, 132 N.C. App. 401, 413, 512 S.E.2d 468, 475 (noting that \u201cthe General Assembly unmistakably signaled its intent that factual determinations by the trial court at [postsepa-ration support] hearings would not conclusively resolve those issues nor bind the ultimate trier of fact thereon\u201d), disc. review denied, 350 N.C. 599, 537 S.E.2d 495-96 (1999).\nAffirmed in part; reversed in part.\nJudges ELMORE and STEELMAN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "McGEE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "James, McElroy & Diehl, P.A., by G. Russell Komegay, III and Preston O. Odom, III, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Horack, Talley, Pharr & Lowndes, PA, by Kary C. Watson, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "TOMMY LAMPROS MEGREMIS, Plaintiff-Appellee v. JUNE FAYE WRIGHT MEGREMIS, Defendant-Appellant\nNo. COA05-1387\n(Filed 15 August 2006)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 failure to argue\nThe assignments of error that defendant wife failed to argue in her brief are deemed abandoned under N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6).\n2. Divorce\u2014 equitable distribution \u2014 sanctions\u2014notice\nThe trial court violated defendant wife\u2019s constitutionally protected right to due process in an equitable distribution case by imposing sanctions under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-21(e) without adequate notice and opportunity to be heard on the issue, and the award of sanctions is reversed, because: (1) plaintiff did not make a written request for sanctions when the equitable distribution pretrial order cited by plaintiff husband did not specify sanctions or cite the sanctions statute; (2) defendant was not otherwise notified in advance of trial that she might face sanctions; (3) while plaintiff\u2019s counsel did state at the 7 September 2004 hearing that defendant\u2019s conduct amounted to an effort to postpone the trial further, he did not mention sanctions, the statute, or any of the operative language of the statute; and (4) in a proceeding for sanctions under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-21(e), the fact that a party against whom sanctions are imposed took part in the hearing and did the best the party could do without knowing in advance the sanctions which might be imposed does not show proper notice was given.\n3. Divorce\u2014 alimony \u2014 earning capacity rule\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant wife\u2019s claim for alimony, because: (1) defendant acknowledges the well-established rule that a trial court may consider a party\u2019s earning capacity only if the court finds the party acted in bad faith, and the Court of Appeals declines to revisit the well-established earning capacity rule; (2) there was no evidence that plaintiff was intentionally depressing his income or in any way acting in bad faith; (3) the trial court properly based plaintiff\u2019s reasonable needs and expenses on the amended financial affidavit submitted to the trial court; and (4) the trial court\u2019s rulings regarding postseparation support are neither conclusive nor binding in the alimony context.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment and order entered 3 March 2005 by Judge Kevin M. Bridges in District Court, Union County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 June 2006.\nJames, McElroy & Diehl, P.A., by G. Russell Komegay, III and Preston O. Odom, III, for plaintiff-appellee.\nHorack, Talley, Pharr & Lowndes, PA, by Kary C. Watson, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0174-01", "first_page_order": 206, "last_page_order": 215 }