{ "id": 8375468, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MICHAEL REED REPLOGLE, II, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Replogle", "decision_date": "2007-02-06", "docket_number": "No. COA06-152", "first_page": "579", "last_page": "584", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "181 N.C. App. 579" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "616 S.E.2d 914", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633665 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/616/0914-01" ] }, { "cite": "616 S.E.2d 515", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633574 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "524" }, { "page": "524", "parenthetical": "quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/616/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "624 S.E.2d 639", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634932 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "641", "parenthetical": "quoting Bustle v. Rice, 116 N.C. App. 658, 659, 449 S.E.2d 10, 11 (1994)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/624/0639-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 S.E.2d 768", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "772" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4725856 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "569" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 S.E.2d 652", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4689817 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 824", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3798415 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0824-01" ] }, { "cite": "587 S.E.2d 456", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "460" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 N.C. App. 144", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8955879 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/161/0144-01" ] }, { "cite": "423 S.E.2d 819", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "821" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 N.C. App. 338", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524198 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/108/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 S.E.2d 192", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "196" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 720", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790161 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "726" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0720-01" ] }, { "cite": "605 S.E.2d 228", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Wilson, 340 N.C. 720, 726, 459 S.E.2d 192, 196 (1995)" }, { "page": "233" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "167 N.C. App. 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8411020 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Wilson, 340 N.C. 720, 726, 459 S.E.2d 192, 196 (1995)" }, { "page": "233" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/167/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 S.E.2d 225", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228", "parenthetical": "internal quotations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 N.C. App. 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549281 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133", "parenthetical": "internal quotations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/48/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 709", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3802205 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "718" }, { "page": "718" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0709-01" ] }, { "cite": "589 S.E.2d 896", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "900" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "162 N.C. App. 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8914681 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/162/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 S.E.2d 10", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "11" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 N.C. App. 658", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525352 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "659" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/116/0658-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 N.C. App. 778", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8353276 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "781", "parenthetical": "quoting Bustle v. Rice, 116 N.C. App. 658, 659, 449 S.E.2d 10, 11 (1994)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/174/0778-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 517", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "519" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2566216 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "552 S.E.2d 596", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "607", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 322, 372 S.E.2d 517, 519 (1988" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138508 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86-87", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 322, 372 S.E.2d 517, 519 (1988" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 S.E.2d 500", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "502" }, { "page": "502" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 N.C. App. 140", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 2644278 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/51/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 S.E.2d 90", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "92" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 633", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4686938 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "637" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0633-01" ] }, { "cite": "483 S.E.2d 436", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "439", "parenthetical": "citing State v. McGill, 314 N.C. 633, 637, 336 S.E.2d 90, 92 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 729", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 54033 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "733", "parenthetical": "citing State v. McGill, 314 N.C. 633, 637, 336 S.E.2d 90, 92 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0729-01" ] }, { "cite": "548 S.E.2d 684", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "700", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "700", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 599", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135851 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "621", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "621" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0599-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 742, "char_count": 14887, "ocr_confidence": 0.744, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.9400253434336036e-07, "percentile": 0.8480486700189857 }, "sha256": "4d566564f331f30142c193868df792ceeb957bfb15887790ec9ae439bcc2d6fd", "simhash": "1:836c40ee70aae942", "word_count": 2434 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:19:54.793724+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge JACKSON concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MICHAEL REED REPLOGLE, II, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ELMORE, Judge.\nMichael Replogle, II (defendant) appeals his conviction for involuntary manslaughter. After a careful review of the record, we find no error in defendant\u2019s conviction of involuntary manslaughter. However, because the State failed to produce any evidence on the issue of restitution at sentencing, we remand for resentencing on that issue.\nBeginning 28 May 2005, defendant held a three-day unsupervised party at his house. Defendant was sixteen years old at the time. On the morning of 30 May 2005, defendant, accompanied by his friends Jessica Parsons (Parsons), Tina Harmon (Harmon), and Tabitha Bumgardner (Bumgarnder), was unloading several guns in his living room. According to defendant, one of the guns jammed as he was attempting to remove a bullet from its chamber. As he struggled to dislodge the bullet, the gun went off, fatally shooting Bumgardner. Defendant was indicted for involuntary manslaughter, and was found guilty by-a jury. He now appeals his conviction.\nDefendant first contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for dismissal due to insufficient evidence. \u201cIn ruling on a defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, the trial court should consider if the state has presented substantial evidence on each element of the crime and substantial evidence that the defendant is the perpetrator.\u201d State v. Fowler, 353 N.C. 599, 621, 548 S.E.2d 684, 700 (2001) (citations omitted). \u201cThe elements of involuntary manslaughter are: (1) an unintentional killing; (2) proximately caused by either (a) an unlawful act not amounting to a felony and not ordinarily dangerous to human life, or (b) culpable negligence.\u201d State v. Hudson, 345 N.C. 729, 733, 483 S.E.2d 436, 439 (1997) (citing State v. McGill, 314 N.C. 633, 637, 336 S.E.2d 90, 92 (1985)). \u201cThe evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to the state, with all conflicts resolved in the state\u2019s favor. ... If substantial evidence exists supporting defendant\u2019s guilt, the jury should be allowed to decide if the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Fowler, 353 N.C. at 621, 548 S.E.2d at 700 (citations omitted). Because the State provided sufficient evidence to send the case to the jury, defendant\u2019s contention is without merit.\nThe State, both at trial and on appeal, relies primarily upon the following evidence: (1) that defendant was holding the gun \u201clike one does when one shoots a gun,\u201d (2) that the gun discharged, killing Bumgardner, and (3) that the State\u2019s expert testified that the gun did not have a hair trigger and that it could not have been fired without actually pulling the trigger. Reviewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we must agree with the State\u2019s contention that this evidence was sufficient to justify the trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion.\nThere is no doubt that defendant unintentionally killed Bumgardner. Moreover, the State does not seriously contend that defendant was engaged in any sort of illegal activity at the time of the shooting. The sole issue before .this Court is therefore whether defendant was culpably, or criminally, negligent.\nThough not cited in either party\u2019s brief, this Court has decided a case factually indistinguishable from the case at hand. State v. McAdams, 51 N.C. App. 140, 275 S.E.2d 500 (1981). In McAdams, the defendant was cleaning and oiling a recently purchased rifle while sitting on a couch with his wife. Id. at 142, 275 S.E.2d at 502. He loaded the weapon, and pointed it out the front of his house, which happened to be on the same side of him as his wife. Id. Noticing that the bolt of the gun was stuck in the back position the defendant slammed the bolt forward in an attempt to place it back in the forward position. Id. The gun fired, fatally shooting his wife. Id. The McAdams court, noting that \u201c[c]ulpable negligence is more than the actionable negligence often considered in tort law, and is such recklessness or carelessness proximately resulting in injury or death as imports a thoughtless or needless indifference to the rights and safety of others,\u201d concluded in that case that there was \u201csufficient evidence of wantonness, recklessness, or other misconduct amounting to culpable negligence to support a verdict of involuntary manslaughter.\u201d Id. at 143, 275 S.E.2d at 502. Because we are unable to distinguish the present case from McAdams, we must hold that there was no error in the trial court\u2019s decision.\nDefendant next contends that it was error or plain error for the trial court to fail to declare a mistrial when informed that the jury was having difficulty in reaching a verdict. This contention is without merit.\nDefendant argues that although he failed to object at the trial level, the issue is nevertheless preserved for appeal as it affects his constitutional right to a jury trial. \u201cConstitutional issues not raised and passed upon at trial will not be considered for the first time on appeal.\u201d State v. Lloyd, 354 N.C. 76, 86-87, 552 S.E.2d 596, 607 (2001) (citing State v. Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 322, 372 S.E.2d 517, 519 (1988). \u201c[The] \u2018scope of appellate review is limited to the issues presented by assignments of error set out in the record on appeal; where the issue presented in the appellant\u2019s brief does not correspond to a proper assignment of error, the matter is not properly considered by the appellate court.\u2019 \u201d Walker v. Walker, 174 N.C. App. 778, 781, 624 S.E.2d 639, 641 (2005) (quoting Bustle v. Rice, 116 N.C. App. 658, 659, 449 S.E.2d 10, 11 (1994)). Because the constitutional issue was neither raised at the trial level nor assigned as error, we will not consider it on appeal. Moreover, plain error review is unavailable for this issue. See State v. McCall, 162 N.C. App. 64, 70, 589 S.E.2d 896, 900 (2004) (holding that plain error review is unavailable to appellants contending that the trial court failed to declare a mistrial because \u201cthe North Carolina Supreme Court has restricted review for plain error to issues \u2018involving either errors in the trial judge\u2019s instructions to the jury or rulings on the admissibility of evidence.\u2019 \u201d). Accordingly, we decline to further address this assignment of error.\nIn a similar vein, defendant contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel by his trial representation\u2019s failure to move for a mistrial. Because there is no reason to believe that such a motion would have been granted, this contention is without merit.\nIn order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, defendant must not only prove that his trial counsel was deficient, he must also show that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. See, e.g., State v. Augustine, 359 N.C. 709, 718, 616 S.E.2d 515, 524 (2005). Defendant fails to establish that there was a likelihood of success had his trial counsel moved for a mistrial; he therefore fails to show ineffective assistance of counsel.\nThe issues of the length of deliberations and the possibility of jury deadlock are addressed in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1235 (2005). That statute allows a trial judge to declare a mistrial: \u201cIf it appears that there is no reasonable possibility of agreement, the judge may declare a mistrial and discharge the jury.\u201d Id. at \u00a7 15A-1235(d). However, the use of the word \u201cmay\u201d makes clear that the decision to do so is at the judge\u2019s discretion. \u201cContrary to defendant\u2019s contention that it was clearly incumbent upon the judge to declare a mistrial, this statute does not mandate the declaration of a mistrial; it merely permits it.\u201d State v. Darden, 48 N.C. App. 128, 133, 268 S.E.2d 225, 228 (1980) (internal quotations omitted). In fact, \u201cthe action of the judge in declaring or failing to declare a mistrial is reviewable only in case of gross abuse of discretion.\u201d Id.\nThus, even assuming that defendant\u2019s trial counsel should have moved for mistrial, the fact that defendant fails to show any likelihood of the trial court granting that motion precludes this Court from holding that defendant\u2019s counsel was ineffective. Simply put, any potential error was not \u201cso serious that a reasonable probability exists that the trial result would have been different absent the error.\u201d Augustine, 359 N.C. at 718, 616 S.E.2d at 524 (quotations and citations omitted).\nFinally, defendant contends that the trial court erred in ordering him to make restitution to the victim\u2019s father in the amount of $12,850.00. He claims that because the prosecutor provided the only information regarding the amount of restitution owed, and because such prosecutorial statements do not constitute evidence, he is entitled to a new hearing on the issue of restitution. Defendant further contends that the fact that he failed to object at trial does not make the issue unappealable. Defendant is correct in both assertions.\nIt is uncontested that \u201c[t]he amount of restitution recommended by the trial court must be supported by evidence adduced at trial or at sentencing.\u201d State v. Shelton, 167 N.C. App. 225, 233, 605 S.E.2d 228, 233 (2004) (quoting State v. Wilson, 340 N.C. 720, 726, 459 S.E.2d 192, 196 (1995)). Furthermore, this Court has held that the \u201cunsworn statements of the prosecutor... [do] not constitute evidence and cannot support the amount of restitution recommended.\u201d State v. Buchanan, 108 N.C. App. 338, 341 423 S.E.2d 819, 821 (1992).\nThe State concedes that there is recent case law \u201csupportive of the defendant\u2019s contention,\u201d holding that even where a defendant does not \u201cspecifically object to the trial court\u2019s entry of an award of restitution, this issue is deemed preserved for appellate review under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1446(d)(18).\u201d Shelton, 167 N.C. App. at 233, 605 S.E.2d 228, 233 (citing State v. Reynolds, 161 N.C. App. 144, 149, 587 S.E.2d 456, 460 (2003)). However, the State argues that our Supreme Court\u2019s recent opinion in State v. Alexander, 359 N.C. 824, 616 S.E.2d 914 (2005), necessitates our holding that defendant\u2019s silence at trial bars his appeal of the issue. In this, the State is simply incorrect. Alexander speaks primarily to the issue of stipulation to prior record level. See, e.g., id. at 829, 616 S.E.2d at 918. Moreover, in Alexander, the trial court \u201casked defense counsel whether he would \u2018stipulate to the worksheet\u2019 to which defense counsel responded \u2018Yes, sir.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 826, 616 S.E.2d at 916. While it is true that \u201c[s]ilence, under some circumstances, may be deemed assent,\u201d a stipulation\u2019s terms must nevertheless \u201cbe definite and certain in order to afford a basis for judicial decision, and it is essential that they be assented to by the parties or those representing them.\u201d Id: at 828, 616 S.E.2d at 917 (quotations and citations omitted). In view of our recent decisions in Shelton, Wilson, and Buchanan, which go specifically to the issue of restitution, we are unpersuaded by the State\u2019s attempt to broadly read Alexander. We therefore remand to the trial court with instructions to rehear the issue of restitution.\nAccordingly, while we find no error in defendant\u2019s conviction of involuntary manslaughter, we reverse on the issue of restitution and remand to the trial court for resentencing consistent with this decision.\nNo error in part, reversed and remanded with instructions in part.\nChief Judge MARTIN and Judge JACKSON concur.\n. Although both the State and defendant discuss the party, what occurred there, and who was to blame for its occurrence in depth, we will not do so here. The events prior to the shooting have little to no bearing on the outcome of this case.\n. Defendant\u2019s reliance on State v. Ashe, 314 N.C. 28, 331 S.E.2d 652 (1985), is misplaced. As our Supreme Court explained, \u201cThe reference [to the state constitution in Ashe] was intended to convey no more than the seemingly obvious proposition that for a trial judge to give explanatory instructions to fewer than all jurors violated only the unanimity requirement imposed on jury verdicts by Article I, section 24.\u201d State v. McLaughlin, 320 N.C. 564, 569, 359 S.E.2d 768, 772 (1987).", "type": "majority", "author": "ELMORE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General David R Brenskelle, for the State.", "L. Jayne Stowers, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MICHAEL REED REPLOGLE, II, Defendant\nNo. COA06-152\n(Filed 6 February 2007)\n1. Homicide\u2014 involuntary manslaughter \u2014 culpable negligence \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of involuntary manslaughter, because a review of the evidence in the light most favorable to the State revealed that: (1) defendant was holding a gun like one does when shooting a gun, the gun discharged killing the victim, and the State\u2019s expert testified that the gun did not have a hair trigger and it could not have been fired without actually pulling the trigger; and (2) there was sufficient evidence of wantonness, recklessness, or other misconduct amounting to culpable negligence.\n2. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 constitutional issue \u2014 failure to raise at trial\nThe trial court did not err in an involuntary manslaughter case by failing to declare a mistrial when it was informed that the jury was having difficulty in reaching a verdict, because: (1) the constitutional issue of defendant\u2019s right to a jury trial was neither raised at the trial level nor assigned as error; and (2) plain error review is unavailable for this issue. .\n3. Constitutional Law\u2014 effective assistance of counsel \u2014 failure to move for mistrial\nDefendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel in an involuntary manslaughter case based on his trial counsel\u2019s failure to move for a mistrial, because: (1) there was no reason to believe that such a motion would have been granted; and (2) any potential error was not so serious that a reasonable probability existed that the trial result would have been different absent the error.\n4. Sentencing\u2014 restitution \u2014 unsworn statements of prosecutor\nThe trial court erred in an involuntary manslaughter case by ordering defendant to pay restitution to the victim\u2019s father in the amount of $12,850, because: (1) the amount of restitution recommended by the trial court must be supported by evidence adduced at trial or at sentencing; (2) the unsworn statements of the prosecutor do not constitute evidence and cannot support the amount of restitution recommended; (3) even though defendant did not specifically object to the trial court\u2019s entry of an award of restitution, this issue was preserved for appellate review under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1446(d)(18); and (4) while it is true that silence under some circumstances may be deemed assent, a stipulation\u2019s terms must nevertheless be definite and certain in order to afford a basis for judicial decision.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 5 August 2005 by Judge Richard L. Doughton in Watauga County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 October 2006.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General David R Brenskelle, for the State.\nL. Jayne Stowers, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0579-01", "first_page_order": 611, "last_page_order": 616 }