{
  "id": 8174661,
  "name": "IN RE: C.L.K., a Minor Child, JOHN OWEN and JANET OWEN, Petitioners v. CHRISTOPHER ROB KEETER, Respondent",
  "name_abbreviation": "C.L.K. v. Keeter",
  "decision_date": "2007-04-17",
  "docket_number": "No. COA06-942",
  "first_page": "600",
  "last_page": "611",
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    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "182 N.C. App. 600"
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    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
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    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
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          "page": "33",
          "parenthetical": "respondent articulated prejudice when the respondent and the \"child have lost time together, the foster parents are in a state of flux, and the adoptive parents are not able to complete their family plan\""
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          "page": "147",
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          "page": "33",
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          "page": "564",
          "parenthetical": "\"Even if prejudice is apparent without argument, '[i]t is not the role of the appellate courts . . . to create an appeal for an appellant.' \" (quoting Viar, 359 N.C. at 402, 610 S.E.2d at 361)"
        },
        {
          "page": "564",
          "parenthetical": "holding \"that the party asserting prejudice [from excessive delays] must actually bear its burden of persuasion\""
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          "page": "564"
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          "page": "564"
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          "page": "565",
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          "page": "707",
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          "page": "427",
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      ],
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    {
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          "page": "510",
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          "parenthetical": "\"Even if prejudice is apparent without argument, '[i]t is not the role of the appellate courts . . . to create an appeal for an appellant.' \" (quoting Viar, 359 N.C. at 402, 610 S.E.2d at 361)"
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    "judges": [
      "Judge ELMORE concurs.",
      "Judge GEER dissents by separate opinion."
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    "parties": [
      "IN RE: C.L.K., a Minor Child, JOHN OWEN and JANET OWEN, Petitioners v. CHRISTOPHER ROB KEETER, Respondent"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "TYSON, Judge.\nChristopher Rob Keeter (\u201crespondent\u201d) appeals from order entered terminating his parental rights to his minor child, C.L.K. We reverse.\nI.Background\nOn 22 April 1998, J.R.O. (\u201cmother\u201d) gave birth to C.L.K. Respondent is C.L.K\u2019s biological father. Since 1999, C.L.K. has resided with her maternal grandparents, John Owen and Janet Owen (\u201cthe maternal grandparents\u201d). In July 2002, C.L.K.\u2019s mother died. C.L.K.\u2019s maternal grandparents have provided for C.L.K. since her mother\u2019s death. Respondent visited C.L.K. five or six times after her mother\u2019s death. Respondent\u2019s last visited with C.L.K. during August 2003.\nOn 30 April 2004, the maternal grandparents filed a petition to terminate respondent\u2019s parental rights and alleged respondent: (1) willfully failed to provide support for C.L.K. for over one year; (2) willfully abandoned C.L.K. for at least six consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the petition; and (3) has been incarcerated most of C.L.K.\u2019s life. The maternal grandparents intend to adopt C.L.K. In August 2004, respondent was incarcerated for felony breaking and entering and larceny.\nOn 11 October 2005, the trial court conducted a hearing on whether to terminate respondent\u2019s parental rights. On 22 March 2006, the trial court found respondent had: (1) willfully failed to provide support for C.L.K. for over one year preceding the institution of this action and (2) willfully abandoned C.L.K. for at least six consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of this action. The trial court also found and concluded C.L.K.\u2019s best interest was served by terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights. Respondent appeals.\nII.Issues\nRespondent argues the trial court erred by: (1) failing to reduce its order to writing within the statutory prescribed time limit and (2) entering findings of fact numbered 12, 13, and 14.\nIII.Standard of Review\nA proceeding to terminate parental rights is a two step process with an adjudicatory stage and a dispositional stage. A different standard of review applies to each stage; In the adjudicatory stage, the burden is on the petitioner to prove by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that one of the grounds for termination of parental rights set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-llll(a) exists. The standard for appellate review is whether, the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and whether those findings of fact support its conclusions of law. Clear, cogent, and convincing describes an evidentiary standard stricter than a preponderance of the evidence, but less stringent than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.\nIf the petitioner meets its burden of proving at least one ground for termination of parental rights exists under N.C. Gen. St\u00e1t. \u00a7 7B-llll(a), the court proceeds to the dispositional phase and determines whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child. The standard of review of the dispositional stage is whether the trial court abused its discretion in terminating parental rights.\nIn re C.C., J.C., 173 N.C. App. 375, 380-81, 618 S.E.2d 813, 817 (2005) (internal quotations and citations omitted).\nIV. Late Entry of Order\nRespondent argues the trial court erred when it failed to reduce its order to writing within the statutory prescribed time limit. We agree.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1110(a) (2005) mandates, \u201c[a]ny order shall be reduced to writing, signed, and entered no later than 30 days following the completion of the termination of parental rights hearing.\u201d (Emphasis supplied). While \u201ca trial court\u2019s violation of statutory time limits ... is not reversible error per se . . ., the complaining party [who] ... appropriately articulate [s] the prejudice arising from the delay.. . justifies] reversal of the order.\u201d In re S.N.H. & L.J.H., 177 N.C. App. 82, 86, 627 S.E.2d 510, 513 (2006). While \u201c[t]he passage of time alone is not enough to show prejudice, . . . [we] recently [held] that the \u2018longer the delay in entry of the order beyond the thirty-day deadline, the more likely prejudice will be readily apparent.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 86, 627 S.E.2d at 513-14 (quoting In re C.J.B. & M.G.B., 171 N.C. App. 132, 135, 614 S.E.2d 368, 370 (2005)). \u201cThis Court has held that use of the language \u2018shall\u2019 is a mandate to trial judges, and that failure to comply with the statutory mandate is reversible error.\u201d In re Eades, 143 N.C. App. 712, 713, 547 S.E.2d 146, 147 (2001) (citations omitted).\nThis Court has held, \u201cprejudice has been adequately shown by a five-month delay in entry of the written order terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights.\u201d In re C.J.B. & M.G.B., 171 N.C. App. at 135, 614 S.E.2d at 370. We stated, \u201c[f]or four unnecessary months the appellate process was put on hold, any sense of closure for the children, respondent, or the children\u2019s current care givers was out of reach[.]\u201d Id.\nThis Court has also stated:\na delay in excess of six months to enter the adjudication and disposition order terminating her parental rights is highly prejudicial to all parties involved. Respondent-[parent], the minorf], and the foster parent[s] did not receive an immediate, final decision in a life altering situation for all parties. Respondent-[parent] could not appeal until \u201centry of the order.\u201d See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1113 (2003). If adoption becomes the ordered permanent plan for the minor[], the foster parent[s] must wait even longer to commence the adoption proceedings. The minors are prevented from settling into a permanent family environment until the order is entered and the time for any appeals has expired.\nIn re L.E.B., K.T.B., 169 N.C. App. 375, 379, 610 S.E.2d 424, 426-27, disc. rev. denied, 359 N.C. 632, 616 S.E.2d 538 (2005). \u201c[T]he harm done in this case and similar cases is not limited solely to the respondent.\u201d Id. at 381, 610 S.E.2d at 428 (Timmons-Goodson, J., concurring). \u201cIn their own respective manners, juveniles, their foster parents, and their adoptive parents are each affected by the trial court\u2019s inability to enter an order within the prescribed time period.\u201d Id.\nUpon similar allegations, this Court has repeatedly found prejudice to exist in numerous cases with facts analogous to those here. See In re D.M.M. & K.G.M., 179 N.C. App. 383, 384-85, 633 S.E.2d 715, 716 (2006) (trial court\u2019s order was reversed when it failed to hold the termination hearing for over one year after DSS filed its petition to terminate and by entering its order an additional seven months after the statutorily mandated time period); In re D.S., S.S., F.S., M.M., M.S., 177 N.C. App. 136, 628 S.E.2d 31 (2006) (trial court\u2019s entry of its order seven months after the termination hearing was a clear and egregious violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1109(e) and \u00a7 7B-1110(a), and the delay prejudiced all parties); In re O.S.W., 175 N.C. App. 414, 623 S.E.2d 349 (2006) (trial court\u2019s order was vacated because it failed to enter its order for six months and the father was prejudiced because he was unable to file an appeal); In re T.W., L.W., E.H., 173 N.C. App. 153, 617 S.E.2d 702 (2005) (trial court entered its order just short of one year from the date of the hearing and this Court reversed the trial court\u2019s order); In re L.L., 172 N.C. App. 689, 616 S.E.2d 392 (2005) (nine month delay prejudiced the parents); In re T.L.T., 170 N.C. App. 430, 612 S.E.2d 436 (2005) (trial court\u2019s judgment was reversed because it failed to enter its order until seven months after the hearing); In re L.E.B., K.T.B., 169 N.C. App. 375, 610 S.E.2d 424 (delay of the entry of the order of six months- was prejudicial to the respondent, the minors, and the foster parent); see also In re E.N.S., 164 N.C. App. 146, 153, 595 S.E.2d 167, 172 (\u201cWhile we have located no clear reasoning for [the thirty day time limit], logic and common sense lead us to the conclusion that the General Assembly\u2019s intent was to provide parties with a speedy resolution of cases where juvenile custody is at issue.\u201d), disc. rev. denied, 359 N.C. 189, 606 S.E.2d 903 (2004).\n\u201cAlthough In re E.N.S. involved N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-807(b) and \u00a7 7B-905(a), the General Assembly added the same thirty day time limitation to both N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1109(e) and \u00a7 7B-1110(a) during the same legislative session.\u201d In re L.E.B., K.T.B., 169 N.C. App. at 380, 610 S.E.2d at 427; see 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 208, \u00a7 17, \u00a7 22, and \u00a7 23). \u201cThe logic applied in In re E.N.S. towards N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-807(b) and \u00a7 7B-905(a) supports our analysis of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1109(e) and \u00a7 7B-1110(a).\u201d In re L.E.B., K.T.B., 169 N.C. App. at 380, 610 S.E.2d at 427.\nRespondent argues: (1) he and all related parties were entitled to a speedy resolution of the petitioners\u2019 allegations; (2) C.L.K. is entitled to a permanent plan of care at the earliest possible age; (3) the trial court\u2019s delay in entering its order delayed his right to appeal; (4) the trial court\u2019s delay extends the time parents are separated from their children to the prejudice of their relationship; and (5) petitioners barred respondent from any communication with C.L.K. See In re J.N.S., 180 N.C. App. 573, 637 S.E.2d 914 (2006); In re D.S., S.S., F.S., M.M., M.S., 177 N.C. App. at 138-39, 628 S.E.2d at 33 (respondent articulated prejudice when the respondent and the \u201cchild have lost time together, the foster parents are in a state of flux, and the adoptive parents are not able to complete their family plan\u201d); In re D.M.M. & K.G.M., 179 N.C. App. at 387, 633 S.E.2d at 718 (respondent alleged prejudice because the respondent was unable to appeal or seek any relief from the trial court).\nThe trial court completed respondent\u2019s termination of parental rights hearing on 11 October 2005. The trial court ruled respondent\u2019s parental rights were terminated that day. On 22 March 2006, nearly six months later, the trial court reduced its order to writing, signed, and filed it with the Clerk of Superior Court.\nRespondent argues the facts here are similar to the cases cited because C.L.K., respondent, and the maternal grandparents did not receive an immediate, final decision within thirty days of 11 October 2005. The maternal grandparents were forced to wait longer before proceeding to adoption. C.L.K. was prevented from settling into a permanent family environment. Respondent argues he was prejudiced by the late entry of the termination of parental rights order because: (1) he could not appeal until the entry of the order; (2) he was incarcerated at the time of the termination of parental rights hearing; (3) his release date was May 2006, within weeks of the entry of the termination of parental rights order; and (4) his living situation was drastically different at the time of the hearing than at the time of the entry of the termination of parental rights order. Our precedents clearly require reversal where a late entry of order occurs and respondent alleges and demonstrates prejudice. See In re D.M.M. & K.G.M., 179 N.C. App. at 387, 633 S.E.2d at 716.\nV. Conclusion\nThe trial court erred and prejudiced respondent and C.L.K. when it entered its order more than five months after the conclusion of the hearing and the court orally rendered its order. \u201cThis late entry is a clear and egregious violation of both N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1109(e), N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1110(a), and this Court\u2019s well established interpretation of the General Assembly\u2019s choice and use of the word \u2018shall.\u2019 \u201d In re L.E.B., K.T.B., 169 N.C. App. at 378, 610 S.E.2d at 426.\nRespondent specifically argued and articulated the prejudice he and his minor child suffered as a result of the delay in the entry. In light of our holding, it is unnecessary to consider respondent\u2019s remaining assignments of error. The trial court\u2019s order is reversed.\nReversed.\nJudge ELMORE concurs.\nJudge GEER dissents by separate opinion.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "TYSON, Judge."
      },
      {
        "text": "GEER, Judge,\ndissenting.\nI do not agree with the majority opinion that the order below should be reversed because it was untimely filed. I do not believe that the reasoning of the majority opinion can be meaningfully distinguished from the reasoning contained in the same authoring judge\u2019s dissent in In re T.S., III & S.M., 178 N.C. App. 110, 117, 631 S.E.2d 19, 25 (2006) (Tyson, J., dissenting) \u2014 reasoning that was specifically rejected by the Supreme Court. In re T.S., III & S.M., 361 N.C. 683, 641 S.E.2d 302 (2007) (per curiam).\nAs our Supreme Court has confirmed, the \u201ctime limitations in the Juvenile Code are not jurisdictional in cases such as this one and do not require reversal of orders in the absence of a showing by the appellant of prejudice resulting from the time delay.\u201d In re C.L.C., 171 N.C. App. 438, 443, 615 S.E.2d 704, 707 (2005) (emphasis added), aff\u2019d per curiam in part, disc. review improvidently allowed in part, 360 N.C. 475, 628 S.E.2d 760 (2006). There is no per se rule of prejudice, but rather the appellant must specifically demonstrate how the delay in filing the order resulted in prejudice.\nIn this case, the majority opinion substantially ignores the appellant\u2019s argument of prejudice and substitutes its own articulations of prejudice. As has been much discussed, our Supreme Court has made it clear that \u201c [i]t is not the role of the appellate courts, however, to create an appeal for an appellant.\u201d Viar v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Transp., 359 N.C. 400, 402, 610 S.E.2d 360, 361 (2005) (per curiam). This principle applies with full force in this situation. See In re As.L.G., 173 N.C. App. 551, 555, 619 S.E.2d 561, 564 (2005) (\u201cEven if prejudice is apparent without argument, \u2018[i]t is not the role of the appellate courts . . . to create an appeal for an appellant.\u2019 \u201d (quoting Viar, 359 N.C. at 402, 610 S.E.2d at 361)), disc. review improvidently allowed, 360 N.C. 476, 628 S.E.2d 760 (2006). Nevertheless, the majority opinion has taken the approach condemned in Viar. the opinion makes an argument for the appellant that he did not specifically assert on his own behalf and then relies upon that argument for reversal.\nThe Supreme Court explained the basis for its holding in Viar. \u201cAs this case illustrates, the Rules of Appellate Procedure must be consistently applied; otherwise, the Rules become meaningless, and an appellee is left without notice of the basis upon which an appellate court might rule.\u201d 359 N.C. at 402, 610 S.E.2d at 361. Here, because the \u201cprejudice\u201d relied upon by the majority opinion was not specifically relied upon by the father as a basis for reversal, respondents had no notice that they needed to rebut that form of \u201cprejudice.\u201d This is no minor problem. Although the majority opinion refers to \u201callegations\u201d of prejudice, an appellant\u2019s mere assertion of prejudice is insufficient \u2014 this Court must be persuaded by the appellant that prejudice in fact occurred. See As.L.G., 173 N.C. App. at 555, 619 S.E.2d at 564 (holding \u201cthat the party asserting prejudice [from excessive delays] must actually bear its burden of persuasion\u201d). In assessing whether an appellant has met his burden of persuasion, we must also have an opportunity to hear from the appellees as to why they contend the alleged prejudice was not in fact prejudicial.\nAfter citing and quoting various cases, respondent made the following argument regarding the prejudice that he suffered in light of his specific circumstances:\nIn this case, respondent was incarcerated at the time of the hearing; his expected release date was early May, 2006; as it turns out, this was within days of the entry of the order in this case. His situation was radically different at the time of the entry of the order than on the day of trial. In the words of Judge Fox on the trial date:\nI believe you when you say you\u2019re, using this prison experience to come out the whole human being that you weren\u2019t when you went in. I believe you. But the point is, you\u2019ve got seven more months before you\u2019re been going [sic] to be in the position to hit the ground at which time you\u2019d be asking the Court to experiment with that child. Seven more months, another eternity in the child\u2019s life, and then start an experiment.\nClearly, the passage of the \u201ceternity\u201d which weighed so heavily on Judge Fox\u2019s mind on the trial date was not at all the situation which existed on the date of the entry of judgment. Given what he considered to be the \u201cvery, very tempting\u201d alternative of not terminating, even on the trial date, Judge Fox may well have been swayed in the other direction by the changed circumstances. Precedent holding that delays approaching and exceeding six months are prejudicial, together with Judge Fox\u2019s illuminating statement, dictate a finding of prejudicial error and reversal.\n(Citations to record omitted; emphasis added.) In other words, respondent\u2019s sole argument regarding prejudice is: (1) six months\u2019 delay is per se prejudicial, and (2) Judge Fox would have been unlikely to terminate his rights had the hearing been held at the time of respondent\u2019s release from incarceration.\nThis Court has held time and time again \u201cthat any violation of the statutory time lines [is] not reversible error per se,\u201d regardless of the length of the delay, and only \u201can appropriate showing of prejudice arising from the delay\u201d justifies reversal. As.L.G., 173 N.C. App. at 555, 619 S.E.2d at 564. Further, mere citation to other cases in which prejudice was found from similar delays is insufficient since \u201c[w]hether a party has adequately shown prejudice is always resolved on a case-by-case basis . . . .\u201d Id. at 554, 619 S.E.2d at 564. Thus, respondent\u2019s bare reliance upon the length of the delay cannot support reversal of the order.\nWe are, therefore, left only with respondent\u2019s curious contention relating to his prison release date. If the trial court had complied with the statutory deadline, the order would have been entered long before his release from incarceration. The fact that the court could not consider respondent\u2019s improved circumstances upon release was due to the timing of the hearing and not the delay in the entry of the order. Had there been no error with respect to the entry of the order, the prejudice articulated by respondent would not have been eliminated. Accordingly, respondent has failed to demonstrate any prejudice from the delay in the filing of the order. See id. at 557, 619 S.E.2d at 565 (\u201cHere, respondent has argued prejudice; however, we cannot agree that any befell her from DSS\u2019s delay.\u201d).\nEven if it were permissible for this Court to scan the record to uncover any possible prejudice overlooked by the appellant, the \u201cprejudice\u201d relied upon by the majority does not fit the facts of this case. This is a private termination of parental rights proceeding. Petitioners, the child\u2019s maternal grandparents, already have been awarded temporary custody of their grandchild, who has lived with them since birth. The delay in the filing of the order does not delay \u201cpermanency\u201d for the grandparents because their relationship with the child is one of blood and will exist regardless of the outcome of these proceedings. The child has not been prejudiced by the delayed order because she continues to reside with her grandparents, who have legal custody, and respondent himself has stated only that \u201c[wjithin 12' months of the trial date, respondent hopes to be stable, working, and in a position to regain custody of his daughter.\u201d (Emphasis added.) In other words, respondent\u2019s own circumstances \u2014 his incarceration \u2014 precluded even the hope of permanency until, at the earliest, a year after the termination of parental rights hearing.\nThe majority opinion\u2019s mere recitation that the grandparents were forced to wait longer to proceed with adoption and the child was prevented from settling into a permanent family environment shows little true prejudice when, as here, the child is in the legal custody of a close family member, and the parent admits he cannot yet, in any event, assume custody. Indeed, the majority opinion\u2019s \u201cprejudice\u201d would apply in almost any case, rendering \u2014 contrary to this Court\u2019s numerous decisions otherwise \u2014 delays in filing orders per se prejudicial.\nWith respect to respondent\u2019s delayed ability to appeal, the majority opinion has failed to explain in what manner that factor prejudiced respondent. If respondent desired to appeal more quickly, it was within his power to request that the court enter its order so that an appeal could be taken. More importantly, respondent has, in his appellate brief, used that delay to his advantage by arguing that reversal of the order terminating his parental rights is warranted because his circumstances at the time of the entry of the order were completely different than at the time of the hearing.\nIn sum, I do not believe that respondent has met his burden of demonstrating prejudice from the belated filing of the order. I would, therefore, address respondent\u2019s remaining arguments. Respondent argues (1) that the evidence failed to support the trial court\u2019s finding that he did not provide support for the child for more than a year prior to the filing of the petition, (2) that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact to support its conclusion that respondent willfully abandoned the child for at least six consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the petition, and (3) that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact to support its conclusion that the child\u2019s best interests would be served by terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights.\nThe trial court first concluded that termination of parental rights was warranted under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B~llll(a)(4). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-llll(a)(4) permits termination if \u201c[o]ne parent has been awarded custody of the juvenile by judicial decree or has custody by agreement of the parents, and the other parent whose parental rights are sought to be terminated has for a period of one year or more next preceding the filing of the petition or motion willfully failed without justification to pay for the care, support, and education of the juvenile, as required by said decree or custody agreement.\u201d\nAlthough the trial court cited \u00a7 7B-1111(a)(6) as a second basis for termination of parental rights, the conclusion of law stated: \u201cThat termination of Father\u2019s parental rights is warranted by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-llll(a)(6) because the clear and convincing evidence shows that Father has had no contact with the Child and, thereby, has willfully abandoned the Child for at least six (6) consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of this action.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-llll(a)(6), however, allows termination upon a showing that \u201cthe parent is incapable of providing for the proper care and supervision of the juvenile, such that the juvenile is a dependent juvenile within the meaning of G.S. 7B-101 . . . .\u201d It is apparent, therefore, that the trial court\u2019s order contains a typographical error and that it intended to rely upon N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-llll(a)(7), which provides: \u201cThe parent has willfully abandoned the juvenile for at least six consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the petition or motion . . . .\u201d\nI do not believe it is necessary to address whether N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-llll(a)(4) provided a proper basis for terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights because I would uphold the trial court\u2019s ruling under \u00a7 7B-llll(a)(7). See In re B.S.D.S., 163 N.C. App. 540, 546, 594 S.E.2d 89, 93-94 (2004) (\u201cHaving concluded that at least one ground for termination of parental rights existed, we need not address the additional ground[s] . . . found by the trial court.\u201d). With respect to the abandonment ground, respondent argues only that the trial court made insufficient findings of fact. I disagree.\n\u201cWillful abandonment has been found where \u2018a parent withholds his presence, his love, his care, the opportunity to display filial affection, and [willfully] neglects to lend support and maintenance.\u201d In re D.J.D., 171 N.C. App. 230, 241, 615 S.E.2d 26, 33 (2005) (quoting In re McLemore, 139 N.C. App. 426, 429, 533 S.E.2d 508, 509 (2000)). Further, \u201c[d] espite incarceration, a parent failing to have any contact can be found to have willfully abandoned the child . ...\u201d Id.\nIn this case, the trial court found (1) that the child has resided with her grandparents since her birth, (2) that the grandparents have \u201ccared for all of the Child\u2019s emotional and physical needs since her birth,\u201d (3) the father was awarded temporary visitation with the child in an order granting temporary custody of the child to the grandparents, (4) the grandparents have neither prevented nor interfered with the father\u2019s visitation rights, and (5) respondent has had no contact with the child. (Emphasis added.) In sum, these findings of fact establish that respondent has provided for none of the child\u2019s needs since her birth and has had no contact with the child despite a legal entitlement to visitation.\nThese findings \u2014 although sparse \u2014 are sufficient, under our case law, to support the conclusion that the criteria of \u00a7 7B-llll(a)(7) were met. See, e.g., id. at 240-41, 615 S.E.2d at 33-34 (finding sufficient basis for abandonment when the respondent had taken no \u201csteps to develop or maintain a relationship with his children\u201d); In re Humphrey, 156 N.C. App. 533, 540, 577 S.E.2d 421, 427 (2003) (upholding conclusion of abandonment .when the respondent\u2019s sole contact with the child in six years was a single birthday card, and the respondent had provided no financial support); McLemore, 139 N.C. App. at 430, 533 S.E.2d at 510 (upholding conclusion of abandonment when \u201c[t]he findings indicate that during these six months, respondent made no contacts with his child, financial or otherwise\u201d). Accordingly, I would hold that the trial court made sufficient findings of fact to support its conclusion that grounds existed to terminate respondent\u2019s parental rights based on abandonment.\nI likewise would reject respondent\u2019s argument that the trial court made insufficient findings of fact to support its conclusion that it was in the child\u2019s best interests to terminate respondent\u2019s parental rights. I believe that conclusion is adequately supported by the findings that the child has lived with her grandparents since birth, that her grandparents have cared for all of the child\u2019s emotional and physical needs, and that respondent has had no contact with the child despite having been awarded visitation. As with the grounds for termination, additional findings of fact would have been preferable, but I believe these findings of fact are still sufficient, if barely so, to justify the trial court\u2019s best interests determination. Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the trial court terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights.\n. The majority opinion states: \u201cRespondent argues he and all related parties were entitled to a speedy resolution of the petitioners\u2019 allegations, C.L.K. is entitled to a permanent plan of care at the earliest possible age, the trial court\u2019s delay in entering the order delayed his right to appeal, the trial court\u2019s delay extends the time parents are separated from their children to the prejudice of their relationship, and petitioners barred respondent from any communication with C.L.K.\u201d The majority opinion has put words in respondent\u2019s mouth. Although respondent cites cases in which those arguments were made, respondent does not in fact make these arguments with respect to himself.\n. Although respondent asserts otherwise in the statement of facts section of his brief, he did not assign error to this finding of fact, and it is, therefore, binding on appeal. Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991).",
        "type": "dissent",
        "author": "GEER, Judge,"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Blanchard, Newman & Hayes, by Ronald G. Blanchard, for petitioners-appellees.",
      "Thomas B. Kakassy, PA, by Thomas B. Kakassy, for respondent-appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "IN RE: C.L.K., a Minor Child, JOHN OWEN and JANET OWEN, Petitioners v. CHRISTOPHER ROB KEETER, Respondent\nNo. COA06-942\n(Filed 17 April 2007)\nTermination of Parental Rights\u2014 late entry of order \u2014 prejudicial error\nThe trial court erred and prejudiced respondent father and his minor child when it entered its written order more than five months after the conclusion of the hearing and the trial court\u2019s oral rendition of its ruling because: (1) the late entry violated both N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 7B-1109(e) and 1110(a), and the Court of Appeals\u2019 well-established interpretation of the General Assembly\u2019s choice and use of the word \u201cshall;\u201d (2) the longer the delay in entry of the order beyond the thirty-day deadline, the more likely prejudice will be readily apparent; (3) the maternal grandparents were forced to wait longer before proceeding to adoption, and the minor child was prevented from settling into a permanent family environment; and (4) respondent was not able to appeal until the entry of the order, he was incarcerated at the time of the termination of parental rights hearing, his release date was May 2006 which was within weeks of the entry of the termination of parental rights order, and his living situation was drastically different at the time of the hearing than at the time of the entry of the termination order.\nJudge Geer dissenting.\nAppeal by respondent from order entered 22 March 2006 by Judge David K. Fox, Jr., in Henderson County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 March 2007.\nBlanchard, Newman & Hayes, by Ronald G. Blanchard, for petitioners-appellees.\nThomas B. Kakassy, PA, by Thomas B. Kakassy, for respondent-appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0600-01",
  "first_page_order": 632,
  "last_page_order": 643
}