{ "id": 8240659, "name": "DR. GENE COUCH, JR., Plaintiff v. DAVID E. BRADLEY, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Couch v. Bradley", "decision_date": "2006-10-17", "docket_number": "No. COA06-285", "first_page": "852", "last_page": "857", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "179 N.C. App. 852" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "159 S.E.2d 556", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 N.C. 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574935 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/273/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 S.E.2d 509", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510-11", "parenthetical": "citing Williams v. Bray, 273 N.C. 198, 159 S.E.2d 556 (1968)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 N.C. App. 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554351 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113-14", "parenthetical": "citing Williams v. Bray, 273 N.C. 198, 159 S.E.2d 556 (1968)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/29/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "586 S.E.2d 791", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "798" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 N.C. App. 484", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8956790 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "494" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/160/0484-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E.2d 672", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 N.C. App. 624", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523240 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/78/0624-01" ] }, { "cite": "363 S.E.2d 229", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "230", "parenthetical": "citing Edge v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 78 N.C. App. 624, 337 S.E.2d 672 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 N.C. App. 397", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358320 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "399", "parenthetical": "citing Edge v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 78 N.C. App. 624, 337 S.E.2d 672 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/88/0397-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 S.E.2d 368", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 338", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568288 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "342", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0338-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 469, "char_count": 9340, "ocr_confidence": 0.748, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.6373204096609493e-07, "percentile": 0.6905041568060531 }, "sha256": "7ace70d66d95bb975149e2a0c39d99a307ae6959fbb865da5a268b1fc6227814", "simhash": "1:d25b91c41e9e9f4a", "word_count": 1473 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:27:33.869735+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges BRYANT and LEVINSON concur." ], "parties": [ "DR. GENE COUCH, JR., Plaintiff v. DAVID E. BRADLEY, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TYSON, Judge.\nDavid E. Bradley (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals from order entered enforcing and awarding damages for violation of a consent judgment entered on 3 November 2004. We affirm.\nI. Background\nDuring February 2000, Dr. Gene Couch, Jr. (\u201cplaintiff\u2019) and defendant were employed by Southwestern Community College. Plaintiff served as Vice President and defendant was an Instructor in Health and Physical Education and Building Construction. In February 2000, defendant resigned from his position. After defendant resigned, he allegedly disseminated two separate memoranda throughout campus which alleged plaintiff had used cocaine and had engaged in an affair with a former Southwestern Community College employee. On 20 September 2000, plaintiff sent defendant a cease and desist letter. Defendant continued his libelous actions against plaintiff.\nOn 3 March 2004, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant for libel and sought an injunction. On 3 November 2004, plaintiff and defendant entered into a consent and forbearance agreement (\u201cthe consent judgment\u201d). The consent judgment stated:\n1) Plaintiff agrees to take no collection or other adverse action against Defendant, including the judgment filed in Jackson or Buncombe County unless this agreement is triggered by any of the following:\na) Defendant shall cease and desist in any and all libelous, slanderous, demeaning, defaming, or otherwise derogatory communications about the Plaintiff, whether factual or not, written, verbal, or otherwise communicated about the Plaintiff for a period of 10 years from the date of this agreement.\nb) In the event that any above referenced material or information is communicated, disseminated or otherwise published about Plaintiff within the next 10 years, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that such publication or communication was the responsibility of the Defendant, unless proven otherwise by Plaintiff or Defendant, and Plaintiff is free to pursue collection of the judgment in accordance with the terms herein.\n(Emphasis supplied). The consent judgment expressly provided for payment of damages by defendant in the amount of $15,000.00 and costs and attorney fees in the event of breach.\nOn 28 July and 2 August 2005, plaintiff applied for the position of president at Mayland Community College and Haywood Community College. One week later, Tiara Lance (\u201cLance\u201d), defendant\u2019s neighbor and employer, inquired of defendant about plaintiff\u2019s complaint against defendant and the consent judgment. Upon her request, defendant gave Lance a copy of the consent judgment.\nLance wrote a letter to both Mayland Community College and Haywood Community College that discussed the complaint plaintiff had filed against defendant. Lance\u2019s letter stated, \u201c[t]he [l]aw [s]uit was settled in agreement that [defendant] shall not make any derogatory comments, as to the same agreement [plaintiff] agreed to make no religious discriminatory statements.\u201d The letter included a copy of the consent judgment.\nOn 17 August 2005, plaintiff filed a motion in the cause to enforce the consent judgment. Plaintiff relied upon Lance\u2019s letters and copies of the consent judgment Lance had sent to both community colleges. On 6 October 2005, the trial court heard plaintiff\u2019s motion and found:\nThe Defendant has failed to meet the burden of proof to sufficiently rebut the presumption that the Defendant [has not] ceased and desisted from any and all libelous, slanderous, demeaning, defaming, or otherwise derogatory communication about the Plaintiff, whether factual or not, written, verbal or otherwise communicated about the Plaintiff, in accordance with Paragraph 1(a) of that Consent and Forbearance Agreement dated November 3rd 2004 and attached to Plaintiffs Motion as Exhibit 1.\nThe trial court entered judgment against defendant for $15,000.00 and awarded plaintiff $631.25 for attorney fees. Defendant appeals.\nII.Issues\nDefendant argues the trial court erred by: (1) not finding specific facts and (2) granting plaintiffs motion based on non-existent facts.\nIII.Standard of Review\nWhen this court reviews an order from the trial court, sitting without a jury:\nthe court\u2019s findings of fact have the force and effect of a verdict by a jury and are conclusive on appeal if there is evidence to support them, even though the evidence might sustain findings to the contrary. The trial judge acts as both judge and jury and considers and weighs all the competent evidence before him. If different inferences may be drawn from the evidence, he determines which inferences shall be drawn and which shall be rejected.\nWilliams v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 288 N.C. 338, 342, 218 S.E.2d 368, 371 (1975) (internal citations omitted).\nIV.Request for Specific Findings of Fact\nDefendant argues the trial court erred by not finding specific facts. We disagree.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 52(a)(2) (2005) states, in part: \u201cFindings of fact and conclusions of law are necessary on decisions of any motion or order ex mero motu only when requested by a party and as provided by Rule 41(b).\u201d This Court has stated, \u201cabsent a specific request made pursuant to Rule 52(a)(2), a trial court is not required to either state the reasons for its decision or make findings of fact showing those reasons.\u201d Strickland v. Jacobs, 88 N.C. App. 397, 399, 363 S.E.2d 229, 230 (1988) (citing Edge v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 78 N.C. App. 624, 337 S.E.2d 672 (1985)). When \u201cthere is no suggestion in the record that defendant asked for findings of fact or conclusions of law to be included in the trial court\u2019s order, the court\u2019s failure to do so is not reversible error.\u201d Granville Med. Ctr. v. Tipton, 160 N.C. App. 484, 494, 586 S.E.2d 791, 798 (2003).\nDefendant contends he requested specific findings of fact during the following colloquy:\nDefense counsel: Mr. Bradley is not responsible for the Consent Forbearance Agreement being sent to Mayland and Haywood Community College. Ms. Lance is, she said many times\u2014\nThe Court: What about the communication to Ms. Lance?\nDefense counsel: Which communication?\nThe Court: The communication that would give her the information that \u2014 enough to send this? Communication that this gentleman was anti-Christian.\nThe Court: . . . the slander has occurred not in.the publication of the letters, but in the communication with [Lance] [.]\nUpon .review of the transcript, including defense counsel\u2019s above-referenced colloquy and the record, defendant failed to request that the trial court enter specific findings of fact. Under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 52, the trial court was not required to make any specific findings of fact in its order allowing judgment in the absence of a motion or request. This assignment of error is overruled.\nV. Granting Plaintiff\u2019s Motion\nDefendant argues the trial court erred by granting plaintiff\u2019s motion based on non-existent facts. We disagree.\nThis Court has stated, \u201cwhen the [trial court] is not required to find facts and make conclusions of law and does not do so, that the court on proper evidence found facts to support its judgment.\u201d Sherwood v. Sherwood, 29 N.C. App. 112, 113-14, 223 S.E.2d 509, 510-11 (1976) (citing Williams v. Bray, 273 N.C. 198, 159 S.E.2d 556 (1968)).\nAs defendant failed to request specific findings of fact, his second assignment of error is without merit. Further, the record contains sufficient evidence to support the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law. Under the express terms of the consent judgment, defendant failed to rebut the presumption that he communicated with Lance about plaintiff and provided her a copy of the consent judgment. This assignment of error is overruled.\nVI. Conclusion\nDefendant failed to request specific findings of fact pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 52(a)(2). In the absence of a motion or request, the trial court properly entered an order allowing judgment against defendant without making specific findings of facts. Without a request for specific findings of fact, it is presumed the trial court found facts from the evidence to support its conclusions of law and enter judgment thereon. Id. The trial court\u2019s order is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJudges BRYANT and LEVINSON concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "TYSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Eric Ridenour, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Karla M. Wood, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DR. GENE COUCH, JR., Plaintiff v. DAVID E. BRADLEY, Defendant\nNo. COA06-285\n(Filed 17 October 2006)\n1. Trials\u2014 specific findings \u2014 not made in the absence of specific request\nA colloquy between counsel and the judge did not amount to a request for specific findings, and the trial court did not err by not making those findings.\n2. Libel and Slander\u2014 consent judgment \u2014 presumption of communication \u2014 findings not requested\nDefendant\u2019s contention that the court erred by granting a motion to enforce a consent judgment in a libel case on nonexistent facts was without merit because defendant did not request specific findings; it is presumed that the trial court found facts from the evidence to support its conclusions. There was sufficient evidence to support the court\u2019s conclusions in that defendant did not rebut the presumption of communication contained in the express terms of the judgment.\nAppeal by defendant from order entered 10 October 2005 by Judge Charles P. Ginn in Jackson County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 September 2006.\nEric Ridenour, for plaintiff-appellee.\nKarla M. Wood, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0852-01", "first_page_order": 884, "last_page_order": 889 }