{ "id": 8243497, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MELVIN CURTIS FAULKNER, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Faulkner", "decision_date": "2006-12-19", "docket_number": "No. COA06-7", "first_page": "499", "last_page": "513", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "180 N.C. App. 499" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "175 S.E. 836", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1934, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "838" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 N.C. 6", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8621595 ], "year": 1934, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/207/0006-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 S.E.2d 742", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "747", "parenthetical": "requiring defendant to make some showing of qualifications of emergency medical technician as either an expert or lay witness before he could testify as to the distance from which victim was shot" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 641", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2551667 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "649-50", "parenthetical": "requiring defendant to make some showing of qualifications of emergency medical technician as either an expert or lay witness before he could testify as to the distance from which victim was shot" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0641-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 L. Ed. 2d 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "516 U.S. 994", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 324192, 326433, 325570, 326147, 328450, 325243, 328216, 323051, 328556, 324366, 324911, 327448, 327675, 328317 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/516/0994-10", "/us/516/0994-09", "/us/516/0994-01", "/us/516/0994-14", "/us/516/0994-08", "/us/516/0994-07", "/us/516/0994-12", "/us/516/0994-06", "/us/516/0994-13", "/us/516/0994-05", "/us/516/0994-04", "/us/516/0994-02", "/us/516/0994-03", "/us/516/0994-11" ] }, { "cite": "457 S.E.2d 841", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "858" }, { "page": "858", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790203 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "547 S.E.2d 427", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 396", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135841, 135938, 135760, 135894, 135895 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0396-04", "/nc/353/0396-05", "/nc/353/0396-03", "/nc/353/0396-01", "/nc/353/0396-02" ] }, { "cite": "540 S.E.2d 388", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 N.C. App. 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9441303 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/141/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 L. Ed. 2d 274", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "528 U.S. 941", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9531459, 9532036, 9531683, 9531419, 9531977, 9531531, 9531499, 9531631, 9531926, 9531799, 9531384, 9531739, 9531868, 9531582 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/528/0941-03", "/us/528/0941-14", "/us/528/0941-08", "/us/528/0941-02", "/us/528/0941-13", "/us/528/0941-05", "/us/528/0941-04", "/us/528/0941-07", "/us/528/0941-12", "/us/528/0941-10", "/us/528/0941-01", "/us/528/0941-09", "/us/528/0941-11", "/us/528/0941-06" ] }, { "cite": "512 S.E.2d 720", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "736" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132015 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "132" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "149 L. Ed. 2d 641", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "532 U.S. 997", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9356447, 9356864, 9356515, 9356644, 9356390, 9356799, 9356683, 9356334, 9356241, 9356982, 9356568, 9356733, 9356926, 9356287 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/532/0997-05", "/us/532/0997-12", "/us/532/0997-06", "/us/532/0997-08", "/us/532/0997-04", "/us/532/0997-11", "/us/532/0997-09", "/us/532/0997-03", "/us/532/0997-01", "/us/532/0997-14", "/us/532/0997-07", "/us/532/0997-10", "/us/532/0997-13", "/us/532/0997-02" ] }, { "cite": "536 S.E.2d 36", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "60-61", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation omitted" }, { "page": "61" }, { "page": "61" }, { "page": "61" }, { "page": "61", "parenthetical": "requiring a defendant to offer some \"explanation, analysis, or specific contention\" in his brief to support a \"bare assertion\" of plain error, or else waiving appellate review" }, { "page": "61" }, { "page": "61", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 600", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 685069 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "636", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation omitted" }, { "page": "637" }, { "page": "636" }, { "page": "636-37" }, { "page": "636" }, { "page": "636", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0600-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 L. Ed. 2d 791", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "536 U.S. 930", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1254400, 1255201, 1254912, 1255398, 1255087, 1254705, 1254609, 1254996, 1254485, 1254614, 1254871, 1255094, 1254524, 1255069 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/536/0930-02", "/us/536/0930-03", "/us/536/0930-01", "/us/536/0930-13", "/us/536/0930-08", "/us/536/0930-09", "/us/536/0930-07", "/us/536/0930-11", "/us/536/0930-14", "/us/536/0930-04", "/us/536/0930-06", "/us/536/0930-05", "/us/536/0930-10", "/us/536/0930-12" ] }, { "cite": "555 S.E.2d 557", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "585", "parenthetical": "internal quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138413 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "415", "parenthetical": "internal quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 L. Ed. 2d 548", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "488 U.S. 975", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1493537, 1495395, 1494695, 1494287, 1494199 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/488/0975-03", "/us/488/0975-05", "/us/488/0975-04", "/us/488/0975-01", "/us/488/0975-02" ] }, { "cite": "366 S.E.2d 459", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "463" }, { "page": "463" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 22", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2514399 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "28" }, { "page": "28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0022-01" ] }, { "cite": "597 S.E.2d 674", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "686" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 440", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2986682 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "458" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0440-01" ] }, { "cite": "540 S.E.2d 744", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 117", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155897, 1155835, 1155676, 1155647 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0117-02", "/nc/351/0117-03", "/nc/351/0117-04", "/nc/351/0117-01" ] }, { "cite": "516 S.E.2d 159", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 N.C. App. 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11220553 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/133/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "562 S.E.2d 47", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. App. 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9129844 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/149/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 U.S. 681", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 14005 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "691-92" }, { "page": "784" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/485/0681-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 L. Ed. 2d 528", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 S. Ct. 1784", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "567 S.E.2d 120", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "122-23", "parenthetical": "citing cases and text expounding upon the rationale for limitation" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511282 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "153-55", "parenthetical": "citing cases and text expounding upon the rationale for limitation" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 S.E.2d 48", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" }, { "page": "56" }, { "page": "56" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5306215 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278-79" }, { "page": "281" }, { "page": "281" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 S.E.2d 626", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 8716319 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sc/289/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 396", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4774166 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0396-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 S.E.2d 468", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Young, 317 N.C. 396, 412 n.2, 346 S.E.2d 626, 635 n.2 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 N.C. App. 647", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524470 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "653", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Young, 317 N.C. 396, 412 n.2, 346 S.E.2d 626, 635 n.2 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/99/0647-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 55", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "59" }, { "page": "59", "parenthetical": "an abuse of discretion is found only when the trial court ruling was \"manifestly unsupported by reason and could not have been the result of a reasoned decision\"" }, { "page": "60" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 749", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4718276 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "756" }, { "page": "756" }, { "page": "758" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0749-01" ] }, { "cite": "592 S.E.2d 191", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 544", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491490 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0544-01" ] }, { "cite": "557 S.E.2d 158", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 N.C. App. 685", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9381119 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "692" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/147/0685-01" ] }, { "cite": "557 S.E.2d 191", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "193-94", "parenthetical": "noting that an appellate court will not overturn a trial court's conclusions of law as to a motion to suppress if they are supported by its factual findings" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 N.C. App. 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9364175 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "138", "parenthetical": "noting that an appellate court will not overturn a trial court's conclusions of law as to a motion to suppress if they are supported by its factual findings" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/148/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "584 S.E.2d 830", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "835", "parenthetical": "stating that a trial court's findings of fact regarding a motion to suppress are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if there is other, conflicting evidence" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 N.C. App. 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8954514 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114", "parenthetical": "stating that a trial court's findings of fact regarding a motion to suppress are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if there is other, conflicting evidence" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/160/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "580 S.E.2d 702", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491616, 491810, 491436, 491885, 491438, 491569, 491772, 491391 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0166-06", "/nc/357/0166-05", "/nc/357/0166-02", "/nc/357/0166-01", "/nc/357/0166-04", "/nc/357/0166-08", "/nc/357/0166-07", "/nc/357/0166-03" ] }, { "cite": "574 S.E.2d 694", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "699" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 N.C. App. 729", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9251989 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "736" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/155/0729-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1271, "char_count": 36905, "ocr_confidence": 0.746, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.6089013594425323e-08, "percentile": 0.351287468883321 }, "sha256": "29aed92ec91d4e09ee58b577e71b85f0861e01e6973cd1a13d009d262265e003", "simhash": "1:837254ab371f1cd4", "word_count": 6046 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:41:00.069129+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and McCULLOUGH concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MELVIN CURTIS FAULKNER, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WYNN, Judge.\nThe plain error rule applies when the appellate court is \u201cconvinced that absent the error the jury probably would have reached a different verdict.\u201d Here, Defendant argues that the admission of testimony from several witnesses was plain error. Because we find that the State\u2019s evidence as to Defendant\u2019s guilt was substantial enough that the testimony in question was not determinative of the jury\u2019s decision, we affirm Defendant\u2019s conviction for second-degree murder.\nOn 7 June 2005, Defendant Melvin Curtis Faulkner was convicted of second-degree murder in the death of 22-month-old Jakob Waddington, the son of Defendant\u2019s girlfriend, Janet Perkins. At trial, the evidence tended to show that Defendant and Ms. Perkins met through an America Online chat room several months before she moved to Fayetteville in March 2001 with her two children, Jakob and his six-year-old sister. Ms. Perkins moved into Defendant\u2019s house within three or four weeks of her arrival in Fayetteville.\nTrial testimony indicated that Defendant\u2019s relationship with Ms. Perkins was tumultuous; for example, shortly after Ms. Perkins moved into Defendant\u2019s house, Defendant asked her to move out so he could work things out with the mother of his child, who was pregnant again, possibly with his child. But a week later Defendant changed his mind, and Ms. Perkins moved back into his house. Ms. Perkins testified that, at the beginning of the relationship, Defendant \u201cwas wonderful with Jakob,\u201d and that he played with the boy and had a lot of interaction with him, although he was not involved in parenting responsibilities.\nBy the end of April 2001, however, Defendant and Ms. Perkins began to have arguments related to Jakob, including Defendant\u2019s suggestion that the boy should go to live with his father in Texas. Also around this time, Jakob began having tantrums in which he would bang his head on the floor. Jakob\u2019s doctor testified that such head banging is not unusual in children, but they are not injured by it, and it cannot produce fatal brain injury. Jakob was slightly developmentally delayed.\nThroughout June and July 2001, the couple\u2019s relationship continued to deteriorate. In June, Ms. Perkins took an overdose of sleeping pills and had her stomach pumped at the hospital, but she denied that it was a suicide attempt. Around the beginning of July, Ms. Perkins threatened to leave Defendant because of his \u201cpicking on\u201d Jakob; she packed belongings and left the house with Jakob, but the two returned a short time later, after Defendant and Ms. Perkins had spoken on the telephone.\nAccording to testimony at Defendant\u2019s trial, Ms. Perkins put Jakob down for his nap between 1:00 and 2:00 p.m. on 18 August 2001, and she then went to the store a short time later, taking Defendant\u2019s car because of heavy rains and flooding. Ms. Perkins stated that Jakob was \u201cfine\u201d at that time. While she was out, she called Defendant, who mentioned during the course of their conversation that he had found Jakob on the floor and put him back in the bed. Defendant called her back a few minutes later, while she was on her way home, and was upset because Ms. Perkins had taken his car to the store, rather than her own. All told, Ms. Perkins estimated her trip to the store took approximately twenty to thirty minutes; no one else .was in the house during that time other than Defendant and Jakob. She did not check on Jakob after she arrived back at the house.\nAround 5:00 p.m., Ms. Perkins went into Jakob\u2019s room to wake him from his nap and found him on the floor on his stomach. When she picked him up, his eyes rolled into the back of his head, and his arms and legs went stiff. Ms. Perkins called 911, and an ambulance arrived approximately fifteen minutes later and transported Jakob to the hospital. He was transferred to Chapel Hill, but he died later that night.\nAt Defendant\u2019s trial, medical personnel testified that Jakob\u2019s pupils were unequal and slow to react to light, evidence of a serious head injury, and that there was a raised and visibly noticeable hematoma on the left side of Jakob\u2019s head. His stiff arms and legs, called \u201cposturing,\u201d indicated brain swelling from a head injury. One emergency responder testified that, in response to the question of what had happened to Jakob, Defendant appeared nervous, with the color drained from his face, and did not respond; Ms. Perkins answered that she believed Jakob had fallen out of his bed. Jakob\u2019s bed was eight inches to a foot off the floor, and testimony at trial suggested that a fall from such a height was inconsistent with and could not have caused the type of head injury suffered by Jakob.\nAdditional testimony was offered at trial as to Defendant\u2019s and Ms. Perkins\u2019 demeanor at the hospital and the types of treatment offered to Jakob. Five medical experts testified for the State that the cause of Jakob\u2019s death was brain swelling caused by blunt force trauma to the head. According to one expert, Jakob would have been immediately symptomatic from the injuries and would have been rendered completely unresponsive, unable to eat, walk, or communicate. None of the State experts believed the injuries could have been accidental, barring an incident such as a fall from a third-story window. However, Defendant offered testimony from three expert witnesses who theorized that Jakob might have died from a stroke or series of strokes, a blockage of veins in the brain, or dissection or clotting of the carotid artery, although such cases would not have accounted for his external bruises.\nAt the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict finding Defendant guilty of second-degree murder. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a term of 125 to 159 months\u2019 imprisonment. Defendant now appeals that verdict, arguing that the trial court (I) erred by allowing impermissible character evidence; (II) erred by allowing impermissible profile evidence as to \u201cnormal caretaker reaction,\u201d which was irrelevant and prejudicial; (III) committed plain error by allowing irrelevant and highly prejudicial evidence as to one side of a telephone conversation between Defendant and his father and as to Ms. Perkins\u2019 suspicions about Defendant\u2019s role in Jakob\u2019s death; (IV) committed plain error by admitting testimony about comments made by Jakob\u2019s grandmother about Defendant at Jakob\u2019s funeral; (V) erred by allowing lay witnesses to offer expert opinions; and (VI) committed plain error by allowing testimony as to Ms. Perkins\u2019 attitude towards Defendant after both were arrested.\nI.\nFirst, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress testimony from Ms. Perkins\u2019 mother, Peggy Acker, regarding the June 2001 incident in which Ms. Perkins took an overdose of sleeping pills. Defendant contends that the testimony was offered solely as evidence of his character and therefore should have been disallowed under North Carolina Rule of Evidence 404. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404 (2005) (character evidence not generally admissible to prove conduct).\nThe standard of review in determining whether a trial court properly denied a motion to suppress evidence is whether the findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, and whether the conclusions of law are in turn supported by those findings of fact. State v. Cockerham, 155 N.C. App. 729, 736, 574 S.E.2d 694, 699, disc. review denied, 357 N.C. 166, 580 S.E.2d 702 (2003); see also State v. Smith, 160 N.C. App. 107, 114, 584 S.E.2d 830, 835 (2003) (stating that a trial court\u2019s findings of fact regarding a motion to suppress are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if there is other, conflicting evidence); State v. Logner, 148 N.C. App. 135, 138, 557 S.E.2d 191, 193-94 (2001) (noting that an appellate court will not overturn a trial court\u2019s conclusions of law as to a motion to suppress if they are supported by its factual findings). Indeed, \u201c[w]hether to exclude evidence of other crimes or bad acts is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court.\u201d State v. Woolridge, 147 N.C. App. 685, 692, 557 S.E.2d 158, 162 (2001), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 357 N.C. 544, 592 S.E.2d 191 (2003). A trial court will be held to have abused its discretion only \u201cupon a showing that its ruling was manifestly unsupported by reason and could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d State v. Riddick, 315 N.C. 749, 756, 340 S.E.2d 55, 59 (1986).\nNorth Carolina Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides in pertinent part:\nEvidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment or accident.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (2005). \u201cTh[e] list of proper purposes is neither exclusive nor exhaustive.\u201d State v. Church, 99 N.C. App. 647, 653, 394 S.E.2d 468, 472 (1990) (citing State v. Young, 317 N.C. 396, 412 n.2, 346 S.E.2d 626, 635 n.2 (1986)). According to our Supreme Court, Rule 404(b) is\na clear general rule of inclusion of relevant evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts by a defendant, subject to but one exception requiring its exclusion if its only probative value is to show that the defendant has the propensity or disposition to commit an offense of the nature of the crime charged.\nState v. Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 278-79, 389 S.E.2d 48, 54 (1990). Thus, so long as evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior acts makes the existence of any fact at issue, other than the character of the accused, more or less probable, that evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b). Id.\nNevertheless, any Rule 404(b) evidence \u201cshould be carefully scrutinized in order to adequately safeguard against the improper introduction of character evidence against the accused.\u201d See State v. al-Bayyinah, 356 N.C. 150, 153-55, 567 S.E.2d 120, 122-23 (2002) (citing cases and text expounding upon the rationale for limitation), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1784, 164 L. Ed. 2d 528 (2006). A trial court should consider whether the evidence is offered for a proper purpose, whether it is relevant, and whether its probative value is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice to the defendant. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92, 99 L. Ed. 2d 771, 784 (1988). Of course, \u201c[e]vidence which is probative of the State\u2019s case necessarily will have a prejudicial effect upon the defendant; the question is one of degree.\u201d Coffey, 326 N.C. at 281, 389 S.E.2d at 56.\nHere, the testimony in question was summarized and read into the record by the trial court:\nMs. Acker described going to the defendant\u2019s house in early June after receiving a call from Janet that she needed assistance. When Ms. Acker arrived, she realized Janet needed medical attention and asked the defendant to call 911. The defendant refused. He then indicated where the phone was located. The defendant also initially refused to give Ms. Acker the street address. The defendant told Ms. Acker he did not know what Janet had taken and, quote, I don\u2019t care if she dies, end quote.\nAfter hearing from the State and defense counsel on the motion to suppress, the trial court found that the testimony would not constitute impermissible character evidence but was instead \u201cfactual information dealing with the dynamics of the two personalities involved, that is Ms. Perkins and [Defendant]. They are factual declarations by [Defendant].\u201d He further found that because \u201cthe state is relying upon a circumstantial evidence case in this case,\u201d those dynamics were \u201crelevant and probative as to assessing the two [personalities],\u201d and the factual statement related to Defendant\u2019s \u201cperception and relationship with Ms. Perkins at that time.\u201d The trial court therefore denied the motion to suppress and allowed the testimony.\nIn State v. Carrilo, 149 N.C. App. 543, 562 S.E.2d 47 (2002), in which the defendant had been convicted of the first-degree murder of his girlfriend\u2019s eight-month-old child, this Court considered the denial of a motion to suppress evidence of the defendant\u2019s prior instances of violence toward the mother of the child. Noting that the evidence was offered to show \u201cwhy the mother did not take any action against defendant when he first began assaulting her son; to identify defendant, rather than [the mother], as the perpetrator; and to dispel defendant\u2019s contention that the injuries were accidentally inflicted,\u201d this Court found no abuse of discretion by the trial court. Id. at 551, 562 S.E.2d at 52.\nWe find Carrilo to be directly analogous to the instant case and likewise conclude that the trial court here did not abuse its discretion in allowing the evidence as to Defendant\u2019s conduct during Ms. Perkins\u2019 overdose of sleeping pills in June 2001. Given the defense\u2019s attempts to suggest that Ms. Perkins may have been the perpetrator or that Jakob died from an accidental fall, evidence concerning the relationship between Defendant and Ms. Perkins was probative for a purpose other than his bad character. The trial court made appropriate findings of fact based on competent evidence, and therefore we will not disturb its conclusions of law. This assignment of error is accordingly overruled.\nII.\nSecond, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by overruling his objection to the testimony of a State expert as to \u201cnormal caretaker reaction\u201d and a profile of caretaker behavior after an injury to a child. Defendant contends the testimony was irrelevant and prejudicial and fell outside the parameters of permissible expert testimony, as established by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 702 (2005). We disagree.\nAs this Court has previously held,\nAccording to Rule 702 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, expert witness testimony is admissible if it will appreciably help the jury. While applying this test, the trial court must balance the probative value of the testimony against its potential for prejudice, confusion, or delay. The trial court has wide discretion in determining whether expert testimony is admissible.\nState v. Owen, 133 N.C. App. 543, 549, 516 S.E.2d 159, 164 (internal quotations and citation omitted), disc. review denied, 351 N.C. 117, 540 S.E.2d 744 (1999). Thus, \u201ca trial court\u2019s ruling on the qualifications of an expert or the admissibility of an expert\u2019s opinion will not be reversed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion.\u201d Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 458, 597 S.E.2d 674, 686 (2004); see also State v. Anderson, 322 N.C. 22, 28, 366 S.E.2d 459, 463, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 975, 102 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1988); Riddick, 315 N.C. at 756, 340 S.E.2d at 59 (an abuse of discretion is found only when the trial court ruling was \u201cmanifestly unsupported by reason and could not have been the result of a reasoned decision\u201d).\nIn the instant case, Dr. Sharon Cooper, a developmental and forensic pediatrician, testified as a rebuttal witness for the State. Among other things, Dr. Cooper outlined three parameters used by medical personnel to determine whether a child\u2019s injuries are accidental or inflicted, namely \u2014 -the consistency of the history given by the caretaker, the extent to which the caretaker\u2019s explanation is consistent with the extent of the injuries, and the behavior of the caretaker. The objected-to exchange was transcribed as follows:\nQ: . . . What is the normal caretaker reaction after an injury to a child or does it vary, that type of thing?\nA: Very often, when a child has been accidentally injured, and it\u2019s obvious that they\u2019re injured, for example unconscious, unable to respond to them or having seizures, if it\u2019s an immediate onset of the accident and then you see these kinds of findings, caregivers who are present and witness an accident, right away try to seek help for the child. On the other hand, the forensic pediatric literature is very clear that when children are injured intentionally, when there is an inflicted injury, it is very common, it\u2019s almost the rule more so than the exception, that the individual who has injured the child will leave them and not seek care for them... .\nA: Oftentimes the caregiver is not concerned about what has happened to the child. They\u2019re much more concerned about how it impacts upon them, but not so much about what has happened to the child.\nThe trial court overruled defense counsel\u2019s objections to the questions and allowed answers as to a caretaker profile.\n\u201cThe law wisely permits evidence not otherwise admissible to be offered to explain or rebut evidence elicited by the defendant himself.\u201d State v. Anthony, 354 N.C. 372, 415, 555 S.E.2d 557, 585 (2001) (internal quotations and citations omitted), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 930, 153 L. Ed. 2d 791 (2002). Thus, \u201c[w]here one party introduces evidence as to a particular fact or transaction, the other party is entitled to introduce evidence in explanation or rebuttal thereof, even though such latter evidence would be incompetent or irrelevant had it been offered initially.\u201d Id.\nHere, earlier testimony offered by medical experts for the defense had outlined some criteria used in determining child abuse; one expert had also suggested that there was an overdiagnosis and perhaps rush to judgment of child abuse because of a belief that child abuse is underreported and because \u201ceverybody is completely discombobulated by the death of a child . . . because children are not supposed to die.\u201d In light of this defense testimony, Dr. Cooper\u2019s statements as to the parameters used to determine child abuse, and specifically the profile of normal caretaker behavior, had significant probative value as proper rebuttal evidence.\nEven assuming arguendo that Dr. Cooper\u2019s testimony would have been impermissible if offered during the State\u2019s direct case, the defense opened the door to the criteria used to determine if child abuse has occurred, including what is considered normal caretaker behavior in such situations. Accordingly, we find the trial court\u2019s decision to allow this testimony was reasonable and was therefore not an abuse of its discretion. This assignment of error is overruled.\nIII.\nThird, Defendant argues the trial court committed prejudicial error and plain error by allowing testimony as to Ms. Perkins\u2019 suspicions of Defendant regarding Jakob\u2019s death, her mother\u2019s disapproval of Ms. Perkins\u2019 relationship with Defendant, and the substance of one side of a phone conversation Defendant had with his father at the hospital while Jakob was being treated.\nRegarding Defendant\u2019s assertion as to prejudicial error, we note that under the rules of this Court,\nIn order to preserve a question for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling the party desired the court to make if the specific grounds were not apparent from the context. It is also necessary for the complaining party to obtain a ruling upon the party\u2019s request, objection or motion.\nN.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1). Here, Defendant made no objection at trial to any of the testimony challenged in this assignment of error; indeed, on several occasions, the objected-to statements were made under cross-examination by defense counsel. We therefore dismiss the portion of Defendant\u2019s assignment of error that asserts the trial court committed prejudicial error.\nNevertheless, our appellate rules state that\nIn criminal cases, a question which was not preserved by objection noted at trial and which is not deemed preserved by rule or law without any such action, nevertheless may be made the basis of an assignment of error where the judicial action questioned is specifically and distinctly contended to amount to plain error.\nN.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(4). Thus, a defendant may challenge a trial court\u2019s admission of evidence under a plain error standard even if no objection was made at trial. However, \u201c[t]he plain error rule applies only in truly exceptional cases,\u201d such that the appellate court would be \u201cconvinced that absent the error the jury probably would have reached a different verdict.\u201d State v. Cummings, 352 N.C. 600, 636, 536 S.E.2d 36, 60-61 (2000) (citation and quotation omitted), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 997, 149 L. Ed. 2d 641 (2001). \u201cTherefore, the test for \u2018plain error\u2019 places a much heavier burden upon the defendant than [that on] defendants who have preserved their rights by timely objection.\u201d Id., 536 S.E.2d at 61. To meet this burden, a defendant must convince the appellate court, using support from the record, that \u201cthe claimed error is so fundamental, so basic, so prejudicial, or so lacking in its elements that justice could not have been done.\u201d State v. Fleming, 350 N.C. 109, 132, 512 S.E.2d 720, 736, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 941, 145 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1999). For those reasons, then, the \u201cbare assertion\u201d of plain error in an assignment of error, without accompanying explanation, analysis, or specific contentions in a defendant\u2019s brief, is insufficient to show plain error. Cummings, 352 N.C. at 637, 536 S.E.2d at 61.\nIn his brief, Defendant states the standard of review for this assignment of error to be that for \u201cbalancing prejudicial effect against probative value,\u201d which would be an abuse of discretion standard, not the plain error standard. Even looking past this violation of the appellate rules, see N.C. R. App. R 28(b)(6) (\u201c[t]he [appellant\u2019s brief] argument. shall contain a concise statement of the applicable standard(s) of review for each question presented . . .\u201d), we find that the admission of this testimony did not rise to the level of plain error, such that it \u201ctilted the scales\u201d and caused the jury to convict Defendant. See Cummings, 352 N.C. at 636, 536 S.E.2d at 61.\nThe State offered a significant amount of evidence at trial that showed the building tension in Defendant\u2019s house in the weeks leading up to Jakob\u2019s death, as a result of the deteriorating relationship between Defendant and Ms. Perkins, as well as of Defendant\u2019s \u201cpicking on\u201d Jakob. Other evidence showed that Defendant was alone at home with Jakob at the time the child\u2019s injuries were sustained, and that his behavior with emergency personnel and at the hospital was somewhat unusual. In light of the strength of the State\u2019s case against Defendant, the challenged statements, particularly about Ms. Perkins\u2019 suspicions in the months after Jakob\u2019s death and her mother\u2019s dislike of Defendant, were unlikely to have been determinative factors in the jury\u2019s verdict. Moreover, the testimony about the phone conversation included Defendant\u2019s denial to his father of any involvement in or responsibility for Jakob\u2019s injuries \u2014 information which could be considered exculpatory rather than harmful. We therefore overrule this assignment of error.\nIV.\nFourth, Defendant contends that the trial court committed plain error when it admitted testimony concerning Jakob\u2019s grandmother\u2019s comments about Defendant at Jakob\u2019s funeral. However, Defendant\u2019s brief fails to offer any discussion of these comments or argument to support this assertion. According to the rules of this Court, \u201c[assignments of error not set out in the appellant\u2019s brief, or in support of which no reason or argument is stated or authority cited, will be taken as abandoned.\u201d N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6); see also Cummings, 352 N.C. at 636-37, 536 S.E.2d at 61 (requiring a defendant to offer some \u201cexplanation, analysis, or specific contention\u201d in his brief to support a \u201cbare assertion\u201d of plain error, or else waiving appellate review). We therefore find that Defendant abandoned his fourth assignment of error as to the testimony about Jakob\u2019s grandmother\u2019s comments about Defendant at Jakob\u2019s funeral.\nV.\nFifth, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by admitting the opinion testimony of lay witnesses as to Jakob\u2019s medical condition, in violation of North Carolina Rule of Evidence 701, and that the admission of testimony in instances in which Defendant did not object at trial rose to the level of plain error. However, as noted by Defendant himself, all of the testimony being challenged was also properly admitted through other expert witnesses; each of the doctors who testified for the State explained the nature of Jakob\u2019s injuries and their belief that they could not have been caused by falling off of his bed. As such, we find that the admission of this evidence through testimony by lay witnesses was not prejudicial and thus cannot rise to the level of plain error. Defendant makes only the bare assertion that the testimony \u201cimpacted the jury verdict.\u201d Accordingly, we dismiss the portion of his assignment of error that alleges plain error.\nWe review the admission of opinion testimony by expert and lay witnesses under an abuse of discretion standard. Anderson, 322 N.C. at 28, 366 S.E.2d at 463; State v. Washington, 141 N.C. App. 354, 362, 540 S.E.2d 388, 395 (2000), disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 396, 547 S.E.2d 427 (2001). In North Carolina, \u201c[w]hile the better practice may be to make a formal tender of a witness as an expert, such a tender is not required.\u201d State v. White, 340 N.C. 264, 293, 457 S.E.2d 841, 858, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 994, 133 L. Ed. 2d 436 (1995). \u201cFurther, absent a request by a party, the trial court is not required to make a formal finding as to a witness\u2019 qualification to testify as an expert witness. Such a finding has been held to be implicit in the court\u2019s admission of the testimony in question.\u201d Id. at 293-94, 457 S.E.2d at 858 (internal citation omitted). A party must make a specific objection to the content of the testimony or the qualifications of a witness as an expert in a particular field; a general objection will not preserve the matter for appellate review. Riddick, 315 N.C. at 758, 340 S.E.2d at 60.\nHere, Defendant contends that testimony by emergency medical personnel Wayne Averitt and Tina Joyner as to Jakob\u2019s medical condition and the possible cause of his injury exceeded the scope of permissible lay opinion testimony. However, at trial, defense counsel made only general objections to the testimony; by overruling the objections, the trial court implicitly accepted Mr. Averitt\u2019s and Ms. Joyner\u2019s qualifications as expert witnesses. By failing to specifically object at trial to their qualifications, Defendant waived the right to raise this issue on appeal.\nMoreover, even if Defendant had properly preserved his challenge to the testimony, we find that Mr. Averitt and Ms. Joyner were qualified to render their opinions as to the nature of Jakob\u2019s injuries and the possibility that they were caused by falling out of a toddler bed that they themselves examined. By virtue of their emergency medical training and experience, both were equipped with \u201cscientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge\u201d that would \u201cassist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 702 (2005). The questions and answers related specifically to their area of expertise and qualifications. Cf. State v. Shuford, 337 N.C. 641, 649-50, 447 S.E.2d 742, 747 (1994) (requiring defendant to make some showing of qualifications of emergency medical technician as either an expert or lay witness before he could testify as to the distance from which victim was shot).\nAccordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.\nVI.\nSixth, Defendant argues that the trial court committed plain error by admitting testimony that Ms. Perkins screamed at Defendant when the two were placed near each other after their arrests. We find this argument to be without merit.\nMs. Perkins testified as to her emotional outburst at the police station, stating that she had screamed, \u201cWhy did you do this? Why did you do this to me? Why did you do this to my son? Why did you do this to my family?\u201d In light of the other substantial evidence offered by the State, the admission of this testimony by Ms. Perkins did not rise to the level of plain error, such that it \u201ctilted the scales\u201d and convinced the jury to convict Defendant. See Cummings, 352 N.C. at 636, 536 S.E.2d at 61. Moreover, in light of the defense theories at trial that either Ms. Perkins inflicted Jakob\u2019s injuries, or they were accidental, this evidence was probative to refute those suggestions. Given that \u201c[e]vidence which is probative of the State\u2019s case necessarily will have a prejudicial effect upon the defendant; the question is one of degree,\u201d Coffey, 326 N.C. at 281, 389 S.E.2d at 56, and the obviously heightened emotional state of Ms. Perkins when she had the outburst, the degree of prejudice here was not sufficient to substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence in question.'Accordingly, we overrule this assignment of error.\nIn sum, we uphold Defendant\u2019s conviction for second-degree murder in the death of Jakob Waddington.\nNo error.\nJudges McGEE and McCULLOUGH concur.\n. State v. Cummings, 352 N.C. 600, 636, 536 S.E.2d 36, 61 (2000) (citation and quotation omitted), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 997, 149 L. Ed. 2d 641 (2001).\n. We note that, at trial, Defendant\u2019s counsel told the trial court that he did not believe the testimony was Rule 404(b) evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, but was instead Rule 404(a) evidence of Defendant\u2019s having \u201ca character trait of being cold-hearted and callous,\u201d being used to show that Defendant acted in conformity with that character on the particular occasion of Jakob\u2019s death. However, Defendant\u2019s brief to this Court cites to Rule 404(b) as the basis for disallowing the evidence. Because the assignment of error references only Rule 404, without specifying which section, we address the merits of Defendant\u2019s argument and do not find that he has attempted to \u201cswap horses\u201d on appeal. See Weil v. Herring, 207 N.C. 6, 10, 175 S.E. 836, 838 (1934); see also N.C. R. App. R 10(a) (\u201c[T]he scope of review on appeal is confined to a consideration of those assignments of error set out in the record on appeal.)\u201d. Nevertheless, we deem his argument as to Rule 404(a) to be abandoned since none was presented in his brief.\n. We note that here again, Defendant misstated in his brief the appropriate standard of review for this assignment of error; as noted in his brief, defense counsel objected to this testimony at trial, such that trial court\u2019s overruling the objection was preserved for appellate review under an abuse of discretion standard. Nevertheless, under either standard, we find no error in the trial court\u2019s admission of this testimony.", "type": "majority", "author": "WYNN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Anne M. Middleton, for the State.", "Leslie G. Rawls for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MELVIN CURTIS FAULKNER, Defendant\nNo. COA06-7\n(Filed 19 December 2006)\n1. Evidence\u2014 prior crimes or bad acts \u2014 purpose other than bad character\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a prosecution of defendant for the second-degree murder of his girlfriend\u2019s infant son by denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress testimony from his girlfriend\u2019s mother regarding a June 2001 incident in which the girlfriend took an overdose of sleeping pills, defendant refused to call 911, defendant initially refused to give the girlfriend\u2019s mother the street address when she called 911, and defendant told his girlfriend\u2019s mother that he did not know what she took nor did he care whether she died, because: (1) the defense was attempting to suggest that defendant\u2019s girlfriend may have been the perpetrator or that the girlfriend\u2019s son died from an accidental fall; and (2) evidence concerning the relationship between defendant and his girlfriend was probative for a purpose other than defendant\u2019s bad character. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b).\n2. Evidence\u2014 expert testimony \u2014 normal caretaker reaction \u2014 rebuttal evidence \u2014 opening the door to evidence\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a prosecution of defendant for the second-degree murder of his girlfriend\u2019s infant son by overruling defendant\u2019s objection to the testimony of a State expert as to normal caretaker reaction and a profile of caretaker behavior after an injury to a child, because: (1) earlier testimony by defense experts had outlined some criteria used in determining child abuse and suggested there was an overdiagno-sis and rush to judgment of child abuse; (2) in light of the defense testimony, the State expert\u2019s statements as to the parameters used to determine child abuse, and specifically the profile of normal caretaker behavior, had significant probative value as proper rebuttal evidence; and (3) even assuming arguendo that the expert\u2019s testimony would not have been permissible if offered during the State\u2019s direct case, the defense opened the door to the criteria used to determine if child abuse had occurred including what is considered normal caretaker behavior in such situations. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 702.\n3. Evidence\u2014 suspicions \u2014 disapproval of relationship \u2014 plain error analysis\nThe trial court did not commit plain error in a second-degree murder case by allowing testimony as to the suspicions of defendant\u2019s girlfriend regarding her child\u2019s death, her mother\u2019s disapproval of her relationship with defendant, and the substance of one side of a phone conversation defendant had with his father at the hospital while the child was being treated, because: (1) the State presented a significant amount of evidence at trial that showed the building tension in defendant\u2019s house in the weeks leading up to the child\u2019s death as a result of the deteriorating relationship between defendant and his girlfriend as well as of defendant\u2019s picking on the child; (2) defendant was alone at home with the child at the time the child\u2019s injuries were sustained, and defendant\u2019s behavior with emergency personnel and at the hospital was somewhat unusual; and (3) in light of the strength of the State\u2019s case against defendant, the challenged statements were unlikely to have been determinative factors in the jury\u2019s verdict.\n4. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 failure to argue\nAlthough defendant contends the trial court committed plain error in a second-degree murder case by admitting testimony concerning comments from the child victim\u2019s grandmother at the child\u2019s funeral, this assignment of error is dismissed, because: (1) defendant\u2019s brief failed to offer any discussion of these comments or argument to support this assertion; and (2) assignments of error not set out in appellant\u2019s brief or in support of which no reason or argument is stated or authority cited will be taken as abandoned under N.C. R. App. R 28(b)(6).\n5. Evidence\u2014 opinion testimony \u2014 lay witnesses \u2014 medical condition\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion or commit plain error in a second-degree murder case by admitting the opinion testimony of lay witnesses as to the minor child victim\u2019s medical condition allegedly in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 701, because: (1) as noted by defendant himself, all of the testimony being challenged was also properly admitted through other expert witnesses; (2) defendant made only the bare assertion that the testimony impacted the jury verdict, and thus the portion of his assignment of error that alleged plain error is dismissed; (3) the trial court implicitly accepted the qualifications of two emergency medical personnel as expert witnesses, and defendant waived the right to raise this issue on appeal by specifically failing to object at trial to their qualifications; and (4) even if defendant had properly preserved his challenge to the testimony, the two individuals were qualified to render their opinions as to the nature of the child\u2019s injuries and the possibility that they were caused by falling out of a toddler bed, that they themselves examined, by virtue of their emergency medical training and experience when the questions and answers related specifically to their area of expertise and qualifications.\n6. Evidence\u2014 admission of testimony \u2014 plain error analysis\nThe trial court did not commit plain error in a second-degree murder case by admitting testimony that defendant\u2019s girlfriend screamed at him when the two were placed near each other after their arrests, because: (1) in light of the other substantial evidence offered by the State, the admission of this testimony did not rise to the level of plain error; (2) in light of the defense theories at trial that either defendant\u2019s girlfriend inflicted the child\u2019s injuries, or they were accidental, the evidence was probative to refute those suggestions; and (3) the degree of prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 7 June 2005 by Judge E. Lynn Johnson in Superior Court, Cumberland County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 17 October 2006.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Anne M. Middleton, for the State.\nLeslie G. Rawls for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0499-01", "first_page_order": 529, "last_page_order": 543 }