{ "id": 8376264, "name": "A. MARK ESPOSITO, Plaintiff v. TALBERT & BRIGHT, INC. and JOHN T. TALBERT, III, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Esposito v. Talbert & Bright, Inc.", "decision_date": "2007-02-20", "docket_number": "No. COA06-572", "first_page": "742", "last_page": "747", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "181 N.C. App. 742" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "628 S.E.2d 249", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635496, 12635497, 12635495 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation and quotations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/628/0249-02", "/se2d/628/0249-03", "/se2d/628/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "627 S.E.2d 301", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635305 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307", "parenthetical": "citation and quotations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/627/0301-01" ] }, { "cite": "629 S.E.2d 898", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635824 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "901", "parenthetical": "upholding summary judgment in favor of the defendant where the plaintiff relied \"only on an allegation, with no proof,\" that the third party intentionally induced her firing" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/629/0898-01" ] }, { "cite": "624 S.E.2d 620", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634918 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "625" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/624/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "612 S.E.2d 428", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632828 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430", "parenthetical": "citing Lowe v. Bradford, 305 N.C. 366, 369, 289 S.E.2d 363, 366 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/612/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 289", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3798496, 3793891, 3791911, 3794600, 3787593, 3797322, 3793706, 3786605, 3796634 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0289-08", "/nc/360/0289-02", "/nc/360/0289-06", "/nc/360/0289-01", "/nc/360/0289-04", "/nc/360/0289-07", "/nc/360/0289-03", "/nc/360/0289-05", "/nc/360/0289-09" ] }, { "cite": "150 S.E.2d 771", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "268 N.C. 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562489 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/268/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "608 S.E.2d 798", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "800", "parenthetical": "citing Shope v. Boyer, 268 N.C. 401, 150 S.E.2d 771 (1966)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 N.C. App. 687", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8471741 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "690", "parenthetical": "citing Shope v. Boyer, 268 N.C. 401, 150 S.E.2d 771 (1966)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/168/0687-01" ] }, { "cite": "554 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "4", "parenthetical": "internal citations and quotations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "146 N.C. App. 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11359685 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488-89", "parenthetical": "internal citations and quotations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/146/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-1.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "declaring unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce unlawful" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "176 N.C. App. 656", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8301470 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "665", "parenthetical": "citation and quotations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/176/0656-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 N.C. App. 765", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8302631 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "770", "parenthetical": "upholding summary judgment in favor of the defendant where the plaintiff relied \"only on an allegation, with no proof,\" that the third party intentionally induced her firing" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/177/0765-01" ] }, { "cite": "547 S.E.2d 51", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "59", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 N.C. App. 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11434189 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/143/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 S.E.2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 643", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2518481 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "661" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0643-01" ] }, { "cite": "573 S.E.2d 183", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "191", "parenthetical": "quoting United Labs., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 322 N.C. 643, 661, 370 S.E.2d 375, 387 (1988)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 N.C. App. 221", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9249551 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "232", "parenthetical": "quoting United Labs., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 322 N.C. 643, 661, 370 S.E.2d 375, 387 (1988)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/154/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3790975 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0280-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "835", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 684915 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 S.E.2d 425", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "427", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2488503 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 S.E.2d 363", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569908 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "369" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 N.C. App. 422", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9005714 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "424", "parenthetical": "citing Lowe v. Bradford, 305 N.C. 366, 369, 289 S.E.2d 363, 366 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/170/0422-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 628, "char_count": 12541, "ocr_confidence": 0.735, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.8698572326376996e-07, "percentile": 0.7261290136992543 }, "sha256": "f13461fccb7f2e9c4742c9dbf23240f31b923d8560b1d6c79f266bf3f1e01919", "simhash": "1:07a8d03234e92d38", "word_count": 1943 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:19:54.793724+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and ELMORE concur." ], "parties": [ "A. MARK ESPOSITO, Plaintiff v. TALBERT & BRIGHT, INC. and JOHN T. TALBERT, III, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BRYANT, Judge.\nA. Mark Esposito (plaintiff) appeals from an order dated 22 November 2005 granting summary judgment in favor of Talbert & Bright, Inc., and John T. Talbert, III (defendants) as to all of plaintiff\u2019s claims. For the reasons below, we affirm the order of the trial court.\nFacts\nFrom 1983 until 12 June 2000, plaintiff was employed by the North Carolina Department of Transportation (NCDOT), Division of Aviation. Plaintiff was NCDOT\u2019s project manager for a runway expansion project (the Project) involving the Brunswick County Airport in Brunswick County, North Carolina. At the time plaintiff was managing the Project, his immediate supervisor was Richard Barkes, the Airport Development Manager. The Aviation Director, William Williams, was Barkes\u2019 immediate supervisor, and Deputy Secretary David King was Williams\u2019 immediate supervisor. Talbert & Bright, Inc. is an engineering firm which provides consulting engineering services and was hired by the Brunswick County Airport Authority to be the consulting engineer for the Project. John T. Talbert, III was an officer and director of Talbert & Bright, Inc.\nOn 3 April 2000 a meeting occurred between, among others, Williams and Talbert. At this meeting the attendees discussed communication and personnel concerns relating to the Project, including several complaints concerning plaintiff\u2019s role in the project and possible ethical violations by plaintiff.\nOn 12 May 2000, Williams initiated disciplinary action against plaintiff by placing him on administrative leave. Subsequently, Williams terminated plaintiff\u2019s employment with NCDOT. Plaintiff challenged his employment termination pursuant to the State Personnel Act, and the Office of Administrative Hearings subsequently overturned plaintiff\u2019s termination finding he was terminated without just cause. Plaintiff has been reinstated to a job with NCDOT, but it is outside of his career field.\nProcedural History\nOn 8 October 2004, plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging claims for tortious interference with contract, unfair and deceptive trade practices, and civil conspiracy. Defendants filed their answer in this case on 7 December 2004. On 18 July 2005, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted by the trial court by Order dated 22 November 2005. Plaintiff appeals.\nPlaintiff argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendants on his claims of tortious interference with contract, unfair and deceptive trade practices, and civil conspiracy. We disagree.\nStandard of Review\nUnder Rule 56(c) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment \u201cshall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2005). \u201cThe burden is upon the moving party to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\u201d McGuire v. Draughon, 170 N.C. App. 422, 424, 612 S.E.2d 428, 430 (2005) (citing Lowe v. Bradford, 305 N.C. 366, 369, 289 S.E.2d 363, 366 (1982)). The moving party may meet its burden \u201cby proving that an essential element of the opposing party\u2019s claim is nonexistent, or by showing through discovery that the opposing party cannot produce evidence to support an essential element of his claim or cannot surmount an affirmative defense which would bar the claim.\u201d Collingwood v. Gen. Elec. Real Estate Equities, Inc., 324 N.C. 63, 66, 376 S.E.2d 425, 427 (1989) (citation omitted).\nOnce the moving party meets its burden, the nonmovant, in order to survive the summary judgment motion, must \u201cproduce a forecast of evidence demonstrating that the [nonmovant] will be able to make out at least a prima facie case at trial.\u201d Id. at 66, 376 S.E.2d at 427 (citation omitted). The nonmovant \u201cmay not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(e) (2005). However, \u201c[a]ll facts asserted by the [nonmoving] party are taken as true and their inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to that party.\u201d Dobson v. Harris, 352 N.C. 77, 83, 530 S.E.2d 829, 835 (2000) (internal citations omitted). On appeal, this Court reviews an order granting summary judgment de novo. McCutchen v. McCutchen, 360 N.C. 280, 285, 624 S.E.2d 620, 625 (2006).\nTortious Interference with Contract\nPlaintiff first argues the trial court erred in granting defendants summary judgment as to his claim of tortious interference with his contract for employment with NCDOT. To establish a claim for tortious interference with contract, plaintiff must show:\n\u201c(1) a valid contract between the plaintiff and a third person which confers upon the plaintiff a contractual right against a third person; (2) the defendant knows of the contract; (3) the defendant intentionally induces the third person not to perform the contract; (4) and in doing so acts without justification; (5) resulting in actual damage to plaintiff.\u201d\nBeck v. City of Durham, 154 N.C. App. 221, 232, 573 S.E.2d 183, 191 (2002) (quoting United Labs., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 322 N.C. 643, 661, 370 S.E.2d 375, 387 (1988)). \u201cA plaintiff may maintain a claim for tor-tious interference with contract even if the employment contract is terminable at will.\u201d Bloch v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 143 N.C. App. 228, 239, 547 S.E.2d 51, 59 (2001) (citation omitted).\nHere, defendants produced evidence challenging plaintiff\u2019s ability to establish that they intentionally induced NCDOT to terminate the employment of plaintiff. Plaintiffs attempts at forecasting evidence supporting this element of his claim fall short of meeting his required burden. Even taking all of plaintiff\u2019s evidence as true, and drawing all inferences in his favor, plaintiff\u2019s forecast of evidence does not show defendants intentionally induced NCDOT to terminate plaintiff\u2019s employment. Defendants\u2019 allegations and problems with plaintiff were but one of six instances of unacceptable conduct upon which NCDOT based the termination of plaintiff\u2019s employment. Plaintiff has not produced any evidence indicating defendants actually sought the termination of plaintiff\u2019s employment with NCDOT. Further, given the sworn affidavits of Williams, Barkes, and King, all stating that defendants did not induce the termination of plaintiff\u2019s employment, any inference drawn from defendants\u2019 statements and conduct suggesting otherwise is too tenuous to defeat summary judgment. See White v. Cross Sales & Eng\u2019g Co., 177 N.C. App. 765, 770, 629 S.E.2d 898, 901 (2006) (upholding summary judgment in favor of the defendant where the plaintiff relied \u201conly on an allegation, with no proof,\u201d that the third party intentionally induced her firing). Therefore, plaintiff has failed to forecast evidence demonstrating he will be able to make out at least a prima facie case at trial and the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment for defendants as to plaintiffs claim for tortious interference with contract.\nUnfair and Deceptive Trade Practices\nPlaintiff next argues the trial court erred in granting defendants summary judgment as to his claim of unfair and deceptive trade practices. \u201cTo prevail on a claim of unfair and deceptive trade practices, a plaintiff must show: (1) defendants committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice; (2) in or affecting commerce; and (3) that plaintiff was injured thereby.\u201d Strickland v. Lawrence, 176 N.C. App. 656, 665, 627 S.E.2d 301, 307 (2006) (citation and quotations omitted); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-1.1 (2005) (declaring unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce unlawful). This Court has further held that:\nThe primary purpose of G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1 is to provide a private c\u00e1use of action for consumers. Although commerce is defined broadly under G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1(b) as all business activities, however denominated, the fundamental purpose of G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1 is to protect the consuming public. Typically, claims under G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1 involve [a] buyer and seller. Thus, the statute usually is not applicable to employment disputes. Nonetheless, the mere existence of an employer-employee relationship does not in and of itself serve to exclude a party from pursuing an unfair trade or practice claim. The proper inquiry is not whether a contractual relationship existed between the parties, but rather whether the defendants\u2019 allegedly deceptive acts affected commerce. What is an unfair or deceptive trade practice usually depends upon the facts of each case and the impact the practice has in the marketplace.\nDurling v. King, 146 N.C. App. 483, 488-89, 554 S.E.2d 1, 4 (2001) (internal citations and quotations omitted).\nHere, as in Issue I, supra, plaintiff\u2019s claim is based upon defendants\u2019 statements and actions to plaintiff\u2019s supervisors. Assuming arguendo that defendants\u2019 statements and actions were unfair or deceptive acts or practices that injured plaintiff, plaintiff has forecast no evidence that defendants\u2019 statements and actions had any impact beyond his employment relationship with NCDOT. Therefore plaintiff has failed to show defendants\u2019 statements and actions were \u201cin or affecting commerce\u201d and the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment for defendants as to plaintiff\u2019s claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices.\nCivil Conspiracy\nPlaintiff lastly argues the trial court erred in granting defendants summary judgment as to his claim of civil conspiracy. It is well established that \u201cthere is not a separate civil action for civil conspiracy in North Carolina.\u201d Dove v. Harvey, 168 N.C. App. 687, 690, 608 S.E.2d 798, 800 (2005) (citing Shope v. Boyer, 268 N.C. 401, 150 S.E.2d 771 (1966)), disc. rev. denied, 360 N.C. 289, 628 S.E.2d 249 (2006). \u201cThe charge of conspiracy itself does nothing more than associate the defendants together and perhaps liberalize the rules of evidence to the extent that under proper circumstances the acts and conduct of one might be admissible against all.\u201d Id. (citation and quotations omitted).\nPlaintiff argues that civil conspiracy should attach to defendants for their statements and actions which underlie plaintiffs claims for tortious interference with contract and unfair and deceptive trade practices. As we have held that summary judgment for defendants on these claims was proper, plaintiffs claim for civil conspiracy must also fall. Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment for defendants as to plaintiffs claim for civil conspiracy.\nAffirmed.\nJudges McGEE and ELMORE concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "BRYANT, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Bailey & Dixon, LLP, by J. Heydt Philbeck, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Jackson, Mills & Carter, PA., by F. Darryl Mills, for defendant-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "A. MARK ESPOSITO, Plaintiff v. TALBERT & BRIGHT, INC. and JOHN T. TALBERT, III, Defendants\nNo. COA06-572\n(Filed 20 February 2007)\n1. Wrongful Interference\u2014 tortious interference with contract \u2014 employment\u2014no evidence that termination sought by defendants\nThe trial court did not err by granting defendants summary judgment on a claim for tortious interference with contract arising from the dismissal of plaintiff from his employment with NCDOT. Taking all of plaintiff\u2019s evidence as true and drawing all inferences in his favor, plaintiff did not produce evidence that defendants sought the termination.\n2. Unfair Trade Practices\u2014 termination of employment \u2014 commerce not affected\nThe trial court did not err by granting defendants summary judgment on a claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices arising from the termination of plaintiff\u2019s employment where there was no forecast of evidence that defendants\u2019 statements had any impact beyond the employment relationship. Plaintiff did not show that defendants\u2019 statements and actions were in or affecting commerce.\n3. Conspiracy\u2014 civil \u2014 no separate claim\nThere is no separate claim for civil conspiracy in North Carolina (although such a claim may associate the defendants for evidentiary purposes), and summary judgment was properly granted for defendants on a civil conspiracy claim where it was also properly granted on the underlying claims.\nAppeal by plaintiff from order dated 22 November 2005 by Judge Ronald L. Stephens in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 January 2007.\nBailey & Dixon, LLP, by J. Heydt Philbeck, for plaintiff-appellant.\nJackson, Mills & Carter, PA., by F. Darryl Mills, for defendant-appellees." }, "file_name": "0742-01", "first_page_order": 774, "last_page_order": 779 }