{
  "id": 8553068,
  "name": "PAUL J. WILLIAMS v. PEGGY W. WILLIAMS",
  "name_abbreviation": "Williams v. Williams",
  "decision_date": "1973-07-11",
  "docket_number": "No. 7326DC25",
  "first_page": "635",
  "last_page": "638",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "18 N.C. App. 635"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "133 S.E. 2d 487",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "260 N.C. 635",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8575789
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/260/0635-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "158 S.E. 2d 77",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "272 N.C. 235",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8572341
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/272/0235-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 330,
    "char_count": 5901,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.478,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 2.1275308519620178e-07,
      "percentile": 0.7654197213814397
    },
    "sha256": "8b1fdd9410ec48ae1fa3dcdeff3a8e8fd738f01f320c46daff962c3449bef837",
    "simhash": "1:3026fffdfd2b3c12",
    "word_count": 970
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:14:36.293491+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges Hedrick and Vaughn concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "PAUL J. WILLIAMS v. PEGGY W. WILLIAMS"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "BROCK, Judge.\nPlaintiff excepts to the court\u2019s order allowing an increase in the amount of child support which plaintiff was paying to defendant under the separation agreement. Plaintiff contends that it was necessary for the court to make a finding of fact that plaintiff was financially able to pay such an increase, and that no such finding of fact was made.\nNo evidence was offered at the hearing with respect to plaintiff\u2019s health, condition, employment, earnings, or earning capacity. Defendant did allege in her motion that plaintiff was a practicing attorney in Charlotte, N. C., that he earned large sums of money, that he had income of several thousand dollars from an estate, and that he was able to support his children in accordance with the custom and standard formerly enjoyed by them. However, no evidence was offered at the hearing to support these allegations. In fact, the court specifically found that no evidence was presented in open court \u201cas to the circumstances of the plaintiff.\u201d\nIt is generally recognized that decrees entered by our courts in child custody and support matters, or written agreements with respect to such matters, are impermanent in character and are subject to alteration by the court upon a change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the child. Crosby v. Crosby, 272 N.C. 235, 158 S.E. 2d 77; Fuchs v. Fuchs, 260 N.C. 635, 133 S.E. 2d 487. The welfare of the child is paramount in matters of custody and maintenance, \u201cyet common sense and common justice dictate that the ultimate object in such matters is to secure support commensurate with the needs of the child and the ability of the father to meet the needs.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Crosby v. Crosby, supra; accord, Fuchs v. Fuchs, supra.\nAt the hearing, no evidence was offered as to plaintiff\u2019s ability to pay increased child support. A determination of such ability to pay was an essential prerequisite of an order for increased child support payments. Appellant is entitled to another hearing in which the court will consider the ability of the plaintiff to pay increased child support \u2014 i.e., plaintiff\u2019s earnings or earning capacity, his financial circumstances, and his living expenses \u2014 as well as the needs of the minor children. The defendant and the court are not without a method to compel the production of plaintiff\u2019s records, and to compel plaintiff\u2019s attendance and testimony. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 45 (f).\nThe order appealed from is vacated and the case remanded for a new hearing on defendant\u2019s motion.\nVacated and remanded.\nJudges Hedrick and Vaughn concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "BROCK, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Mraz, Aycock, Casstevens & Davis, by Gary A. Davis, for plaintiff.",
      "Robert F. Rush for defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "PAUL J. WILLIAMS v. PEGGY W. WILLIAMS\nNo. 7326DC25\n(Filed 11 July 1973)\nDivorce and Alimony \u00a7 23 \u2014 child support \u2014 failure to consider ability of father to pay\nWhere plaintiff did not appear and no evidence was offered as to his health, employment, earnings or earning capacity in a hearing instituted by defendant seeking an increase in the amount of child support paid by plaintiff, the trial court erred in granting the increase without first making a finding of fact as to plaintiff\u2019s ability to pay.\nAppeal by plaintiff from Belk, District Judge, 17 July 1972 Session of District Court held in Mecklenburg County.\nDefendant and plaintiff entered into a separation agreement in March 1968 which provided, among other things, that plaintiff should pay $350/month to defendant as child support for the benefit of the two children born of the marriage. Defendant retained custody of the two minor children. Plaintiff obtained an absolute divorce in March 1969.\nDefendant filed this motion in the cause on 26 April 1972, seeking an increase in the amount of child support paid by plaintiff for the support of their two minor children. Defendant also sought an award of attorney\u2019s fees. She alleged a substantial increase in expenses for the support and maintenance of the two children, and that, because of this increase, the $350/month child support specified under the separation agreement was insufficient to support the children in accordance with the custom and standards to which they were previously accustomed. The court issued an order to plaintiff to appear at a hearing in district court on defendant\u2019s motion, and to show cause why, if there were any, he should not be required to increase the support payments for the children born of the marriage. The order also directed plaintiff to bring with him to the hearing all books and records indicating: the plaintiff\u2019s earnings in the previous year, including Federal tax returns; all amounts he may have on deposit in Building & Loan and other institutions; and all real and personal property owned by plaintiff. Defendant was also served with a subpoena directing her to bring to the hearing all records of her expenditures during 1971-1972, including bank statements and cancelled checks.\nAt the hearing, defendant testified as to the increased expenses related to the support of the two minor children. She was not able to* produce any bank statements or cancelled checks, which she explained she did not save after she checked her monthly balance. Plaintiff was not called as a witness, nor did he appear on his own behalf. Plaintiff\u2019s financial records were also not produced into evidence.\nThe court found as a fact that defendant had experienced an increase in expenses for the support and maintenance of the children, that the sum of $350 paid by plaintiff as child support pursuant to the separation agreement was insufficient to support the children in light of the increased expenses related to child support, and that there was \u201cno evidence presented in Open Court as to the circumstances of the plaintiff.\u201d The court ordered plaintiff to pay child support to defendant in the amount of $550, and also to pay defendant\u2019s attorney\u2019s fees.\nPlaintiff appealed.\nMraz, Aycock, Casstevens & Davis, by Gary A. Davis, for plaintiff.\nRobert F. Rush for defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0635-01",
  "first_page_order": 659,
  "last_page_order": 662
}