{ "id": 8237646, "name": "LUCILLE GRIGGS, Plaintiff-Appellant v. SHAMROCK BUILDING SERVICES, INC., Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Griggs v. Shamrock Building Services, Inc.", "decision_date": "2006-09-19", "docket_number": "No. COA05-1536", "first_page": "543", "last_page": "551", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "179 N.C. App. 543" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "571 S.E.2d 222", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511608, 1511289, 1511570, 1511500 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0437-04", "/nc/356/0437-02", "/nc/356/0437-01", "/nc/356/0437-03" ] }, { "cite": "567 S.E.2d 209", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "211" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 N.C. App. 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9249645 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "230" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/152/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 A.L.R.5th 413", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 5th", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "436-37" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "477 S.E.2d 150", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 730", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867574 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0730-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 S.E.2d 463", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 14, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464" }, { "page": "464" }, { "page": "465" }, { "page": "465-66" }, { "page": "466" }, { "page": "465" }, { "page": "465" }, { "page": "465" }, { "page": "466" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 N.C. App. 767", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11920273 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "767" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/121/0767-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 N.W.2d 852", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "442 S.E.2d 504", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 309", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2534356 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0309-01" ] }, { "cite": "433 S.E.2d 481", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 16, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Greene, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "486" }, { "page": "483" }, { "page": "486" }, { "page": "486", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "486" }, { "page": "486" }, { "page": "486" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 N.C. 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App.", "case_ids": [ 8523837 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Greene, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "765-66" }, { "page": "765-66" }, { "page": "766" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/111/0758-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 S.E.2d 344", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 10, "year": 1946, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "344" }, { "page": "344" }, { "page": "345" }, { "page": "344" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "226 N.C. 758", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625369 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1946, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "759" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/226/0758-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 S.E.2d 425", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2488503 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 S.E.2d 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4725743 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "504 S.E.2d 574", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "577" }, { "page": "577" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 N.C. App. 729", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11470258 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "733" }, { "page": "733" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/130/0729-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 890, "char_count": 21064, "ocr_confidence": 0.746, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.497341544922815e-08, "percentile": 0.39977601010715297 }, "sha256": "348e39c4beb75dd5d516b6e60164a4bbafe02349f326e1cdfa2d6f29c644b0f9", "simhash": "1:8b10746294271c54", "word_count": 3543 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:27:33.869735+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges BRYANT and ELMORE concur." ], "parties": [ "LUCILLE GRIGGS, Plaintiff-Appellant v. SHAMROCK BUILDING SERVICES, INC., Defendant-Appellee" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McGEE, Judge.\nLucille Griggs (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against Shamrock Building Services, Inc. (Defendant) on 5 August 2004 alleging that employees of Defendant, a cleaning service, negligently left a slick residue on the floor at RPM Wood Finishes Group, Inc. (RPM), where Plaintiff worked, causing Plaintiff to slip, fall, and sustain injuries. \u25a0 Plaintiff alleged the fall occurred on 8 August 2001.\nDefendant answered and denied that Defendant\u2019s employees left a slick residue on RPM\u2019s floor. Defendant also moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) and alleged Plaintiff was contributorily negligent and RPM was negligent. Defendant later voluntarily dismissed without prejudice its defense regarding negligence by RPM. Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on 8 July 2005, changing the date of Plaintiff\u2019s alleged injury from 8 August 2001 to 10 August 2001. Defendant filed an answer to Plaintiff\u2019s first amended complaint, again denying that its employees left a slick residue on the floor at RPM. Defendant again moved to dismiss Plaintiff\u2019s first amended complaint and alleged contributory negligence.\nDefendant filed a motion for summary judgment dated 14 July 2005. The trial court conducted a hearing on Defendant\u2019s motion on 25 July 2005. Evidence introduced at the hearing tended to show the following. Plaintiff testified at her deposition that in August 2001, she was employed as an administrative assistant at RPM. She testified that while at work at RPM on 10 August 2001, she was called to the lobby to meet someone. Plaintiff walked from her cubicle work area to the lobby through a two-door elevator. The elevator opened on each side with one door opening onto the cubicle work area and one door opening onto the lobby. Plaintiff stepped into the elevator from the cubicle work area side, and immediately stepped out of the elevator on the lobby side. As Plaintiff stepped out of the elevator, she slipped and fell, hitting the wooden floor outside the elevator. Plaintiff further testified as follows:\nQ. Okay. What did you see?\nA. I just. . . saw where my foot had just slid across the floor.\nQ. Specifically, what did you see?\nA. It was just like kind of a skid mark. It was like kind of a film on the floor, but I didn\u2019t know what it was. It was just something on the floor. I don\u2019t know what it was.\nQ. Could you see any type of puddle of fluid on the floor?\nA. No. It wasn\u2019t that kind of a \u2014 it was just like ice, maybe, on asphalt, like black ice kind of thing, and then you could just see where my shoe went just through it.\nBelia Conner (Conner) testified at her deposition that she had been employed by RPM as a corporate receptionist since November 2000. Conner testified that she worked in RPM\u2019s lobby and saw Plaintiff fall on 10 August 2001. Conner said that her boss, Brenda Taylor, told her to type a statement regarding the events Conner observed on 10 August 2001. Conner typed and signed the following statement, which was introduced at her deposition:\nRight before lunchtime on August 10, 2001. I observed [Plaintiff] slip and fall coming out of the elevator into the lobby at RPM Wood Finishes Group. After helping [Plaintiff] to a chair, I went over to the elevator and examined the area where [Plaintiff] fell. There seemed to be an oily substance around the doors and the floor around the elevator. Immediately I called Andy Frye from [Defendant cleaning service] and notified him of the incident. He came over to our facility in a matter of minutes and inspected the area in and around the elevator. Mr. Frye acknowledged that his cleaning crew must have over sprayed the stainless steel doors and walls when cleaning the inside and outside of the elevator. After this, Brenda Taylor Senior Employee Relations Manager instructed [Plaintiff] to go to the Hart Industrial Clinic to be examined.\nAndrew Frye (Frye) testified at his deposition that he had worked for Defendant as a sales manager for approximately twelve years. Frye testified that in August 2001, RPM was a client of Defendant and every weeknight from 5:30 p.m. to 7:30 p.m., two of Defendant\u2019s employees cleaned RPM\u2019s premises. Frye visited RPM on a monthly basis to make sure everything was going well with the cleaning contract.\nFrye testified that Conner called him on 10 August 2001 to tell Frye that someone had fallen at RPM and asked Frye \u201cto come over and just look around.\u201d Frye drove to RPM and waited for Brenda Taylor at the reception desk. Frye testified he had no memory of any discussion with Conner regarding cleaning. Frye inspected the area where Plaintiff had fallen and testified \u201cthere was nothing evident on that floor. It was as dry as the top of this table.\u201d\nAt the summary judgment hearing, Defendant argued it was entitled to summary judgment because Defendant had completed, and RPM had accepted, Defendant\u2019s cleaning work prior to Plaintiff\u2019s fall. Therefore, even if Defendant had been negligent in the performance of the contract, Defendant no longer owed a duty to Plaintiff under the completed and accepted rule. Defendant argued that RPM had accepted Defendant\u2019s work either when Defendant\u2019s employees finished cleaning the premises on 9 August 2001 or when RPM opened for business on 10 August 2001. Defendant also argued it was entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff had failed to produce any evidence of negligence on the part of Defendant.\nThe trial court entered an order dated 17 August 2005 granting Defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment. In its order, the trial court stated that \u201cthe work of [Defendant] [] had been completed and had been accepted by [RPM] at the time of the incident complained of in the pleadings, that there was no imminently dangerous work exception, and thus . . . [Defendant is not subject to liability for . . . [Plaintiff\u2019s claim as a matter of law[.]\u201d\nPlaintiff filed a motion pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rules 59 and 60 on 4 August 2005. The trial court denied Plaintiffs motion on 30 August 2005. Plaintiff appeals.\nPlaintiff argues the trial court erred by granting summary judgment for Defendant on the basis of the completed and accepted rule. Specifically, Plaintiff argues the trial court erred by extending the completed and accepted rule beyond the context of contracts for construction or repair to a contract for cleaning services. We agree.\n\u201c[T]he standard of review on appeal from summary judgment is whether there is any genuine issue of material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d Bruce-Terminix Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 130 N.C. App. 729, 733, 504 S.E.2d 574, 577 (1998). Summary judgment is appropriate \u201cif the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2005). The party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of \u201cestablishing the lack of any triable issue of fact.\u201d Pembee Mfg. Corp. v. Cape Fear Constr. Co., 313 N.C. 488, 491, 329 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1985). This burden may be met by \u201cproving that an essential element of the opposing party\u2019s claim is nonexistent, or by showing through discovery that the opposing party cannot produce evidence to support an essential element of his claim[.]\u201d Collingwood v. G.E. Real Estate Equities, 324 N.C. 63, 66, 376 S.E.2d 425, 427 (1989). On appeal from summary judgment, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Bruce-Terminix Co., 130 N.C. App. at 733, 504 S.E.2d at 577.\nOnly three cases dealing with the completed and accepted rule have been decided by our appellate courts since 1946. In Price v. Cotton Co., 226 N.C. 758, 40 S.E.2d 344 (1946), the defendant, an independent contractor, contracted with the owner of a tobacco barn to construct a platform to hold a kerosene tank. Id. at 758, 40 S.E.2d at 344. Pursuant to the contract, the defendant \u201cinstalled a 250-gallon [kerosene] tank on a platform constructed of 2x4 scantling and braced by lx4\u2019s[.]\u201d Id. The plaintiff, an employee of an oil dealer, was injured when the platform gave way as the plaintiff was standing on the platform to fill the tank. Id. The plaintiff filed a complaint, alleging that the defendant \u201ccarelessly and negligently built the scaffold for the support of said kerosene tank out of timbers which were insufficient to hold the weight of the tank when filled with kerosene and the weight of a man while filling said tank.\u201d Id.\nThe defendant demurred to the plaintiffs complaint on the ground that prior to the plaintiffs injury, the work had been completed by the defendant and accepted by the owner. Id. at 759, 40 S.E.2d at 344. The trial court sustained the demurrer and our Supreme Court affirmed, recognizing that \u201c[i]t is the general rule that an independent contractor is not liable for injuries to third parties occurring after the contractor has completed the work and it has been accepted by the owner.\u201d Id. Our Supreme Court further recognized that \u201c[w]here work has been completed and accepted by the owner, and the defect in construction, if any, is not hidden but readily observable upon reasonable inspection, the contractor is not liable.\u201d Id. at 760, 40 S.E.2d at 345. The Court held that because the defendant had completed the work and the owner had accepted it, and the plaintiff did not allege there were any hidden defects in the construction, the defendant was not liable for the plaintiffs injuries. Id.\nIn the next case to discuss the completed and accepted rule, Thrift v. Food Lion, 111 N.C. App. 758, 433 S.E.2d 481 (1993) (Greene, J., dissenting), rev\u2019d per curiam for reasons stated in the dissent, 336 N.C. 309, 442 S.E.2d 504 (1994), the dissent adopted by the Supreme Court refused to extend the application of the rule beyond the context of contracts for construction and repair. Thrift, 111 N.C. App. at 765-66, 433 S.E.2d at 486. In Thrift, an employee of the defendant Triangle Ice Co. (Triangle Ice) delivered bags of ice to a store operated by the defendant Food Lion (Food Lion). Id. at 760, 433 S.E.2d at 483. A Food Lion employee supervised the delivery and counted off the bags as the Triangle Ice employee loaded the ice into a bin located inside the Food Lion store, near the entrance. Id. After the Triangle Ice employee completed the delivery and left, the Food Lion employee noticed a puddle on the floor and sent another Food Lion employee to get a cloth and dry the floor. Id. However, before the employee could dry the floor, the plaintiff walked into the area to get a shopping cart, slipped on the water and fell, sustaining injuries. Id.\nThe plaintiff sued Food Lion and Triangle Ice, and the trial court granted summary judgment for Triangle Ice. Id. A divided panel of our Court affirmed the trial court on the ground that the completed and accepted rule applied in the context of a contract for the delivery of goods. Id. at 765, 433 S.E.2d at 486. The majority held that \u201c[o]ne who delivers goods or materials and then leaves the delivery site should be afforded at least the same protection as a contractor who actively participates in the production of a structure or the repair of a building or fixture.\u201d Id.\nThe dissent in Thrift stated that \u201cNorth Carolina courts have applied the \u2018completed and accepted\u2019 rule only in the context of contracts for construction or repair, . . . and there is no justification for extending its application to the delivery of goods.\u201d Id. at 765-66, 433 S.E.2d at 486 (citations omitted). The dissent further stated that \u201c[t]he proper test of the liability of Triangle Ice requires application of general principles of negligence, that is, all persons are held to a standard of reasonable care for the protection of third parties who may foreseeably be endangered by a negligent act.\u201d Id. at 766, 433 S.E.2d at 486. In a footnote, the dissent noted that\n[m]any courts have completely abandoned the \u201ccompleted and accepted\u201d rule, even in the context of construction contracts. See, e.g., Kapalczynski v. Globe Constr. Co., 172 N.W.2d 852 (Mich. App. 1969); W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts \u00a7 104A, at 723 (5th ed. 1984) (\u201cIt is now the almost universal rule that the contractor is liable to all those who may foresee-ably be injured by the structure, not only when he fails to disclose [dangerous] conditions known [to] him, but also when the work is negligently done.\u201d).\nId. at 766 n. 1., 433 S.E.2d at 486 n. 1. Adopting the dissent, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of our Court. Thrift, 336 N.C. at 309, 442 S.E.2d at 505.\nIn Nifong v. C.C. Mangum, Inc., 121 N.C. App. 767, 468 S.E.2d 463, aff\u2019d per curiam, 344 N.C. 730, 477 S.E.2d 150 (1996), our Court again addressed the completed and accepted rule. In Nifong, the plaintiff was driving in the rain on Miami Boulevard in Durham when water \u201ccame up all over [her] windshield\u201d and obscured her vision. Nifong, 121 N.C. App. at 767, 468 S.E.2d at 464. As a result, the plaintiffs car slid, hit the curb and ran into trees, causing her to sustain serious injuries. Id. The plaintiff sued the defendant contractor who had constructed the road for negligent construction, and the trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant. Id. at 767-68, 468 S.E.2d at 464.\nIn support of summary judgment, the defendant presented deposition testimony from several engineers who testified that the defendant had constructed Miami Boulevard in accordance with DOT plans and that DOT would not have accepted the defendant\u2019s work if DOT had not been satisfied with the work. Id. at 769, 468 S.E.2d at 465.\n[The] defendant presented deposition testimony to show that before a contractor begins working on a road project, DOT engineers drive stakes in the ground with written instructions on them and also write instructions on the edge of the roadway to show the contractor exactly where to build the pavement. The contractor follows the guidelines set by the DOT and DOT engineers inspect the work as it progresses. It is ultimately up to the DOT to insure that the road is constructed properly.\nId. at 769-70, 468 S.E.2d at 465-66. One of the engineers testified that there was no hydroplaning hazard at the location of the plaintiffs accident and \u201ca reasonable person would not have noticed any change in the curve as constructed from the original design.\u201d Id. at 770, 468 S.E.2d at 466.\nThe plaintiff presented deposition testimony that the road construction deviated from DOT plans and \u201ccreate [d] a hazardous hydroplaning condition.\u201d Id. at 769, 468 S.E.2d at 465. The plaintiff also presented deposition testimony that it \u201cshould have been obvious\u201d that the curve was not constructed as designed by DOT. Id. The plaintiff also presented affidavits of three people who stated that several vehicles had hydroplaned in the area of the plaintiffs accident and that water collected at that location when it rained. Id.\nOur Court recognized that \u201c[i]n North Carolina, the \u2018completed and accepted work\u2019 doctrine provides that \u2018an independent contractor is not liable for injuries to third parties occurring after the contractor has completed the work and it has been accepted by the owner.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 768, 468 S.E.2d at 465 (quoting Price, 226 N.C. at 759, 40 S.E.2d at 344). However, our Court also recognized that as an exception to the completed and accepted rule, a contractor remains liable where the work completed and turned over to the owner was imminently dangerous to third persons. Id. at 769, 468 S.E.2d at 465.\nWe held that the plaintiff failed to forecast evidence showing that the defendant\u2019s work was imminently dangerous. Id. at 770, 468 S.E.2d at 466. Therefore, the defendant did not owe any legal duty to the plaintiff under the completed and accepted rule. Id.\nIn the present case, Defendant contracted to clean RPM\u2019s premises each weekday night from 5:30 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. RPM did not contract with Defendant to provide construction or repair services to RPM\u2019s premises. Plaintiff was injured when she slipped on the floor outside the elevator in the lobby of RPM. It is not disputed that Defendant\u2019s employees cleaned RPM\u2019s premises on 9 August 2001 from 5:30 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. and that RPM opened for business the following morning. However, it is disputed whether Defendant left a substance, which caused Plaintiff to slip and fall, on the floor at RPM.\nThe present case is most analogous to Thrift. As the dissent in Thrift, which was adopted by our Supreme Court, refused to extend the application of the completed and accepted rule to the delivery of goods, we also decline to extend the application of the rule to service contracts. Defendant argues that a service contract is more analogous to a construction or repair contract than a contract for the sale of goods, in that service contracts and construction contracts both involve work done to property. Even if this may be true, our Courts have never applied the completed and accepted rule outside the context of construction or repair contracts. See Thrift, 111 N.C. App. at 765-66, 433 S.E.2d at 486. Moreover, we decline to expand the application of the rule when the rule is being abandoned, even in the context of construction contracts, in favor of modern rules of foreseeability. See Id. at 766 n. 1., 433 S.E.2d at 486 n. 1; see also Emmanuel S. Upon, Modem Status of Rules Regarding Tort Liability of Building or Construction Contractor for Injury or Damage to Third Person Occurring After Completion and Acceptance of Work; \u201cForeseeability\u201d or \u201cModem\u201d Rule, 75 A.L.R.5th 413, 436-37 (2000) (noting that \u201c[a]s late as the 1950s, the majority of jurisdictions adhered to the \u2018completed and accepted rule.\u2019 Since then, the \u2018completed and accepted rule\u2019 has been severely criticized and repudiated in most states and is now the minority rule while the \u2018modern rule\u2019 has become the majority rule.\u201d). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment for Defendant on the basis of the completed and accepted rule, as it has no application to service contracts. Defendant\u2019s liability, if any, should be governed by general principles of negligence. See Thrift, 111 N.C. App. at 766, 433 S.E.2d at 486.\nDefendant also argues that a separate ground exists upon which summary judgment could have been granted, and therefore, we should uphold the grant of summary judgment for Defendant. Defendant argues that because Plaintiff is attempting to hold Defendant liable on a theory of premises liability and Defendant was not the owner or operator of the premises, Defendant did not owe a duty to Plaintiff. However, Defendant did not argue this ground before the trial court. Rather, Defendant\u2019s second argument in favor of summary judgment was that\nthere is no evidence of any negligence on the part of [Defendant] that. . . [P]laintiff has been able to produce . . . either. The depositions, discovery served indicate that there was something on the floor, may have been something on the floor. There\u2019s no clear evidence. There\u2019s no evidence, period, as to what that substance was. And there\u2019s absolutely no evidence that [Defendant] put a substance on the floor.\nWe do not address arguments in favor of granting summary judgment that were not presented to the trial court. See McDonald v. Skeen, 152 N.C. App. 228, 230, 567 S.E.2d 209, 211, disc. review denied, 356 N.C. 437, 571 S.E.2d 222 (2002). Therefore, because Defendant\u2019s argument was raised for the first time on appeal, we decline to address it.\nThe trial court erred by granting summary judgment for Defendant, and because genuine issues of material fact remain, we remand the matter to the trial court. Because we reverse and remand, we do not reach Plaintiff\u2019s remaining assignments of error.\nReversed and remanded.\nJudges BRYANT and ELMORE concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "McGEE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "John J. Korzen; and Lyndon R. Helton, PLLG, by Lyndon R. Helton, for Plaintiff-Appellant.", "Hedrick, Batman, Gardner & Kincheloe, L.L.P., by L. Kristin King and Heather T. Twiddy, for Defendant-Appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LUCILLE GRIGGS, Plaintiff-Appellant v. SHAMROCK BUILDING SERVICES, INC., Defendant-Appellee\nNo. COA05-1536\n(Filed 19 September 2006)\nPremises Liability\u2014 slip and fall \u2014 completed and accepted rule\nThe trial court erred in a slip and fall case by granting summary judgment in favor of defendant cleaning service on the basis of the completed and accepted rule, because: (1) the trial court erroneously extended the rule beyond the context of contracts for construction or repair to service contracts; and (2) defendant\u2019s argument that it was not the owner or operator of the premises, and thus did not owe a duty to plaintiff, will not be addressed for the first time on appeal.\nAppeal by Plaintiff from order dated 17 August 2005 and order entered 30 August 2005 by Judge Timothy L. Patti in Superior Court, Catawba County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 16 August 2006.\nJohn J. Korzen; and Lyndon R. Helton, PLLG, by Lyndon R. Helton, for Plaintiff-Appellant.\nHedrick, Batman, Gardner & Kincheloe, L.L.P., by L. Kristin King and Heather T. Twiddy, for Defendant-Appellee." }, "file_name": "0543-01", "first_page_order": 575, "last_page_order": 583 }