{ "id": 8170253, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. STEPEN KERNAL SINGS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Sings", "decision_date": "2007-03-06", "docket_number": "No. COA06-554", "first_page": "162", "last_page": "165", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "182 N.C. App. 162" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "359 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3798427 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "584 S.E.2d 765", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "768" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 433", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491552 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "435" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "532 S.E.2d 773", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "788" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 531", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 685072 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "554" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0531-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 L. Ed. 2d 1094", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "544 U.S. 1052", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5866179, 5919171, 5891939, 5903939, 5918343, 5884294, 5895371, 5889036, 5878317, 5887025, 5863858, 5869783, 5881624, 5868636, 5893086 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/544/1052-07", "/us/544/1052-05", "/us/544/1052-08", "/us/544/1052-14", "/us/544/1052-06", "/us/544/1052-01", "/us/544/1052-13", "/us/544/1052-04", "/us/544/1052-03", "/us/544/1052-11", "/us/544/1052-02", "/us/544/1052-09", "/us/544/1052-15", "/us/544/1052-12", "/us/544/1052-10" ] }, { "cite": "603 S.E.2d 93", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116" }, { "page": "116", "parenthetical": "emphasis added; citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "541 U.S. 36", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5873383 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/541/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 S.E.2d 325", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "326", "parenthetical": "\"[t]he use of hearsay evidence at sentencing hearings'does not violate the Constitution of the United States\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2490089 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3798427 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "36" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 429, "char_count": 6915, "ocr_confidence": 0.747, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.686291800742055e-08, "percentile": 0.2936010941178424 }, "sha256": "5d82b4f4ddf3f7e81211fe53ea74b90d74958b595ad058df354cc5f7f17c9dbb", "simhash": "1:193bf26a74461155", "word_count": 1114 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:32:14.097428+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WYNN and STEELMAN concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. STEPEN KERNAL SINGS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, Judge.\nStepen Kernal Sings (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals from a judgment sentencing him to 140 to 177 months\u2019 imprisonment for voluntary manslaughter. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.\nOn 27 April 2005, defendant entered a plea of no contest to a charge of voluntary manslaughter for the shooting of Nicholas McKay (\u201cdecedent\u201d). Under his plea agreement, defendant also stipulated to a Prior Record Level of IV and to three aggravating factors alleged in the indictment. Further, the agreement stated that counsel for both defendant and the State would present evidence about the appropriate sentence, which the-agreement explicitly stated would be within the presumptive or aggravated range.\nAt defendant\u2019s sentencing hearing, the court admitted testimony by Lamont McGuiness (\u201cMcGuiness\u201d), cousin to decedent and the only eyewitness to the crime. Two pieces of testimony were admitted over defendant\u2019s objections: First, that some time after the shooting, defendant offered McGuiness $1,000.00 not to testify against him (via an intermediary), and second, that McGuiness left Charlotte after the shooting because he was afraid defendant would hire someone to kill him.\nThe State also presented evidence as to the three aggravating factors included in the plea agreement: (1) at the time of the shooting, defendant was on pretrial release for a charge of cocaine trafficking, (2) defendant was on pretrial release for a charge of possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine, and (3) decedent was a witness against defendant in connection with the latter charge. Defendant was sentenced in the aggravated range to imprisonment for 140 to 177 months. Defendant appeals that sentence.\nI.\nDefendant first argues that McGuiness\u2019s testimony regarding the attempted bribe by defendant was admitted in violation of the Confrontation Clauses of the federal and state constitutions (Sixth Amendment and Art. I, \u00a7 23, respectively) and that, as a direct result of this error, defendant was sentenced in the aggravated range. This argument is without merit.\nWhen asked whether he had contact with defendant after the shooting, McGuiness testified that \u201cI had a girl and a guy come by my house, and was talking to me, asking me what happened, and then said that she talked to [defendant] on the phone, and that he offered me a Thousand Dollars . . . not to testify.\u201d\nPer statute, the Rules of Evidence do not apply at sentencing hearings. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 1101(b)(3) (2005); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1334(b) (2005). Thus, the fact that this testimony constitutes hearsay would not govern its admissibility at the sentencing hearing. In addition, in State v. Phillips, 325 N.C. 222, 381 S.E.2d 325 (1989), our Supreme Court held that no hearsay evidence \u2014 testimonial or not \u2014 violates the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 224, 381 S.E.2d at 326 (\u201c[t]he use of hearsay evidence at sentencing hearings'does not violate the Constitution of the United States\u201d).\nDefendant correctly notes that our Supreme Court in one case applied the Confrontation Clause and the standard outlined by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004), to testimony given at a sentencing hearing in a capital case. State v. Bell, 359 N.C. 1, 36, 603 S.E.2d 93, 116 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1052, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1094 (2005). Defendant urges this Court to extend this application to noncapital sentencing hearings.\nHowever, the Court\u2019s ruling in Bell is clearly intended to apply only to capital sentencing hearings. When the Court discusses Crawford\u2019s requirement that a witness be unavailable to testify, it specifically states that the requirement comes into play \u201c \u2018[o]nce the [S]tate decides to present the testimony of a witness to a capital sentencing jury[.]\u2019 \u201d Id. at 35, 603 S.E.2d at 116 (emphasis added; citation omitted). In light of this language, we see no basis for extending this ruling to noncapital sentencing hearings. As such, we find no error in the trial court\u2019s admission of the testimony regarding the alleged bribe attempt.\nII.\nAs to the second piece of testimony, in which McGuiness claimed he left town \u201c[o]ut of fear\u201d because \u201c[p]eople tried to get close to me that [defendant] might hire[,]\u201d defendant argues only that the testimony was \u201cspeculative\u201d and \u201cunreliable.\u201d We find this argument to be without merit. As mentioned above, the Rules of Evidence do not apply to sentencing hearings, and a trial judge has \u201cwide latitude\u201d in what evidence he admits in such hearings. See State v. Smith, 352 N.C. 531, 554, 532 S.E.2d 773, 788 (2000).\nBecause we find that the trial court did not err in admitting the testimony at issue, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed.\nJudges WYNN and STEELMAN concur.\n. We note that defendant was indicted under the name Stephen Kernal Sings, and most all documents refer to defendant as Stephen Kernal Sings. However, the judgment of conviction in this case refers to defendant as Stepen Kernal Sings. As we use the name on the judgment in the captions of appellate opinions, defendant\u2019s name appears as Stepen Kernal Sings on the caption. Neither party has raised any issues related to the discrepancy in the names. We do encourage all parties, however, to ensure a defendant\u2019s correct name is placed on all court documents to help facilitate appellate review.\n. Although defendant cites to both federal and state constitutions at the beginning of his brief, in the remainder he argues only the applicability of the federal constitution. As a general rule, the two clauses are construed by this Court and the Supreme Court as having no significant differences. See State v. Nobles, 357 N.C. 433, 435, 584 S.E.2d 765, 768 (2003). As such, our consideration of defendant\u2019s arguments refers to the federal version only.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Special Deputy Attorney General Gary R. Govert, for the State.", "Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Benjamin Dowling-Sendor, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. STEPEN KERNAL SINGS\nNo. COA06-554\n(Filed 6 March 2007)\n1. Sentencing\u2014 noncapital \u2014 hearsay testimony \u2014 Confrontation Clause \u2014 not violated\nHearsay testimony at a noncapital sentencing hearing that a witness had been offered a bribe by defendant did not violate the Confrontation Clause. The standard outlined in State v. Bell, 359 N.C. 1, was clearly intended only for capital sentencing hearings and is not extended to noncapital hearings.\n2. Sentencing\u2014 evidence \u2014 witness\u2019s fear of defendant\nThere was no error in a sentencing hearing where testimony was admitted that a witness had left town because of fear of defendant. The Rules of Evidence do not apply to sentencing hearings.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 29 June 2005 by Judge Albert Diaz in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 January 2007.\nAttorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Special Deputy Attorney General Gary R. Govert, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Benjamin Dowling-Sendor, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0162-01", "first_page_order": 194, "last_page_order": 197 }