{ "id": 8243658, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF: T.M., Minor Child", "name_abbreviation": "In re T.M.", "decision_date": "2006-12-19", "docket_number": "No. COA06-79", "first_page": "539", "last_page": "551", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "180 N.C. App. 539" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "616 S.E.2d 264", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633480 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "279", "parenthetical": "finding no error when trial court directed that petitioner draft the order" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/616/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "629 S.E.2d 916", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635828, 12635829 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "919", "parenthetical": "\"even when the trial court commits error in allowing the admission of hearsay statements, one must show that such error was prejudicial in order to warrant reversal\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/629/0916-01", "/se2d/629/0916-02" ] }, { "cite": "616 S.E.2d 300", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633515 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "303-04" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/616/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "628 S.E.2d 245", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635485, 12635486, 12635487 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/628/0245-01", "/se2d/628/0245-02", "/se2d/628/0245-03" ] }, { "cite": "620 S.E.2d 913", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634261 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "919" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/620/0913-01" ] }, { "cite": "631 S.E.2d 150", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636077 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "155" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/631/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "635 S.E.2d 59", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636864, 12636862, 12636863 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/635/0059-01", "/se2d/635/0059-01", "/se2d/635/0059-01" ] }, { "cite": "625 S.E.2d 594", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635050 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "596" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/625/0594-01" ] }, { "cite": "628 S.E.2d 760", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635608, 12635609, 12635610 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/628/0760-01", "/se2d/628/0760-02", "/se2d/628/0760-03" ] }, { "cite": "615 S.E.2d 704", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633351 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "707" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/615/0704-01" ] }, { "cite": "623 S.E.2d 45", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634685 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50", "parenthetical": "applying Fran's Pecans in termination of parental rights appeal" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/623/0045-01" ] }, { "cite": "628 S.E.2d 867", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635648, 12635649, 12635650, 12635651, 12635652, 12635653, 12635640, 12635641, 12635642, 12635643, 12635644, 12635645, 12635646, 12635647 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/628/0867-09", "/se2d/628/0867-10", "/se2d/628/0867-11", "/se2d/628/0867-12", "/se2d/628/0867-13", "/se2d/628/0867-14", "/se2d/628/0867-07", "/se2d/628/0867-01", "/se2d/628/0867-02", "/se2d/628/0867-03", "/se2d/628/0867-04", "/se2d/628/0867-05", "/se2d/628/0867-06", "/se2d/628/0867-08" ] }, { "cite": "306 S.E.2d 792", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "795", "parenthetical": "noting that a conclusion of neglect was supported where a pediatrician's recommendations that child be \"evaluated\" and receive counseling were not followed by respondent mother" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "64 N.C. App. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526232 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "101", "parenthetical": "noting that a conclusion of neglect was supported where a pediatrician's recommendations that child be \"evaluated\" and receive counseling were not followed by respondent mother" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/64/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 S.E.2d 181", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 669", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4758195 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "679" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0669-01" ] }, { "cite": "608 S.E.2d 813", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "819" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 N.C. App. 638", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8471449 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "648" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/168/0638-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8318580 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "26", "parenthetical": "finding no error when trial court directed that petitioner draft the order" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/172/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 S.E.2d 642", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "646", "parenthetical": "trial judge not required \"to announce in open court his findings and conclusions\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 N.C. App. 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521090 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179", "parenthetical": "trial judge not required \"to announce in open court his findings and conclusions\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/89/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "554 S.E.2d 341", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138560, 138547, 138483, 138421, 138301 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0218-02", "/nc/354/0218-05", "/nc/354/0218-03", "/nc/354/0218-01", "/nc/354/0218-04" ] }, { "cite": "546 S.E.2d 169", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "175" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 N.C. App. 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11434950 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "411" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/143/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 N.C. App. 771", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8302674 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "775", "parenthetical": "\"even when the trial court commits error in allowing the admission of hearsay statements, one must show that such error was prejudicial in order to warrant reversal\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/177/0771-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 N.C. App. 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8319797 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "303-04" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/172/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 289", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3798496, 3793891, 3791911, 3794600, 3787593, 3797322, 3793706, 3786605, 3796634 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0289-08", "/nc/360/0289-02", "/nc/360/0289-06", "/nc/360/0289-01", "/nc/360/0289-04", "/nc/360/0289-07", "/nc/360/0289-03", "/nc/360/0289-05", "/nc/360/0289-09" ] }, { "cite": "174 N.C. App. 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8351618 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/174/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 N.C. App. 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8377492 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "328" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/178/0322-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 S.E.2d 232", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238", "parenthetical": "where no evidence supported a particular finding, inclusion of this finding in the order was immaterial and not prejudicial because even \"[i]f the erroneous finding [was] deleted, there remained] an abundance of clear, cogent, and convincing evidence to support a finding of neglect\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 N.C. App. 539", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525909 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/109/0539-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 S.E.2d 729", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "731" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2510111 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3790365, 3795301, 3789994, 3798602, 3787890, 3792500, 3796951, 3787645, 3789086 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0534-03", "/nc/360/0534-01", "/nc/360/0534-08", "/nc/360/0534-04", "/nc/360/0534-02", "/nc/360/0534-06", "/nc/360/0534-07", "/nc/360/0534-05", "/nc/360/0534-09" ] }, { "cite": "175 N.C. App. 719", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8353200 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "722" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/175/0719-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 475", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3794743 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0475-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 N.C. App. 438", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8437736 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "443" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/171/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 N.C. App. 66", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8350019 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "74", "parenthetical": "applying Fran's Pecans in termination of parental rights appeal" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/175/0066-01" ] }, { "cite": "516 S.E.2d 647", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "649", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "134 N.C. App. 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11143141 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/134/0110-01" ] }, { "cite": "491 S.E.2d 672", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "676" }, { "page": "676", "parenthetical": "upholding adjudication of neglect where, in part, respondent mother \"placed [child] at substantial risk through repeated exposure to violent individuals\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 505", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11798267 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "511" }, { "page": "512" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0505-01" ] }, { "cite": "539 S.E.2d 362", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 N.C. App. 475", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9441627 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "480", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/141/0475-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 N.C. App. 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1113, "char_count": 29506, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.758523513136485e-07, "percentile": 0.9302019152467963 }, "sha256": "b010527c7a364dcf7339f60d9d24a912612cc52255a8581560691700c3c0f53b", "simhash": "1:e6fa412b776f0f62", "word_count": 4661 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:41:00.069129+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges CALABRIA and JACKSON concur." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF: T.M., Minor Child" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GEER, Judge.\nRespondent appeals from a 26 July 2005 order adjudicating her son to be a neglected child. Because we conclude that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, we affirm the trial court\u2019s order.\nAppellate Rules Violations\nAs a preliminary matter, we observe that the statement of facts in respondent\u2019s brief fails to comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure, which require that a brief contain \u201ca non-argumentative summary of all material facts underlying the matter in controversy . . . .\u201d N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(5). Respondent\u2019s statement of facts, just over a page long, contains almost entirely naked argument and includes no citations at all to the record. Unfortunately, this is not the first time that this Court has admonished respondent\u2019s counsel for violations of our appellate rules. See In re B.B., C.B. & N.B., 177 N.C. App. 462, 628 S.E.2d 867, (2006) (unpublished) (dismissing appeal for rule violations, with Judge Steelman in concurrence stating that \u201c [t]he bombast which appellant labels as \u2018Statement of Facts\u2019 meets none of the stated requirements for that portion of the brief\u2019 and suggesting counsel \u201cshould be personally sanctioned\u201d). We note that respondent\u2019s counsel would have further violated the appellate rules had this Court not granted counsel\u2019s motion to amend the record on appeal with respect to the assignments of error.\nBecause we do not believe that respondent should be prejudiced by having had the Appellate Defender appoint counsel who has a tendency to overlook the appellate rules, we choose to sanction respondent\u2019s counsel. We believe that a sanction is particularly warranted given the frivolous nature of some of the arguments respondent\u2019s counsel chose to assert on appeal. Pursuant to Rules 25 and 34 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, we direct the Clerk of this Court to enter an order providing that counsel shall personally pay the costs of this appeal.\nFacts\nBuncombe County Department of Social Services (\u201cDSS\u201d) first became involved with Tim\u2019s family in August 2003. At the time, respondent was in a relationship that she admitted to DSS involved domestic violence and excessive drinking. Although respondent signed a safety agreement with DSS, in which she agreed not to expose Tim to her boyfriend or other abusive individuals, respondent violated the agreement by allowing Tim to have contact with the boyfriend. Respondent finally terminated the relationship after the boyfriend held her and Tim hostage until the police intervened.\nSubsequently, respondent became involved with another boyfriend named Travis. Travis, respondent, and Tim all lived together in the home of respondent\u2019s mother. While living with respondent\u2019s family, Travis accused the grandmother of being a \u201cnosy bitch\u201d and changed the locks to his and respondent\u2019s part of the house. Travis also restricted Tim\u2019s contact with the grandmother. When Tim sneaked away to see his grandmother, Travis whipped him.\nUltimately, the grandmother was forced to ask respondent and Travis to move out of her home. While the family was moving, a fight between respondent and her sister took place on the front lawn in the presence of Tim. About the same time, the family agreed with DSS that Tim would stay with the grandmother and that Travis would not be allowed in Tim\u2019s presence. While DSS was investigating reports that the agreement was being violated, Travis and Tim were found riding in the same truck.\nDSS also learned that, although respondent denied \u201cinappropriate discipline\u201d of the child, respondent would spank Tim with a paint stirrer. Travis admitted that he would spank Tim when the child wet the bed. DSS further learned that Travis directed violent behavior towards animals, \u201cincluding kicking ducks, throwing cats, and beating dogs.\u201d\nOn 4 February 2005, DSS responded to a report that Travis had physically abused respondent and Tim. When Tim answered the door, respondent yelled for him to get back to his bedroom. Respondent \u201cdid not deny the allegations contained in the report\u201d of physical abuse. DSS requested permission to examine Tim for physical injuries, but respondent refused access to the house and the child.\nOn the same day, DSS filed a petition alleging neglect and obtained non-secure custody of Tim. Upon examining Tim for injuries, social workers noticed a bruise on the side of his face and linear bruises to each side of his waist area. While in foster care and during his psychological evaluations, Tim displayed aggressive, violent, and volatile behavior suggestive of past exposure to traumatic events.\nThe adjudicatory and dispositional hearing commenced on 31 March 2005, but the district court continued the hearing in order to allow time for respondent, Tim, and Travis to undergo psychological evaluations. The hearing resumed on 29 June 2005, and the court entered an order adjudicating Tim to be a neglected child on 26 July 2005.\nDiscussion\nThe role of this Court in reviewing an initial adjudication of neglect is to determine \u201c(1) whether the findings of fact are supported by clear and convincing evidence, and (2) whether the legal conclusions are supported by the findings of fact.\u201d In re Gleisner, 141 N.C. App. 475, 480, 539 S.E.2d 362, 365 (2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). \u201cIn a non-jury neglect adjudication, the trial court\u2019s findings of fact supported by clear and convincing competent evidence are deemed conclusive, even where some evidence supports contrary findings.\u201d In re Helms, 127 N.C. App. 505, 511, 491 S.E.2d 672, 676 (1997).\nWe note at the outset that respondent\u2019s appeal suffers from a fatal defect: she has not challenged on appeal the court\u2019s conclusions of law. Respondent originally assigned error to the court\u2019s third conclusion of law that \u201c[Tim] is a neglected child ... in that the minor child lived in an environment injurious to his welfare due to repeated exposure to severe ongoing domestic violence between the respondent mother and her male partners.\u201d In her brief, however, respondent chose to expressly withdraw this assignment of error. Other than this withdrawn assignment of error, respondent did not assign error to any other conclusion of law.\nRespondent\u2019s omission eviscerates respondent\u2019s appeal since an \u201cappellant must assign error to each conclusion it believes is not supported by the evidence. Failure to do so constitutes an acceptance of the conclusion and a waiver of the right to challenge said conclusion as unsupported by the facts.\u201d Fran\u2019s Pecans, Inc. v. Greene, 134 N.C. App. 110, 112, 516 S.E.2d 647, 649 (1999) (internal citation omitted). Having withdrawn her assignment of error as to the third conclusion of law, respondent effectively accepted the trial court\u2019s conclusions in toto. Notwithstanding her various challenges to the trial court\u2019s factual findings, failure to challenge any conclusion of law precludes this Court from overturning the trial court\u2019s judgment. Id,, (summarily affirming trial court\u2019s ruling on issue that was subject of unchallenged conclusion of law); see also In re J.A.A., 175 N.C. App. 66, 74, 623 S.E.2d 45, 50 (2005) (applying Fran\u2019s Pecans in termination of parental rights appeal). Nonetheless, even ignoring this fatal defect, our review of respondent\u2019s arguments on appeal reveals that they do not support reversal of the trial court\u2019s order.\nI\nRespondent contends that the trial court was without authority or jurisdiction to hear the case because the adjudication hearing was not held within 60 days from the filing of DSS\u2019 petition as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-801(c) (2005). We note that respondent\u2019s suggestion that violations of statutory time limitations deprives a trial court of subject matter jurisdiction is contrary to the well-established law. As this Court stated in In re C.L.C., 171 N.C. App. 438, 443, 615 S.E.2d 704, 707 (2005), aff\u2019d, per curiam in part and disc, review improvidently allowed in part, 360 N.C. 475, 628 S.E.2d 760 (2006), \u201ctime limitations in the Juvenile Code are not jurisdictional in cases such as this one and do not require reversal of orders in the absence of a showing by the appellant of prejudice resulting from the time delay.\u201d See also In re S.W., 175 N.C. App. 719, 722, 625 S.E.2d 594, 596 (holding that respondent must show prejudice as a result of an untimely termination of parental rights hearing), disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 534, 635 S.E.2d 59 (2006). Respondent has made no serious attempt to establish prejudice.\nIn any event, the record reveals no violation of \u00a7 7B-801(c). The petition in this case was filed on 7 February 2005, and the adjudication hearing was commenced on 31 March 2005 \u2014 within the 60-day requirement. On 5 April 2005, the court decided to continue the proceedings in order to allow for psychological evaluations of respondent, Tim, and Travis. Respondent argues that this continuance made the hearing untimely.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-803 (2005), however, specifically allows a court, for good cause, to continue a hearing for receipt of additional evidence, reports, or assessments. Once the trial court determined that additional input from psychological experts was necessary to resolve the issue of neglect, it was entitled to continue the hearing so that such information could be obtained. Respondent, notably, did not object to the continuance, but rather agreed to cooperate and participate with respect to the further evaluations.\nRespondent nonetheless argues on appeal that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-801(c) grants only the chief district court judge authority to order a continuance. We cannot agree with this interpretation of the statute. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-801(c) provides:\nThe adjudicatory hearing shall be held in the district at such time and place as the chief district court judge shall designate, but no later than 60 days from the filing of the petition unless the judge pursuant to G.S. 7B-803 orders that it be held at a later time.\nWe hold that nothing in this statute precludes the trial judge assigned to decide a petition to grant a continuance under \u00a7 7B-803. As \u00a7 7B-803 recognizes, the judge presiding over a hearing must be able to exercise his or her discretion to continue a hearing if circumstances warrant it. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-803 (\u201c[t]he court may, for good cause, continue the hearing for as long as is reasonably required\u201d (emphasis added)). The General Assembly could not have intended to tie a trial judge\u2019s.hands by limiting the power to grant continuances to a single chief district court judge not necessarily familiar with the facts of a case.\nRespondent makes no argument that the court\u2019s decision to order a continuance beyond the 60-day mark lacked \u201cgood cause.\u201d We, therefore, hold that the proceedings in this case complied with the statutory time limitations of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-801(c).\nII\nRespondent challenges a number of the trial court\u2019s findings of fact as not being supported by competent evidence. She first contends that the trial court\u2019s findings improperly rely upon testimony of the grandmother, which \u2014 according to respondent \u2014 she ultimately \u201crecanted.\u201d Respondent failed, however, to assign error to specific findings of fact that detail various incidents of violence. Those findings as to the domestic violence are, therefore, binding on appeal and form a basis for the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law. Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991).\nIn any event, we conclude that the trial court was entitled to rely upon the grandmother\u2019s testimony. It is true that the grandmother, when she was recalled as a witness by respondent, attempted to cast doubt on her earlier testimony regarding Tim\u2019s exposure to domestic violence by suggesting that she had troubles with her memory. Nevertheless, her subsequent statements were far from a recantation. When asked by respondent\u2019s attorney if she had ever witnessed domestic violence between respondent and Travis, she replied, \u201cI\u2019ve seen Travis bring her in one time to the living room by her feet. I forget parts. I had a memory loss later on . . . .\u201d Responding to questions from the DSS attorney, the grandmother again remembered that Travis had \u201cwhipped\u201d Tim: \u201cI just heard Travis say, \u2018You peed in the floor,\u2019 and he whipped him.\u201d The grandmother even commented that Travis\u2019 use of force against respondent was only his effort to try to \u201ckeep [respondent] from hitting him.\u201d Thus, the grandmother in fact corroborated her own earlier testimony. Regardless, the trial court was entitled to decide whether to credit the grandmother\u2019s initial testimony or a subsequent purported recantation.\nWith respect to respondent\u2019s remaining challenges to the court\u2019s factual findings, we agree that some of them are not supported by evidence in the record. When, however, ample other findings of fact support an adjudication of neglect, erroneous findings unnecessary to the determination do not constitute reversible error. See In re Beck, 109 N.C. App. 539, 548, 428 S.E.2d 232, 238 (1993) (where no evidence supported a particular finding, inclusion of this finding in the order was immaterial and not prejudicial because even \u201c[i]f the erroneous finding [was] deleted, there remained] an abundance of clear, cogent, and convincing evidence to support a finding of neglect\u201d).\nHere, the erroneous findings are in no way necessary to the court\u2019s conclusion that Tim\u2019s exposure to domestic violence rendered him a neglected juvenile. The order at issue contains numerous unchallenged findings of fact establishing Tim\u2019s exposure to an environment of violence, including respondent\u2019s prior abusive relationship with the first boyfriend, respondent\u2019s inability to abide by the safety agreements designed to insulate her child from domestic abuse, physical abuse by Travis and respondent, DSS\u2019 observations of bruising on Tim, and Urn\u2019s own displays of aggressive, volatile behavior since in DSS custody. These findings of fact fully support the court\u2019s conclusion that Tim was neglected on account of his exposure to severe domestic violence. See In re K.D., 178 N.C. App. 322, 328, 631 S.E.2d 150, 155 (2006) (upholding adjudication of neglect where \u201c[respondent mother\u2019s struggles with parenting skills, domestic violence, and anger management, as well as her unstable housing situation, have the potential to significantly impact her ability to provide \u2018proper care, supervision, or discipline\u2019 \u201d for child (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-101(15) (2005))); Helms, 127 N.C. App. at 512, 491 S.E.2d at 676 (upholding adjudication of neglect where, in part, respondent mother \u201cplaced [child] at substantial risk through repeated exposure to violent individuals\u201d).\nIII\nRespondent\u2019s assignments of error as to Findings of Fact 24 through 28 must be specifically addressed. Respondent challenges each of these findings, which are based on the testimony of Dr. Shepherd-LeBreque, because \u201cthis physician did not testify.\u201d The trial transcript shows, however, that the physician did testify.\nRespondent\u2019s contrary argument seems based on the first version of transcript volume one that was delivered on 26 October 2005. This version did not contain the testimony of Dr. Shepherd-LeBreque. On 3 January 2006, however, an updated version was sent to counsel for all parties, including respondent\u2019s counsel, and this version contained the doctor\u2019s testimony. In fact, the copy of the updated transcript on file with this Court bears a stamp marked \u201cReceived\u201d by respondent\u2019s counsel dated 5 January 2006. It is, therefore, bewildering that respondent\u2019s brief would assert that the doctor \u201cdid not testify.\u201d Further, once DSS and the guardian ad litem pointed out respondent\u2019s error, respondent should have withdrawn this argument, but chose not to do so. The trial court\u2019s factual findings are thus sufficiently supported by evidence in the record, and respondent\u2019s argument is frivolous.\nIV\nRespondent next asserts that the admission of out-of-court statements of Tim constitutes a violation of respondent\u2019s rights under the Confrontation Clause of the U.S. Constitution and North Carolina Constitution. Prior to the filing of respondent\u2019s brief in this appeal, this Court had already held that the protections of the Confrontation Clause do not apply in civil cases of this nature. In re B.D., 174 N.C. App. 234, 243, 620 S.E.2d 913, 919 (2005), disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 289, 628 S.E.2d 245 (2006); In re D.R., 172 N.C. App. 300, 303-04, 616 S.E.2d 300, 303-04 (2005). Respondent\u2019s constitutional argument, therefore, has no merit.\nRespondent argues alternatively that Tim\u2019s statements constituted inadmissible hearsay. Assuming without deciding that the statements attributed to Tim were inadmissible hearsay, respondent falls far short of demonstrating the kind of prejudice necessary for this Court to reverse the trial court\u2019s order. See In re M.G.T.-B., 177 N.C. App. 771, 775, 629 S.E.2d 916, 919 (2006) (\u201ceven when the trial court commits error in allowing the admission of hearsay statements, one must show that such error was prejudicial in order to warrant reversal\u201d). Respondent makes a single cursory, unsubstantiated claim that the admission of the hearsay statements \u201cconstitute^] prejudicial error.\u201d\nIn the absence of a particularized showing of prejudice, any error cannot justify reversal. Indeed, even disregarding the challenged hearsay statements, the court\u2019s findings and conclusions are amply supported by other evidence. See In re McMillon, 143 N.C. App. 402, 411, 546 S.E.2d 169, 175 (\u201cWhere there is competent evidence to support the court\u2019s findings, the admission of incompetent evidence is not prejudicial.\u201d), disc. review denied, 354 N.C. 218, 554 S.E.2d 341 (2001).\nV\nRespondent also stages a generalized attack against the entirety of the court\u2019s order. Quoting the trial judge\u2019s oral adjudication of neglect, respondent claims in her brief that \u201c[t]he Court made no findings of fact whatsoever in support of this decision.\u201d This argument ignores the court\u2019s entry of a written order containing 37 findings of fact as to the neglect adjudication alone. The trial judge was not required to make detailed findings of fact in open court. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-807(b) (2005) (an \u201cadjudicatory order shall be in writing and shall contain appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law\u201d); In re Bullabough, 89 N.C. App. 171, 179, 365 S.E.2d 642, 646 (1988) (trial judge not required \u201cto announce in open court his findings and conclusions\u201d).\nRespondent dismisses the written order on the ground that it \u201cwas likely drafted by the Petitioner\u2019s attorney and does not constitute findings of fact by the trial judge.\u201d This Court has previously rejected this argument. See In re J.B., 172 N.C. App. 1, 26, 616 S.E.2d 264, 279 (2005) (finding no error when trial court directed that petitioner draft the order).\nRespondent\u2019s next attack on the order is equally meritless. She claims that the trial court\u2019s findings are mere \u201crecitations of testimony given or documents received into evidence.\u201d Significantly, respondent does not identify a single specific finding in the record to support her argument. In fact, a review of the order reveals that the trial court made ample ultimate findings of fact and did not merely include \u201crecitations\u201d of the evidence.\nVI\nWith respect to the dispositional order, respondent has not challenged the court\u2019s conclusions of law or any aspect of the de-cretal portion of the order. Instead, respondent argues that the trial court erred in referring to respondent\u2019s psychological evaluation and in concluding that a DSS witness, Dr. Cynthia Brown, an admitted expert in pediatrics and child sexual abuse, including child medical evaluations, was also an expert in the field of making recommendations for counseling of abused children. We disagree with both contentions.\nAs for the psychological evaluation, DSS concedes this evaluation was excluded during the adjudication hearing, but argues that this does not preclude consideration of the report at the disposition hearing. A \u201cdispositional hearing may be informal and the court may consider written reports or other evidence concerning the needs of the juvenile.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-901 (2005). Further, \u201c[t]he court may consider any evidence ... that the court finds to be relevant, reliable, and necessary to determine the needs of the juvenile and the most appropriate disposition.\u201d Id. Interpreting this statute, this Court in In re M.J.G., 168 N.C. App. 638, 648, 608 S.E.2d 813, 819 (2005), approved a disposition order where the trial court considered reports that had not been formally moved into evidence. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err by considering the psychological evaluation of Tim\u2019s mother in reaching its decision on disposition.\nWith respect to Dr. Brown, the court made an oral finding during the adjudicatory phase that as an expert \u201cin pediatrics and child sexual abuse matters, including child medical evaluations of children suspected of child sexual abuse, neglect, physical or mental abuse . . .,\u201d Dr. Cynthia Brown was also \u201can expert in the field of making recommendations for counseling of suspected abused children.\u201d We note that respondent has failed to set forth the standard of review on this issue as required by N.C.R. App. R 28(b). Significantly, it is well established that \u201c[w]here a judge finds a witness qualified as an expert, that finding will not be reversed unless there was no competent evidence to support the finding or unless the judge abused his discretion.\u201d State v. Young, 312 N.C. 669, 679, 325 S.E.2d 181, 188 (1985).\nIn voir dire, Dr. Brown never asserted that she was qualified to conduct psychological evaluations or counseling, but she did testify that in the course of her professional duties she frequently recommends counseling to her patients. Accordingly, the court was well within its discretion to accept Dr. Brown as an expert with respect to counseling recommendations.\nFurther, respondent has not suggested that counseling was inappropriate or pointed to any testimony of Dr. Brown that she contends was outside Dr. Brown\u2019s area of expertise. At most, respondent raises an academic issue. On the whole, we find respondent\u2019s objection with respect to Dr. Brown to be frivolous. A pediatric doctor, who specializes in abuse cases, is certainly qualified to recommend counseling to her allegedly abused patients. Cf. In re Thompson, 64 N.C. App. 95, 101, 306 S.E.2d 792, 795 (1983) (noting that a conclusion of neglect was supported where a pediatrician\u2019s recommendations that child be \u201cevaluated\u201d and receive counseling were not followed by respondent mother). This assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.\nAffirmed.\nJudges CALABRIA and JACKSON concur.\n. Throughout this opinion, we will refer to the child by the pseudonym \u201cTim.\u2019", "type": "majority", "author": "GEER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Reid Gonella for petitioner-appellee.", "Hall & Hall Attorneys at Law, P.G., by Douglas L. Hall, for respondent-appellant.", "Judy N. Rudolph for guardian ad litem-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF: T.M., Minor Child\nNo. COA06-79\n(Filed 19 December 2006)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 appellate rules violations \u2014 sanctions\nThe Clerk of the Court of Appeals was directed to enter an order providing that respondent\u2019s counsel shall personally pay the costs of this appeal under N.C. R. App. P. 25 and 34 based on the frivolous nature of some of the arguments asserted on appeal in addition to his violations of the appellate rules.\n2. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 failure to challenge conclusions of law\nRespondent mother\u2019s appeal in a child neglect case suffers from a fatal defect because notwithstanding the various challenges to the trial court\u2019s factual findings, failure to challenge any conclusions of law precludes the Court of Appeals from overturning the trial court\u2019s judgment. Even ignoring this fatal defect, a review of respondent\u2019s arguments on appeal do not support reversal of the trial court\u2019s order.\n3. Child Abuse and Neglect\u2014 adjudication hearing \u2014 continuation of proceedings outside 60 days for psychological evaluations\nThe trial court did not err in a child neglect case by concluding it had jurisdiction to hear the case even though respondent contends the adjudication hearing was allegedly not held within 60 days from the filing of DSS\u2019 petition as required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-801(c) based on the court\u2019s decision to continue the proceeding in order to allow for psychological evaluations, because: (1) N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-803 specifically allows a court, for good cause, to continue a hearing for receipt of additional evidence, reports, or assessments, and the trial court was entitled to continue the hearing once it determined that additional input from psychological experts was necessary to resolve the issue of neglect; (2) respondent did not object to the continuance, but instead agreed to cooperate and participate with respect to the further evaluations; (3) although respondent contends N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-801(c) grants only the chief district court judge authority to order a continuance, nothing in that statute precludes the trial judge assigned to decide a petition to grant a continuance under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-803; and (4) respondent made no argument that the court\u2019s decision to order a continuance beyond the 60-day mark lacked good cause.\n4. Evidence\u2014 testimony \u2014 child\u2019s exposure to domestic violence\nThe trial court did not err in a child neglect case by its findings of fact including, among others, those relying on the grandmother\u2019s testimony concerning the minor child\u2019s exposure to domestic violence, because: (1) respondent failed to assign error to specific findings of fact that detailed various incidents of violence; (2) although the grandmother attempted to cast doubt on her earlier testimony by suggesting that she had troubles with her memory, the grandmother in fact corroborated her own earlier testimony and the trial court was entitled to decide whether to credit the grandmother\u2019s initial testimony or a subsequent purported recantation; and (3) with respect to respondent\u2019s remaining challenges to the court\u2019s factual findings, any erroneous findings unnecessary to the determination do not constitute reversible error when there were ample other findings of fact supporting an adjudication of neglect.\n5. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 frivolous argument\nThe trial court did not err in a child neglect case by its findings of fact based on a physician\u2019s testimony, because: (1) contrary to defendant\u2019s assertion, the physician did testify according to the updated version of the trial transcript sent on 3 January 2006; and (2) once DSS and the guardian ad litem pointed out respondent\u2019s error, respondent should have withdrawn this argument, but chose not to do so.\n6. Evidence\u2014 hearsay \u2014 out-of-court statements \u2014 failure to show prejudice\nThe trial court did not err or violate respondent\u2019s right to confrontation in a child neglect case by admitting out-of-court statements of the minor child, because: (1) the Court of Appeals has already held that the protections of the Confrontation Clause do not apply in civil cases of this nature; (2) assuming without deciding that the statements were inadmissible hearsay, respondent failed to demonstrate the kind of prejudice necessary for reversal; and (3) even disregarding the challenged hearsay statements, the court\u2019s findings and conclusions are amply supported by other evidence.\n7. Child Abuse and Neglect\u2014 findings of fact \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nRespondent\u2019s generalized attack on the entirety of the trial court\u2019s order in a child neglect case is overruled, because: (1) although respondent claims the trial court made no findings of fact whatsoever in support of this decision, there were 37 findings of fact as to the neglect adjudication alone; (2) the Court of Appeals has previously rejected respondent\u2019s argument that the written order should be dismissed based on the fact that it was likely drafted by petitioner\u2019s attorney and does not constitute findings of fact by the trial judge; and (3) a review of the order revealed the trial court made ample ultimate findings of fact and did not merely include recitations of the evidence.\n8. Evidence\u2014 psychological evaluation \u2014 expert recommending counseling of abused children\nThe trial court did not err in a child neglect case by referring to respondent\u2019s psychological evaluation and by concluding that a DSS witness, an admitted expert in pediatrics and child sexual abuse including child medical evaluations, was also an expert in the field of making recommendations for counseling of abused children, because: (1) although the evaluation was excluded during the adjudication hearing, the trial court could consider the evaluation in reaching its decision on disposition when the court may consider any evidence that it finds to be relevant, reliable, and necessary to determine the needs of the juvenile and the most appropriate disposition; (2) the court was well within its discretion to accept the pediatric doctor witness as an expert with respect to counseling recommendations; and (3) respondent has not suggested that counseling was inappropriate or pointed to any testimony of the expert that was outside the witness\u2019s area of expertise.\nAppeal by respondent from judgment entered 26 July 2005 by Judge Marvin R Pope in Buncombe County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 September 2006.\nG. Reid Gonella for petitioner-appellee.\nHall & Hall Attorneys at Law, P.G., by Douglas L. Hall, for respondent-appellant.\nJudy N. Rudolph for guardian ad litem-appellee." }, "file_name": "0539-01", "first_page_order": 569, "last_page_order": 581 }