{ "id": 8373638, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF: L.C., I.C., L.C., Minor Children", "name_abbreviation": "In re L.C.", "decision_date": "2007-01-02", "docket_number": "No. COA06-575", "first_page": "278", "last_page": "287", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "181 N.C. App. 278" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "612 S.E.2d 328", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632812 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332", "parenthetical": "denying ineffective assistance claim when respondent \"failed to specify what motions should have been made and what evidence could have been, but was not, presented before the trial court\"." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/612/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "622 S.E.2d 522", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634432, 12634433, 12634434, 12634435, 12634425, 12634426, 12634427, 12634428, 12634429, 12634430, 12634431 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "second alteration original" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/622/0522-07", "/se2d/622/0522-08", "/se2d/622/0522-09", "/se2d/622/0522-10", "/se2d/622/0522-11", "/se2d/622/0522-01", "/se2d/622/0522-02", "/se2d/622/0522-03", "/se2d/622/0522-04", "/se2d/622/0522-05", "/se2d/622/0522-06" ] }, { "cite": "483 S.E.2d 156", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157", "parenthetical": "\"The filing of a petition alleging abuse and neglect commences a civil proceeding. By its terms, the Sixth Amendment applies only to criminal cases.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 745", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53934 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "748", "parenthetical": "\"The filing of a petition alleging abuse and neglect commences a civil proceeding. By its terms, the Sixth Amendment applies only to criminal cases.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0745-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 S.E.2d 79", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "80" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4682240 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0283-01" ] }, { "cite": "554 S.E.2d 341", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138560, 138547, 138483, 138421, 138301 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0218-02", "/nc/354/0218-05", "/nc/354/0218-03", "/nc/354/0218-01", "/nc/354/0218-04" ] }, { "cite": "546 S.E.2d 169", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "176-77" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 N.C. 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App.", "case_ids": [ 12125951 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301" }, { "page": "291" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/140/0288-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 S.E.2d 205", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 712", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559202, 8559235, 8559212, 8559183, 8559193 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0712-03", "/nc/291/0712-05", "/nc/291/0712-04", "/nc/291/0712-01", "/nc/291/0712-02" ] }, { "cite": "229 S.E.2d 693", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "696" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 N.C. App. 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548308 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "180" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/31/0174-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 N.C. App. 728", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8473183 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "733", "parenthetical": "denying ineffective assistance claim when respondent \"failed to specify what motions should have been made and what evidence could have been, but was not, presented before the trial court\"." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/169/0728-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 S.E.2d 393", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396" }, { "page": "396" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 N.C. App. 434", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11913599 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "436" }, { "page": "436" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/123/0434-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005 WL 3291365", "category": "reporters:specialty_west", "reporter": "WL", "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "*2", "parenthetical": "second alteration original" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "174 N.C. App. 839", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "second alteration original" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 920, "char_count": 22264, "ocr_confidence": 0.752, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.6922497885596954e-07, "percentile": 0.8925329237341636 }, "sha256": "4432dec698c57af14ed93f270b476ce3913386c8adfd720300ca019a9a137771", "simhash": "1:8fe9548ea24e0dd6", "word_count": 3505 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:19:54.793724+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges STEELMAN and STEPHENS concur.", "Judge STEPHENS concurred prior to 31 December 2006." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF: L.C., I.C., L.C., Minor Children" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GEER, Judge.\nRespondent father appeals from an order of the district court terminating his parental rights with respect to his minor children, L.C. (\u201cLandon\u201d), I.C. (\u201cIrene\u201d), and L.C. (\u201cLee\u201d). On appeal, respondent primarily argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when the afternoon session of the termination of parental rights (\u201cTPR\u201d) hearing began as scheduled, even though his attorney had not yet returned, and, when the trial court later did not allow respondent\u2019s attorney to ask petitioner\u2019s first afternoon witness introductory questions to \u201cbring [respondent\u2019s counsel] up to speed.\u201d Respondent also contends that the trial court erred by admitting two of the minor children\u2019s mental health records, which he argues contain inadmissible hearsay. Finally, respondent asserts that several of the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are unsupported by the evidence, that they cannot support the court\u2019s conclusions of law, and that the trial court abused its discretion by terminating his parental rights.\nWe conclude that respondent has not shown that his attorney\u2019s tardiness deprived him of a fair hearing, and, therefore, respondent has failed to establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Additionally, as respondent has made no effort to rebut the presumption that the trial court disregarded any hearsay contained in the disputed medical records, he is not entitled to reversal on this ground. We also conclude that the trial court\u2019s findings are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, that they adequately support the court\u2019s conclusion that respondent abused his children, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by terminating his parental rights on this basis. Accordingly, we affirm.\nFacts\nOn 31 July 2001, the Vance County Department of Social Services (\u201cVance County DSS\u201d) filed petitions alleging that Landon, Irene, and Lee were abused, neglected, and dependent juveniles. According to Vance County DSS, the children\u2019s mother was deceased, and respondent had inappropriately disciplined the children and left them home alone without proper supervision. Respondent does not contest that, prior to the filing of the petitions, he had hit all three children with belts and switches; had \u201cback-handed\u201d Land\u00f3n in the eye; had struck Irene in the eye and on her face, shoulders, and back numerous times with belts, brooms, shoes, and drop cords; and had beaten Lee about the face and back.\nThe trial court issued non-secure custody orders on 31 July 2001, granting custody of the children to Vance County DSS. At the time they were taken from respondent\u2019s custody, all three children had marks, bruises, and scars indicative of both old and new abuse.\nBecause respondent missed numerous court dates, adjudication proceedings did not occur until January 2002. At the time of the adjudication hearing, respondent resided in a half-way house, was scheduled for vocational rehabilitation and anger management classes, and had signed both a protection plan and a family services case plan addressing proper discipline and supervision. On 23 October 2002, the trial court adjudicated the children to be abused, neglected, and dependent and ordered Vance County DSS to retain custody. The case plan at that time was reunification.\nThe matter was transferred to Durham County Department of Social Services (\u201cDurham County DSS\u201d) on 25 October 2002. On 5 August 2003, following a review hearing, the trial court entered an order noting that respondent had presented letters showing that he had completed an outpatient substance abuse program as well as parenting classes and had been drug-free since June 2002. On the other hand, it appeared, according to guardian ad litem and Durham County DSS reports, that respondent may not have completed anger management classes, obtained a recommended psychological evaluation, or provided proof of stable housing and income. As a result, the court ordered respondent to obtain a psychological evaluation, continue with substance abuse treatment, maintain housing at the halfway house, attend anger management classes, and adhere to a restraining order requiring he stay 1,000 feet away from the children. The court, however, also decided to change the permanent plan to termination of parental rights and adoption, or, alternatively, guardianship with a relative.\nOn 31 December 2003, Durham County DSS filed a petition to terminate respondent\u2019s parental rights. The trial court entered an order on 2 September 2004 finding that respondent had abused each of the three children and that, as a result, they suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder and other behavioral and emotional conditions. Because respondent was only in the beginning stages of anger management education, the court determined that he was not yet able to give the children appropriate care and supervision. Further, because respondent would still require \u201csignificant individual therapy to deal with his personal issue [s]\u201d before he could safely parent his children, the court concluded that there was a reasonable probability that he would continue to abuse the children if they were returned to his care. Based on these findings of fact, the court terminated respondent\u2019s parental rights.\nRespondent appealed, and this Court reversed, concluding that the wording of the trial court\u2019s \u201cconclusion of law merely reiterate [d] \u2018the grounds upon which the petition for termination [was] filed\u2019 and [did] not conclude that any of those grounds actually exist.\u201d In re L.C., 174 N.C. App. 839, 622 S.E.2d 522, 2005 N.C. App. LEXIS 2600, at *5, 2005 WL 3291365, at *2 (2005) (second alteration original) (unpublished). We remanded for further proceedings, but left to the trial court\u2019s discretion the decision as to whether to conduct an additional hearing on remand. Id.\nThe trial court chose not to hold another hearing and, instead, entered a new order specifically finding that the \u201cerror in the termination order was a drafting error and the [c]ourt specifically did make the necessary conclusions of law, even if incorrectly drafted.\u201d Following discovery of additional clerical errors, the trial court ultimately altered the disputed conclusion of law to begin by stating that \u201cthe grounds upon which termination exist are as follows . . . .\u201d (Emphasis added.) The order otherwise remained the same, and respondent again timely appealed.\nI\nWe turn first to respondent\u2019s argument that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Parents have a \u201cright to counsel in all proceedings dedicated to the termination of parental rights.\u201d In re Oghenekevebe, 123 N.C. App. 434, 436, 473 S.E.2d 393, 396 (1996). See also N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-602(a) (2005) (\u201cIn cases where the juvenile petition alleges that a juvenile is abused, neglected, or dependent, the parent has the right to counsel . . . unless that person waives the right.\u201d). This right includes the right to effective assistance of counsel. Oghenekevebe, 123 N.C. App. at 436, 473 S.E.2d at 396.\nRespondent points to the fact that on the second of five days of hearing, the trial court commenced court following the luncheon recess even though his attorney had not yet arrived. At that time, Durham County DSS called its second witness of the day, Lee\u2019s case manager, Elizabeth Fortune. At some unknown point during Ms. Fortune\u2019s testimony, respondent\u2019s attorney arrived. After Ms. Fortune was examined by the attorneys for Durham County DSS and the guardian ad litem, respondent\u2019s attorney began her cross-examination as follows:\nQ. I have a few questions for you, and some are to bring me up to speed from the beginning of your testimony.\nWhat\u2019s your full name?\nA. Elizabeth Fortune.\nQ. And what is your relation to [Lee]?\nA. I\u2019m his case manager and individual therapist.\nQ. And what is your background and qualifications as\u2014\nThe Court: You were not here when this went over, so you missed it. So just go on with your cross-examination. You\u2019ve got her name and that\u2019s all you need. We started on time, you were not here. So skip over that and let\u2019s just go to testimony.\nThe record does not reflect how much of Ms. Fortune\u2019s direct testimony respondent\u2019s attorney missed on account of her tardiness.\nA claim of ineffective assistance of counsel not only requires a respondent to show that counsel\u2019s performance was deficient, but also that \u201cthe deficiency was so serious as to deprive the represented party of a fair hearing.\u201d Id. Here, respondent has failed to demonstrate how his attorney\u2019s tardiness caused him to be denied a fair hearing.\nRespondent has not identified what direct testimony his attorney missed, has not explained how the failure of his counsel to hear that testimony prejudiced him, and has not suggested what other introductory questions his attorney would have asked, if allowed, and how the preclusion of such questions impacted her ability to effectively represent respondent. Because respondent has failed to demonstrate the prejudice he suffered, he has likewise failed to establish his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See In re B.P., 169 N.C. App. 728, 733, 612 S.E.2d 328, 332 (2005) (denying ineffective assistance claim when respondent \u201cfailed to specify what motions should have been made and what evidence could have been, but was not, presented before the trial court\u201d.).\nRespondent alternatively argues that, even if he was not denied effective assistance of counsel, the trial court nevertheless erred by refusing to allow his attorney to cross-examine \u201ca key witness\u201d on \u201ca relevant topic.\u201d Rule 103(a) of the Rules of Evidence provides:\nError may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and\n. . . .\n(2) .... In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which questions were asked.\nHere, when the trial court instructed respondent\u2019s attorney to \u201cjust go to testimony,\u201d she responded \u201c[o]kay\u201d and proceeded with her substantive cross-examination. We have no way of determining what respondent\u2019s attorney was precluded from asking because she failed to make an offer of proof. Accordingly, since respondent did not comply with Rule 103, we are not in a position to review this argument on appeal. These assignments of error are, therefore, overruled.\nII\nRespondent next contends that the trial court erred by admitting, over objection, Lee\u2019s and Irene\u2019s mental health records, which respondent argues contain inadmissible hearsay. Even assuming, arguendo, that the records contain inadmissible hearsay, respondent has failed to demonstrate that the trial court\u2019s order must be reversed.\nIn a bench trial, \u201cit will be presumed that the judge disregarded any incompetent evidence that may have been admitted unless it affirmatively appears that he was influenced thereby.\u201d Stanback v. Stanback, 31 N.C. App. 174, 180, 229 S.E.2d 693, 696 (1976), disc. review denied, 291 N.C. 712, 232 S.E.2d 205 (1977). Under this principle, respondent bears the burden of showing that the trial court relied on the incompetent evidence in making its findings. In re Huff, 140 N.C. App. 288, 301, 536 S.E.2d 838, 846 (2000), appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 374, 547 S.E.2d 9 (2001).\nRespondent has not met his burden. Although the children\u2019s mental health records span over 550 pages, respondent has not pointed to any specific instances of hearsay upon which he contends the trial court improperly relied. As respondent has failed to rebut the presumption that the trial court disregarded inadmissible evidence in making its findings, we overrule this assignment of error.\nIII\nFinally, we consider respondent\u2019s argument that the trial court erred by terminating his parental rights. During the adjudication stage of a termination of parental rights proceeding, the petitioner has the burden of proving by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that one or more of the statutory grounds for termination set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1111 (2005) exist. On appeal, this Court determines whether the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. Huff, 140 N.C. App. at 291, 536 S.E.2d at 840.\nAs we find it dispositive, we review only the trial court\u2019s conclusion that grounds existed under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-llll(a)(l), providing for termination of a respondent\u2019s parental rights when the parent has \u201cabused or neglected the juvenile.\u201d An abused juvenile is one whose parent, among other things, inflicts upon the juvenile serious physical injury by other than accidental means, uses upon the juvenile cruel or grossly inappropriate procedures to modify behavior, or creates serious emotional damage to the juvenile evidenced by the juvenile\u2019s severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or aggressive behavior. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-101(1) (2005). For the trial court to decide, following a termination of parental rights hearing, that a child is abused, the court \u201cmust admit and consider all evidence of relevant circumstances or events which existed or occurred before the adjudication of abuse, as well as any evidence of changed conditions in light of the evidence of prior abuse and the probability of a repetition of that abuse.\u201d In re Greene, 152 N.C. App. 410, 417, 568 S.E.2d 634, 638 (2002).\nHere, the trial court found that all three children had been abused and exhibited symptoms of that abuse. Further, the court determined that there was a reasonable probability that respondent would again abuse the children if they were returned to his care. As to past abuse, the trial court found, and respondent candidly admits, that he physically beat and abused the children. This abuse, the trial court found, caused the children to suffer various emotional and behavioral problems, including post-traumatic stress disorder. Although respondent contests this finding of fact on appeal, it is amply supported by the testimony of each child\u2019s therapist.\nIn addition, the trial court\u2019s finding that respondent would likely continue the abuse if the children were returned to his custody was supported by the testimony of respondent\u2019s individual therapist, Carolyn Cordasko. She testified that his anger management progress had been \u201crather slow\u201d and that he was still \u201cfairly high-risk.\u201d She expressed her view that the parenting classes respondent had taken to learn about \u201calternatives to corporal punishment\u201d had not been sufficient to train him about \u201cappropriate parenting.\u201d She concluded that respondent\u2019s taking custody of his children at that time would be a significant \u201cchallenge.\u201d Indeed, Ms. Cordasko specifically noted that respondent had not yet experienced sufficient progress even to meet with his children and apologize for his past abuse. Based on this testimony, we hold that the trial' court\u2019s finding that respondent was likely to continue to abuse the children was also supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.\nFurther, these findings of fact \u2014 regarding past abuse, the effect of the abuse on the children, and the probability of future abuse \u2014 -were in turn sufficient to support the trial court\u2019s conclusion that grounds existed to terminate respondent\u2019s parental rights because he had abused his children. \u201cHaving concluded that at least one ground for termination of parental rights existed, we need not address the additional ground[s] . . . found by the trial court.\u201d In re B.S.D.S., 163 N.C. App. 540, 546, 594 S.E.2d 89, 93-94 (2004).\nAs petitioner met its burden of proving that grounds for termination existed, the trial court was required to move to the disposition phase and consider whether termination was in the best interests of the children. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1110(a). The trial court\u2019s decision to terminate parental .rights is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. In re Nesbitt, 147 N.C. App. 349, 352, 555 S.E.2d 659, 662 (2001). Here, the trial court did indeed find termination would be in the children\u2019s best interests, and, given respondent\u2019s history of severe physical abuse and ongoing battle with anger management even after three years of the children being in DSS custody, we see nothing manifestly unreasonable about this decision. See In re McMillon, 143 N.C. App. 402, 412-13, 546 S.E.2d 169, 176-77 (trial court did not abuse discretion by terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights when he admitted \u201cdisciplining\u201d child by \u201csmacking\u201d and \u201cwhipping,\u201d and father had not made \u201cmeaningful clinical progress\u201d during counseling), disc. review denied, 354 N.C. 218, 554 S.E.2d 341 (2001).\nRespondent, however, points to the court\u2019s finding that \u201c[a]ll of the children\u2019s therapists think that it would be in the children\u2019s best interests and assist in their therapy' to have family sessions with [respondent] that involve some clarification, and apology and emotional reconciliation.\u201d Respondent contends that this finding required that the trial court conclude that termination of parental rights was not in the children\u2019s best interests.\nThe trial court, however, also found that such family sessions could not occur until respondent had \u201cprogressed to a stage where he can appropriately do those things, and . . . the children are at a stage where they can safely process the information and experience.\u201d Further, according to the court, the children also \u201crequire permanency to ensure continued progress in their therapy.\u201d We cannot find an abuse of discretion when the trial court concluded that the need for permanency required, in these circumstances, termination of parental rights.\nAffirmed.\nJudges STEELMAN and STEPHENS concur.\nJudge STEPHENS concurred prior to 31 December 2006.\n. The pseudonyms Landon, Irene, and Lee will be used throughout the opinion to protect the children\u2019s privacy.\n. We note that respondent\u2019s reliance on State v. Colbert, 311 N.C. 283, 316 S.E.2d 79 (1984), for his argument that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel during a \u201ccritical stage\u201d of the proceeding is misplaced. Although the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does indeed attach during \u201ccritical stages\u201d of criminal proceedings, see, e.g., id. at 285, 316 S.E.2d at 80, our Supreme Court has specifically held that this right does not apply to actions seeking the termination of parental rights. State v. Adams, 345 N.C. 745, 748, 483 S.E.2d 156, 157 (1997) (\u201cThe filing of a petition alleging abuse and neglect commences a civil proceeding. By its terms, the Sixth Amendment applies only to criminal cases.\u201d).\n. We note that respondent contests the trial court\u2019s findings on this issue by challenging the court\u2019s decision not to hold another hearing and take additional evidence following this Court\u2019s remand in the initial appeal. Our prior opinion, however, left the issue of whether to hold an additional hearing to the trial court\u2019s discretion, and respondent makes no argument suggesting that the decision not to do so was manifestly unreasonable. In any event, respondent has pointed to nothing in the record indicating that he requested an opportunity to present additional evidence on remand, and, accordingly, we conclude this issue has not been properly preserved for appellate review. N.C.R. App. P. 10(b)(1).", "type": "majority", "author": "GEER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Durham County Attorney S. C. Kitchen, by Deputy County Attorney Thomas W. Jordan, Jr., for petitioner-appellee.", "Peter Wood for respondent-appellant.", "Wendy C. Sotolongo for guardian ad litem." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF: L.C., I.C., L.C., Minor Children\nNo. COA06-575\n(Filed 2 January 2007)\n1. Constitutional Law\u2014 effective assistance of counsel\u2014 tardiness\nDefendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel in a termination of parental rights proceeding even though his counsel was late on the second of five days of hearing after a lunch recess, because: (1) respondent failed to demonstrate how his attorney\u2019s tardiness caused him to be denied a fair hearing; and (2) there was no way of determining what respondent\u2019s attorney was precluded from asking based on her failure to make an offer of proof as required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 103.\n2. Evidence\u2014 hearsay \u2014 mental health records of children\nThe trial court did not err in a termination of parental rights case by admitting, over objection, mental health records of two of the minor children, because: (1) even assuming arguendo that the records contain inadmissible hearsay, in a bench trial it is presumed that the judge disregarded any incompetent evidence that may have been admitted unless it affirmatively appears that he was influenced thereby; and (2) respondent has not pointed to any specific instances of hearsay upon which the trial court improperly relied.\n3. Termination of Parental Rights\u2014 past abuse \u2014 reasonable probability of continued abuse \u2014 emotional and behavioral problems\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion by terminating respondent father\u2019s parental rights, because: (1) the trial court found that all three children had been abused and exhibited symptoms of that abuse, and respondent admitted that he physically beat and abused the children; (2) the court determined there was a reasonable probability that respondent would again abuse the children if they were returned to his care based on the testimony of respondent\u2019s individual therapist; (3) the children\u2019s therapist testified the children suffered various emotional and behavioral problems including posttraumatic stress disorder based on the abuse; and (4) although respondent pointed to the trial court\u2019s finding that all of the children\u2019s therapists think it would be in the children\u2019s best interests and assist in their therapy to have family sessions with respondent, the trial court found the family sessions could not occur until respondent had progressed and the children are at a stage where they can safely process the information, and further, the trial court found the children also require permanency to ensure continued progress in their therapy.\nAppeal by respondent from order entered 25 January 2006 by Judge James T. Hill in Durham County .District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 October 2006.\nDurham County Attorney S. C. Kitchen, by Deputy County Attorney Thomas W. Jordan, Jr., for petitioner-appellee.\nPeter Wood for respondent-appellant.\nWendy C. Sotolongo for guardian ad litem." }, "file_name": "0278-01", "first_page_order": 310, "last_page_order": 319 }