{ "id": 8242280, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF: J.J., J.J., J.J., Minor Children", "name_abbreviation": "In re J.J.", "decision_date": "2006-12-05", "docket_number": "No. COA05-1510", "first_page": "344", "last_page": "361", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "180 N.C. App. 344" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "599 S.E.2d 46", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12631472 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/599/0046-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12631460, 12631464, 12631499, 12631468, 12631471, 12631472, 12631474 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/599/0040-01", "/se2d/599/0042-03", "/se2d/599/0907-01", "/se2d/599/0043-01", "/se2d/599/0045-01", "/se2d/599/0046-01", "/se2d/599/0048-02" ] }, { "cite": "612 S.E.2d 436", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632830 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/612/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "616 S.E.2d 538", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633576, 12633575 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/616/0538-02", "/se2d/616/0538-01" ] }, { "cite": "614 S.E.2d 368", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633137 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/614/0368-01" ] }, { "cite": "594 S.E.2d 211", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "216" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 N.C. App. 438", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8918351 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/163/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 N.C. App. 430", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9005766 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/170/0430-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 632", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3798082, 3795365, 3797350, 3794823, 3804744, 3796621, 3795799 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0632-01", "/nc/359/0632-04", "/nc/359/0632-03", "/nc/359/0632-07", "/nc/359/0632-06", "/nc/359/0632-02", "/nc/359/0632-05" ] }, { "cite": "610 S.E.2d 424", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 N.C. App. 375", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8470251 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/169/0375-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 N.C. App. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8435401 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/171/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "604 S.E.2d 314", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 68", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3793476, 3799505, 3801974, 3800535, 3795417, 3797691, 3800412, 3797917 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0068-03", "/nc/359/0068-04", "/nc/359/0068-05", "/nc/359/0068-08", "/nc/359/0068-02", "/nc/359/0068-01", "/nc/359/0068-07", "/nc/359/0068-06" ] }, { "cite": "598 S.E.2d 387", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 N.C. App. 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8997210 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/165/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "608 S.E.2d 813", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "819" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 N.C. App. 638", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8471449 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "648" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/168/0638-01" ] }, { "cite": "477 S.E.2d 211", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 N.C. App. 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11889393 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "336" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/124/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "581 S.E.2d 134", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "137", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 N.C. App. 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9188114 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "477", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/158/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "628 S.E.2d 760", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635608, 12635609, 12635610 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/628/0760-01", "/se2d/628/0760-02", "/se2d/628/0760-03" ] }, { "cite": "619 S.E.2d 561", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633989 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565" }, { "page": "564", "parenthetical": "\"[A]n appropriate showing of prejudice arising from the delay could constitute reversal.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/619/0561-01" ] }, { "cite": "616 S.E.2d 392", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633568 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "This Court held the nine month delay prejudiced the parents." } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/616/0392-01" ] }, { "cite": "617 S.E.2d 702", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633752 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "The trial court entered its order just short of one year from the date of the hearing. This Court reversed the trial court's order." } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/617/0702-01" ] }, { "cite": "623 S.E.2d 349", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634614 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "The trial court's order was vacated because the court failed to enter its order for six months, and the father was prejudiced because he was unable to file an appeal." } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/623/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "633 S.E.2d 715", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636476 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "718", "parenthetical": "\"The trial court erred ... by entering its order an additional seven months after the statutorily mandated time period.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/633/0715-01" ] }, { "cite": "628 S.E.2d 31", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635549 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "33" }, { "page": "33", "parenthetical": "internal quotations and citations omitted" }, { "page": "33" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/628/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "627 S.E.2d 510", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635397 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "513" }, { "page": "513-14" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/627/0510-01" ] }, { "cite": "599 S.E.2d 46", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12631472 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/599/0046-01" ] }, { "cite": "612 S.E.2d 436", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632830 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "This Court reversed the trial court's judgment because the trial court failed to enter its order until seven months after the hearing." } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/612/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "616 S.E.2d 538", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633576, 12633575 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/616/0538-02", "/se2d/616/0538-01" ] }, { "cite": "614 S.E.2d 368", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633137 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "370" }, { "parenthetical": "This Court reversed the trial court's order because the trial court failed to enter its order until five months after the hearing." } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/614/0368-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 476", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3788490 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0476-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 N.C. App. 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8353965 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "555" }, { "page": "555" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/173/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 U.S. 745", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11307633 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "753" }, { "page": "606" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/us/455/0745-01" ] }, { "cite": "555 S.E.2d 659", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "665-66" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "147 N.C. App. 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9379604 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "359" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/147/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 N.C. App. 689", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8321258 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "This Court held the nine month delay prejudiced the parents." } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/172/0689-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 N.C. App. 153", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8353074 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "The trial court entered its order just short of one year from the date of the hearing. This Court reversed the trial court's order." } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/173/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 N.C. App. 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8352275 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "The trial court's order was vacated because the court failed to enter its order for six months, and the father was prejudiced because he was unable to file an appeal." } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/175/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "493 S.E.2d 450", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551138, 551077, 551207, 551251, 551284 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0263-05", "/nc/347/0263-03", "/nc/347/0263-02", "/nc/347/0263-04", "/nc/347/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "486 S.E.2d 735", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "737" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "126 N.C. App. 800", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11713506 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "803" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/126/0800-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 N.C. App. 136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8301018 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "139" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/177/0136-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 N.C. App. 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8300927 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/177/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 N.C. App. 430", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9005766 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "This Court reversed the trial court's judgment because the trial court failed to enter its order until seven months after the hearing." } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/170/0430-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 632", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3798082, 3795365, 3797350, 3794823, 3804744, 3796621, 3795799 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0632-01", "/nc/359/0632-04", "/nc/359/0632-03", "/nc/359/0632-07", "/nc/359/0632-06", "/nc/359/0632-02", "/nc/359/0632-05" ] }, { "cite": "610 S.E.2d 424", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427" }, { "page": "426-27", "parenthetical": "internal quotations and citation omitted" }, { "page": "426" }, { "page": "428", "parenthetical": "Timmons-Goodson, J., concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "169 N.C. App. 375", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8470251 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380" }, { "page": "378" }, { "page": "382" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/169/0375-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 N.C. App. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8435401 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "135" }, { "parenthetical": "This Court reversed the trial court's order because the trial court failed to enter its order until five months after the hearing." } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/171/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "581 S.E.2d 134", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "137" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "158 N.C. App. 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9188114 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "477" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/158/0473-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1346, "char_count": 41911, "ocr_confidence": 0.737, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0446031217563963e-07, "percentile": 0.7515034660321895 }, "sha256": "a36dfe8deb031a1a5dbac2571947946aedb4d161e1dc6da36f838af5cd0fcd03", "simhash": "1:b3ad142e5e275e72", "word_count": 6795 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:41:00.069129+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge WYNN concurs in a separate opinion.", "Judge TYSON dissents in a separate opinion." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF: J.J., J.J., J.J., Minor Children" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUDSON, Judge.\nOn 30 April '2002, the Gaston County Department of Social Services (\u201cDSS\u201d) filed a removal petition alleging that respondent mother had neglected her three children. Respondent mother stipulated to the dependency of the children, and the petition was amended to assert dependency in lieu of neglect. The court continued DSS\u2019s physical and legal custody of the children, and their placement with the maternal grandmother. Review hearings were held throughout 2003, during which time the permanency plan remained reunification with the mother for two of the children and placement with the father for the third child. At a May 2004 review hearing, the court ordered DSS to develop a plan for reunification.\nFollowing a August 2004 permanency planning hearing, the court entered an order ceasing reunification efforts and changing the children\u2019s permanent plan to custody by a guardian or court-approved care-taker. The court entered the order on 24 March 2005. Respondent mother appeals. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.\nRespondent is the mother of three minor children: J.J.(l), a girl born in 1994, J.J.(2), a son bom in 2000, and J.J.(3), another son, bom in 2001. DSS removed the children in April 2002, alleging that respondent mother left cleaning products in the children\u2019s reach, left them unsupervised at home, allowed people on drugs and alcohol into the home, missed the children\u2019s medical appointments, and failed to keep her hearing aid working properly. On 24 August 2004, the court held a permanency planning hearing at which DSS presented no evidence. A social worker testified that respondent could manage her children with assistance.\nRespondent first argues that the court erred in ceasing reunification efforts and changing the permanency plan to guardianship with a court-approved care-taker where all the evidence supported a conclusion that the children were not dependent at the time of the hearing. We disagree.\nAll dispositional orders following dependency hearings\nmust contain findings of fact based upon the credible evidence presented at the hearing. If the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, they are conclusive on appeal. In a permanency planning hearing held pursuant to Chapter 7B, the trial court can only order the cessation of reunification efforts when it finds facts based upon credible evidence presented at the hearing that support its conclusion of law to cease reunification efforts.\nIn re Weiler, 158 N.C. App. 473, 477, 581 S.E.2d 134, 137 (2003) (internal citations omitted). We review the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law de novo. Starco, Inc. v. AMG Bonding and Ins. Servs., 124 N.C. App. 332, 336, 477 S.E.2d 211, 215 (1996).\nA dependent juvenile is defined as:\nA juvenile in need of assistance or placement because the juvenile has no parent, guardian, or custodian responsible for the juvenile\u2019s care or supervision or whose parent, guardian, or custodian is unable to provide for the care or supervision and lacks an appropriate alternative child care arrangement.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-101(9) (2006). In entering an order placing a juvenile in the custody of a county department of social services, including a review order, the trial court may stop reunification efforts based on findings of fact that:\n(1) Such efforts clearly would be futile or would be inconsistent with the juvenile\u2019s health, safety, and need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable period of time[.]\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-507(b) (2006). Respondent contends that at the time of the permanency planning hearing, the children were no longer dependent.\nThe court made the following findings:\n13. That the level of assistance necessary would require supervision of the Respondent/mother for 24 hours a day/7 days a week to ensure the safety and well being [sic] of the children. The Court in particular is concerned with the security of Ms. J and the children; their vulnerability; and the potential for third parties to disturb their well-being in an independent living environment.\n14. That the CBS workers can be available for around the clock one-on-one supervision; however, DSS advises, and the ad litem does not have facts to the contrary, that Medicaid funding is not available for 24/7 care on a permanent basis.\n***\n16. DSS advises, and the guardian ad litem does not have facts to the contrary, that there are no known group home resources wherein Respondent/mother, Fay J, could live together with her children and can obtain the help necessary to assist the family at the required level of supervision.\nHere, the court found that respondent could not care for her children without constant assistance, and that such assistance is not available to her. While respondent assigned error to several of the trial court\u2019s findings and lists them following the title of her first argument section, specifically findings 4, 5, 13-22 and 24, she does not discuss them in her argument. These assignments of error are presumed abandoned, and all of the court\u2019s findings of fact are deemed binding. The findings, included those quoted above, support the court\u2019s conclusion that the children were dependent in that respondent \u201cis unable to provide for the care or supervision and lacks an appropriate alternative child care arrangement.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-101(9). The court did not abuse its discretion, and we overrule this assignment of error.\nRespondent also contends that the court erred in considering the DSS report and the psychological evaluation because neither was properly admitted. At a dispositional hearing, the court \u201cmay consider any evidence ... that the court finds to be relevant, reliable, and necessary to determine the needs of the juvenile and the most appropriate disposition.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-901 (2006). Thus, the formal rules of evidence do not apply to such hearings. In re M.J. G., 168 N.C. App. 638, 648, 608 S.E.2d 813, 819 (2005). This assignment of error is without merit.\nRespondent next argues that the court erred in failing to enter a timely order which prejudiced respondent. We do not agree.\n\u201cAny order shall be reduced to writing, signed, and entered no later than 30 days following the completion of the hearing.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-907 (2006). An appellant must show prejudice in order to obtain appellate relief for violation of the 30 day period. In re J.L.K., 165 N.C. App. 311, 316, 598 S.E.2d 387, 391, disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 68, 604 S.E.2d 314 (2004). Here, the order states that the hearing came \u201con August 24 and 31, 2004.... and has been further heard and continued on various dates through December 9, 2004.\u201d (Emphasis supplied.) The court entered the order on 24 March 2005. The lapse between completion of the hearing and the entry of the order was approximately 3\u2018A months, 2% months longer than the statutory period. Respondent cites various termination of parental rights (\u201cTPR\u201d) cases where prejudice was shown. See In re C.J.B., 171 N.C. App. 132, 614 S.E.2d 368 (2005); In re L.E.B., 169 N.C. App. 375, 610 S.E.2d 424, disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 632, 616 S.E.2d 538 (2005); In re T.L.T., 170 N.C. App. 430, 612 S.E.2d 436 (2005). Prejudice in these cases was associated with delay in the final settlement of custody and permanency plans where parental rights were being- terminated in favor of adoption.\nIn the instant case, the order changed the permanency plan from reunification to guardianship, and respondent\u2019s visitation rights were not being terminated. In fact, because the order reduced her visitation rights, any delay in the entry of the order actually benefitted respondent in that the reduction of her visitation was delayed. Respondent asserts that her oldest child has had negative behaviors resulting from the delay, but the negative behavior began prior to the August 2004 review hearing. Respondent also asserts that she has become depressed; however, the psychological evaluation of respondent reveals that these symptoms began several months before the August 2004 review hearing. Respondent does not allege any specific prejudice occurring as a result of the 2/ month delay in entry of the court\u2019s order.\nThe dissent concludes that respondent did allege specific prejudice occurring as a result of the 2!4 month delay in entry of the court\u2019s order. However, the only language on this issue in the mother\u2019s brief not directly discussing the mother\u2019s depression or the older child\u2019s negative behavior is the following:\nIn the case at Bar, \u201clittle more than common sense is necessary\u201d to see that for the mother and these children, their wait has been unconscionable, [discussion of delay in Appellate Entries]. . . .\nThe trial court found as fact that, the \u201cRespondent/mother, Faye J[] dearly loves her children and that the children dearly love her and have a strong bond with their mother.\u201d The court found, in fact, that the family is so strongly bonded that it \u201ccannot envision that termination of Ms. J[]\u2019s parental right would be in the best interests of the children in this highly bonded family.\u201d\n[The next paragraph discusses the daughter\u2019s negative behaviors]\n[discussion of mother\u2019s mild depression] When she visited the children, \u201cthey loved and hugged on her.\u201d Up until the time of the hearing (from which appeal was taken), Faye and her children visited together two afternoons per week. At that hearing, though, visits were reduced to one (1) hour a week.\nConsidering the level of bonding among these family members, it takes \u201clittle more than common sense\u201d to conclude that they have all been prejudiced by the delays in this case. The trial court must be reversed.\nThis language is essentially a statement that this family is strongly bonded, but without any allegation that the bonding has been harmed in any way by the 2lA month delay in entry of the order, and a statement that the mother\u2019s visitation with the children was reduced by the order. The dissent states that \u201c[a]fter 24 August 2004, respondent and her children saw each other only \u2018one (1) hour a week\u2019 supervised.\u201d However, the order was not signed and filed until March 2005. There is no indication in the briefs or order or record that the visitation change went into effect and was enforced before the order was signed and filed. The mother\u2019s brief indicates that \u201c[a]t that hearing . . . visits were reduced,\u201d but does not state that this change actually went into effect or that she actually began seeing her children less. Thus, we conclude she suffered no prejudice from the delay.\nRespondent also argues that the court erred in failing to appoint a guardian ad litem for respondent where mental illness was the basis of the allegations that the children were dependent. We disagree.\nOur Courts have held that\nthe language of the statute itself . . . requires the appointment of a guardian ad litem only in cases where (1) it is alleged that a juvenile is dependent; and (2) the juvenile\u2019s dependency is alleged to be caused by a parent or guardian being \u201cincapable as the result of substance abuse, mental retardation, mental illness, organic brain syndrome, or any other similar cause or condition of providing for the proper care and supervision of the juvenile.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-602(b)(1) (2003). Thus, a trial court need not appoint a guardian ad litem pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 7B-602(b)(1) unless (1) the petition specifically alleges dependency; and (2) the majority of the dependency allegations tend to show that a parent or guardian is incapable as the result of some debilitating condition listed in the statute of providing for the proper care and supervision of his or her child.\nIn re H. W., 163 N.C. App. 438, 447, 594 S.E.2d 211, 216 (2004), cert. denied sub nom. In re H.W., 358 N.C. 543, 599 S.E.2d 46 (2004). The petition filed by DSS does not mention any developmental disabilities or limitations. While respondent\u2019s brief mentions her learning limitations (highly functioning mentally retarded) and DSS reports requiring her to cooperate with Developmental Disability Services, she cites nothing in the record indicating that her inability to care for her children without constant assistance is due to her mental health issues. This assignment of error is without merit.\nThe dissent asserts that the court is halting reunification efforts based on poverty in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1111(a)(2):\nThe parent has willfully left the juvenile in foster care or placement outside the home for more than 12 months without showing to the satisfaction of the court that reasonable progress under the circumstances has been made in correcting those conditions which led to the removal of the juvenile. Provided, however, that no parental rights shall be terminated for the sole reason that the parents are unable to care for the juvenile on account of their poverty.\n(Emphasis supplied). Here, the court did conclude that because the mother would need twenty-four hour a day help to cope with and care for her children, \u201creunification is possible but not financially practical.\u201d However, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1111 governs the termination of parental rights rather than changing a permanency plan to guardianship. Here, the court did not terminate the mother\u2019s parental rights. Instead, the hearing was a review hearing held pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-906 (2003) and a permanency planning hearing held pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-907 (2003). Neither of these statutes bars consideration of the cost of providing the services deemed necessary for reunification when making a change to the permanency plan.\nAffirmed.\nJudge WYNN concurs in a separate opinion.\nJudge TYSON dissents in a separate opinion.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUDSON, Judge." }, { "text": "WYNN, Judge\nconcurring.\nI concur fully with the majority opinion. I write separately to point out that notwithstanding the laudable policy statements of the dissent expressing concern for the absence of these children from their mother, this Court and the trial judges who viewed the witnesses in this matter, must follow the law. While the law does indeed provide that dispositional orders shall be entered within thirty days of the hearing, this Court is bound by the prior decisions holding that this is not a per se rule; indeed, the complaining party must articulate the prejudice that arises from a delay beyond thirty days.\nBy requiring the complaining party to show prejudice, our Courts recognize that technical procedural rules should not be enforced to the exclusion of the common-sense impact on the parties involved. In this case, enforcing the thirty-day rule would further harm these children by delaying the inevitable cessation of efforts to reunite them with a mother who admits she has failed to provide proper care and supervision, and who has shown no evidence that she is willing to cooperate with reunification efforts. A review of the record on appeals confirms a protracted involvement of Department of Social Service and the trial judges in this matter.\nThe record on appeal shows that over four years ago, on 30 April 2002, DSS filed a neglect petition regarding the three children. The petition alleged that the mother allowed \u201cpersons harmful to her children in her home\u201d resulting in the sex abuse of her then six-year old child and the successful prosecution of the perpetrator. The petition also indicated the mother allowed persons under the influence of drugs and alcohol to care for her children. And, the mother failed to follow medical directives for two of her children \u201cdiagnosed with William Syndrome, a disorder of the 15th chromosome,\u201d which is accompanied by \u201cvarious special needs.\u201d\nIn response to that petition, the mother \u201cadmitted in open court\u201d that \u201cthe juveniles do not receive proper care or supervision.\u201d Accordingly, on 26 August 2002, District Court Judge Ralph Gingles found the children dependent, placed them in the home of their maternal grandmother, and allowed the mother supervised visits. But, by September 2002, the mother closed her case with Developmental Disabilities and refused to cooperate with DSS and other professionals enlisted to assist her family. She failed to demonstrate appropriate parenting skills, was inattentive to the children during visits, and showed hostility towards the DSS social worker. In the meantime, the Guardian ad Litem for the juveniles who initially favored reunification with the mother, opined that the mother had not made substantial progress and had not shown a willingness to cooperate with personnel from necessary services.\nThe record shows that trial judges remained active in this matter with Juvenile Orders (dated internally) on 20 May 2002; 23 August 2002; 18 September 2002; 12 December 2002; 15 January 2003; 25 February 2003; 10 April 2003; 29 April 2003; 27 May 2003; 29 July 2003, 28 October 2003; 23 March 2004; 7 May 2004; 13 July 2004; and 31 August 2004. The orders were signed by various district court judges including Judges Ralph C. Gingles, Jr.; James A. Jackson; Dennis J. Redwing; Angela G. Hoyle; and John K. Greenlee.\nSignificantly, before DSS filed the petition of 30 April 2002, it made numerous efforts to assist the family and prevent the need for placement, namely: Intensive Family Preservation Services, referral to Parents and Children Together, referral to Developmental Disabilities Services, Community Based Services, and resource assessment from the North Carolina Division of Services for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing. DSS also provided financial assistance, case management services, and purchased assistive listening devices to assist the mother in monitoring the home.\nThus, the record shows that in this matter the judges involved, and the employees of the Department of Social Services, exercised diligence. Indeed, the record reflects that the judges in this case performed their duties \u201cimpartially and diligently.\u201d\nMoreover, even if the mother can show prejudice resulting from the delay in filing the order in this case, the prejudice to the children far outweighs the inconvenience to the mother. To reverse this order will do nothing to benefit these children who have too long been denied proper care and supervision which the mother admittedly has failed to provide. In fact, the dissent challenges primarily the technical compliance with the time for filing the order.\nIn sum, in determining whether the mother has been prejudiced by the delay in entering the order in this matter, I find it significant that she has stated no basis to support the proposition that her appeal from that order, even if made seven months earlier, would have been successful. Second, I find it significant that the trial judges involved in this matter exercised diligence in overseeing and administering this matter. It is apparent to me that the judges in this case acted promptly and made every effort to afford the mother a meaningful opportunity to reunite with her children; she, however, refused that opportunity. Third, the order appealed from compassionately recognizes that the mother is a loving person, but it also acknowledges her inability to provide for these children. Faced with this difficult dilemma, in light of the years of efforts by the employees of the Department of Social Services and the conscientious involvement by numerous trial judges, Judge Jackson who had been involved in this case since 2002, decided that it was time to consider the best interest of the children in this matter. Based on the evidence showing that reunification was not possible within six months due to the mother\u2019s need for constant supervision and assistance in order to care for the children, Judge Jackson properly authorized the cessation of reunification efforts.\nSince the mother cannot demonstrate that the delay in filing the order prejudiced her ability to file a substantively meritless appeal, I join with Judge Hudson to form a majority opinion that affirms the order of the trial court finding it to be in the best interest of the child to cease reunification efforts.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "WYNN, Judge" }, { "text": "TYSON, Judge,\ndissenting.\nThe majority opinion erroneously affirms the trial court\u2019s order, which ceased reunification efforts and changed the children\u2019s permanent plan to custody by a guardian or court approved caretaker. The majority opinion holds respondent failed to establish prejudice from the trial court\u2019s excessive delay in reducing to writing and entering its order and also fails to address on its merits respondent not being reunited with her three children due to her poverty. I respectfully dissent.\nI. Late Entry of Order\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-905(a) (2005) mandates, \u201cThe dispositional order shall be in writing, signed, and entered no later than 30 days from the completion of the hearing, and shall contain appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law.\u201d (Emphasis supplied). The statute clearly states the outside limit to enter the order is \u201cno later than 30 days.\u201d Id.\nThis Court has previously stated, \u201c[a] trial court\u2019s violation of statutory time limits in a juvenile case is not reversible error per se . . . [T]he complaining party [who] appropriately articulate [s] the prejudice arising from the delay . . . [does] justify reversal.\u201d In re S.N.H. & L.J.H. 177 N.C. App. 82, 86, 627 S.E.2d 510, 513 (2006).\nWhile \u201c[t]he passage of time alone is not enough to show prejudice, . . . [this Court] recently [held] .\u2022. . the longer the delay in entry of the order beyond the thirty-day deadline, the more likely prejudice will be readily apparent.\u201d Id. at 86, 627 S.E.2d at 513-14 (quoting In re C.J.B., 171 N.C. App. 132, 135, 614 S.E.2d 368, 370 (2005)).\nThis Court has repeatedly reversed orders affecting a respondent\u2019s parental rights due to prejudice to the respondent, the children, and the other parties, resulting from the trial court\u2019s inordinate late entry of its order. In re D.S., S.S.; F.S., M.M., M.S., 177 N.C. App. 136, 139, 628 S.E.2d 31, 33 (2006). This Court stated in In re D.S.:\nRespondent argues the delay prejudiced all members of the family involved, as well as the foster and adoptive parents. By failing to reduce its order to writing within the statutorily prescribed [30 day] time period, the parent and child have lost time together, the foster parents are in a state of flux, and the adoptive parents are not able to complete their family plan. The delay of over six months to enter the adjudication and disposition order terminating respondent-mother\u2019s parental rights prejudiced all parties, not just respondent-mother.\n177 N.C. App. at 139-40, 628 S.E.2d at 33 (internal quotations and citations omitted).\nThis Court held a delay in the entry of an order of six months was \u201c[highly] prejudicial to respondent-mother, the minors, and the foster parent.\u201d In re L.E.B., K.T.B., 169 N.C. App. 375, 380, 610 S.E.2d 424, 427, disc. rev. denied, 359 N.C. 632, 616 S.E.2d 538 (2005). Prejudice to the respondent, her children, and all parties involved is clear when:\nRespondent-mother, the minors, and the foster parent did not receive an immediate, final decision in a life altering situation for all parties. Respondent-mother could not appeal until entry of the order. If adoption becomes the ordered permanent plan for the minors, the foster parent must wait even longer to commence the adoption proceedings. The minors are prevented from settling into a permanent family environment until the order is entered and the time for any appeals has expired.\nId. at 379, 610 S.E.2d at 426-27 (internal quotations and citation omitted).\nHere, the trial court held, a review hearing on 24 August 2004 to determine whether respondents\u2019 children could be reunited with her. On 31 August 2004, an oral order was rendered in open court. The order was not signed until 18 March 2005 and was ultimately filed and entered seven months after the hearing on 24 March 2005. The order states, \u201cEntered (sic) this 31 day of August, 2004. Signed this the 18th day of March, 2005.\u201d The order was not filed in the Gaston County Clerk of Superior Court\u2019s Office until 24 March 2005.\nThe majority opinion erroneously concludes, \u201c[t]he lapse between the completion of the hearing and the entry of the order was approximately 3!4 months, 2% months longer than the statutory period.\u201d The majority\u2019s conclusion is based upon the contention that, while the matter was heard and the oral rendition of the order was announced at a review hearing on 24 August 2004 and 31 August 2004, the matter was continued through 9 December 2004. The only reference to the 9 December 2004 hearing is in the written order entered. No transcript of the December hearing is filed on appeal. No terms different from those orally rendered in August 2004 are contained in the order entered on 24 March 2005.\nRespondent\u2019s visitation rights with her children were restricted to \u201cone (1) hour a week\u201d supervised on 24 August 2004. At the hearing on 24 August 2004, respondent\u2019s attorney asked, \u201cIn terms of visitation, you didn\u2019t announce that from the bench, would that be an hour a week... ?\u201d The trial court responded, \u201call right.\u201d Reunification efforts ceased between respondent and her children on 31 August 2004. The trial court ordered DSS \u201ccan cease the reunification efforts with [respondent] and I believe the permanent plan was custody to a guardian.\u201d Though the order was purportedly \u201centered\u201d on 31 August 2004, the order was not signed until 18 March 2005 and filed and entered on 24 March 2005.\nA judgment is not entered until \u201cit is reduced to writing, signed by the judge, and filed with the clerk of court.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 58 (2005). Respondent could not notice entry of appeal until the order was \u201centered,\u201d even though all reunification efforts had ceased and her visitation was severely restricted to one hour per week supervised for over seven months. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 58; see Abels v. Renfro Corp., 126 N.C. App. 800, 803, 486 S.E.2d 735, 737 (The Court of Appeals is without authority to entertain appeal of a case which lacks entry of judgment), disc. rev. denied, 347 N.C. 263, 493 S.E.2d 450 (1997).\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-905(a) (2005) specifically states, \u201c[t]he dis-positional order shall be in writing, signed, and entered no later than 30 days from the completion of the hearing.\u201d (Emphasis supplied). Here, \u201cthe hearing\u201d is the date reunification efforts ceased. DSS no longer provided services to respondent, and she remained separated from her children. Her parental rights to the \u201ccare, custody, and control\u201d of respondent\u2019s children were supervised and restricted to \u201cone (1) hour a week.\u201d The order appealed from is from the review hearing which, as the order specifically states, was held on 24 August 2004. For these reasons, the delay in entry of the order is seven months, not three and one-half months.\nII. Prejudice to Respondent\nThe majority opinion next errs in concluding that the delay did not cause prejudice to respondent and concludes, \u201c[respondent does not allege any specific prejudice occurring as a result of the 3/ month delay in entry of the court\u2019s order.\u201d This conclusion dismisses and fails to address respondent\u2019s allegations of prejudice.\nIn her brief, respondent specifically argues and shows the prejudice that resulted from the seven month late entry of this order:\nThe judge signed the order on 18 March, 2005, nearly seven (7) months later....\n[L]ittle more than common sense is necessary to see that for this [respondent] mother and these children, their wait has been unconscionable ....\nThe trial court found as a fact that, \u201cRespondent/mother, Faye J[] dearly loves her children and that the children dearly love her and have a strong bond with their mother.\u201d The court found, in fact, that the family is so strongly bonded that it, \u201ccannot envision that termination of Ms. J[]\u2019s parental rights would be in the best interests of the children in this highly bonded family.\u201d\nTragically, the oldest child thought she would \u201cbe reunited with her mother by Christmas\u201d \u2014 of 2004. The order additionally stated that she [the oldest daughter] was exhibiting \u201cnegative behavior,\u201d and those behavior issues were not being addressed because . . . there was poor communication between school personnel and her foster care givers.\nWhile being evaluated, Ms. J [respondent] exhibited symptoms of mild depression, which were caused by not having her children living with her .... Up until the time of the hearing (from which appeal was taken,) Faye [respondent] and her children visited together two afternoons a week. At that hearing [24 August 2005], though, visits were reduced to one (1) hour a week.\nRespondent\u2019s alleged prejudice arose from the separation, limited visitation, and strain on the strong familial bonds the court found to be present between respondent and her children. After 24 August 2004, respondent and her children saw each other only \u201cone (1) hour a week\u201d supervised. The majority opinion dismisses respondent\u2019s alleged prejudice that \u201cfor this mother and these children, their wait has been unconscionable.\u201d Respondent was also prejudiced by not being able to appeal for the seven months that elapsed between the hearing date, when reunification efforts ceased and respondent\u2019s visitation was severely restricted, and the trial court\u2019s entry of its order.\nUpon similar allegations, this Court has repeatedly found prejudice to exist in many cases, upon facts closely analogous to those here. See In re D.M.M. & K.G.M., 180 N.C. App. -, -, 633 S.E.2d 715, 718 (2006) (\u201cThe trial court erred ... by entering its order an additional seven months after the statutorily mandated time period.\u201d); see also In re D.S., S.S., F.S., M.M., M.S. 177 N.C. App. at 140, 628 S.E.2d at 33 (The trial court\u2019s entry seven months after the termination was a clear and egregious violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 7B-1109(e) and 1110(a), and the delay prejudiced all parties.); In re O.S.W., 175 N.C. App. 414, 623 S.E.2d 349 (2006) (The trial court\u2019s order was vacated because the court failed to enter its order for six months, and the father was prejudiced because he was unable to file an appeal.); In re T.W., 173 N.C. App. 153, 617 S.E.2d 702 (2005) (The trial court entered its order just short of one year from the date of the hearing. This Court reversed the trial court\u2019s order.); In re L.L., 172 N.C. App. 689, 616 S.E.2d 392 (2005) (This Court held the nine month delay prejudiced the parents.); In re C.J.B., 171 N.C. App. 132, 614 S.E.2d 368 (2005) (This Court reversed the trial court\u2019s order because the trial court failed to enter its order until five months after the hearing.); In re T.L.T., 170 N.C. App. 430, 612 S.E.2d 436 (2005) (This Court reversed the trial court\u2019s judgment because the trial court failed to enter its order until seven months after the hearing.). In accordance with these and other precedent, the trial court\u2019s order should be reversed.\nIII. Respondent\u2019s Poverty\nRespondent argues the trial court\u2019s order should be reversed because the trial court\u2019s conclusions are based upon respondent\u2019s poverty or economic circumstances. I agree and vote to reverse the trial court\u2019s order. The trial court specifically found as fact:\n9. That the Respondent/mother is supremely motivated to reunite with her children.\n10. That the motivation of Respondent/mother, Faye J[], is a significant asset and that she singularly directed her energies toward reunification.\n11. That Respondent/mother, Faye J[], dearly loves her children and that the children dearly love her and have a strong bond with their mother[.]\n15. That Respondent/mother, Faye J[], and her children could reunite, and that such would be in the best interests of the children were this care available with no financial considerations[.]\n17. In an economic sense, reunification is possible but not financially practical[.]\n(Emphasis supplied). Based upon these findings of fact, the trial court concluded \u201creunification with the Respondent/mother is possible, but is not a practical solution in an economic sense.\u201d\nThe General Statutes and precedents clearly require \u201cno parental rights shall be terminated for the sole reason that the parents are unable to care for the juvenile on account of their poverty.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1111 (a)(2) (2005). As this Court held in In re Nesbitt, \u201cwe also recognize that making ends meet from month to month is not unusual for many families particularly those who live in poverty. However, we do not find this a legitimate basis upon which to terminate parental rights.\u201d 147 N.C. App. 349, 359, 555 S.E.2d 659, 665-66 (2001).\nHere, the trial court expressly relied on respondent\u2019s lack of financial means in reaching its conclusions of law to cease efforts to reunify respondent with her children. The trial court found as fact \u201c[t]hat Respondent/mother, . . . , and her children could reunite, and that such would be in the best interests of the children were this care available with no financial considerations.\u201d (Emphasis supplied). Based on this finding of fact, the trial court found as a matter of law \u201creunification with the Respondent/mother is possible, but is not a practical solution in an economic sense.\u201d The trial court also specifically found as fact that reunification with respondent would be \u201cin the best interests of the children.\u201d\nThe statutory presumption requires children be reunited with their parents. A trial court can only cease reunification efforts when clear, cogent, and convincing evidence is presented at the hearing to support such a conclusion. In re Weiler, 158 N.C. App. 473, 477, 581 S.E.2d 134, 137 (2003). The trial court\u2019s findings of fact expressly support the conclusion to continue to reunify respondent with her children and fails to support a contrary conclusion. The findings of fact are not supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence to support a conclusion of law that it is in the children\u2019s best interest to cease reunification efforts with their natural mother.\nIV. Conclusion\nOur United States Supreme Court has stated:\nThe fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State. Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life. If anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have a more critical need for procedural protections than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs. When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures.\nSantosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 606 (1982).\nEvery day a young child is absent from a parent seems like a week, a week\u2019s absence seems like a month, a month passes as slowly as a year. To a parent, seven months without the care, custody, and control of her young children and being limited to one hour of supervised visitation per week looms as an eternity when the trial court found the children\u2019s best interest compel a contrary conclusion. No excuse is offered in the trial court\u2019s order or by DSS to explain why the statutorily required outside entry date of 24 September 2004 for entering the order languished and was not accomplished until 24 March 2005. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-905(a).\nIn 2005, the People of North Carolina, through their elected representatives in the General Assembly, amended and expressly mandated specific deadlines for DSS to act and for the courts to promptly enter orders when children are removed from their parents\u2019 custody. Compliance with these statutory mandates is necessary to enforce the overall objectives of the Juvenile Code, which states, \u201c[t]o provide standards for the removal, when necessary, of juveniles from their homes and for the return of juveniles to their homes consistent with preventing the unnecessary or inappropriate separation of juveniles from their parents.\" N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-100(4) (2005) (emphasis supplied).\nThese statutory mandates are not suggestions. The recent amendments shortening the required response and order entry times were specifically enacted to preserve federal funding for those important programs. Noncompliance with the deadlines can jeopardize future funding.\nPrejudice to respondent and her young children is argued, and prejudice is shown. In re As.L.G., 173 N.C. App. 551, 555, 619 S.E.2d 561, 565 (2005), disc. rev. improvidently allowed, 360 N.C. 476, 628 S.E.2d 760 (2006). Ceasing all services to help resolve the issues that led to the removal of the children from their mother, and procrastination in entering the order, prevented respondent from entering her notice of appeal for seven months until the order was entered. These provisions were placed into effect seven months earlier. This seven month delay in entry neither \u201cpromptly\u201d nor \u201cdiligently\u201d disposed \u201cof the business of the Court.\u201d North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3, 2006 Ann. R. N.C. 401. This delay is highly prejudicial and bears consequences to those statutorily responsible.\nThe trial court erred when it failed to enter the order within the statutorily mandated time period. \u201cThis late entry is a clear and egregious violation of [the General Statutes], and this Court\u2019s well-established interpretation of the General Assembly\u2019s use of the word \u2018shall.\u2019 \u201d In re L.E.B., K.T.B., 169 N.C. App. at 378, 610 S.E.2d at 426.\nRespondent specifically argued and articulated the prejudice she and her children suffered as a result of the egregious late entry of the court\u2019s order. In re As.L.G., 173 N.C. App. at 555, 619 S.E.2d at 564 (\u201c[A]n appropriate showing of prejudice arising from the delay could constitute reversal.\u201d).\n[B]y allowing the trial court to delay its entry of the order terminating the respondent\u2019s parental rights, we do nothing to protect the respondent\u2019s right to a quick and speedy resolution when his or her appeal is no longer \u201cacademic.\u201d . . . [I]f, in the interest of efficient case-resolution, this Court allows the trial court to remove an appeal from our purview by issuing an order terminating parental rights, we should at least require that the trial court enter that order in the amount of time mandated by the legislature.\nIn re L.E.B., K.T.B., 169 N.C. App. at 382, 610 S.E.2d at 428 (Timmons-Goodson, J., concurring).\nThe separate concurring opinion correctly states the trial court must follow the law. Here, the law requires the order to be entered within the thirty-day deadline mandated by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-905(a) and not be based upon respondent\u2019s economic circumstances. Most of the earlier orders referenced in the concurring opinion were entered within days after the hearings were held. Either respondent\u2019s poverty or the prejudice respondent and her children suffered due to the inordinate delays in entry of the order which \u201cremove[d] an appeal from our purview,\u201d requires reversal of the trial court\u2019s order. Id. I respectfully dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "TYSON, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Katharine Chester, for respondent mother.", "Jill Y Sanchez, for petitioner Gaston County Department of Social Services." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF: J.J., J.J., J.J., Minor Children\nNo. COA05-1510\n(Filed 5 December 2006)\n1. Child Abuse and Neglect\u2014 conclusion of dependency\u2014 findings \u2014 necessary assistance not available\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that respondent\u2019s children were dependent in that respondent is unable to provide for their care or supervision and lacks an appropriate alternative child care arrangement. Findings, deemed binding, that respondent could not care for her children without constant assistance and that such assistance is not available supported the conclusion.\n2. Child Abuse and Neglect\u2014 dispositional hearing \u2014 evidence considered\nThe formal rales of evidence do not apply in a child dispo-sitional hearing and the court may consider any evidence it finds relevant. The trial court here did not err by considering a DSS report and a psychological evaluation that were not properly admitted.\n3. Child Abuse and Neglect\u2014 dependency proceeding \u2014 failure to enter timely order \u2014 no prejudice\nThere was no prejudice in a child dependency proceeding from failure to enter a timely order. The order here did not involve termination of parental rights, but changed the permanency plan from reunification to guardianship. Respondent\u2019s visitation rights were reduced, so that any delay benefitted her.\n4. Child Abuse and Neglect\u2014 dependency proceeding\u2014 guardian ad litum for parent not appointed\nThe trial court did not err in a dependency proceeding by failing to appoint a guardian ad litum where mental illness was involved. The petition filed by DSS does not mention any developmental disabilities or limitations and, while respondent\u2019s brief mentions her learning limitations, she cites nothing to indicate that her inability to care for her children without constant assistance is due to mental health issues.\n5. Child Abuse and Neglect\u2014 dependency proceeding \u2014 guardianship \u2014 financial considerations\nThe trial court did not violate N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-llll(a)(2) by halting reunification efforts between a mother and her children based upon the financial impracticality of twenty-four hour help for the mother; that statute governs termination of parental rights based upon poverty rather than guardianship, as here. The governing statutes for this case, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-906 and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-907, do not bar consideration of the cost of providing services deemed necessary for reunification when making a change to the permanency plan.\nJudge Wynn concurring.\nJudge Tyson dissenting.\nAppeal by respondent mother from order entered 24 March 2005 by Judge James A. Jackson in the District Court in Gaston County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 August 2006.\nKatharine Chester, for respondent mother.\nJill Y Sanchez, for petitioner Gaston County Department of Social Services." }, "file_name": "0344-01", "first_page_order": 374, "last_page_order": 391 }