{ "id": 8236586, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: ELIZABETH N. WHITAKER", "name_abbreviation": "In re the Estate of Whitaker", "decision_date": "2006-09-05", "docket_number": "No. COA05-1328", "first_page": "375", "last_page": "382", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "179 N.C. App. 375" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "611 S.E.2d 899", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632736, 12632737, 12632738, 12632739, 12632740, 12632741, 12632742, 12632743, 12632730, 12632731, 12632732, 12632733, 12632734, 12632735 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/611/0899-07", "/se2d/611/0899-08", "/se2d/611/0899-09", "/se2d/611/0899-10", "/se2d/611/0899-11", "/se2d/611/0899-12", "/se2d/611/0899-13", "/se2d/611/0899-14", "/se2d/611/0899-06", "/se2d/611/0899-01", "/se2d/611/0899-02", "/se2d/611/0899-03", "/se2d/611/0899-04", "/se2d/611/0899-05" ] }, { "cite": "330 S.E.2d 616", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 612", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4722697, 4725936, 4721340, 4722525, 4724158 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0612-03", "/nc/313/0612-05", "/nc/313/0612-01", "/nc/313/0612-02", "/nc/313/0612-04" ] }, { "cite": "325 S.E.2d 260", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "266", "parenthetical": "\"A single assignment generally challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support numerous findings of fact, as here, is broadside and ineffective.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 N.C. App. 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526819 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "375-76", "parenthetical": "\"A single assignment generally challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support numerous findings of fact, as here, is broadside and ineffective.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/72/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 S.E.2d 488", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4686688, 4689061, 4686601, 4692620, 4691991 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0330-05", "/nc/314/0330-03", "/nc/314/0330-02", "/nc/314/0330-01", "/nc/314/0330-04" ] }, { "cite": "328 S.E.2d 804", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "807" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 N.C. App. 386", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524689 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "390" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/74/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 S.E.2d 693", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "700-01", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 N.C. 345", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563919 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/271/0345-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-301.3", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "511 S.E.2d 665", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "671", "parenthetical": "trial court may order specific performance of the terms of a mediated settlement agreement" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 N.C. App. 291", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11237604 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "299", "parenthetical": "trial court may order specific performance of the terms of a mediated settlement agreement" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/132/0291-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 S.E.2d 607", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 598", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4720930, 4721031, 4723818, 4721579, 4725520 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0598-04", "/nc/313/0598-05", "/nc/313/0598-01", "/nc/313/0598-03", "/nc/313/0598-02" ] }, { "cite": "325 S.E.2d 36", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 N.C. App. 668", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527424 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "670" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/72/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "548 S.E.2d 499", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "500", "parenthetical": "\"This Court has previously stated that compromise agreements, such as the mediated settlement agreement reached by the parties in this case, are governed by general principles of contract law.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 690", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135733 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "692", "parenthetical": "\"This Court has previously stated that compromise agreements, such as the mediated settlement agreement reached by the parties in this case, are governed by general principles of contract law.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0690-01" ] }, { "cite": "230 S.E.2d 541", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548", "parenthetical": "\"These statutes . . . clearly give the clerk exclusive original probate jurisdiction.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 386", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558339 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395", "parenthetical": "\"These statutes . . . clearly give the clerk exclusive original probate jurisdiction.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 S.E.2d 673", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "675", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 N.C. App. 666", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12169132 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "668", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/84/0666-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005 WL 589482", "category": "reporters:specialty_west", "reporter": "WL", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 N.C. App. 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 752, "char_count": 19357, "ocr_confidence": 0.766, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3608438240779088e-07, "percentile": 0.6362324598847269 }, "sha256": "6d0ad0216a00f6a2d7f38c8ce0c58a4e25b1293e296d720ae899db40e5ab83a1", "simhash": "1:4ae3dfd057f08779", "word_count": 3038 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:27:33.869735+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges TYSON and JACKSON concur." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: ELIZABETH N. WHITAKER" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GEER, Judge.\nIn an apparent attempt to avoid this Court\u2019s decision in Whitaker v. Whitaker, 169 N.C. App. 266, 611 S.E.2d 899, 2005 N.C. App. LEXIS 550, 2005 WL 589482 (Mar. 15, 2005) (unpublished) (hereinafter \u201cWhitaker F), affirming the trial court\u2019s enforcement of a settlement entered into by petitioner Louisa B. Whitaker and respondents, petitioner requested in this action that the clerk of superior court and the superior court declare as void'for lack of subject matter jurisdiction Whitaker I and its underlying orders. Petitioner appeals from the superior court\u2019s order affirming the clerk\u2019s order, asserting that both the superior court and the clerk erred in rejecting her subject matter jurisdiction argument. Even assuming that petitioner\u2019s argument was properly raised in this proceeding, because the lawsuit in Whitaker I was a breach of contract action brought by petitioner to enforce various settlement agreements entered into by the parties and did not involve issues within the exclusive jurisdiction of the clerk, we affirm.\nFacts\nRespondents (John C. Whitaker, Elizabeth N. Whitaker, II, and William A. Whitaker) and petitioner, who are all siblings, have been involved in a series of legal disputes relating to their mother and the administration of her estate for the past seven years. In 1991, the parties\u2019 mother named respondent John Whitaker and petitioner as her attorneys-in-fact. In 1999, respondents filed a petition alleging various acts of misfeasance by petitioner and sought to have her removed as attorney-in-fact (the \u201cSpecial Proceeding\u201d).\nBefore the Special Proceeding was resolved, the parties\u2019 mother died, an estate file was opened (the \u201cEstate Proceeding\u201d), and the mother\u2019s will was admitted to probate. When the parties could not agree on the administration of their mother\u2019s estate, they participated in mediation with Judge James M. Long, a retired superior court judge. That mediation resulted in a handwritten Memorandum of Mediated Settlement Agreement (the \u201cMemorandum\u201d). Subsequently, petitioner refused to execute any formalized version of the Memorandum.\nUnder their mother\u2019s will, petitioner and respondents inherited, among other things, multiple pieces of real property as joint tenants. Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corporation approached the parties about the possibility of building Krispy Kreme\u2019s corporate headquarters on a portion of this real estate. Respondents and petitioner then executed an Amendment to Memorandum of Mediated Settlement Agreement (the \u201cAmendment\u201d). The Amendment provided that respondent John Whitaker would be the sole spokesperson and negotiator for the family with Krispy Kreme and that a vote of three out of the four siblings would be binding on the entire group. Additionally, the Amendment provided that respondents would voluntarily dismiss the Special Proceeding and the parties would \u201c[t]ake such steps as are necessary\u201d to begin administration of their mother\u2019s estate, including appointing both respondent John Whitaker and petitioner as co-executors.\nAfter extensive negotiations, a tentative agreement was reached between respondent John Whitaker and Krispy Kreme. Respondents thereafter executed the necessary documents for the sale of the property. Although the Amendment required petitioner to do the same, when she was asked to execute the documents necessary to finalize the sale, she refused, and the sale to Krispy Kreme fell through.\nPetitioner then sued respondents in superior court (civil action number 02 CVS 1327), asserting three claims for relief: (1) breach of contract, alleging that respondents had breached the Memorandum and the Amendment; (2) breach of a trust agreement relating to their mother\u2019s estate; and (3) a request for a declaratory judgment that petitioner was not bound by the terms of the Amendment. Respondents counterclaimed for breach of contract, interference with contract, unfair and deceptive trade practices, fraud, and punitive damages.\nThe parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment, which were granted in part and denied in part by Judge Clarence E. Horton, Jr. With respect to petitioner\u2019s claim that defendants had breached the Memorandum and the Amendment by refusing to approve payment of $40,937.50 in executor\u2019s fees, Judge Horton observed that the parties were in agreement on the issue and ordered that petitioner was entitled to executor\u2019s fees of $40,937.50, and respondent John Whitaker was entitled to executor\u2019s fees of $59,062.50. Judge Horton\u2019s order further provided that \u201csummary judgment is granted in favor of [respondents] on [petitioner\u2019s] claim for reimbursement for estate expenses,\u201d but that \u201cthis ruling is without prejudice to the right of [petitioner] ... to seek reimbursement of alleged estate expenses in the pending estate proceeding before the Clerk.\u201d Additionally, Judge Horton\u2019s order concluded that, under the terms of the Memorandum and the Amendment, \u201cthe attorneys for each side may be paid fees and expenses by or on behalf of the estate to a maximum of $35,000.00\u201d and, therefore, ordered that \u201ceach side\u2019s ' attorney\u2019s fees and expenses shall be paid by or on behalf of the Estate, up to a maximum of $35,000.00.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Judge Horton made various other rulings regarding petitioner\u2019s claims that are not pertinent to this appeal.\nThe case proceeded to trial before Judge Russell G. Walker, and, at the close of petitioner\u2019s evidence, Judge Walker granted a directed verdict for respondents on all but one of petitioner\u2019s remaining claims. At that point, with respondents\u2019 counterclaims remaining to be tried, the parties negotiated a settlement in which petitioner agreed to convey her interest in the disputed real estate to respondents. Judge Walker thereafter convened a hearing at which the attorneys read the terms of the settlement into the record, which included: (1) respondents would pay petitioner $1.35 million; (2) petitioner would \u201cexecute deeds prepared by [respondents\u2019] counsel\u201d; (3) petitioner could remove a portion of the fixtures attached to the real estate; (4) executors\u2019 commissions and attorneys\u2019 fees were to be paid in accordance with Judge Horton\u2019s order; (5) the amounts remaining in the estate, after payment of the applicable attorneys\u2019, executors\u2019, and mediator fees, would be divided equally among the parties; (6) the parties would execute \u201c[c]omplete mutual general releases\u201d; and (7) any further disputes would be subject to binding arbitration.\nWhen counsel for petitioner asked whether the agreement would be reduced to writing, counsel for respondents stated: \u201cI hope we have more success than we did [previously], but if we don\u2019t, we have a judge who can help us because we\u2019re stating this on the record in the presence of the Court so that the Court can then enforce the settlement agreement.\u201d Judge Walker then asked each of the parties, \u201cDo you agree and accept this settlement agreement and will you sign, execute and do whatever else is necessary \u2014 the documents that are necessary to bring this about?\u201d Petitioner and each of the respondents stated their assent on the record.\nPetitioner ultimately refused to sign a written settlement agreement. Consequently, on 3 July 2003, respondents moved the trial court for entry of a judgment consistent with the terms of the settlement as stated on the record. Judge Walker granted the motion, and, on 14 July 2003, entered judgment setting forth the terms of the settlement. Petitioner appealed, and this Court affirmed the trial court\u2019s judgment in Whitaker I.\nFollowing this Court\u2019s decision in Whitaker I, petitioner filed a petition in the Estate Proceeding seeking, among other things, reimbursement for expenses and attorneys\u2019 fees she claimed she incurred as co-executor of her mother\u2019s estate. On 18 February 2005, after holding a hearing on the matter, the clerk entered findings of fact and conclusions of law in a 21-page document that included 66 findings of fact and concluded that petitioner\u2019s request for reimbursement should be granted in part and denied in part.\nOn the same date, the clerk entered an order setting forth her precise rulings on each request. She denied the request for reimbursement for flowers, for grave lot cleaning, in part for rug cleaning, for mileage and Other expenses, and for additional legal fees above the $35,000.00 already paid to the attorneys for each side. She granted the request for reimbursement for a grave marker, for a real estate appraisal, in part for rug cleaning, and for moving expenses and repair costs. Petitioner appealed to the superior court.\nAfter holding a hearing on petitioner\u2019s appeal, Judge Ronald E. Spivey entered an order on 2 June 2005. In his order, he noted that petitioner, in addition to asking the court to vacate the clerk\u2019s order, \u201csought to have this Court declare as null and void, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, (1) the Order of The Honorable Clarence E. Horton, Jr., filed on May 15, 2003, in Civil Action No. 02 CVS 1327, in Forsyth County Superior Court; (2) the Judgment signed by The Honorable Russell G. Walker, Jr., and filed on July 14, 2003, in 02 CVS 1327; and (3) the Order of the North Carolina Court of Appeals, filed on March 15, 2005, No. COA 04-10, which affirmed the Judgment of Judge Walker in 02 CVS 1327 in its entirety.\u201d Judge Spivey concluded that the clerk\u2019s findings of fact were supported by the evidence and that the conclusions of law were supported by the findings of fact. He, therefore, affirmed the clerk\u2019s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order in their entirety. Judge Spivey further ruled that the arguments regarding the orders and Court of Appeals opinion in Whitaker I constituted \u201can impermissible collateral attack... and that estoppel applies to prevent such an attack.\u201d Petitioner timely appealed to this Court from Judge Spivey\u2019s order.\nI\nAll but one of petitioner\u2019s 10 assignments of error are based upon petitioner\u2019s contention that Judge Horton\u2019s order and Judge Walker\u2019s judgment in 02 CVS 1327 (which was affirmed in Whitaker I) are void because of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We need not address the specifics of each assignment of error or whether Judge Spivey properly concluded this argument constituted an impermissible collateral attack since we hold that the superior court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction.\n\u201c[Original general jurisdiction of all justiciable matters of a ciyil nature cognizable in the General Court of Justice is vested in the aggregate in the superior court division and the district court division . . . .\u2019\u2019N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-240 (2005). \u201cIt is, therefore, evident that except for areas specifically placing jurisdiction elsewhere (such as claims under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act) the trial courts of North Carolina have subject matter jurisdiction over all justiciable matters of a civil nature.\u201d Harris v. Pembaur, 84 N.C. App. 666, 668, 353 S.E.2d 673, 675 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted).\nPetitioner contends that Whitaker I did not involve a general civil matter, but rather resolved issues within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the clerk of superior court. Under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-241 (2005), \u201c[exclusive original jurisdiction for the probate of wills and the administration of decedents\u2019 estates is vested in the superior court division, and is exercised by the superior courts and by the clerks of superior court as ex officio judges of probate according to the practice and procedure provided by law.\u201d Thus, it is \u201c[t]he clerk of superior court of each county . . . [that has] jurisdiction of the administration, settlement, and distribution of estates of decedents . . . .\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 28A-2-1 (2005). See also In re Estate of Adamee, 291 N.C. 386, 395, 230 S.E.2d 541, 548 (1976) (\u201cThese statutes . . . clearly give the clerk exclusive original probate jurisdiction.\u201d).\nNevertheless, contrary to petitioner\u2019s contentions, the order and judgment in Whitaker I did not address \u201cthe administration, settlement, and distribution of estates of decedents . . . .\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 28A-2-1. Rather, the Whitaker I litigation involved petitioner\u2019s claims that respondents were not complying with the parties\u2019 prior settlement agreements arising out of a mediation. In his partial summary judgment order, Judge Horton was determining whether there were issues of fact regarding the terms of the parties\u2019 agreement following the mediation. There can be no doubt that the superior court has subject matter jurisdiction over such claims. See, e.g., Chappell v. Roth, 353 N.C. 690, 692, 548 S.E.2d 499, 500 (2001) (\u201cThis Court has previously stated that compromise agreements, such as the mediated settlement agreement reached by the parties in this case, are governed by general principles of contract law.\u201d); DeGree v. DeGree, 72 N.C. App. 668, 670, 325 S.E.2d 36, 37 (\u201cordinary contracts]\u201d are enforceable by trial courts), disc. review denied, 313 N.C. 598, 330 S.E.2d 607 (1985).\nSubsequently, petitioner\u2019s lawsuit went to trial as to the issues relating to the Memorandum, the Amendment, and the trust agreement not resolved by Judge Horton. After the parties reached an oral settlement of those remaining issues, Judge Walker\u2019s judgment merely enforced the settlement entered on the record. Again, the superior court undoubtedly had jurisdiction. See, e.g., Few v. Hammack Enters., Inc., 132 N.C. App. 291, 299, 511 S.E.2d 665, 671 (1999) (trial court may order specific performance of the terms of a mediated settlement agreement).\nConsequently, petitioner\u2019s contention that the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in the Whitaker I action is without merit. The nine assignments of error that rely upon that contention are, therefore, overruled.\nII\nPetitioner contends in her remaining assignment of error that the trial court erred when it stated that petitioner\u2019s notice of appeal made only a \u201cgeneral objection\u201d to the clerk\u2019s order. Petitioner has, however, failed to demonstrate any harm from Judge Spivey\u2019s observation.\nJudge Spivey\u2019s order specifies:\nThe Court has reviewed, paragraph-by-paragraph, the Clerk\u2019s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. The Court has also reviewed portions of the transcript of the hearing before the Clerk held on January 18, 2005, together with an Affidavit of a witness at that hearing relating to matters that were alleged not to be contained in the record... .\nThe Court concludes, as a matter of law, pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-301.3, that the Clerk\u2019s Findings of Fact are supported by the evidence; the Clerk\u2019s Conclusions of Law are supported by the Findings of Fact; and the Clerk\u2019s Order is consistent with the Conclusions of Law and the applicable law in the State of North Carolina.\nIn short, despite his belief that petitioner\u2019s notice of appeal was inadequate as a general objection, Judge Spivey conducted a full review of the Clerk\u2019s order.\nMoreover, we agree with Judge Spivey that petitioner\u2019s notice of appeal constituted only a general objection under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-301.3 (2005). On appeal of estate matters determined by the clerk, the superior court reviews an order of the clerk for purposes of determining: (1) whether the findings of fact are supported by the evidence; (2) whether the conclusions of law are supported by the findings of fact; and (3) whether the order or judgment is consistent with the conclusions of law and applicable law. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-301.3(d). The superior court, however, only reviews those \u201cfindings of fact which the appellant has properly challenged by specific exceptions.\u201d In re Estate of Lowther, 271 N.C. 345, 354, 156 S.E.2d 693, 700-01 (1967) (emphasis added). See also In re Estate of Longest, 74 N.C. App. 386, 390, 328 S.E.2d 804, 807 (\u201cThus, in an appeal from an order of the Clerk in a probate matter, the Superior Court is not required to conduct a de novo hearing. Rather, . . . when a finding of fact by the Clerk of Court is properly challenged by specific exception, the Superior Court judge will review those findings, and either affirm, reverse, or modify them.\u201d (internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added)), appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 314 N.C. 330, 330 S.E.2d 488 (1985).\nIn the present case, petitioner\u2019s appeal to the superior court did not refer specifically to any of the clerk\u2019s 66 findings of fact. Instead, petitioner\u2019s appeal states only:\n[T]he findings of fact are not supported by evidence, the conclusions of law are not supported by the findings of fact, and the order is inconsistent with the conclusions of law, prior court orders and applicable law.\nThis statement constitutes only a broadside attack on the findings of fact and thus the trial court did not err by concluding that petitioner had only made a \u201cgeneral objection.\u201d See, e.g., Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C. App. 372, 375-76, 325 S.E.2d 260, 266 (1985) (\u201cA single assignment generally challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support numerous findings of fact, as here, is broadside and ineffective.\u201d), disc. review denied, 313 N.C. 612, 330 S.E.2d 616 (1985).\nAffirmed.\nJudges TYSON and JACKSON concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "GEER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Ross Law Firm, by C. Thomas Ross, for petitioner-appellant.", "Bell, Davis & Pitt, P.A., by William K. Davis, Alan M. Ruley, and Edward B. Davis, for respondents-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: ELIZABETH N. WHITAKER\nNo. COA05-1328\n(Filed 5 September 2006)\n1. Jurisdiction\u2014 subject matter \u2014 settlement agreements\u2014 oral settlement\nThe trial court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction in an action seeking enforcement of a settlement entered into by petitioner and respondents, because: (1) contrary to petitioner\u2019s assertions, the order and judgment in Whitaker I did not address the administration, settlement, and distribution of estates of decedents under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 28A-2-1, but instead involved petitioner\u2019s claims that respondents were not complying with the parties\u2019 prior settlement agreements arising out of a. mediation which are matters within the superior court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction; and (2) the superior court also had jurisdiction over petitioner\u2019s lawsuit relating to the memorandum, the amendment, and the trust agreement not resolved by the first trial court after the parties reached an oral settlement of those remaining issues with the judgment merely enforcing the settlement entered on the record.\n2. Appeal and Error\u2014 notice of appeal \u2014 general objection\nAlthough petitioner contends the trial court erred when it stated that petitioner\u2019s notice of appeal made only a general objection to the clerk\u2019s order, petitioner failed to demonstrate any harm from the trial court\u2019s observation, because: (1) despite its belief that petitioner\u2019s notice of appeal was inadequate because it constituted only a general objection, the trial court conducted a full review of the clerk\u2019s order; and (2) the notice of appeal did constitute only a general objection under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-301.3 when petitioner\u2019s appeal to the superior court did not refer specifically to any of the clerk\u2019s sixty-six findings of fact and constituted only a broadside attack on the findings of fact.\nAppeal by petitioner from an order entered 2 June 2005 by Judge Ronald E. Spivey in Forsyth County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 April 2006.\nRoss Law Firm, by C. Thomas Ross, for petitioner-appellant.\nBell, Davis & Pitt, P.A., by William K. Davis, Alan M. Ruley, and Edward B. Davis, for respondents-appellees." }, "file_name": "0375-01", "first_page_order": 407, "last_page_order": 414 }