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  "name": "PHIL JACKSON FERGUSON AND WIFE, MARTHA J. FERGUSON, Plaintiffs v. LYLE W. COFFEY and wife, ELEANOR COFFEY and JOHN D. KINSLAND, Defendants",
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    "judges": [
      "Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge CALABRIA concur."
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    "parties": [
      "PHIL JACKSON FERGUSON AND WIFE, MARTHA J. FERGUSON, Plaintiffs v. LYLE W. COFFEY and wife, ELEANOR COFFEY and JOHN D. KINSLAND, Defendants"
    ],
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        "text": "TYSON, Judge.\nLyle W. and Eleanor Coffey and John D. Kinsland (\u201cdefendants\u201d) appeal from judgment entered computing the amount Phil Jackson and Martha J. Ferguson (\u201cplaintiffs\u201d) owe to them on an installment land sale contract or contract for deed. We affirm.\nI. Background\nOn 8 November 1971, plaintiffs entered into an installment sales contract with defendants to purchase real property located in Haywood County, North Carolina (\u201cthe property\u201d). Plaintiffs agreed to pay defendants $12,100.00 plus interest at seven percent. Plaintiffs agreed to pay $78.50 per month beginning 1 December 1971. Plaintiffs also agreed to maintain fire insurance and pay the ad valorum property taxes. Defendants agreed to place the deed in escrow with Northwestern Bank and upon plaintiffs\u2019 completion of payments defendants agreed to release the deed.\nPlaintiffs made payments for a period of time and in 1995 demanded the deed to be released by defendants. Defendants contended plaintiffs had ceased payments in 1987 and even if plaintiffs had continued to make payments on the loan, the principal was amortized over a thirty-two year period which had not yet expired. Defendants refused to release the deed. Plaintiffs commenced suit on 29 August 2000 and demanded delivery of the deed and damages.\nAt trial, all causes of action were dismissed except for plaintiffs\u2019 equity of redemption. The only issue submitted to the jury was the date of plaintiffs\u2019 last loan payment. The jury determined plaintiffs\u2019 last payment occurred in October 1987. The trial court entered judgment that plaintiffs were entitled to redeem their equity in the property by paying the outstanding balance and all taxes on the property. Upon receipt of this payment, defendants were ordered to convey title of the property to plaintiffs.\nPlaintiffs paid $16,634.12 into the Haywood County Clerk of Superior Court\u2019s Office. Defendants disputed the accuracy of this amount and moved for a judicial determination of the amount plaintiffs owed. Plaintiffs and defendants each had their respective accountants to prepare and submit affidavits along with their payoff calculations.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 certified public accountant, Michael Kennedy (\u201cKennedy\u201d), based his calculations on simple interest and concluded \u201cthe total principal due would be $8,544.82 and the total interest due would be $5,852.73.\u201d Thomas J. Sheehan (\u201cSheehan\u201d), defendants\u2019 accountant, prepared an amortization schedule based upon compounded interest and calculated the principal and accrued interest balance as of 1 October 1987 to be $9,488.70 and the balance due to be $32,853.93 as of 1 July 1995.\nThe trial court accepted Kennedy\u2019s calculations based upon simple interest. The trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law and entered judgment that \u201c [pjlaintiff pay the sum of $8,544.82 with interest of $6,670.87 as of August 15, 2005 and a daily rate of $1.62 per day until satisfied in full.\u201d Defendants appeal.\nII. Issue\nDefendants contend the trial court erred in calculating the balance and interest due defendants by using simple interest instead of compound interest.\nIII. Standard of Review\nThis Court has stated:\nIn an appeal from a judgment entered in a non-jury trial, our standard of review is whether competent evidence exists to support the trial court\u2019s findings of fact, and whether the findings support the conclusions of law. The trial judge acts as both judge and jury and considers and weighs all the competent evidence before him. The trial court\u2019s findings of fact are binding on appeal as long as competent evidence supports them, despite the existence of evidence to the contrary. When competent evidence supports the trial court\u2019s findings of fact and the findings of fact support its conclusions of law, the judgment should be affirmed in the absence of an error of law.\nResort Realty of the Outer Banks, Inc. v. Brandt, 163 N.C. App. 114, 116, 593 S.E.2d 404, 407-08 (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis in original), disc. rev. denied, 358 N.C. 236, 595 S.E.2d 154 (2004).\nWe review the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law de novo. Starco, Inc. v. AMG Bonding and Ins. Services, 124 N.C. App. 332, 336, 477 S.E.2d 211, 215 (1996).\nIV. Balance and Interest Due\nDefendants argue the trial court erroneously used simple interest to calculate the unpaid balance and determine plaintiffs\u2019 payoff amount. Defendants contend they are entitled to compound interest. Simple interest is defined as \u201cInterest paid on the principal only and not on accumulated interest.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 830 (8th ed. 2004). Compound interest is defined as \u201cInterest paid on both the principal and the previously accumulated interest.\u201d Id.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 and defendants\u2019 respective accountants prepared and submitted affidavits and amortization schedules to the trial court in support of their payoff calculations. The trial court: (1) accepted plaintiffs\u2019 accountant\u2019s calculations; (2) found that \u201c[s]imple interest is the sum calculated on the unpaid balance;\u201d (3) calculated plaintiffs payoff amount using simple interest; and (4) ordered that \u201c[p]laintiff pay the sum of $8,544.82 with interest of $6,670.87 as of August 15, 2005 and a daily rate of $1.62 per day until satisfied in full.\u201d\nA. Redemption of Equity\n\u201cThe right to redeem under the law of mortgages ... also [applies] to installment land contracts, even if [the buyers] have surrendered the property and are behind in mortgage payments.\u201d Lamberth v. McDaniel, 131 N.C. App. 319, 321, 506 S.E.2d 295, 297 (1998) (citing Brannock v. Fletcher, 271 N.C. 65, 73, 155 S.E.2d 532, 540-41 (1967)), cert. denied, 356 N.C. 614, 574 S.E.2d 681 (2002). The buyer of property through an installment sales contract is entitled to redeem the property by paying to the seller the total amount due under the contract plus accrued interest. See id. at 322, 506 S.E.2d at 297 (\u201c[Buyers] are entitled to redeem the property by the payment to the [sellers] of the balance due of the purchase price, plus interest and ad valorem taxes.\u201d); see also James A. Webster, Jr., Webster\u2019s Real Estate Law in North Carolina \u00a7 13-5, at 543 (Patrick K. Hetrick & James B. McLaughlin, Jr. eds., 5th ed. 1999) (\u201cSince a mortgage is intended only for security for an indebtedness, if the total indebtedness is paid at any time before foreclosure is complete, plus interest and costs, although not within the time limited, the object of the transaction will be attained and the creditor-mortgagee will have no complaint.\u201d).\nHere, the installment sales contract provides plaintiffs will: (1) \u201cpay in full the payments as set forth in the attached bank payment book for ($12,100.00 & 7% interest payable at $78.50 monthly beginning December 1, 1971.);\u201d (2) \u201ckeep fire insurance on the house in force for enough to cover the indebtedness on the house;\u201d and (3) \u201ckeep . . . county taxes on this house paid each year beginning with the 1972 taxes due and payable Dec. 1972.\u201d The \u201cattached bank payment book\u201d referred to in the contract is not included in the record on appeal.\nB. Simple or Compound Interest\nThe installment sales contract contains no express provision for plaintiffs to pay compounded interest. \u201c \u2018If [a] contract is clearly expressed, it must be enforced as it is written, and the court may not disregard the plainly expressed meaning of its language.\u2019 \u201d McClure Lumber Co. v. Helmsman Constr., Inc., 160 N.C. App. 190, 197, 585 S.E.2d 234, 238 (2003) (quoting Catawba Athletics v. Newton Car Wash, 53 N.C. App. 708, 712, 281 S.E.2d 676, 679 (1981)). If defendants and plaintiffs had bargained for compound interest to accrue on the balance due, interest upon unpaid interest would be added to the principal balance owed under the note. The land sales contract is silent on whether defendants may demand compounded interest from plaintiffs. In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, \u201c[e]quity dictates that a party should not be forced to pay interest on interest.\u201d NCNB v. Robinson, 80 N.C. App. 154, 157, 341 S.E.2d 364, 366 (1986).\nCurrent statutes governing interest expressly state whether a creditor or seller may require compounded interest. Compare N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 24-14 (2005) (For loans secured by secondary or junior mortgages, \u201cinterest may not be compounded.\u201d), with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 24-1.1A (2005) (Parties to a home loan $10,000.00 or more \u201cmay contract for the payment of interest as agreed upon by the parties.\u201d)\nNorth Carolina appellate courts have not addressed the question of whether compound or simple interest should be used to calculate the payoff amount for a buyer exercising their right of redemption in the absence of any provision in the agreement. The Supreme Court of Alabama specifically addressed this issue in Bookman v. WCH, L.L.C., - Ala. -, -, 943 So. 2d 789, 795 (Ala. 2006). In Bookman, the express terms of the note provided the debtor promised to pay compounded interest. Id. Bockman argued simple interest should be applied to the outstanding balance. Id. The Alabama Supreme Court disagreed and stated compound interest could be applied to the debt owed on the note because the mortgagor and the mortgagee expressly agreed to allow interest to be compounded. Id.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 accountants\u2019 affidavit supported the trial court\u2019s finding of fact that, \u201csimple interest is the sum calculated on the unpaid balance.\u201d This finding of fact supported the trial court\u2019s conclusion of law computing plaintiffs\u2019 payoff amount due. \u201cWhen competent evidence supports the trial court\u2019s findings of fact and the findings of fact support its conclusions of law, the judgment should be affirmed in the absence of an error of law.\u201d Resort Realty of the Outer Banks, Inc., 163 N.C. App. at 116, 593 S.E.2d at 408. We find no error of law in the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nV. Conclusion\nThe parties\u2019 contract did not require plaintiffs to pay compounded interest. The trial court\u2019s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence. The trial court\u2019s findings of fact supported its conclusions of law. The trial court\u2019s judgment is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nChief Judge MARTIN and Judge CALABRIA concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "TYSON, Judge."
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    "attorneys": [
      "McLean Law Firm, P.A., by Russell L. McLean, III, for plaintiff s-appellees.",
      "Gina L. Norwood,, for defendants-appellants."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "PHIL JACKSON FERGUSON AND WIFE, MARTHA J. FERGUSON, Plaintiffs v. LYLE W. COFFEY and wife, ELEANOR COFFEY and JOHN D. KINSLAND, Defendants\nNo. COA06-200\n(Filed 21 November 2006)\nInterest\u2014 simple or compound \u2014 installment sale of property \u2014 contract silent\nThe trial court did not err by calculating the balance and interest due on the installment sale of property by using simple rather than compound interest where the contract did not have an express provision for compound interest.\nAppeal by defendants from judgment entered 18 August 2005 by Judge Danny E. Davis in Haywood County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 30 October 2006.\nMcLean Law Firm, P.A., by Russell L. McLean, III, for plaintiff s-appellees.\nGina L. Norwood,, for defendants-appellants."
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