{ "id": 8167523, "name": "BARBARA KATRINA HASSELL, Employee, Plaintiff v. ONSLOW COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Employer SELF-INSURED (KEY RISK MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC.), Third-Party Administrator, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Hassell v. Onslow County Board of Education", "decision_date": "2007-03-06", "docket_number": "No. COA06-276", "first_page": "1", "last_page": "14", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "182 N.C. App. 1" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "637 S.E.2d 299", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637253 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "electing to entertain appeal despite the appellant's violations of Rule 28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/637/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "620 S.E.2d 25", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634104 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/620/0025-01" ] }, { "cite": "594 S.E.2d 100", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12631221 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "103" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/594/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 N.C. App. 432", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8242879 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "electing to entertain appeal despite the appellant's violations of Rule 28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/180/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 N.C. App. 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8353857 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "483" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/173/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 549", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 684964 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116-17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "586 S.E.2d 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "833" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 N.C. App. 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8957782 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "600" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/160/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 S.E.2d 272", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 N.C. 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575582 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/265/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 N.C. App. 408", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8918156 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "412" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/163/0408-01" ] }, { "cite": "566 S.E.2d 807", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "813" }, { "page": "813" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 N.C. App. 641", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9081725 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "648" }, { "page": "648" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/151/0641-01" ] }, { "cite": "584 S.E.2d 881", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "887-88" }, { "page": "884" }, { "page": "888" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 N.C. App. 161", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8954802 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171" }, { "page": "165" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/160/0161-01" ] }, { "cite": "534 S.E.2d 259", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 N.C. App. 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9497462 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "621" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/139/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-53", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(13)" }, { "page": "(13)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "594 S.E.2d 100", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12631221 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/594/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 N.C. App. 408", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. 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App.", "case_ids": [ 8954802 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/160/0161-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1049, "char_count": 32232, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.89950402824256e-08, "percentile": 0.3081380420248439 }, "sha256": "6b1c2e689f5eb451758ce7ee54a529cbb89b606a37ac2bcebb58ea1ac6ec6d66", "simhash": "1:f6a4e5fbc567aa7c", "word_count": 5015 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:32:14.097428+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge STEELMAN concurs.", "Judge WYNN dissents in a separate opinion." ], "parties": [ "BARBARA KATRINA HASSELL, Employee, Plaintiff v. ONSLOW COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Employer SELF-INSURED (KEY RISK MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC.), Third-Party Administrator, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, Judge.\nBarbara Katrina Hassell (\u201cplaintiff\u2019) appeals from an opinion and award of the Industrial Commission (\u201cthe Commission\u201d) denying her claim for workers\u2019 compensation benefits. The Commission determined that plaintiff\u2019s generalized anxiety disorder was not due to causes and conditions characteristic of and peculiar to her employment as a sixth-grade teacher with the Onslow County Board of Education (\u201cdefendant\u201d). Plaintiff argues the Commission erred in certain findings of fact and erred in concluding she had. failed to prove her position placed her at an increased risk of developing an occupational disease. After careful review, we affirm the opinion and award of the Commission.\nOn 8 June 2005, plaintiff\u2019s case came before the Commission, which found facts tending to establish the following: Plaintiff, who was fifty-six years old, worked as a school teacher for defendant from 1987 until February 2002. Plaintiff was an elementary school teacher until approximately 1996, when she became a sixth-grade teacher at Dixon Middle School in Onslow County, North Carolina. While working at Dixon Middle School, plaintiff had problems maintaining order in her classroom on a continual basis. During 2001, plaintiff experienced some type of disciplinary incident every week. Plaintiff dreaded going to work because of these disciplinary problems. Because of plaintiff\u2019s lack of classroom management, her students were disrespectful and verbally and physically harassed and intimidated her. For example, students called her \u201cgrease monkey,\u201d and used curse words towards her. Students regularly walked out of plaintiff\u2019s classroom without permission and wrote rude remarks about plaintiff in their books. Additionally, students threw spitballs and wads of paper at plaintiff. On one occasion during an assembly, plaintiff was hit in the back of her head by an object thrown by a student. As a result of that incident, plaintiff began sitting at the top bleachers of the gym with her back to the wall during assemblies.\nPlaintiff referred an unusually large number of students to the principal\u2019s office and received comments from the administration regarding the volume of her referrals. Students and parents complained to the school administration about plaintiffs performance as a teacher. During her employment, plaintiff received negative performance reviews, resulting in four \u201cAction Plans\u201d intended to improve plaintiffs job performance. An Action Plan is required by law if, at any point during or at the end of the school year, a teacher ranks below standard, in any of the major functions. On 25 January 2002, plaintiff entered into her fourth Action Plan with defendant. The Action Plan required plaintiff in February, March, and April 2002 to show progress toward overcoming her deficiencies and present information to show that she was attempting to comply with the Action Plan. The Action Plan had an anticipated completion date of 28 May 2002. The Action Plan addressed plaintiffs problems with her failure to follow a classroom management plan, random efforts in discipline, negative learning climate in her classroom, errors in grading practices, ineffective instructional presentation, lack of feedback to students, and numerous student and parent complaints.\nPursuant to the 25 January 2002 Action Plan, plaintiffs progress was scheduled for review at the end of February 2002, at which time plaintiff was to provide the school with evidence of her efforts to comply with the Action Plan. At a 25 February 2002 observation of her classroom by a curriculum specialist, plaintiff failed to show progress or improvement in the quality of her classroom instruction. The curriculum specialist noted that plaintiff was experiencing the same classroom problems listed in the 25 January 2002 Action Plan. Plaintiffs first deadline for submission of information to show that she was complying with the current Action Plan was 28 February 2002. Plaintiff did not submit any information to the school. Plaintiff was given a reminder that she was scheduled to meet with Lesley Eason (\u201cEason\u201d), Dixon Middle School principal, at 3:15 p.m. on 28 February 2002. Rather than attend this meeting, plaintiff asked Eason for a four-day extension of the deadline. On 1 March 2002, Eason met with plaintiff and advised her that she had not documented sufficient progress and that the curriculum specialist would observe her classroom again on 4 March 2002, before discussing her observations with plaintiff. Eason told plaintiff to continue to work to demonstrate improved classroom instruction and that she would share the results of their meeting with the personnel department. However, plaintiff refused to sign a warning letter, left the school, and never returned there. On 19 April 2002, plaintiff officially resigned her position with defendant, effective 3 June 2002.\nPlaintiff testified that she was unable to continue working at the school because of the feeling that she could no longer handle the work environment due to her stress and anxiety. Eason testified that plaintiff herself created the chaotic classroom environment and that plaintiffs lack of instructional presentation and delivery in her classroom led to many of her classroom problems. Other teachers with the same students as plaintiff did not have similar problems. Eason stated that \u201c \u2018in sixteen years I had never seen a situation as bad as the situation in [plaintiffs] classroom.\u2019 \u201d\nOn 2 March 2002, plaintiff was examined by Dennis Chestnut, a psychologist. Dr. Chestnut found plaintiff was experiencing a severe emotional crisis and he considered hospitalizing plaintiff. At his initial interview with plaintiff, the two major areas of concern identified were family relations and occupational issues. Dr. Chestnut diagnosed plaintiff with Generalized Anxiety Disorder. As of 6 March 2002, Dr. Chestnut medically excused plaintiff from work and stated that she was unable to return to the teaching profession. Dr. Chestnut stated that plaintiffs \u201c \u2018job was driving her crazy\u2019 \u201d and that plaintiff\u2019s total job experience was a major stressor in her life.\nThe Commission found that \u201c [although plaintiff developed an anxiety disorder, her psychological condition was not the result of anything caused by defendant or because she was required to do anything unusual as a teacher.\u201d Rather, \u201c[p]laintiff was in a stressful classroom environment that was caused by her inadequate job performance and inability to perform her job duties as a teaching professional.\u201d Based on its findings, the Commission concluded that \u201cplaintiff\u2019s stress and anxiety disorder developed from her inability to perform her job in accordance with defendant\u2019s requirements\u201d and that she had failed to show that she sustained an occupational disease \u201cdue to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to her employment.\u201d The Commission entered an opinion and award denying plaintiff workers\u2019 compensation benefits. Plaintiff appeals.\nPlaintiff argues she sustained an occupational disease arising from her employment. An occupational disease is one \u201cwhich is proven to be due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular trade, occupation or employment, but excluding all ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is equally exposed outside of the employment.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-53(13) (2005). \u201cThe claimant bears the burden of proving the existence of an occupational disease.\u201d Norris v. Drexel Heritage Furnishings, Inc., 139 N.C. App. 620, 621, 534 S.E.2d 259, 261 (2000).\nWhile mental illness qualifies as a compensable occupational disease under appropriate circumstances, see Smith-Price v. Charter Pines Behavioral Ctr., 160 N.C. App. 161, 171, 584 S.E.2d 881, 887-88 (2003), the claimant must first establish that \u201cthe mental illness or injury was due to stresses or conditions different from those borne by the general public.\u201d Pitillo v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Envtl. Health & Natural Res., 151 N.C. App. 641, 648, 566 S.E.2d 807, 813 (2002). We therefore consider whether the Commission erred in determining that plaintiff failed to prove she sustained an occupational disease due to conditions and stress unique to her employment as a teacher.\nBy her first assignment of error, plaintiff argues the evidence was insufficient to support the Commission\u2019s Findings of Fact Nos. 6, 8, 11, 12, 13, and 14. Plaintiff contends the greater weight of the evi7 dence supports alternate findings favorable to plaintiff, and that the Commission erred in failing to find such alternate findings. Plaintiff contends the flawed findings made by the Commission do not support its conclusion that plaintiff failed to prove she suffered from an occupational disease.\nThe standard of review upon appeal of an Industrial Commission case is well settled: \u201cAppellate review of an opinion and award of the Commission is limited to a determination of (1) whether the findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, and (2) whether the conclusions of law are supported by the findings.\u201d Lewis v. Duke Univ., 163 N.C. App. 408, 412, 594 S.E.2d 100, 103 (2004); Smith-Price, 160 N.C. App. at 165, 584 S.E.2d at 884. This Court is bound by the Commission\u2019s findings where they are supported by any substantial evidence even where there is evidence that would have supported a finding to the contrary. Id.\nPlaintiff argues the Commission erred when it found in Finding of Fact No. 6 that \u201c[p]laintiff refused to sign a warning letter, left school and never returned to school\u201d and by finding in Finding of Fact No. 8 that:\nPlaintiff acknowledged that her stress was caused by her inability to perform her job in accordance with the requirements set by defendant, as well as her inability to achieve the requirements of the Action Plan and observational analysis. Plaintiff admitted that she did not have control of her classes, that her lesson plans and the subjects to be taught were not completed, that she had complaints from parents and students that grades were inaccurate, that she had not properly averaged students\u2019 grades, and that she had not completed the items listed on the January 25, 2002 Action Plan before she quit working for the school.\nPlaintiff argues the Commission erred by finding these issues were unresolved at the time of plaintiffs last day of employment, and that the Commission should have found that all of the issues had been resolved except for students\u2019 behavioral problems in the classroom.\nPlaintiff testified she had \u201ca problem . . . maintaining order in [her] classroom\u201d and \u201cdid not have control of [her] classes [,]\u201d although other teachers at the school teaching the same children did not experience the behavioral problems plaintiff encountered. She also acknowledged there had been \u201ccomplaints at various times since .1999 from students and parents that their grades were not accurate[,]\u201d and that she failed to properly average the grades. The school took several measures to assist plaintiff with the situation, including implementation of an Action Plan on 25 January 2002 to focus on correcting problems in plaintiff\u2019s teaching and to help her better manage her classroom. Plaintiff met with the school principal, Eason, on 25 February 2002 to discuss the Action Plan. Plaintiff acknowledged that Eason was not satisfied with plaintiff\u2019s progress in implementing the Action Plan. Plaintiff and Eason met again on 2 March 2002. Eason asked plaintiff to \u201creview and sign papers indicating that [plaintiff was] not progressing along the Action Plan[.]\u201d Plaintiff refused to sign the papers and did not return to her employment after that day. She felt she \u201ccould not do [the] action plans, and . . . could not do everything else with the behavior and just life in general.\u201d Plaintiff agreed that her \u201cstress [was] caused by [her] inability to perform in accordance with the requirements of what the school [was] demanding and [her] inability to achieve the requirements of the action plans and the observation analysis[.]\u201d In light of this testimony, we conclude there is substantial evidence of record to support the Commission\u2019s findings, and we overrule this assignment of error.\nPlaintiff contends the Commission erred by finding in Finding of Fact No. 11 that \u201cDr. Chestnut explained that plaintiffs anxiety focused on her difficulty with the principal.\u201d Plaintiff argues the Commission should have found that the behavior of the children in her classroom caused her the greatest anxiety. However, plaintiffs treating psychologist, Dr. Dennis Chestnut, testified that plaintiff\nhad gotten a new administrator, and she felt that the new administrator was not supportive of her; did \u2014 the new administrator did not feel that she was doing a good job, and that regardless of how hard she worked or regardless of what she did, that the administrator was going to find something wrong with it.... [S]he felt that not only [did] the administrator fe[el] that she was not doing a good job . . . she felt that the administrator was not supportive when she made decisions in reference to students.\nAnd so that was a \u2014 what I call a second element, the \u2014 first the administrative feeling, you know, of what you\u2019re doing on the job, whether that\u2019s the right thing; then the lack of support.\nDr. Chestnut further noted that plaintiff \u201cwas constantly in fear of not doing something, not pleasing somebody; you know, that fear was there, and, you know, and it\u2019s documented that, you know, this is not satisfactory, this is not satisfactory.\u201d\nAlthough Dr. Chestnut testified that the students\u2019 misbehavior also caused plaintiff great apprehension, this Court \u201cdoes not have the right to weigh the evidence and decide the issue on the basis of its weight. The court\u2019s duty goes no further than to determine whether the record contains any evidence tending to support the finding.\u201d Anderson v. Construction Co., 265 N.C. 431, 434, 144 S.E.2d 272, 274 (1965). As the Commission\u2019s finding was supported by competent evidence of record, we must overrule this assignment of error.\nBy further assignment of error, plaintiff contends the Commission failed to give proper weight to the testimony by Dr. Chestnut. It is well established, however, that the Commission is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Matthews v. City of Raleigh, 160 N.C. App. 597, 600, 586 S.E.2d 829, 833 (2003). The Commission\ndoes not have to explain its findings of fact by attempting to distinguish which evidence or witnesses it finds credible. Requiring the Commission to explain its credibility determinations and allowing the Court of Appeals to review the Commission\u2019s explanation of those credibility determinations would be inconsistent with our legal system\u2019s tradition of not requiring the fact finder to explain why he or she believes one witness over another or believes one piece of evidence is more credible than another.\nDeese v. Champion Int\u2019l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 116-17, 530 S.E.2d 549, 553 (2000).\nAlthough Dr. Chestnut testified that plaintiff\u2019s employment placed her at greater risk of developing generalized anxiety, he did not identify specific factors unique to plaintiff\u2019s job that led to the development of her anxiety. There was no evidence that Dr. Chestnut reviewed plaintiff\u2019s employment records or otherwise investigated the validity of her complaints regarding the school. Dr. Chestnut explained that such investigation would contradict his primary role with plaintiff as her psychologist, which was to be supportive. The Commission therefore had grounds to discount Dr. Chestnut\u2019s opinion with regard to causation and plaintiff\u2019s increased risk of developing anxiety as opposed to the public at large, and did not err in giving little weight to Dr. Chestnut\u2019s opinion on these issues.\nPlaintiff argues there was no competent evidence to support the Commission\u2019s finding that \u201cDr. Chestnut did not indicate, however, that another person in the same work environment or experience would develop Generalized Anxiety Disorder.\u201d Again, we must disagree with plaintiff.\nIn support of her position, plaintiff notes Dr. Chestnut was asked whether \u201canother person ... in the same school with the same students and the same principal and the same administration would result in having a psychological diagnosis[.]\u201d He responded that \u201c[t]hey could or they may not.\u201d This testimony does not support plaintiff\u2019s argument, however. A general question regarding whether or not another person working under similar conditions as plaintiff would \u201cresult in having a psychological diagnosis\u201d is not the same as a specific question whether someone would develop Generalized Anxiety Disorder. Indeed, it is not at all clear what is meant by a \u201cpsychological diagnosis.\u201d Moreover, Dr. Chestnut indicated only that a person working under similar circumstances \u201ccould\u201d have such a \u201cpsychological diagnosis.\u201d\nPlaintiff also points to the following statement by Dr. Chestnut: \u201cBut I could say that if you took a person where they were constantly . . . being thrown at, that they were having materials hidden from them, they were having disparaging remarks, it is likely that they, too, would show signs of anxiety, if you take those factors.\u201d Again, however, we do not conclude that such vague statements by Dr. Chestnut indicating the possibility of some sort of anxiety on the part of a person working in plaintiffs position equates to a definite opinion that a person working under similar circumstances would develop Generalized Anxiety Disorder. We find no evidence of record that Dr. Chestnut testified another person in the same work environment or experience as plaintiff would develop Generalized Anxiety Disorder, and we overrule this assignment of error.\nPlaintiff contends there was no competent evidence to support Findings of Fact Nos. 13 and 14, The Commission found that:\n13. Although plaintiff developed an anxiety disorder, her psychological condition was not the result of anything caused by defendant or because she was required to do anything unusual as a teacher. Plaintiff was in a stressful classroom environment that was caused by her inadequate job performance and inability to perform her job duties as a teaching professional. Considering all the evidence presented, the Commission finds that there was nothing unusual about plaintiffs job with defendant or what was expected of her as compared to any person similarly situated. The work plaintiff was asked to perform by defendant was the same kind of work any teacher is required to do. Plaintiff was merely asked to perform her job in the manner it should have been performed. Plaintiff was responsible for the bad environment in her classroom.\n14. The stress caused by plaintiffs conflicts with students and parents and her concerns about being disciplined and losing her job were not shown to have been characteristic of the teaching profession as opposed to occupations in general. Plaintiffs employment as a teacher did not place her at an increased risk of developing anxiety disorder as compared to the general public not so employed. Therefore, plaintiff has not proven by the greater weight of the evidence that her anxiety disorder is a com-pensable occupational disease under the provisions of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act.\nPlaintiff argues the Commission should have found alternate findings favorable to her, and that \u201c[t]he only competent evidence proves that the plaintiff\u2019s job was unusual.\u201d We do not agree.\nThere is substantial evidence of record to show that, although the \u25a0environment in plaintiff\u2019s classroom was certainly stressful, such stress was not created by defendant, nor was it characteristic of plaintiff\u2019s particular employment. Rather, the evidence showed that the stressful classroom environment was caused by plaintiff\u2019s inability to effectively manage her classroom. Other teachers at plaintiff\u2019s school who taught the same students did not experience the disciplinary problems encountered by plaintiff. Defendant did not require plaintiff to do anything other than perform her job duties as a teaching professional. Such duties included maintaining control of the classroom learning environment, a task plaintiff unfortunately was unable to perform. Defendant attempted to intervene and assist plaintiff in her endeavors to better manage her classroom, but such attempts were ultimately unsuccessful. We conclude there was substantial evidence to support the Commission\u2019s findings that plaintiff was responsible for the stressful work environment, and that such stress was not characteristic of the teaching profession. We overrule this assignment of error.\nPlaintiff argues the Commission erred as a matter of law when it concluded that she had failed to prove that her position placed her at an increased risk of developing an anxiety disorder, and by denying her claim for benefits. Plaintiff contends she was subjected to an abusive and dangerous work environment, and that her anxiety disorder was an occupational disease arising from such environment. Plaintiff argues the Commission erred in concluding otherwise. We do not agree.\nAs noted supra, plaintiff has the burden of showing that her anxiety disorder arose due to stresses and conditions unique to her employment. Pitillo, 151 N.C. App. at 648, 566 S.E.2d at 813. Here, the Commission found, and there was substantial evidence to show, that under the circumstances presented in this case, plaintiff\u2019s anxiety disorder did not develop from \u201ccauses and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular trade, occupation or employment^]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-53(13). Plaintiff\u2019s employment as a sixth-grade teacher did not expose her to unusual and stressful conditions, nor did defendant require her to perform any extraordinary tasks. While we acknowledge the challenges and stress teachers encounter every day in their classrooms, we cannot conclude under the facts of this case that plaintiff faced challenges and situations unlike those confronting the general public, including other teachers. Compare Smith-Price, 160 N.C. App. at 171, 584 S.E.2d at 888 (affirming the Commission\u2019s finding that the claimant\u2019s job exposed her to unique stress not experienced by the general public where the claimant was a nurse working with severely mentally ill and often suicidal patients, including minor patients, and where treatment errors could and had resulted in a minor patient\u2019s death, whose death the claimant took very personally). Plaintiff asserts she was \u201csubjected\u201d to a dangerous and volatile work environment, but the evidence tends to establish that plaintiff herself created the stressful work environment through her inability to perform the ordinary tasks expected of her and every other teacher. Because plaintiff failed to show that her employment placed her at an increased risk of developing an occupational disease, the Commission properly denied workers\u2019 compensation benefits. We overrule this'assignment of error.\nIn conclusion, we affirm the award and opinion of the Commission.\nAffirmed.\nJudge STEELMAN concurs.\nJudge WYNN dissents in a separate opinion.\n. We must note that plaintiff\u2019s brief fails to comply with the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure by (1) failing to include a \u201cstatement of the grounds for appellate review[,]\u201d N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(4); and (2) failing to include a \u201cconcise statement of the applicable standard(s) of review for each question presented].]\u201d N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6). However, we conclude that plaintiff\u2019s rule violations, while serious, are not so egregious as to warrant dismissal of the appeal. Coley v. State, 173 N.C. App. 481, 483, 620 S.E.2d 25, 27 (2005). Reaching the merits of this case does not create an appeal for an appellant or cause this Court to examine issues not raised by the appellant. Id. Defendant was given sufficient notice of the issues on appeal as evidenced by the filing of its brief thoroughly responding to plaintiff\u2019s arguments. As a result, we elect to review the merits of plaintiff\u2019s appeal pursuant to N.C.R. App. P. 2. See Seay v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 180 N.C. App. 432, 637 S.E.2d 299 (2006) (electing to entertain appeal despite the appellant\u2019s violations of Rule 28).", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, Judge." }, { "text": "WYNN, Judge,\ndissenting.\nThe issue on appeal is whether a 56-year-old teacher\u2019s \u201cgeneralized anxiety disorder\u201d qualifies as an occupational disease that entitles her to workers\u2019 compensation under the North Carolina Workers Compensation Act. The teacher, Barbara Hassell, contends the Industrial Commission erred by finding that her employment at Dixon Middle School did not place her at an increased risk of developing an anxiety disorder. I agree with Ms. Hassell and therefore dissent from the majority\u2019s decision to the contrary.\nAs the majority observes, mental illness qualifies as a compensable occupational disease, see Smith Price v. Charter Pines Behavioral Ctr., 160 N.C. App. 161, 171, 584 S.E.2d 881, 887-88 (2003) and Ms. Hassell suffered from generalized anxiety disorder. Thus, the question is whether Ms. Hassell\u2019s condition was \u201cdue to stresses or conditions different from those borne by the general public\u201d Pitillio v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Envt\u2019l Health & Natural Res., 151 N.C. App. 641, 648, 566 S.E.2d 807, 814 (2002).\nIn determining that Ms. Hassell failed to make this showing, the Commission found that her anxiety centered around her principal, rather than her students, and that the defect in this work environment was caused by Ms. Hassell\u2019s own failings, rather than problems within the environment. However, the evidence does not support this finding. Rather the evidence, as relied upon by the Commission, included Dr. Chestnut\u2019s opinion that Ms. Hassell\u2019s anxiety was caused by \u201cthe nature of her employment\u201d which would include her principal\u2019s lack of support. Significantly, Dr. Chestnut pointed to the totality of the pressures placed on her as the primary cause of her anxiety disorder. Indeed, the language cited by the Commission expressly noted that \u201cshe felt that the administrator was not supportive when she made decisions in reference to students.\" (Emphasis added). As Dr. Chestnut indicated, Ms. Hassell\u2019s day-to-day interaction with a student body that regularly disrespected, threatened, and assaulted her was the primary cause of her anxiety.\nThe Commission\u2019s also found that Ms. Hassell\u2019s condition \u201cwas not the result of anything caused by the defendant or because she was required to do anything unusual as a teacher [but was] caused by her inadequate job performance and inability to perform her duties as a teaching professional.\u201d However, the test of whether Ms. Hassell can show that her illness was due to stresses or conditions different from those borne by the general public is met \u201cif, as a matter of fact, the employment exposed the worker to a greater risk of contracting the disease than the public generally. Lewis v. Duke Univ., 163 N.C. App. 408, 594 S.E.2d 100 (2004) (citation omitted) (The greater risk in such cases provides the nexus between the disease and the employment which makes them an appropriate subject for workman\u2019s compensation). This test is not a matter of apportioning blame between the teacher and the administration. Rather, the issue is whether unique workplace factors existed that put Ms. Hassell at greater risk for illness. Factually, the Committee heard no competent evidence that the general public faces stress or conditions on par with what Ms. Hassell saw on a daily basis \u2014 personal taunts, racially-charged invectives, workspace vandalism, and physical threats.\nThe Commission indicated that other teachers with some of the same students did not have the same problems as Ms. Hassell. However, no other teachers confronted a classroom like Ms. Hassell\u2019s. The only competent evidence about Ms. Hassell\u2019s classroom indicated that it was uniquely hazardous. In fact, testimony from a substitute teacher confirmed what Ms. Hassell, her co-workers, and her principal all expressly stated: Ms. Hassell went to work in conditions that members of the average teaching public do not experience.\nIn sum, neither the Commissions\u2019s findings that Ms. Hassell\u2019s problems centered around her principal, nor that her problems were caused by her own \u201cinadequate\u201d job performance are supported by competent evidence.", "type": "dissent", "author": "WYNN, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Ralph T. Bryant, Jr., P.A., by Ralph T. Bryant, Jr., for plaintiff - appellant.", "Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Gary A. Scarzafava, for defendant-appellee Onslow County Board of Education." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BARBARA KATRINA HASSELL, Employee, Plaintiff v. ONSLOW COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Employer SELF-INSURED (KEY RISK MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC.), Third-Party Administrator, Defendants\nNo. COA06-276\n(Filed 6 March 2007)\n1. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 occupational disease \u2014 anxiety disorder \u2014 findings of fact \u2014 credibility\nThe Industrial Commission did not err by denying plaintiff sixth-grade teacher\u2019s claim for workers\u2019 compensation benefits based on her failure to show she sustained an occupational disease due to conditions and stress unique to her employment as a teacher as evidenced by findings of fact numbered 6, 8, 11, and 12, because: (1) in regard to numbers 6 and 8, plaintiff agreed that her stress was caused by her inability to perform in accordance with the requirements of what the school was demanding and her inability to achieve the requirements of the action plans and the observation analysis; (2) in regard to number 11, although a psychologist testified that the students\u2019 misbehavior also caused plaintiff great apprehension, the Court of Appeals does not have the right to weigh the evidence and decide the issue on the basis of its weight; (3) although plaintiff contends the commission failed to give proper weight to the testimony of the psychologist, the Commission had grounds to discount the psychologist\u2019s opinion with regard to causation and plaintiff\u2019s increased risk of developing anxiety as opposed to the public at large; and (4) there was no evidence of record that the psychologist testified another person in the same work environment or experience as plaintiff would develop generalized anxiety disorder.\n2. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 occupational disease \u2014 anxiety disorder \u2014 failure to show conditions unique to employment\nThe Industrial Commission did not err by denying plaintiff sixth-grade teacher\u2019s claim for workers\u2019 compensation benefits based on her failure to show she sustained an occupational disease due to conditions and stress unique to her employment as a teacher as evidenced by findings of fact numbered 13 and 14, because: (1) there was substantial evidence of record to show that although the environment in plaintiff\u2019s classroom was stressful, such stress was not created by defendant nor was it characteristic of plaintiff\u2019s particular employment; and (2) the evidence showed that the stressful classroom environment was caused by plaintiff\u2019s inability to effectively manage her classroom.\n3. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 occupational disease \u2014 anxiety disorder \u2014 failure to show employment placed at increased risk\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in a workers\u2019 compensation case by concluding that plaintiff sixth-grade teacher failed to prove that her position placed her at an increased risk of developing an anxiety disorder and by denying her claims for benefits, because: (1) plaintiff\u2019s anxiety disorder did not develop from causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular trade, occupation, or employment; (2) it cannot be concluded under the facts of this case that plaintiff faced challenges and situations unlike those confronting the general public including other teachers; and (3) the evidence tended to establish that plaintiff herself created the stressful work environment through her inability to perform the ordinary tasks expected of her and every other teacher.\nJudge Wynn dissenting.\nAppeal by plaintiff from an opinion and award entered 5 October 2005 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 December 2006.\nRalph T. Bryant, Jr., P.A., by Ralph T. Bryant, Jr., for plaintiff - appellant.\nAttorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Gary A. Scarzafava, for defendant-appellee Onslow County Board of Education." }, "file_name": "0001-01", "first_page_order": 33, "last_page_order": 46 }