{ "id": 8172027, "name": "CALVIN B. BRYANT, and MARK T. PRESTON, Co-Executors of the ESTATE OF DOLEN J. BOWERS, Deceased, Plaintiffs v. HAZEL R. BOWERS, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Bryant v. Bowers", "decision_date": "2007-03-20", "docket_number": "No. COA06-852", "first_page": "338", "last_page": "343", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "182 N.C. App. 338" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "180 S.E.2d 813", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "816" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 N.C. 657", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561294 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "661" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/278/0657-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-152", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(e)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "248 S.E.2d 467", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "469" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 N.C. App. 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554696 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/38/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 S.E.2d 438", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "439" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 N.C. App. 515", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554810 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "516" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/38/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 30-27", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 30-15", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 S.E. 593", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1917, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "173 N.C. 719", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 1917, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "723" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "241 S.E.2d 324", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "328" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 60", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570860 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "493 S.E.2d 418", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "420" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 339", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551213 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0339-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 S.E.2d 281", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "283" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 N.C. 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574896 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "303" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/281/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "239 S.E.2d 48", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "65", "parenthetical": "quoting Stevenson v. City of Durham, 281 N.C. 300, 303, 188 S.E.2d 281, 283 (1972)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 N.C. 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565044 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392", "parenthetical": "quoting Stevenson v. City of Durham, 281 N.C. 300, 303, 188 S.E.2d 281, 283 (1972)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/293/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 S.E.2d 163", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "165" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 N.C. App. 602", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525459 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "605" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/57/0602-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 526, "char_count": 10137, "ocr_confidence": 0.753, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.20109550788482264 }, "sha256": "fc78dd9883815f737ccbe4251d3e1bac5584e9e647395f382f6bd9ec748d4b22", "simhash": "1:af3f835225192172", "word_count": 1664 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:32:14.097428+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUNTER and STROUD concur." ], "parties": [ "CALVIN B. BRYANT, and MARK T. PRESTON, Co-Executors of the ESTATE OF DOLEN J. BOWERS, Deceased, Plaintiffs v. HAZEL R. BOWERS, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN, Chief Judge.\nDolen Bowers (\u201cdecedent\u201d) died testate on 6 June 2003. Hazel Bowers (\u201cdefendant\u201d) is the widow of decedent and a named beneficiary of his will dated 5 March 2003. Calvin B. Bryant and Mark T. Preston (\u201cplaintiffs\u201d) were named as co-executors of the estate. By the terms of the will, defendant was to receive an amount from decedent\u2019s estate sufficient to prevent defendant \u201cfrom being able to dissent and claim an elective share.\u201d Defendant elected to have her year\u2019s allowance determined by the superior court pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 30-27, et seq. On 4 February 2004, the superior court entered a consent order directing the estate to pay defendant $112,115.20 as a surviving spouse\u2019s year\u2019s allowance.\nFollowing decedent\u2019s death, the estate paid income taxes due from decedent and defendant, as husband and wife, for the second quarter of 2003. Defendant subsequently received state and federal income tax refunds, which she retained.\nPlaintiffs brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment that the estate is entitled to deduct the year\u2019s allowance from defendant\u2019s share of decedent\u2019s estate as a beneficiary under his will, and that the estate is entitled to the tax refunds received by defendant.\nAfter the matter was heard on stipulated facts, the superior court entered a judgment in which it ordered that the amount previously awarded defendant as a year\u2019s allowance be charged against her share of decedent\u2019s estate and that plaintiffs, as executors, deduct one-half of the federal income tax refund and $877.50 of the state income tax refund from defendant\u2019s share of the estate. Defendant appeals.\nDefendant argues on appeal that the year\u2019s allowance paid to a spouse pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 30-27 is not subject to a charge against the surviving spouse\u2019s share in the estate. The drafters of N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 30-27 et seq. did not expressly indicate whether the allowance is charged against the surviving spouse\u2019s share in the estate. As a result, the question before this Court is one of statutory construction. The primary function of statutory construction is to ensure the purpose of the legislature. State v. Anderson, 57 N.C. App. 602, 605, 292 S.E.2d 163, 165 (1982). To this end, our Court considers \u201cthe language of the statute, the spirit of the act, and what the act seeks to accomplish.\u201d Comr. of Insurance v. Automobile Rate Office, 293 N.C. 365, 392, 239 S.E.2d 48, 65 (1977) (quoting Stevenson v. City of Durham, 281 N.C. 300, 303, 188 S.E.2d 281, 283 (1972)). It is presumed that the legislature acted with reason and common sense, and that statutory construction should avoid the creation of absurd results. In re Brake, 347 N.C. 339, 341, 493 S.E.2d 418, 420 (1997). \u201cParts of the same statute dealing with the same subject matter must be considered and interpreted as a whole.\u201d Comr. of Insurance v. Automobile Rate Office, 294 N.C. 60, 66, 241 S.E.2d 324, 328 (1978).\nA year\u2019s allowance is allotted to a surviving spouse to meet immediate needs, maintain a standard of living, ease the mourning process and keep the family intact. See Drewry v. Raleigh Savings Bank and Trust Co., 173 N.C. 719, 723, 92 S.E. 593, 594 (1917). N.C.G.S. \u00a7 30-15 entitles a surviving spouse to a year\u2019s allowance of $10,000 dollars payable out of the personal property of the deceased spouse and charged against the share of the surviving spouse. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 30-15 (2005). As an alternative, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 30-27 permits the following:\nIt shall not, however, be obligatory on a surviving spouse or child to have the support assigned as above prescribed [G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 30-15 et seq.]. Without application to the personal representative, the surviving spouse, or the child through his guardian or next friend, may at any time within one year after the decedent\u2019s death, apply to the superior court of the county in which administration was granted or the will probated to have a year\u2019s support assigned.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 30-27 (2005). N.C.G.S. \u00a7 30-27 provides an opportunity for surviving spouses to apply for a larger allowance than that which is allowed under N.C.G.S. 30-15. In re Kirkman, 38 N.C. App. 515, 516, 248 S.E.2d 438, 439 (1978). The manner by which the superior court arrives at the amount of the allowance is set forth in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 30-31.\nThe statute, G.S. 30-31, is designed to permit the allowance to the surviving spouse of a solvent decedent of an amount sufficient to maintain for a period that standard of living to which he or she had been accustomed, thereby avoiding the hardship which an immediate and drastic reduction in income would entail. This interpretation of the purpose of the statute is borne out by its history.\nPritchard v. First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 38 N.C. App. 489, 491, 248 S.E.2d 467, 469 (1978).\nUpon examination of the purpose of a year\u2019s allowance, it appears in contravention of legislative intent to charge a surviving spouse\u2019s $10,000 allowance against the distributive share while not doing the same to a surviving spouse receiving significantly more under the procedures prescribed by N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 30-27 et seq. Reading our General Statute\u2019s year\u2019s allowance provisions as a whole, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 30-27 merely outlines an alternative procedural method to pursue larger allowances in superior court and should, in all other ways, be treated in like manner with allowances administered pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 30-15. In the present case, there was no error in the order charging the year\u2019s allowance against defendant\u2019s distributive share.\nDefendant next argues that she was entitled to retain the entire income tax refund from taxes paid on a joint North Carolina tax return. She has not assigned error to the trial court\u2019s order with respect to the refund of federal income tax.\nDefendant contends that two statutes, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 105-152(e) and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 28A-15-8, conflict on the issue. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 105-152(e) provides in pertinent part:\nA wife and husband filing jointly have expressly agreed that if the amount of the payments made by them with respect to the taxes for which they are liable, including withheld and estimated taxes, exceeds the total of the taxes due, refund of the excess may be made payable to both spouses jointly or, if either is deceased, to the survivor alone.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-152(e). Defendant\u2019s refund, however, was calculated according to N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 28A-15-8, 9 (2005).\n\u00a7 28A-15-8. Upon the determination by the Secretary of Revenue of North Carolina of an overp\u00e1yment of income tax by any m\u00e1r-ried person, any refund of the tax by reason of such overpayment, if not in excess of two hundred dollars ($200.00) exclusive of interest, shall be the sole and separate property of the surviving spouse, and said Secretary of Revenue may pay said sum directly to such surviving spouse, and such payment to the extent thereof shall operate as a complete acquittal and discharge of the Secretary of Revenue.\n\u00a7 28A-15-9. If the amount of any refund exceeds the sums specified in G.S. 28A-15-6, 28A-15-7 or 28A-15-8, the sums specified therein and one half of any additional sums shall be the sole and separate property of the surviving spouse. The remaining one half of such additional sums shall be the property of the estate of the decedent spouse.\nDefendant argues that in dealing with two conflicting statutes, the more recently enacted statute, \u00a7 105-152(e), prevails. See Bland v. City of Wilmington, 278 N.C. 657, 661, 180 S.E.2d 813, 816 (1971).\nThe two statutes, however, are reconcilable. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 105-152(e) applies to joint income tax returns filed by individuals. N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 28A-15-8 and 28A-15-9 deal with the administration of a decedent\u2019s estate and applies to joint income tax returns filed by the estate rather than individuals. The tax refund at issue here has been properly administered in accordance with \u00a7 28A-15-9. Defendant\u2019s assignment of error is overruled.\nAffirmed.\nJudges HUNTER and STROUD concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Wyatt, Early, Harris, & Wheeler, LLP, by Stanley F. Hammer, for plaintiff s-appellees.", "Smith, James, Rowlett & Cohen, LLP, by Norman B. Smith, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CALVIN B. BRYANT, and MARK T. PRESTON, Co-Executors of the ESTATE OF DOLEN J. BOWERS, Deceased, Plaintiffs v. HAZEL R. BOWERS, Defendant\nNo. COA06-852\n(Filed 20 March 2007)\n1. Declaratory Judgments; Estates\u2014 year\u2019s allowance\u2014 charged against share of decedent\u2019s estate\nThe trial court did not err in a declaratory judgment action by ordering that the amount previously awarded to defendant widow as a year\u2019s allowance pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 30-27 be charged against her share of decedent\u2019s estate, because: (1) upon examination of the purpose of a year\u2019s allowance, it appears in contravention of legislative intent to charge a surviving spouse\u2019s $10,000 allowance under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 30-15 against the distributive share while not doing the same to a surviving spouse receiving significantly more under the procedures prescribed by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 30-27; and (2) N.C.G.S. \u00a7 30-27 merely outlines an alternative procedural method to pursue larger allowances in superior court and should, in all other ways, be treated in like manner with allowances administered under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 30-15.\n2. Estates\u2014 share of estate \u2014 deduction from joint income tax return\nThe trial court did not err in a declaratory judgment action by ordering that plaintiff executors deduct, from taxes paid on a joint North- Carolina income tax return, $877.50 of the state income tax refund from defendant widow\u2019s share of the estate even though defendant contends that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 105-152(e) and N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 28-15-8, 9 conflict on the issue, because: (1) N.C.G.S. \u00a7 105-152(e) applies to joint income tax returns filed by individuals; (2) N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 28-15-8, 9 deal with the administration of a decedent\u2019s estate and apply to joint income tax returns filed by the estate rather than individuals; and (3) the tax refund in this case has been properly administered in accordance with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 28A-15-9.\nAppeal by defendant from order entered 2 May 2006 by Judge John O. Craig, III in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 February 2007.\nWyatt, Early, Harris, & Wheeler, LLP, by Stanley F. Hammer, for plaintiff s-appellees.\nSmith, James, Rowlett & Cohen, LLP, by Norman B. Smith, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0338-01", "first_page_order": 370, "last_page_order": 375 }