{ "id": 8239959, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF: S.R.S.", "name_abbreviation": "In re S.R.S.", "decision_date": "2006-11-07", "docket_number": "No. COA06-47", "first_page": "151", "last_page": "160", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "180 N.C. App. 151" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "158 N.C. 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "611 S.E.2d 886", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632727 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "888" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/611/0886-01" ] }, { "cite": "622 S.E.2d 120", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634478 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "123", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Patterson, 335 N.C. 437, 449-50, 439 S.E.2d 578, 585 (1994)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/622/0120-01" ] }, { "cite": "612 S.E.2d 320", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632798, 12632799 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/612/0320-01", "/se2d/612/0320-02" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 411", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12632800, 12632801, 12632802, 3797732, 3793990, 3803693, 3804429, 3799921, 3793971, 3799381, 3800918, 3798330 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/612/0321-01", "/se2d/612/0322-01", "/se2d/612/0322-02", "/nc/359/0411-06", "/nc/359/0411-08", "/nc/359/0411-01", "/nc/359/0411-02", "/nc/359/0411-05", "/nc/359/0411-09", "/nc/359/0411-07", "/nc/359/0411-04", "/nc/359/0411-03" ] }, { "cite": "625 S.E.2d 558", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635041 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "560", "parenthetical": "quoting In re J.F.M. & T.J.B., 168 N.C. App. 143, 150, 607 S.E.2d 304, 309, appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 411, 612 S.E.2d 320 (2005)" }, { "page": "560" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/625/0558-01" ] }, { "cite": "616 S.E.2d 627", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633601 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "631" }, { "page": "631" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/616/0627-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 N.C. App. 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9004897 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "194-95" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/170/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "580 S.E.2d 395", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "399" }, { "page": "397" }, { "page": "399" }, { "page": "397" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 N.C. App. 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9187123 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "289" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/158/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "439 S.E.2d 578", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "585" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2526577 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449-50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 N.C. App. 790", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8353318 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "795", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Patterson, 335 N.C. 437, 449-50, 439 S.E.2d 578, 585 (1994)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/174/0790-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 S.E.2d 779", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "782" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 N.C. App. 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520702 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/77/0110-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 S.E.2d 139", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "140" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "19 N.C. App. 497", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554486 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/19/0497-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 S.E.2d 410", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "411-12", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Reavis, 19 N.C. App. 497, 498, 199 S.E.2d 139, 140 (1973)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 N.C. App. 289", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525412 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "291", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Reavis, 19 N.C. App. 497, 498, 199 S.E.2d 139, 140 (1973)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/110/0289-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-277.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 S.E.2d 232", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 N.C. App. 637", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526577 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "639" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/75/0637-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 S.E.2d 595", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "597" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 N.C. App. 36", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12121556 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "40" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/86/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "607 S.E.2d 304", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 N.C. App. 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8468501 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "150" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/168/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 N.C. App. 760", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8353353 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "761", "parenthetical": "quoting In re J.F.M. & T.J.B., 168 N.C. App. 143, 150, 607 S.E.2d 304, 309, appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 411, 612 S.E.2d 320 (2005)" }, { "page": "761" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/175/0760-01" ] }, { "cite": "592 S.E.2d 12", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "162 N.C. App. 487", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8918200 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/162/0487-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 N.C. App. 782", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8321482 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "787" }, { "page": "787-88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/172/0782-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 S.E.2d 719", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "729" }, { "page": "731" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 293", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567490 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308" }, { "page": "311" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0293-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 856, "char_count": 22540, "ocr_confidence": 0.761, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.439813038534033e-07, "percentile": 0.8795952968686591 }, "sha256": "bc7722931477850eebe9a8ac5cee0c51a3b6e03e136906c516b951d290858ab6", "simhash": "1:8dc3940975ce0e44", "word_count": 3658 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:41:00.069129+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges CALABRIA and GEER concur." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF: S.R.S." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JACKSON, Judge.\nOn 21 April 2005, Cindy Walker (\u201cWalker\u201d), a teacher at Hopewell Elementary School in Trinity, North Carolina, was walking down the hall of the school when she heard a commotion coming from one of the classrooms. As she neared the classroom, Walker saw S.R.S. (\u201cjuvenile\u201d) standing in the doorway of the room, being prevented from entering the hallway by a teacher. The juvenile proceeded to shout at Walker, stating that \u201cI\u2019m going to kill your fucking daughter,\u201d and \u201cI\u2019m going to bring a gun to school tomorrow and kill your fucking daughter.\u201d Walker testified that she knew the juvenile was talking to her, as he was looking directly at her. Walker stated that she took the juvenile seriously based on past incidents between the juvenile and Walker\u2019s daughter. Walker reported the threats to school officials, who in turn reported the threats to the School Resource Officer.\nOn 22 April 2005, a Juvenile Petition was filed alleging the juvenile had committed the misdemeanor offense of communicating threats. The juvenile was found delinquent following a 19 September 2005 adjudication hearing, and was placed on twelve months of supervised probation following a disposition hearing on the same date. The juvenile appeals from the adjudication and disposition.\nWe begin by noting that the juvenile presents arguments as to only three of his eight assignments of error listed in the record on appeal. Therefore, the five assignments of error for which no argument has been presented are deemed abandoned. N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (2006).\nThe juvenile contends the juvenile petition charging him with communicating threats was fatally defective, in that it failed to properly allege all of the essential elements of the offense charged. The State contends that our review of this issue should be for plain error only, as'the juvenile failed to raise this issue before the lower court. However, it is well established that fatal defects in an indictment or a juvenile petition are jurisdictional, and thus may be raised at any time. See State v. Sturdivant, 304 N.C. 293, 308, 283 S.E.2d 719, 729 (1981); In re R.P.M., 172 N.C. App. 782, 787, 616 S.E.2d 627, 631 (2005). Therefore, we review the juvenile\u2019s argument on this issue to determine if the juvenile petition was in fact fatally defective.\nIn a juvenile delinquency action, the juvenile petition \u201cserves essentially the same function as an indictment in a felony prosecution and is subject to the same requirement that it aver every element of a criminal offense, with sufficient specificity that the accused is clearly apprised of the conduct for which he is being charged.\u201d In re Griffin, 162 N.C. App. 487, 493, 592 S.E.2d 12, 16 (2004). \u201c \u2018When a petition is fatally deficient, it is inoperative and fails to evoke the jurisdiction of the court.\u2019 \u201d In re B.D.W., 175 N.C. App. 760, 761, 625 S.E.2d 558, 560 (2006) (quoting In re J.F.M. & T.J.B., 168 N.C. App. 143, 150, 607 S.E.2d 304, 309, appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 411, 612 S.E.2d 320 (2005)); R.P.M., 172 N.C. App. at 787-88, 616 S.E.2d at 631. \u201c \u2018Because juvenile petitions are generally held to the standards of a criminal indictment, we consider the requirements of the indictments of the offenses at issue.\u2019 \u201d B.D.W., 175 N.C. App. at 761, 625 S.E.2d at 560.\nAlthough an indictment must give a defendant notice of every element of the crime charged, the indictment need not track the precise language of the statute. \u201c[A]n indictment which avers facts which constitute every element of an offense does not have to be couched in the language of the statute.\u201d State v. Hicks, 86 N.C. App. 36, 40, 356 S.E.2d 595, 597 (1987). An indictment need not even state every element of a charge so long as it states facts supporting every element of the crime charged. State v. Jordan, 75 N.C. App. 637, 639, 331 S.E.2d 232, 233 (1985). North Carolina General Statutes, section 15A-924(a)(5) (2005) requires that a criminal pleading set forth \u201c[a] plain and concise factual statement in each count which, without allegations of an evidentiary nature, asserts facts supporting every element of a criminal offense and the defendant\u2019s commission thereof with sufficient precision clearly to apprise the defendant or defendants of the conduct which is the subject of the accusation.\u201d Id.\nOur courts have recognized that while an indictment should give a defendant sufficient notice of the charges against him, it should not be subjected to hyper technical scrutiny with respect to form.\n[I]t is not the function of an indictment to bind the hands of the State with technical rules of pleading; rather, its purposes are to identify clearly the crime being charged, thereby putting the accused on reasonable notice to defend against it and prepare for trial, and to protect the accused from being jeopardized by the State more than once for the same crime.\nSturdivant, 304 N.C. at 311, 283 S.E.2d at 731.\nIn the instant case, the juvenile was charged with communicating threats, in violation of North Carolina General Statutes, section 14-277.1. Pursuant to section 14-277.1, anindividual commits the misdemeanor of communicating threats when:\n(1) He willfully threatens to physically injure the person or that person\u2019s child, sibling, spouse, or dependent or willfully threatens to damage the property of another;\n(2) The threat is communicated to the other person, orally, in writing, or by any other means;\n(3) The threat is made in a manner and under circumstances which would cause a reasonable person to believe that the threat is likely to be carried out; and\n(4) The person threatened believes that the threat will be carried out.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-277.1(a) (2005) (emphasis added). The juvenile\u2019s petition alleged the following:\nThe juvenile is a delinquent juvenile as defined by G.S. 7B-1501(7) in that on or about the date of alleged offense shown above and in the county named above the juvenile did unlawfully and willfully threaten to physically injure the person and damage the property of:\n(name person) Cindv Walker\nThe threat was communicated to the person in the following manner (describe):\nbv orally statins to the victim several times \u201cI\u2019m going to bring a gun to school and kill vour fucking daughter.\u201d\nand the threat was made in a manner and under circumstances which would cause a reasonable person to believe that the threat was likely to be carried out and the person believed that the threat would be carried out.\nThe juvenile contends the petition is fatally defective in that it alleges the juvenile threatened to injure the person and property of Walker, whereas the specific statement alleged to be the actual threat referred only to injury to Walker\u2019s daughter. The juvenile argues that the allegation that he \u201cdid unlawfully and willfully threaten to physically injure the person and damage the property\u201d, is the fatal defect which causes the petition to fail to properly allege the offense of communicating threats. He contends therefore that his adjudication as delinquent, and subsequent disposition, should be vacated.\nHere, the juvenile petition charged the juvenile with communicating threats, and correctly identified the applicable statute, North Carolina General Statutes, section 14-277.1. It correctly named the victim, and described precisely the actual threat that was the basis of the charge. Accordingly, we hold the juvenile received sufficient notice of the charge against him.\nThe juvenile was placed on notice of the particular statute he was accused of violating, and was given the corresponding statute number. The only ground for potential confusion was the petition\u2019s stating, \u201c[T]he juvenile did unlawfully and willfully threaten to physically injure the person and damage the property of... Cindy Walker.\u201d This, if left uncured, would render the juvenile petition fatally defective in that it would seem to accuse the juvenile of both threatening the victim and threatening to damage the victim\u2019s property. Also problematic is the fact that the petition initially accused the juvenile of threatening injury to the person of the victim, when the juvenile actually was charged with threatening the victim\u2019s child. But the statute makes clear that threatening the victim\u2019s child is treated the same as threatening the victim\u2019s person. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-277.1 (2005).\nFurther, any confusion created by the first paragraph of the petition was cleared up by the subsequent paragraph setting forth the precise conduct forming the basis of the charge. As such, the totality of the circumstances demonstrate that the juvenile had notice of the precise statutory provision he was being charged under, as well as the precise conduct that was alleged to be a violation of the statutory provision. The juvenile therefore had notice sufficient to allow him to mount a defense to the charge, and he can show no unfair prejudice or danger of unfair prejudice from the defective first paragraph. Also, the petition was specific enough to allow the trial court to enter judgment upon a finding of delinquency and to alleviate any concerns with respect to double jeopardy. This is all that is required of an indictment. State v. Jones, 110 N.C. App. 289, 291, 429 S.E.2d 410, 411-12 (1993) (quoting State v. Reavis, 19 N.C. App. 497, 498, 199 S.E.2d 139, 140 (1973)). This also is all that is required of a juvenile petition. As the juvenile\u2019s petition was not fatally defective, we hold the juvenile\u2019s assignment of error is overruled.\nNext, the juvenile contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss at the close of all of the evidence. The juvenile argues the State failed to introduce evidence establishing that the juvenile made the statement in a manner or circumstance which would cause a reasonable person to believe that the threat was likely to be carried out.\nTo withstand a juvenile\u2019s motion to dismiss based on an insufficiency of the evidence, the State must present substantial evidence of each element of the offense alleged. In re Bass, 77 N.C. App. 110, 115, 334 S.E.2d 779, 782 (1985). \u201cSubstantial evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u201d State v. Wood, 174 N.C. App. 790, 795, 622 S.E.2d 120, 123 (2005) (citing State v. Patterson, 335 N.C. 437, 449-50, 439 S.E.2d 578, 585 (1994)). In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the trial court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, and affords the State the benefit of every reasonable inference of fact which may be drawn from the evidence. Id.\nThe juvenile contends that because there was no evidence presented showing that the juvenile had a violent temper or that he had ever injured anyone, then there was not any evidence which would lead to the logical conclusion that Walker was reasonable in her belief that the juvenile would carry through with his threat. The juvenile also argues that there was insufficient evidence showing that Walker believed that the threat actually would be carried out. We disagree. We hold the evidence presented was sufficient to support a finding that the manner and circumstances surrounding juvenile\u2019s threat would cause a reasonable person to believe that the threat was likely to be carried out, and that Walker actually believed the threat was likely to be carried out.\nWalker testified at the juvenile\u2019s adjudication that she had known the juvenile for several years, and that he previously had been involved in incidents with Walker\u2019s daughter which caused Walker to take the juvenile\u2019s threat seriously. When the juvenile made the threat, he was not only looking directly at Walker, but he had to be physically prevented from coming into the hall. Walker testified that in the past, the juvenile had chased Walker\u2019s daughter down the hall and knocked her into a wall after her daughter told the juvenile that he was not supposed to be in the hall. Based upon Walker\u2019s testimony regarding her past history with the juvenile, we hold there was sufficient evidence which would lead a reasonable mind to conclude that the manner and circumstances surrounding the juvenile\u2019s threat were such that it was reasonable for Walker to believe that the threat would be carried out, and that Walker did in fact believe the threat was likely to be carried out. The juvenile\u2019s assignment of error is overruled.\nFinally, the juvenile contends the trial court erred in ordering the juvenile to comply with the following special conditions of his probation:\n(b) That the juvenile abide by any rules set out by the Court Counselor and the juvenile\u2019s parents, including, but not limited to, curfew rules and rules concerning those with [whom] he may or may not associate.\n(f) That the juvenile cooperate with any out of home placement if deemed necessary, or if arranged by the Court Counselor, including, but not limited to, a wilderness program.\n(m) That the juvenile cooperate with any counseling recommended by the Court Counselor.\n(p) That the juvenile cooperate with any counseling or assessment recommended by the Court Counselor.\nWe note initially that the juvenile\u2019s disposition order which placed the juvenile on twelve months of supervised probation was entered on 23 September 2005. As counsel for the juvenile has failed to notify this Court of the actual starting date of the juvenile\u2019s probation, and the trial court properly found that it was without authority to stay the dis-positional order pending the juvenile\u2019s appeal, this Court is left to assume that the juvenile\u2019s term of probation has since expired. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2510(c) (2005) (\u201cAn order of probation shall remain in force for a period not to exceed one year from the date entered.\u201d). Similarly, neither party has submitted anything to this Court indicating that the juvenile\u2019s probation has been exte'nded. Thus, due to the passage of time, the juvenile\u2019s appeal on this issue has become moot, as he has likely been released from his term of probation.\nHowever, in the interest of justice, we address the substance of the juvenile\u2019s assignment of error on the precaution that the juvenile\u2019s probation term was extended and has not expired.\nThe juvenile argues that these special conditions of his probation violate this Court\u2019s holding in In re Hartsock, 158 N.C. App. 287, 580 S.E.2d 395 (2003), in which we held that a trial court may not delegate or vest its discretion in another person or entity, and that \u201cthe court, and the court alone, must determine which dispositional alternatives to utilize with each delinquent juvenile.\u201d Id. at 292, 580 S.E.2d at 399. In Hartsock, the trial court ordered that a delinquent juvenile \u201ccooperate with placement in a residential treatment facility if deemed necessary by MAJORS counselor or Juvenile Court Counselor.\u201d Id. at 289, 580 S.E.2d at 397. This Court held that in so ordering, the trial court \u201cimproperly delegated its authority to \u2018order the juvenile to cooperate with placement in a residential treatment facility,\u2019 \u201d and therefore reversed this portion of the trial court\u2019s order. Id. at 292, 580 S.E.2d at 399.\nAlthough Hartsock dealt with a trial court\u2019s discretion to determine dispositional alternatives pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes, section 7B-2506, the instant case involves a trial court\u2019s determination of a juvenile\u2019s conditions of probation pursuant to section 7B-2510. Section 7B-2506 details the dispositional alternatives which a trial court may use, one of which is that the trial court may \u201c[p]lace the juvenile on probation under the supervision of a juvenile court counselor, as specified in G.S. 7B-2510.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2506(8) (2005). Thus, while our holding in Hartsock dealt solely with the trial court\u2019s discretion in ordering dispositional alternatives pursuant to section 7B-2506, we find it to be persuasive and applicable also to a trial court\u2019s order of probation pursuant to section 7B-2506(8), and the underlying conditions of that term of probation, which are governed by section 7B-2510.\nThe first condition of probation challenged by the juvenile states \u201c[t]hat the juvenile abide by any rules set out by the Court Counselor and the juvenile\u2019s parents, including, but not limited to, curfew rules and rules concerning those with [whom] he may or may not associate.\u201d Section 7B-2510(a)(3) specifically provides that one of the conditions of probation which a trial court may impose is \u201c[t]hat the juvenile shall not violate any reasonable and lawful rules of a parent, guardian, or custodian.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2510(a)(3) (2005). As the condition imposed by the trial court does not vary substantially from that allowed per the statute, we hold the condition is valid, and the trial court did not err in imposing it.\nThe juvenile next challenges the condition that he \u201ccooperate with any out of home placement if deemed necessary, or if arranged by the Court Counselor, including, but not limited to, a wilderness program.\u201d As the language of this condition is substantially similar to that in Hartsock which we held was an impermissible delegation of the trial court\u2019s authority, we therefore hold this condition too constitutes an impermissible delegation of authority. See Hartsock, 158 N.C. App. at 289, 580 S.E.2d at 397; compare, In re M.A.B., 170 N.C. App. 192, 194-95, 611 S.E.2d 886, 888 (2005) (order that juvenile was to \u201ccooperate and participate in a residential treatment program as directed, by court counselor or mental health agency\u201d was not an improper delegation of the trial court\u2019s authority, as \u201c[t]he determination of whether M.A.B. would participate in a residential treatment program was made by the trial court, but the specifics of the day-to-day program were to be directed by the Juvenile Court Counselor or Mental Health Agency.\u201d) (emphasis in original). The record before us fails to include any recommendation by the Court Counselor indicating that an out-of-home placement of any kind was recommended or may be necessary. Thus, if the trial court felt the juvenile was in need of an out-of-home placement or participation in a wilderness program, the trial court was in the position to order such, and should not have delegated this authority to the Court Counselor. This condition of the juvenile\u2019s probation therefore is reversed, provided that the issue is not moot due to the expiration of the juvenile\u2019s term of probation.\nThe final conditions of probation challenged by the juvenile are substantially similar in that they order the juvenile to cooperate with any counseling recommended by the Court Counselor, and also to comply with any assessments recommended by the Court Counselor. The record before us contains a \u201cJuvenile-Family Data Sheet\u201d which contains details regarding the juvenile, his family, his educational, medical, and psychological background, along with his juvenile delinquency court history. The report, which is signed by the Court Counselor, recommends the juvenile be ordered to \u201c[c]ooperate with any counseling or assessment recommended by court counselor.\u201d However, the report fails to indicate what type of counseling or assessment the juvenile may need \u2014 psychological, educational, or for substance abuse. As with the prior condition, if the trial court wished to order the juvenile to participate in a specific type of counseling or receive particular types of assessments, the condition should have specified the details of such counseling or assessments. Therefore, we hold this condition, without a more specific statement regarding the type of counseling or assessment the juvenile was to cooperate with, constitutes an impermissible delegation of the trial court\u2019s authority, and as such must be reversed. These conditions of probation therefore are reversed, provided that the issue is not moot due to the expiration of the juvenile\u2019s term of probation.\nAffirmed in part, reversed in part.\nJudges CALABRIA and GEER concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JACKSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Meredith Jo Alcoke, for the State.", "Michelle FormyDuval Lynch, for respondent-juvenile." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF: S.R.S.\nNo. COA06-47\n(Filed 7 November 2006)\n1. Juveniles\u2014 petition \u2014 defects jurisdictional \u2014 raised at any time\nA juvenile petition serves essentially the same function as an indictment in a felony prosecution and is held to the same standards. Fatal defects in an indictment or a juvenile petition are jurisdictional and may be raised at any time.\n2. Juveniles\u2014 petition \u2014 communicating threats \u2014 sufficiency\nA juvenile petition was not fatally defective where it charged the juvenile with communicating threats with initial language that the juvenile had threatened a person and her property, and subsequently and more specifically described only a threat to the person. The juvenile had notice of the precise statutory provision he was being charged under, as well as the precise conduct alleged to be a violation, he had notice sufficient for mounting a defense and can show no unfair prejudice, and the petition was specific enough to allow the court to enter a finding of delinquency and to alleviate any double jeopardy concerns.\n3. Threats\u2014 communicating \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThere was sufficient evidence that a juvenile communicated a threat where the juvenile was looking at the victim when he threatened to kill her daughter, he had to be restrained from coming into the school hallway where she was standing, and she testified that the victim had been involved in prior incidents with her daughter that caused her to take the threats seriously.\n4. Juveniles\u2014 probation \u2014 conditions\u2014delegation of authority\nThe holding in In re Hartsoek, 158 N.C. 287, was persuasive and applicable to a juvenile\u2019s order of probation under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2506(8), and to the underlying conditions of probation under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2510. The condition that the juvenile abide by any rules set by the court counselor and his parents does not vary substantially from that allowed by the statute and is valid. However, the trial court impermissibly delegated its authority by imposing the conditions that the juvenile cooperate with any out of home placement deemed necessary or arranged by the court counselor, and that he cooperate with any assessments and counseling recommended by the counselor.\nAppeal by respondent-juvenile from the order entered 23 September 2005 by Judge Scott C. Etheridge in Randolph County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 September 2006.\nAttorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Meredith Jo Alcoke, for the State.\nMichelle FormyDuval Lynch, for respondent-juvenile." }, "file_name": "0151-01", "first_page_order": 181, "last_page_order": 190 }