{ "id": 8235940, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TIMOTHY STONE", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Stone", "decision_date": "2006-09-05", "docket_number": "No. COA05-1418", "first_page": "297", "last_page": "311", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "179 N.C. App. 297" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "624 S.E.2d 369", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634832, 12634830, 12634831 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/624/0369-03", "/se2d/624/0369-01", "/se2d/624/0369-02" ] }, { "cite": "612 S.E.2d 371", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632818 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "375" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/612/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "612 S.E.2d 420", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632827 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/612/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "631 S.E.2d 203", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636088 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/631/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "441 U.S. 520", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1780223 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "559" }, { "page": "481" }, { "page": "559" }, { "page": "481" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/441/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 U.S. 248", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6221328 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "251" }, { "page": "302" }, { "page": "251" }, { "page": "302" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/500/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 S.E.2d 809", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5308673, 5304354, 5305838, 5307792, 5307378 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0366-01", "/nc/326/0366-02", "/nc/326/0366-05", "/nc/326/0366-04", "/nc/326/0366-03" ] }, { "cite": "150 S.E.2d 481", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "483" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "268 N.C. 320", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561746 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/268/0320-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 U.S. 218", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6172008 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "219" }, { "page": "858" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/412/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 S.E.2d 217", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222", "parenthetical": "citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 858 (1973) and State v. Belk, 268 N.C. 320, 322, 150 S.E.2d 481, 483 (1966)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 N.C. App. 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522580 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397", "parenthetical": "citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 858 (1973) and State v. Belk, 268 N.C. 320, 322, 150 S.E.2d 481, 483 (1966)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/96/0389-01" ] }, { "cite": "527 S.E.2d 921", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "923" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 627", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155623 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "630" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0627-01" ] }, { "cite": "515 S.E.2d 488", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 12, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490" }, { "page": "490" }, { "page": "490-91" }, { "page": "491" }, { "page": "493" }, { "page": "493" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 N.C. App. 292", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11219037 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/133/0292-01" ] }, { "cite": "519 U.S. 408", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11595747 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/519/0408-01" ] }, { "cite": "533 S.E.2d 280", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "283", "parenthetical": "citing Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1997)" }, { "page": "283" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 N.C. App. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9496982 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440-41", "parenthetical": "citing Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1997)" }, { "page": "440-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/139/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 75", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3787393, 3794473, 3786572, 3788150, 3787286, 3795577, 3798174, 3794495 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0075-06", "/nc/360/0075-01", "/nc/360/0075-08", "/nc/360/0075-02", "/nc/360/0075-03", "/nc/360/0075-05", "/nc/360/0075-04", "/nc/360/0075-07" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "30" }, { "page": "911" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 N.C. App. 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9005009 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "226" }, { "page": "226" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/170/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 U.S. 47", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6179718 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "51" }, { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/443/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 67", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "69-70" }, { "page": "70" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2549311 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441" }, { "page": "441" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "560 S.E.2d 358", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 220", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 220137, 220044, 219890, 219958, 219998 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0220-02", "/nc/355/0220-05", "/nc/355/0220-04", "/nc/355/0220-03", "/nc/355/0220-01" ] }, { "cite": "556 S.E.2d 602", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "606" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 N.C. App. 619", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9380836 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "623" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/147/0619-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 N.C. App. 299", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9005169 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "304" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/170/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 N.C. App. 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8377534 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/178/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-63", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(d)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-141", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. 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App.", "case_ids": [ 11916594 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/121/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "601 S.E.2d 893", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "stating that \"[findings of fact that are mislabeled conclusions of law are, nonetheless, factual findings.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "166 N.C. App. 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8411455 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "stating that \"[findings of fact that are mislabeled conclusions of law are, nonetheless, factual findings.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/166/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "1994 WL 539300", "category": "reporters:specialty_west", "reporter": "WL", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that a trooper's search of defendant's underwear to remove crack cocaine was reasonable because defendant was not required to remove clothing or submit to visual body cavity search, and because public view was blocked by defendant's clothes, troopers and patrol cars" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "180 F.3d 1237", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11670831 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1243", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]o ascertain what conduct is within the 'bounds of reasonableness,' we must consider what the parties knew to be the object (or objects) of the search\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/180/1237-01" ] }, { "cite": "134 L. Ed. 2d 779", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "517 U.S. 1189", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11816256, 11816772, 11816364, 11817228, 11816942, 11816464, 11817040, 11817298, 11817141, 11817397, 11816695, 11816861 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/517/1189-01", "/us/517/1189-05", "/us/517/1189-02", "/us/517/1189-10", "/us/517/1189-07", "/us/517/1189-03", "/us/517/1189-08", "/us/517/1189-11", "/us/517/1189-09", "/us/517/1189-12", "/us/517/1189-04", "/us/517/1189-06" ] }, { "cite": "464 S.E.2d 45", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 796061 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 S.E.2d 680", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687", "parenthetical": "Walker; J., concurring in part and dissenting in part" }, { "page": "687" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "118 N.C. App. 106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11916879 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117", "parenthetical": "Walker; J., concurring in part and dissenting in part" }, { "page": "117" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/118/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "902 F.2d 937", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10537203 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "941" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/902/0937-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 N.C. App. 122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8300988 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "124", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Jones, 96 N.C. App. 389, 397, 386 S.E.2d 217, 222 (1989)" }, { "page": "125" }, { "page": "125" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/177/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "39 S.E. 960", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1901, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "960" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "129 N.C. 182", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 1901, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "183" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "237 F.3d 356", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11160781 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/237/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "613 So. 2d 554", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7487911 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/613/0554-01" ] }, { "cite": "956 F.2d 295", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10519786, 5684493 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297-98", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "298" }, { "page": "296" }, { "page": "298", "parenthetical": "D.C. Cir. 1992" }, { "page": "296" }, { "page": "298" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/956/0295-01", "/us-app-dc/294/0009-01" ] }, { "cite": "667 F.2d 16", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 463854 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "19" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/667/0016-01" ] }, { "cite": "31 Va. App. 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Va. App.", "case_ids": [ 278714 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455" }, { "page": "159" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/va-app/31/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 223", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "226" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 180", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560030 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "184" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0180-01" ] }, { "cite": "441 U.S. 520", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1780223 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "559" }, { "page": "481" }, { "page": "559" }, { "page": "481" }, { "page": "559" }, { "page": "481" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/441/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 U.S. 248", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6221328 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "251", "parenthetical": "holding that it was \"objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that the scope of the suspect's consent permitted him to open a particular container within [an] automobile\"" }, { "page": "302", "parenthetical": "holding that it was \"objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that the scope of the suspect's consent permitted him to open a particular container within [an] automobile\"" }, { "page": "251" }, { "page": "303" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/500/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 U.S. 218", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6172008 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "219" }, { "page": "858" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/412/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 S.E.2d 217", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222", "parenthetical": "citing Schneckloth v. 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Ed. 2d 854, 858 (1973)" }, { "page": "397" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/96/0389-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1208, "char_count": 35004, "ocr_confidence": 0.766, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1473207228301756e-07, "percentile": 0.5805415682535932 }, "sha256": "a3609b0f7b8f2367b1e39267cbb417c641de02f1a044d68f993bb70fa6228f56", "simhash": "1:a16d710a66de0676", "word_count": 5718 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:27:33.869735+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge ELMORE concurs.", "Judge STEELMAN concurs in part and dissents in part with a separate opinion." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TIMOTHY STONE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McGEE, Judge.\nTimothy Stone (defendant) was convicted of possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine and of having attained the status of habitual felon. The trial court sentenced defendant to 130 months to 165 months in prison.\nDefendant filed a motion to suppress evidence in August 2003, arguing he was entitled to \u201can order suppressing any and all evidence obtained during a search of the person of defendant on October 7, 2002, for the reason that such evidence was obtained as a result of the illegal search and seizure of defendant by Officer R.E. Correa of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department[]\u201d (Officer Correa). The trial court conducted a suppression hearing on 8 December 2004 and in an order filed 16 December 2004, denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nIn its order denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, the trial court made the following uncontested findings of fact:\n1. At approximately 3:30 a.m. on October 7, 2002, [Officer Correa] was on routine patrol in the Nations Ford area of Charlotte, North Carolina.\n2. [Officer] Correa has been a CMPD officer for over six years. The Nations Ford area is part of the Steel Creek Division, where he has worked for three years. This particular area has a high incidence of drug and prostitution offenses.\n3. On this date, [Officer] Correa noticed a burgundy Oldsmobile [(the vehicle)] leaving the Villager Lodge motel. . . .\n4. [Officer] Correa began following the [vehicle]. The [vehicle] accelerated and turned right onto Farmhurst Drive. [Officer] Correa estimated that the [vehicle] was traveling at 50 mph, approximately 15 mph over the speed limit. [Officer] Correa, however, did not activate his blue lights or make any effort to stop the [vehicle].\n5. The [vehicle] pulled into the parking lot of an apartment complex on Farmhurst Drive. [Officer] Correa pulled in directly behind the [vehicle] and shone his spot light on the vehicle.\n6. [Officer] Correa saw two people in the [vehicle]. He also saw that the vehicle\u2019s license plate was displayed on the rear window instead of the bumper. Finally, he noticed that the passenger (in this case, . . . [defendant) was moving from side to side.\n7. [Officer] Correa approached the driver\u2019s side window. The driver appeared very nervous, his hands were shaking, and he would not look at [Officer] Correa.\n10. [Officer] Correa then turned his attention to . . . [defendant, who was not wearing a seatbelt. [Officer] Correa recognized . . . [defendant, having previously received an anonymous tip that [defendant was a drug dealer. He asked [defendant for identification, but he could not produce one.\n11. [Officer] Correa asked [defendant to step to the back of the vehicle. Defendant complied. [Officer] Correa asked [defendant if he had any drugs or weapons on his person. Defendant said no, which prompted [Officer] Correa to ask for consent to search. Defendant gave consent.\n12. Defendant was wearing a jacket and a pair of drawstring sweat pants.\n13. During the initial search, [Officer] Correa found $552.00 in cash in the lower left pocket of [defendant\u2019s sweat pants. After advising [defendant that it was not safe to carry such a large amount of cash in that manner as it could easily fall out, [Officer] Correa again asked [defendant if he had anything on him. Once again, [defendant denied having drugs or weapons and authorized [Officer] Correa to continue the search. By this time, Officer Gerson Herrera [(Officer Herrera)] had arrived as the backup officer.\n14. [Officer] Correa checked the rear of [defendant's sweat pants and then moved his hands to the front of [defendant's waistband. At that point, [Officer] Correa pulled [defendant\u2019s sweat pants away from his body and trained his flashlight on... . [defendant\u2019s groin area. Defendant objected, but by that time, both [Officer] Correa and [Officer] Herrera had already seen the white cap of what appeared to be a pill bottle tucked in between [defendant\u2019s inner thigh and testicles.\n15. [Officer] Correa has made several arrests in the past after finding drugs concealed in a suspect\u2019s groin area. He immediately suspected that the pill bottle contained contraband. As a result, he and [Officer] Herrera grabbed the protesting [defendant and handcuffed him. [Officer] Correa then retrieved the pill bottle from [defendant's groin area.\n16. Inside the bottle were approximately 130 rocks of crack cocaine weighing 26 grams.\nThe trial court concluded that Officer Correa \u201c \u2018seized\u2019 the occupants of the [vehicle] when he pulled in behind them in the apartment parking lot[,]\u201d and that Officer Correa\u2019s traffic stop of the vehicle \u201cwas based on a \u2018reasonable suspicion\u2019 (if not probable cause) that the driver had been speeding (in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-141(b)) and was not properly displaying the vehicle\u2019s license tag (in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-63(d)).\u201d The trial court further concluded that Officer Correa \u201cdid not violate [defendant's constitutional rights by asking him to step out of the [vehicle].\u201d The trial court also concluded that \u201c[b]efore seeking [defendant's consent to search, [Officer] Correa asked [d]efendant whether he had any drugs or weapons on his person. Thus, [d]efendant was on notice as to what [Officer] Correa would be looking for during a search.\u201d The trial court concluded that \u201calthough [Officer] Correa\u2019s search was intrusive, in the absence of [d]efendant placing any particular limit on the scope of the search, the Court finds that it was reasonable.\u201d The trial court further concluded as follows:\n13. Additionally, the relevant attendant circumstances, including [Officer] Correa\u2019s prior sighting of the [vehicle] in a high drug area, the anonymous tip that [defendant was a drug dealer, the time of night, the driver\u2019s evasive demeanor and responses, and the large wad of cash found on [defendant's person, gave [Officer] Correa sufficient reason to suspect that [defendant might be hiding contraband and/or weapons somewhere on his person, including his groin area.\n14. The search itself was limited and focused (in that the police did not remove or lower [defendant's pants), and took place in a private apartment complex parking lot during the early morning hours, with no opportunity for onlookers (other than the police) to gawk at . . . [d]efendant. On these facts, the Court finds that [Officer] Correa did not unlawfully impinge on [defendant\u2019s privacy interests.\nThe evidence introduced at trial was substantially similar to the evidence introduced at the suppression hearing. Defendant appeals.\nWhere a defendant has \u201cfailed to assign error to any findings of fact, our review [of the denial of a motion to suppress] is limited to the question of whether the trial court\u2019s findings of fact, which are presumed to be supported by competent evidence, support its conclusions of law and judgment.\u201d State v. Pickard, 178 N.C. App. 330, 334, 631 S.E.2d 203, 206 (2006). We apply de novo review to a trial court\u2019s conclusions of law. State v. Hernandez, 170 N.C. App. 299, 304, 612 S.E.2d 420, 423 (2005).\nI.\nDefendant argues the trial court erred by concluding that (1) Officer Correa seized the occupants of the vehicle when he pulled behind the vehicle and (2) Officer Correa did not violate defendant\u2019s constitutional rights by asking defendant to step out of the vehicle. \u201cThe Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Section 20 of Article I of the North Carolina Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.\u201d State v. Sanchez, 147 N.C. App. 619, 623, 556 S.E.2d 602, 606 (2001), disc. review denied, 355 N.C. 220, 560 S.E.2d 358 (2002). The prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to \u201c \u2018seizures of the person, including brief investigatory detentions such as those involved in the stopping of a vehicle.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441, 446 S.E.2d 67, 69-70 (1994)).\n\u201cAn investigatory stop must be justified by \u2018a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity.\u2019 \u201d Watkins, 337 N.C. at 441, 446 S.E.2d at 70 (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 362 (1979)). \u201cSimilarly, an officer may frisk a person where the officer reasonably suspects that \u2018criminal activity may be afoot and that the [person] with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous[.]\u2019 \u201d State v. Shearin, 170 N.C. App. 222, 226, 612 S.E.2d 371, 375 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 911 (1968)), disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 75, 624 S.E.2d 369 (2005). In determining whether reasonable suspicion existed for a stop or frisk, a trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances. Shearin, 170 N.C. App. at 226, 612 S.E.2d at 376. Police may order passengers from a vehicle when they have made a lawful traffic stop of the vehicle. State v. Pulliam, 139 N.C. App. 437, 440-41, 533 S.E.2d 280, 283 (2000) (citing Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1997)).\nIn the present case, the unchallenged findings of fact show that Officer Correa observed the vehicle driving in excess of the speed limit. Officer Correa pulled behind the vehicle and shined his spot light on the vehicle. He saw that the vehicle\u2019s license plate was displayed in the rear window, rather than on the bumper. Officer Correa therefore had reasonable suspicion, if not probable cause, to believe that two traffic violations had occurred.\nHowever, defendant argues the trial court erred by concluding that Officer Correa \u201c \u2018seized\u2019 the occupants of the [vehicle] when he pulled behind them in the apartment parking lot.\u201d In support of his argument, defendant cites State v. Foreman, 133 N.C. App. 292, 515 S.E.2d 488 (1999), aff'd as modified, 351 N.C. 627, 527 S.E.2d 921 (2000). In Foreman, the defendant was convicted of driving while impaired. Id. at 293, 515 S.E.2d at 490. The evidence at trial showed that a vehicle traveling towards a DWI checkpoint made a quick left turn before the checkpoint, at an intersection where a \u201cDWI Checkpoint Ahead\u201d sign was displayed. Id. An officer witnessed this action and began following the vehicle. Id. The officer saw the vehicle make another abrupt turn and lost sight of the vehicle. Id. The officer found the vehicle parked in a driveway and pulled behind the vehicle. Id. at 294, 515 S.E.2d at 490. The officer turned on his take-down lights and saw people scrunched down in the vehicle. Id. The vehicle\u2019s engine was turned off and the doors were closed. Id. at 294, 515 S.E.2d at 490-91. The officer called for backup and continued to watch the vehicle. Id. at 294, 515 S.E.2d at 491. Once backup arrived, the officer approached the vehicle, and saw the defendant in the driver\u2019s seat. Id.\nOur Court held that the defendant \u201cwas seized, at the earliest, when backup arrived.\u201d Id. at 297, 515 S.E.2d at 493. Our Court also held that the facts available to the officer before the seizure were \u201csufficient to raise a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity.\u201d Id. at 298, 515 S.E.2d at 493. Our Supreme Court affirmed our Court\u2019s decision that the officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, but held that the defendant was not seized until the officer approached the vehicle. Foreman, 351 N.C. at 630, 527 S.E.2d at 923.\nIn the present case, whether Officer Correa seized the occupants of the vehicle when he pulled behind them or when he approached the vehicle, Officer Correa had reasonable suspicion of two traffic violations and lawfully conducted a brief detention of the occupants of the vehicle. Defendant also argues the trial court erred by concluding that Officer Correa did not violate defendant\u2019s constitutional rights by asking defendant to step out of the vehicle. However, pursuant to Pulliam, Officer Correa was justified in asking defendant to step out of the vehicle during Officer Correa\u2019s lawful stop of the vehicle. See Pulliam, 139 N.C. App. at 440-41, 533 S.E.2d at 283. Moreover, Officer Correa did have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity because Officer Correa saw defendant moving from side to side inside the vehicle and also recognized defendant as someone who had been identified to police as a drug dealer. Accordingly, the trial court did not err.\nII.\nDefendant also argues the trial court erred by concluding that Officer Correa\u2019s search did not exceed the scope of defendant\u2019s consent. We agree. \u201cGenerally, the Fourth Amendment and article I, \u00a7 20 of the North Carolina Constitution require issuance of a warrant based on probable cause for searches. However, our courts recognize an exception to this rule when the search is based on the consent of the detainee.\u201d State v. Jones, 96 N.C. App. 389, 397, 386 S.E.2d 217, 222 (1989) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 858 (1973) and State v. Belk, 268 N.C. 320, 322, 150 S.E.2d 481, 483 (1966)), disc. review denied, 326 N.C. 366, 389 S.E.2d 809 (1990).\n\u201cThe standard for measuring the scope of a suspect\u2019s consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of \u2018objective\u2019 reasonableness-what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?\u201d Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 114 L. Ed. 2d 297, 302 (1991). In the context of a search upon probable cause, the United States Supreme Court has stated that the test of reasonableness \u201crequires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.\u201d Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447, 481 (1979).\nIn the present case, Officer Correa asked defendant if he had any drugs or weapons on his person, and defendant said he did not. Officer Correa asked for consent to search defendant and defendant gave consent. Officer Correa searched defendant and found $552.00 in cash in a pocket of defendant\u2019s pants. Officer Correa advised defendant it was not safe to carry that much cash and again asked defendant if he had any drugs or weapons. Defendant said he did not and again gave Officer Correa consent to search his person. Officer Correa pulled defendant\u2019s sweat pants away from defendant\u2019s body and \u201ctrained his flashlight on . . . [defendant's groin area.\u201d Defendant objected, but Officer Correa had already seen a white pill bottle cap \u201ctucked in between [defendant's inner thigh and testicles.\u201d\nWe conclude that Officer Correa exceeded the scope of defendant\u2019s consent when he inspected defendant\u2019s genitals. First, Officer Correa did not obtain specific consent to visually inspect defendant\u2019s genitals. Officer Correa simply obtained general consent to search defendant\u2019s person. Second, given the scope of Officer Correa\u2019s first search of defendant, a reasonable person would not have expected the second search to entail such an intrusive genital inspection. Third, the fact that defendant did not expressly limit the scope of the second search does not make the second search reasonable. Defendant could not reasonably have expected that Officer Correa would visually inspect defendant\u2019s genitals. Therefore, defendant had no reason to limit the scope of the second search. This is further demonstrated by defendant\u2019s reaction when Officer Correa pulled defendant\u2019s sweat pants away from defendant\u2019s body and trained his flashlight on defendant\u2019s genitals. Defendant objected to this intrusion; however, the trial court found that Officer Correa had already seen the white cap of the pill bottle. Nevertheless, defendant\u2019s reaction demonstrates that he could not reasonably have expected the excessive scope of Officer Correa\u2019s second search.\nWe also examine Officer Correa\u2019s justification for the search. Although the trial court concluded that the attendant circumstances \u201cgave [Officer] Correa sufficient reason to suspect that [defendant might be hiding contraband and/or weapons somewhere on his person, including his groin area[,]\u201d this conclusion was erroneous. At the suppression hearing, Officer Correa testified that when he asked for consent to search defendant a second time, he \u201cwas not really expecting to find anything, honestly.\u201d Officer Correa also testified on cross-examination that \u201c[w]hen I ask if I can search, I check everywhere. That\u2019s just standard procedure, that\u2019s just the way I was taught, that you search everywhere because drugs, guns, money, weapons, anything can be concealed under their clothing as well.\u201d Officer Correa\u2019s testimony demonstrates that he did not have any reason to suspect that defendant, in particular, was concealing weapons or contraband near his genitals. Rather, Officer Correa conducted genital searches as a matter of course. Furthermore, Officer Correa had already conducted a full search of defendant\u2019s person, which had not uncovered any weapons or contraband, when he conducted an inspection of defendant\u2019s genitals. Because Officer Correa\u2019s first full search did not uncover any weapons or contraband, Officer Correa reasonably did not expect to find anything on his second search, and accordingly had little justification for conducting a visual inspection of defendant\u2019s genitals. Officer Correa\u2019s discovery of the cash in defendant\u2019s pocket, while suspicious, did not authorize Officer Correa to proceed with such an intrusive search.\nThe trial court also concluded that \u201c[t]he search itself was limited and focused (in that the police did not remove or lower [defendant's pants), and took place in a private apartment complex parking lot during the early morning hours, with no opportunity for onlookers (other than the police) to gawk at.. . [defendant. \u201d However, the trial court did not make any findings that Officer Correa or Officer Herrera attempted to shield defendant\u2019s genitals from view. A reasonable person would not have expected police to pull his pants away from his body and expose his genitals in a parking lot of an apartment complex, even if the encounter with police occurred in the early hours of the morning.\nIn view of the factors examined above, we conclude that a reasonable person in defendant\u2019s circumstances would not have understood that he would be subjected to an inspection of his genitals. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 302. We further conclude that the need for an inspection of defendant\u2019s genitals was outweighed by the significant invasion of defendant\u2019s personal rights. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 559, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 481. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred by denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress and defendant is entitled to a new trial.\nNew trial.\nJudge ELMORE concurs.\nJudge STEELMAN concurs in part and dissents in part with a separate opinion.", "type": "majority", "author": "McGEE, Judge." }, { "text": "STEELMAN, Judge,\nconcurring in part and dissenting in part.\nI concur with the first portion of the majority opinion affirming the trial court\u2019s ruling as to the stop of the vehicle. However, I must respectfully dissent from the second part of the opinion with regard to the scope of defendant\u2019s consent to Officer Correa\u2019s search.\nThe two pertinent questions with respect to this issue are: (1) whether the search of defendant constituted a strip search, thus requiring specific consent; or (2) whether the search, if not a strip search, was objectively reasonable such that it did not exceed the defendant\u2019s scope of consent.\nAppellant does not argue that any of Judge Diaz\u2019s findings of fact are erroneous. This Court is therefore bound by these findings and our review is limited to whether the conclusions of law are supported by the findings of fact. Stale v. Tate, 300 N.C. 180, 184, 265 S.E.2d 223, 226 (1980). The trial judge found that defendant gave consent to search his person on two separate occasions, one before Officer Correa found $552.00 in defendant\u2019s pocket and one after. The trial judge also found that \u201c[a]t no time prior to Correa and Herrera finding the pill bottle in [defendant's underwear did the [defendant limit the scope of either search.\u201d\nI: Strip Search\n\u201cA search of the person may range from a Terry-type pat-down to a generalized search of the person to the more intrusive strip search or body cavity search.\u201d Hughes v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 447, 455, 524 S.E.2d 155, 159 (2000). \u201cThese three categories [pat-downs, strip searches, and body cavity searches] are subject to different standards because of the varying degrees of intrusion that they entail.\u201d United States v. De Gutierrez, 667 F.2d 16, 19 (5th Cir. 1982). Courts have consistently held pat-downs and generalized searches of the person are within the scope of a consent search, but the heightened intrusions of strip searches and cavity searches are objectively unreasonable unless supported by probable cause or specific consent. See, e.g., United States v. Rodney, 956 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Johnson v. State, 613 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1993); Hughes, 31 Va. App. 447, 524 S.E.2d 155.\nAlthough many states have statutory definitions for \u201cstrip search,\u201d our legislature has not chosen to define this term. Cf. Amaechi v. West, 237 F.3d 356, 365 (4th Cir. 2001). Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the appellate courts of North Carolina have defined the term \u201cstrip search.\u201d Because other states\u2019 statutes are not binding upon our courts and there is no common law definition within North Carolina, \u201cwe must give it that meaning generally recognized by lexicographers.\u201d Clinard v. White, 129 N.C. 182, 183, 39 S.E. 960, 960 (1901). Ntrip search is defined as \u201c[a] search of a person conducted after that person\u2019s clothes have been removed, the purpose usu. being to find any contraband the person might be hiding.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1378 (8th ed. 2004).\nIn the instant case, the trial court in its findings described the search of the defendant:\nCorrea checked the rear of Defendant\u2019s sweat pants and then moved his hands to the front of Defendant\u2019s waistband. At that point, Correa pulled Defendant\u2019s sweat pants away from his body and trained his flashlight on the Defendant\u2019s groin area. Defendant objected, but by that time, both Correa and Herrera had already seen the white cap of what appeared to be a pill bottle tucked in between Defendant\u2019s inner thigh and testicles.\nApplying the aforementioned definition of strip search, the facts as found by the trial court show that there was no removal of defendant\u2019s clothing during Officer Correa\u2019s search of defendant. Officer Correa only \u201cpulled [defendant's sweat pants away from his body\u201d without removing them. Therefore, I conclude that Officer Correa\u2019s search of defendant did not rise to the level of a strip search, and therefore, the specific consent of defendant to perform a strip search was not required.\nII: Scope of Consent\n\u201cGenerally, the Fourth Amendment and article I, \u00a7 20 of the North Carolina Constitution require issuance of a warrant based on probable cause for searches. However, our courts recognize an exception to this rule when the search is based on the consent of the detainee.\u201d State v. Jones, 96 N.C. App. 389, 397, 386 S.E.2d 217, 222 (1989) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 858 (1973)). \u201c \u2018The scope of the search can be no broader than the scope of the consent.\u2019 \u201d State v. Johnson, 177 N.C. App. 122, 124, 627 S.E.2d 488, 490 (2006) (quoting State v. Jones, 96 N.C. App. 389, 397, 386 S.E.2d 217, 222 (1989)). \u201c \u2018When an individual gives a general statement of consent without express limitations, the scope of a permissible search is not limitless. Rather it is constrained by the bounds of reasonableness[.]\u2019 \u201d Johnson, 177 N.C. App. at 125, 627 S.E.2d at 490 (quoting United States v. Strickland, 902 F.2d 937, 941 (11th Cir. 1990)). \u201cThe standard for measuring the scope of a suspect\u2019s consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of \u2018objective\u2019 reasonableness\u2014 what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?\u201d Johnson, 177 N.C. App. at 125, 627 S.E.2d at 490 (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 114 L. Ed. 2d 297, 302 (1991) (holding that it was \u201cobjectively reasonable for the officer to believe that the scope of the suspect\u2019s consent permitted him to open a particular container within [an] automobile\u201d)). \u201cThe test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.\u201d Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447, 481 (1979). In determining whether a search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a court must balance \u201cthe scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place, in which it is conducted.\u201d Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 559, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 481. \u201c[S]earches akin to strip searches can be justified in public places if limited in scope and required by unusual circumstances.\u201d State v. Smith, 118 N.C. App. 106, 117, 454 S.E.2d 680, 687 (1995) (Walker; J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasizing that the availability of \u201cless intrusive means does not automatically transform an otherwise reasonable search into a Fourth Amendment violation\u201d), rev\u2019d per curiam per dissent, 342 N.C. 407, 464 S.E.2d 45 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1189, 134 L. Ed. 2d 779 (1996).\nFurthermore, \u201c[t]he scope of a search is generally defined by its expressed object.\u201d Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 303; see also, United States v. Zapata, 180 F.3d 1237, 1243 (1999) (stating that \u201c[t]o ascertain what conduct is within the \u2018bounds of reasonableness,\u2019 we must consider what the parties knew to be the object (or objects) of the search\u201d). Because \u201c[d]ealers frequently hide drugs near their genitals[,]\u201d the reasonable person would understand that \u201ca request to conduct a body search for drugs reasonably includes a request to conduct some search of [the genital] area.\u201d Rodney, 956 F.2d at 297-98 (emphasis added). The court in Rodney explained the meaning of \u201csome search\u201d:\nAlthough Jimeno states the test \u201cgenerally\u201d used to determine the scope of a consent to search, we doubt that the Supreme Court would have us apply that test unflinchingly in the context of body searches. At some point, we suspect, a body search would become so intrusive that we would not infer consent to it from a generalized consent, regardless of the stated object of the search. For example, although drugs can be hidden virtually anywhere on or in one\u2019s person, a generalized consent to a body search for drugs surely does not validate everything up to and including a search of body cavities.\nRodney, 956 F.2d at 298.\nIn Rodney, the Court nonetheless found the police did not exceed the scope of the search allowed by the suspect\u2019s generalized consent in the following circumstances:\n[The policeman] asked Rodney whether he was carrying drugs on his person. After Rodney again said no, [the policeman] requested permission to conduct a body search. Rodney said \u201csure\u201d and raised his arms above his head. [The policeman] placed his hands on Rodney\u2019s ankles and, in one sweeping motion, ran them up the inside of Rodney\u2019s legs. As he passed over the crotch area, [the policeman] felt small, rock-like objects. Rodney exclaimed: \u201cThat\u2019s me!\u201d Detecting otherwise, [the policeman] placed Rodney under arrest.\nRodney, 956 F.2d at 296. The Court in Rodney concluded that the search undertaken \u201cwas not unusually intrusive, at least relative to body searches generally. It involved a continuous sweeping motion over Rodney\u2019s outer garments, including the trousers covering his crotch area. In this respect, the search was no more invasive than the typical pat-down frisk for weapons described by the Supreme Court over two decades ago[.]\u201d Rodney, 956 F.2d at 298 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The Court in Rodney described this search as \u201cthe sort of careful frisk described in Terry v. Ohio[.]\u201d Rodney, 956 F.2d at 296 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 17, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 903 n.13 (\u201cThe officer must feel with sensitive fingers every portion of the [defendant\u2019s] body. A thorough search must be made of the [defendant\u2019s] arms and armpits, waistline and back, the groin and area about the testicles, and entire surface of the legs down to the feet.\u201d (citation omitted)). Ultimately, the Court in Rodney concluded that the consent search of the suspect was objectively reasonable. Rodney, 956 F.2d at 298.\nIn the instant case, this Court must decide whether the police exceeded the scope of a suspect\u2019s generalized consent with regard to a search of his body for drugs by pulling back the suspect\u2019s pants for a brief moment and visually examining his genital region. Officer Correa was familiar with the practice of drug dealers hiding drugs near their genitals. He had \u201cmade several arrests in the past after finding drugs concealed in a suspect\u2019s groin area.\u201d After asking defendant if he had any drugs or weapons on his person, Officer Correa asked whether he could search defendant\u2019s body, and defendant consented. In the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law, the court stated that because of the officer\u2019s questions, defendant was on notice as to what Officer Correa would be looking for during the search. Officer Correa \u201casked him [for consent to search] twice. The first time I asked for consent to pat down and search. The second time I asked him if he had anything on him that I needed to know about.\u201d Officer Correa tes-tifed that he asked, \u201cdo you mind if I search[,] and he said no, go ahead.\u201d Officer Correa did not ask defendant to remove his clothes, nor did Officer Correa remove defendant\u2019s clothes. Neither were defendant\u2019s genitals, nor any private part of defendant\u2019s body, exposed to anyone except police officers of the same sex as defendant, and defendant\u2019s genitals were only exposed to Officer Correa and Officer Herrera for a fleeting moment. The search itself was limited and focused on hidden contraband in the groin area and took place in a private apartment complex parking lot during the early morning hours, with no opportunity for any onlookers. See Smith, 118 N.C. App. at 117, 454 S.E.2d at 687; United States v. Bazy, 1994 WL 539300 (D. Kan. 1994) (holding that a trooper\u2019s search of defendant\u2019s underwear to remove crack cocaine was reasonable because defendant was not required to remove clothing or submit to visual body cavity search, and because public view was blocked by defendant\u2019s clothes, troopers and patrol cars). The attendant circumstances, including the anonymous tip that defendant was a drug dealer, the time of night, the high drug area, the large amount of cash found on defendant, and the suspicious actions of defendant and the driver, considered in the aggregate, are sufficient to support the conclusion that the search conducted by Officers Correa and Herrera was objectively reasonable.\nWhen balancing \u201cthe scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted,\u201d I find the search of defendant to be objectively reasonable and within the scope of defendant\u2019s consent. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 559, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 481. For these reasons, I would affirm the trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence.\n. See Hensley v. Industrial Maint. Overflow, 166 N.C. App. 413, 419 n.1, 601 S.E.2d 893; 898 n.1 (2004) (stating that \u201c[findings of fact that are mislabeled conclusions of law are, nonetheless, factual findings.\u201d); citing Gainey v. N.C. Dept. of Justice, 121 N.C. App. 253, 257 n.1, 465 S.E.2d 36, 40 n.1 (1996)).", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "STEELMAN, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Douglas A. Johnston, for the State.", "Jarvis John Edgerton, IV for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TIMOTHY STONE\nNo. COA05-1418\n(Filed 5 September 2006)\n1. Search and Seizure \u2014 : investigatory search \u2014 reasonable suspicion\nThe trial court did not err in a possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine case by concluding that an officer seized the occupants of the pertinent vehicle when he pulled behind the vehicle and that the officer did not violate defendant\u2019s constitutional rights by asking defendant to step out of the vehicle, because: (1) whether the officer seized the occupants of the vehicle when he pulled behind them or when he approached the vehicle, he had reasonable suspicion of two traffic violations and lawfully conducted a brief detention of the occupants of the vehicle; (2) the officer was justified in asking defendant to step out of the vehicle during the lawful stop of the vehicle; and (3) the officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity since the officer saw defendant moving from side to side inside the vehicle and also recognized defendant as someone who had been identified to police as a drug dealer.\n2. Search and Seizure\u2014 exceeding scope of consent \u2014 inspecting defendant\u2019s genitals\nAn officer\u2019s search exceeded the scope of defendant\u2019s consent, and defendant is entitled to a new trial on charges of possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine, because: (1) the officer inspected defendant\u2019s genitals after he simply obtained general consent to search defendant\u2019s person; (2) given the scope of the officer\u2019s first search of defendant, a reasonable person would not have expected the second search to entail such an intrusive genital inspection; (3) the fact that defendant did not expressly limit the scope of the second search does not make the second search reasonable; (4) defendant\u2019s reaction demonstrated that he could not reasonably have expected the excessive scope of the officer\u2019s second search; (5) the officer\u2019s testimony demonstrated that he did not have any reason to suspect that defendant was concealing weapons or contraband near his genitals, and the officer had already conducted a full search of defendant\u2019s person which had not uncovered any weapons or contraband when he conducted an inspection of defendant\u2019s genitals; (6) the officer\u2019s discovery of cash in defendant\u2019s pocket, while suspicious, did not authorize the officer to proceed with such an intrusive search; (7) the trial court did not make any findings that the two officers attempted to shield defendant\u2019s genitals from view; and (8) a reasonable person would not have expected police to pull his pants away from his body and expose his genitals in a parking lot of an apartment complex even if the encounter with police occurred in the early morning hours.\nJudge Steelman concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nAppeal by defendant from order on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress entered 16 December 2004 by Judge Albert Diaz and from judgment dated 22 March 2005 by Judge J. Gentry Caudill in Superior Court, Mecklenburg County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 June 2006.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Douglas A. Johnston, for the State.\nJarvis John Edgerton, IV for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0297-01", "first_page_order": 329, "last_page_order": 343 }