{ "id": 8235220, "name": "JOSEPH DUGANIER, Employee, Plaintiff v. CAROLINA MOUNTAIN BAKERY, Employer, TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Duganier v. Carolina Mountain Bakery", "decision_date": "2006-08-15", "docket_number": "No. COA05-1467", "first_page": "184", "last_page": "191", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "179 N.C. App. 184" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-91", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "186 S.E. 252", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1936, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "257", "parenthetical": "stating the long-held recognition of the Commission's authority to determine the rights and liabilities of employees and employers" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "210 N.C. 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626165 ], "year": 1936, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319-20", "parenthetical": "stating the long-held recognition of the Commission's authority to determine the rights and liabilities of employees and employers" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/210/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-93", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 S.E.2d 659", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "665" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "264 N.C. 667", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574883 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "674" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/264/0667-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 S.E.2d 397", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "401" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 N.C. App. 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11912671 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/123/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "597 S.E.2d 695", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "699", "parenthetical": "quoting Seagraves v. Austin Co. of Greensboro, 123 N.C. App. 228, 233, 472 S.E.2d 397, 401 (1996)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2986640 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493", "parenthetical": "quoting Seagraves v. Austin Co. of Greensboro, 123 N.C. App. 228, 233, 472 S.E.2d 397, 401 (1996)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "548 S.E.2d 513", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 659", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135857 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "664" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0659-01" ] }, { "cite": "303 S.E.2d 83", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 753", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574961, 8574981 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0753-01", "/nc/306/0753-02" ] }, { "cite": "293 S.E.2d 140", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142-43", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "143" }, { "page": "143" }, { "page": "143" }, { "page": "143" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568216 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277-78", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "277" }, { "page": "278" }, { "page": "278" }, { "page": "278" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 S.E.2d 835", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "837-38", "parenthetical": "emphasis omitted" }, { "page": "837" }, { "page": "837" }, { "page": "837" }, { "page": "837-38" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 N.C. App. 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523223 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238", "parenthetical": "emphasis omitted" }, { "page": "238" }, { "page": "238" }, { "page": "238" }, { "page": "238" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/116/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 S.E.2d 888", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "896" }, { "page": "896" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 N.C. App. 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519302 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "30" }, { "page": "30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/79/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "581 S.E.2d 778", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "783" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 N.C. App. 341", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9187488 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/158/0341-01" ] }, { "cite": "547 S.E.2d 17", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135848, 135570, 135571, 135636 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0381-03", "/nc/353/0381-02", "/nc/353/0381-04", "/nc/353/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 S.E.2d 760", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "762" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 N.C. App. 140", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548488 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/47/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 S.E.2d 577", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "580", "parenthetical": "quoting Porterfield v. RPC Corp., 47 N.C. App. 140, 144, 266 S.E.2d 760, 762 (1980)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 N.C. App. 58", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12121612 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61-62", "parenthetical": "quoting Porterfield v. RPC Corp., 47 N.C. App. 140, 144, 266 S.E.2d 760, 762 (1980)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/140/0058-01" ] }, { "cite": "471 S.E.2d 68", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 305", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 798896, 798810, 798767, 798951 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0305-03", "/nc/343/0305-02", "/nc/343/0305-01", "/nc/343/0305-04" ] }, { "cite": "465 S.E.2d 343", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "345" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 N.C. App. 387", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11917453 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/121/0387-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-36-105", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "444 S.E.2d 628", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "629" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 N.C. App. 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12130104 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "386" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/115/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-99", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 722, "char_count": 18123, "ocr_confidence": 0.761, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.60167783687625e-08, "percentile": 0.28867648268296725 }, "sha256": "3bfcf395869bb3c295f4ba3cd92c1642ed6f88dc4da5e75b5d579844989c2658", "simhash": "1:8764f52e042f3010", "word_count": 2865 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:27:33.869735+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ELMORE and STEELMAN concur." ], "parties": [ "JOSEPH DUGANIER, Employee, Plaintiff v. CAROLINA MOUNTAIN BAKERY, Employer, TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McGEE, Judge.\nDefendant-appellant Travelers Insurance Company (Travelers) issued a workers\u2019 compensation insurance policy to defendant-employer Carolina Mountain Bakery (CMB) covering CMB from 5 June 2001 through 5 June 2002 (CMB\u2019s policy). Joseph Duganier (plaintiff) began working at CMB in August 2001 and sustained a back injury at work on 17 December 2001.\nPlaintiff filed a Form 18 with the North Carolina Industrial Commission (the Commission) on 25 April 2002, alleging he \u201c[f]elt something pop in his back\u201d while working at CMB on 17 December 2001. Plaintiff filed a Form 33 on 25 April 2002 requesting a hearing. Travelers filed a Form 61 on 14 May 2002, denying coverage for plaintiff\u2019s injuries on the ground that Travelers cancelled CMB\u2019s policy effective 5 December 2001. The parties signed a pretrial agreement on 16 October 2003, stipulating that plaintiff suffered a compensable injury to his back on 17 December 2001.\nA deputy commissioner conducted a hearing on the matter on 16 October 2003. Evidence introduced at the hearing tended to show that Travelers mailed a \u201cNotice of Cancellation for Non-payment of Premium\u201d (notice of cancellation) on 15 November 2001 by certified mail to CMB\u2019s designated mailing address. Travelers did not mail the notice of cancellation return receipt requested. The effective date of cancellation was listed as 5 December 2001 on the notice of cancellation. The notice of cancellation stated that Travelers would \u201creinstate this coverage if [Travelers] receive [d] [CMB\u2019s] payment on or before the effective date of cancellation.\u201d CMB did not make the premium payment by 5 December 2001.\nAt the time CMB\u2019s policy became effective on 5 June 2001, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-99(a) set forth the requirements for cancellation for non-payment of premium. This statute provided, in pertinent part: \u201cThe carrier may cancel the policy for nonpayment of premium on 10 days\u2019 written notice to the insured[.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-99(a) (1999). In Wilson v. Claude J. Welch Builders, 115 N.C. App. 384, 386, 444 S.E.2d 628, 629 (1994), our Court interpreted N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-99(a), stating that the statute did not require \u201cthat the notice of intent to cancel due to nonpayment of premium be sent by registered or certified mail.\u201d\nThe N.C. General Assembly amended the workers\u2019 compensation insurance policy cancellation statutes in 2001 by removing the cancellation provisions from N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-99(a) and adding N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-36-105. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-36-105(b) provides the following notice requirements for cancellation of a workers\u2019 compensation insurance policy:\nAny cancellation permitted by subsection (a) of this section is not effective unless written notice of cancellation has been given by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the insured not less than 15 days before the proposed effective date of cancellation. The notice shall be given by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the insured and any other person designated in the policy to receive notice of cancellation at their addresses shown in the policy or, if not indicated in the policy, at their last known addresses. The notice shall state the precise reason for cancellation. Whenever notice of intention to cancel is required to be given by registered or certified mail, no cancellation by the insurer shall be effective unless and until such method is employed and completed.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-36-105(b) (2001). Section three of the amending Act which created N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-36-105(b) provides: \u201cThis act becomes effective October 1, 2001, and applies to policies issued, renewed or subject to renewal, or amended on or after that date.\u201d 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 241, \u00a7 3.\nTravelers\u2019 compliance officer, Larry Rodriguez (Mr. Rodriguez), testified at the hearing before the deputy commissioner that he was responsible for Travelers\u2019 compliance with state laws related to cancellation and nonrenewal notices for its workers\u2019 compensation insurance policies. Mr. Rodriguez testified that CMB\u2019s policy was not \u201csubject to renewal\u201d at the time of the \u201ccancellation\u201d of CMB\u2019s policy. He stated that \u201c[Travelers] would consider a policy subject to renewal when [Travelers] start[s] [its] renewal underwriting process, which is approximately 90 days prior to the expiration date of the policy.\u201d The expiration date of CMB\u2019s policy was 5 June 2002.\nIn an opinion and award filed 31 March 2004, the deputy commissioner concluded as follows: (1) plaintiff sustained a compensable injury to his back on 17 December 2001; (2) CMB\u2019s policy was not \u201csubject to renewal\u201d on or after 1 October 2001; (3) the cancellation provisions of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-99(a) applied to CMB\u2019s policy at the time of Travelers\u2019 notice of cancellation; (4) therefore, Travelers\u2019 notice of cancellation and CMB\u2019s failure to pay its premium by 5 December 2001 effectively cancelled CMB\u2019s coverage; and (5) CMB was uninsured at the time of plaintiff\u2019s injury. The deputy commissioner ordered CMB to pay plaintiff temporary total disability and all medical expenses incurred by plaintiff as a result of the injury. Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal with the Commission on 13 April 2004, and CMB filed a notice of appeal with the Commission on 14 April 2004. Plaintiff notified the Commission on 7 October 2004 that he had settled his claim with CMB but would continue his claim against Travelers on the issue of coverage.\nThe Commission filed an opinion and award on 4 August 2005, affirming the deputy commissioner\u2019s decision that plaintiff\u2019s injury was compensable but reversing the deputy commissioner\u2019s decision that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-99(a) applied to CMB\u2019s policy. Instead, the Commission concluded that CMB\u2019s policy was \u201csubject to renewal\u201d on or after 1 October 2001 and therefore N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-36-105(b) was the applicable statute governing the cancellation of CMB\u2019s policy. The Commission concluded that Travelers\u2019 cancellation was ineffective because the notice of cancellation had not been sent by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. The Commission ordered Travelers to pay plaintiffs temporary total disability at a rate of $253.35 per week from 17 December 2001 through 16 October 2003, the date of the hearing before the deputy commissioner. Additionally, Travelers was ordered to pay plaintiff\u2019s medical expenses.\nTravelers appeals.\nTravelers appears to argue that because CMB\u2019s policy was not \u201csubject to renewal\u201d prior to Travelers\u2019 attempted cancellation date of 5 December 2001, the provisions of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-36-105(b) did not apply, and its cancellation of CMB\u2019s policy was effective pursuant to the provisions of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-99(a). However, the issue in the present case is not whether CMB\u2019s policy was \u201csubject to renewal\u201d at the time of Travelers\u2019 attempted cancellation on 5 December 2001. Rather, the issue in the present case is whether CMB\u2019s policy was \u201csubject to renewal\u201d on or after 1 October 2001 such that the provisions of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-36-105(b) applied to Travelers\u2019 notice of cancellation of CMB\u2019s policy. If CMB\u2019s policy was \u201csubject to renewal\u201d on or after 1 October 2001, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-36-105(b) governed the cancellation of CMB\u2019s policy and required Travelers to send its notice of cancellation by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, which Travelers concedes it did not do.\nOur Court limits its review of an opinion and award of the Commission to two inquiries: (1) whether there is competent evidence in the record to support the Commission\u2019s findings of fact, and (2) whether the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law are justified by the findings of fact. Counts v. Black & Decker Corp., 121 N.C. App. 387, 389, 465 S.E.2d 343, 345, disc. review denied, 343 N.C. 305, 471 S.E.2d 68 (1996). \u201c[S]o long as there is some \u2018evidence of substance which directly or by reasonable inference tends to support the findings, this Court is bound by such evidence, even though there is evidence that would have supported a finding to the contrary.\u2019 \u201d Shah v. Howard Johnson, 140 N.C. App. 58, 61-62, 535 S.E.2d 577, 580 (2000) (quoting Porterfield v. RPC Corp., 47 N.C. App. 140, 144, 266 S.E.2d 760, 762 (1980)), disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 381, 547 S.E.2d 17 (2001). We review the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law de novo. Whitfield v. Laboratory Corp. of Am., 158 N.C. App. 341, 348, 581 S.E.2d 778, 783 (2003).\nTravelers assigns error to several findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Commission related to the term \u201csubject to renewal.\u201d Although the Commission regarded them as findings of fact, its findings challenged by Travelers \u201c[\u00e1re] in reality . . . conclusion^] of law . . . rather than . . . determination[s] of facts from the appellant\u2019s evidence].]\u201d See State ex rel. Utilities Comm. v. Mackie, 79 N.C. App. 19, 30, 338 S.E.2d 888, 896 (1986). Therefore, we review the Commission\u2019s statements regarding the term \u201csubject to renewal\u201d and the applicability of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-36-105(b) as conclusions of law. See Mackie, 79 N.C. App. at 30, 338 S.E.2d at 896. Essentially, Travelers contends that the following conclusions of the Commission are not \u201csupported by prior legislative or judicial authority and [are] contrary to the laws of statutory construction\u201d: (1) CMB\u2019s policy was \u201csubject to renewal\u201d on or after 1 October 2001; (2) the cancellation provisions of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-36-105(b) applied at the time of Travelers\u2019 notice of cancellation of CMB\u2019s policy; (3) Travelers\u2019 notice of cancellation was ineffective because the notice of cancellation was not sent by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested; and (4) plaintiff is entitled to have Travelers pay him temporary total disability compensation and medical expenses incurred as a result of the compensable injury.\nThe term \u201csubject to renewal\u201d is not defined in the statute and its meaning has not been interpreted by our Courts. When our Courts interpret a statutory provision of our Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, we follow well-established rules of statutory construction:\n\u201cFirst, the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act should be liberally construed, whenever appropriate, so that benefits will not be denied upon mere technicalities or strained and narrow interpretations of its provisions. Second, such liberality should not, however, extend beyond the clearly expressed language of those provisions, and our courts may not enlarge the ordinary meaning of the terms used by the legislature or engage in any method of \u2018judicial legislation.\u2019. . . Third, it is not reasonable to assume that the legislature would leave an important matter regarding the administration of the Act open to inference or speculation; consequently, the judiciary should avoid \u2018ingrafting upon a law something that has been omitted, which [it] believes ought to have been embraced.\u2019 Fourth, in all cases of doubt, the intent of the legislature regarding the operation or application of a particular provision is to be discerned from a consideration of the Act as a whole \u2014 its language, purposes and spirit. Fifth, and finally, the Industrial Commission\u2019s legal interpretation of a particular provision is persuasive, although not binding, and should be accorded some weight on appeal and not idly cast aside, since that administrative body hears and decides all questions arising under the Act in the first instance.\u201d\nAllen v. Piedmont Transport Services, 116 N.C. App. 234, 238, 447 S.E.2d 835, 837-38 (1994) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Deese v. Lawn and Tree Expert Co., 306 N.C. 275, 277-78, 293 S.E.2d 140, 142-43, reh\u2019g denied, 306 N.C. 753, 303 S.E.2d 83 (1982) (citations omitted)).\nIn the present case, we apply the rules of statutory construction to the term \u201csubject to renewal.\u201d Applying these rules of statutory construction, we conclude that CMB\u2019s policy was \u201csubject to renewal\u201d after 1 October 2001. Therefore, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-36-105(b) controlled the cancellation of CMB\u2019s policy and Travelers\u2019 notice of cancellation was ineffective. First, as directed by Allen, we construe the \u201csubject to renewal\u201d provision of 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 241, \u00a7 3 liberally in order that benefits will not be denied based upon \u201c \u2018mere technicalities or strained and narrow interpretations[.]\u2019 \u201d See Allen, 116 N.C. App. at 238, 447 S.E.2d at 837 (quoting Deese, 306 N.C. at 277, 293 S.E.2d at 143).\nSecond, we look to the plain, ordinary meaning of the term \u201csubject to renewal.\u201d See Id. \u201cIf the language of a statute is clear, the court must implement the statute according to the plain meaning of its terms so long as it is reasonable to do so.\u201d Lenox, Inc. v. Tolson, 353 N.C. 659, 664, 548 S.E.2d 513, 517 (2001). \u201cSubject to\u201d is defined as \u201cdependent or conditional upon: the proposed merger is subject to the approval of the shareholders.\u201d The New Oxford American Dictionary 1685 (2d ed. 2005). \u201cRenewal\u201d is defined as \u201c[t]he recreation of a legal relationship or the replacement of an old contract with a new contract, as opposed to the mere extension of a previous relationship or contract.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1322 (8th ed. 2004). Therefore, the plain meaning of \u201csubject to renewal\u201d as applied to this case denotes a conditional situation in which CMB\u2019s policy was liable to be replaced with a new policy from Travelers in the future. Mr. Rodriguez, Travelers\u2019 compliance officer, effectively admitted that CMB\u2019s policy was \u201csubject to renewal\u201d after 1 October 2001, when he testified it was \u201csubject to renewal\u201d ninety days prior to the expiration date in June 2002, which was approximately- 7 March 2002.\nThird, it is unreasonable for our Court to assume the General Assembly left the applicability of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-36-105(b) \u201c \u2018open to inference or speculation.\u2019 \u201d See Allen, 116 N.C. App. at 238, 447 S.E.2d at 837 (quoting Deese, 306 N.C. at 278, 293 S.E.2d at 143). Considering the ordinary meaning of \u201csubject to renewal,\u201d the General Assembly did not leave the statute\u2019s applicability subject to speculation, stating: \u201cThis act becomes effective October 1, 2001, and applies to policies issued, renewed or subject to renewal, or amended on or after that date.\u201d 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 241, \u00a7 3. By specifically including each situation in which a policy was included within the new statute as of 1 October 2001, the General Assembly reinforced its intention for N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-36-105(b) to apply broadly to notices of cancellation for nonpayment of premium.\nFourth, we consider the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act \u201c \u2018as a whole \u2014 its language, purposes and spirit[]\u2019 \u201d \u2014 to determine the intent of the General Assembly regarding the applicability of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-36-105(b), particularly the meaning of \u201csubject to renewal.\u201d See Allen, 116 N.C. App. at 238, 447 S.E.2d at 837 (quoting Deese, 306 N.C. at 278, 293 S.E.2d at 143). \u201c[T]he underlying purpose of the North Carolina Workers\u2019 Compensation Act is to \u2018provide compensation to workers whose earning capacity is diminished or destroyed by injury arising from their employment[.]\u2019 \u201d McRae v. Toastmaster, Inc., 358 N.C. 488, 493, 597 S.E.2d 695, 699 (2004) (quoting Seagraves v. Austin Co. of Greensboro, 123 N.C. App. 228, 233, 472 S.E.2d 397, 401 (1996)). It is the \u201cmanifest legislative intent that the employer\u2019s liability should be insured at all times[.]\u201d Moore v. Electric Co., 264 N.C. 667, 674, 142 S.E.2d 659, 665 (1965); see generally N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-93 (2005).\nFinally, although the Commission\u2019s interpretation regarding the applicability of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-36-105(b) to CMB\u2019s policy is not binding, its \u201c \u2018legal interpretation of a particular provision is persuasive . . . and should be accorded some weight on appeal . . . since [the Commission] hears and decides all questions arising under the [Workers\u2019 Compensation] Act in the first instance.\u2019 \u201d See Allen, 116 N.C. App. at 238, 447 S.E.2d at 837-38 (quoting Deese, 306 N.C. at 278, 293 S.E.2d at 143); see also Hanks v. Utilities Co., 210 N.C. 312, 319-20, 186 S.E. 252, 257 (1936) (stating the long-held recognition of the Commission\u2019s authority to determine the rights and liabilities of employees and employers); see generally N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-91 (2005).\nThe Commission concluded that the cancellation provisions of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-36-105(b) controlled on 15 November 2001, the date Travelers sent its notice of cancellation of CMB\u2019s policy. Furthermore, the Commission determined that the notice was ineffective as a matter of law because it did not comply with the statutory requirement that notice of cancellation for nonpayment of premium be sent by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. Construing the term \u201csubject to renewal\u201d in compliance with our rules of statutory construction, we agree with the Commission. CMB\u2019s policy was \u201csubject to renewal\u201d after 1 October 2001, the date when N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-36-105(b) became effective. Travelers\u2019 notice of cancellation for nonpayment of premium was not mailed return receipt requested as required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-36-105(b) and therefore was ineffective.\nAffirmed.\nJudges ELMORE and STEELMAN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "McGEE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Neill S. Fuleihan for plaintiff-appellee.", "Russell & King, by Sandra M. King, for defendant-appellee Carolina Mountain Bakery.", "Northup & McConnell, PLLC, by Steven W. Sizemore, for defendant-appellant Travelers Insurance Company." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JOSEPH DUGANIER, Employee, Plaintiff v. CAROLINA MOUNTAIN BAKERY, Employer, TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants\nNo. COA05-1467\n(Filed 15 August 2006)\nWorkers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 cancellation of coverage \u2014 statutory requirements \u2014 return receipt requested\nThe Industrial Commission correctly determined that an insurer\u2019s notice cancelling workers\u2019 compensation coverage did not comply with statutory requirements and was not effective because it was not mailed return receipt requested. The policy was \u201csubject to renewal,\u201d contrary to defendant\u2019s contention, and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-36-105(b) controlled the cancellation of the policy.\nAppeal by defendant-appellant Travelers Insurance Company from opinion and award entered 4 August 2005 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 June 2006.\nNeill S. Fuleihan for plaintiff-appellee.\nRussell & King, by Sandra M. King, for defendant-appellee Carolina Mountain Bakery.\nNorthup & McConnell, PLLC, by Steven W. Sizemore, for defendant-appellant Travelers Insurance Company." }, "file_name": "0184-01", "first_page_order": 216, "last_page_order": 223 }