{ "id": 8174898, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MARK ANTHONY KEY", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Key", "decision_date": "2007-04-17", "docket_number": "No. COA06-499", "first_page": "624", "last_page": "635", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "182 N.C. App. 624" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "643 S.E.2d 452", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638084 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/643/0452-01" ] }, { "cite": "630 S.E.2d 234", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635856 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/630/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 S.E.2d 649", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 537", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659850 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "547" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0537-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 S.E.2d 241", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "241-2", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "16 N.C. App. 188", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549704 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/16/0188-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 N.C. App. 714", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8176080 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/182/0714-01" ] }, { "cite": "576 S.E.2d 305", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313", "parenthetical": "emphasis in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 626", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511427 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 N.C. App. 614", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8301914 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "926-27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/177/0614-01" ] }, { "cite": "247 S.E.2d 246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 N.C. App. 680", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554572 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/37/0680-01" ] }, { "cite": "247 S.E.2d 241", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 N.C. App. 671", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554547 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/37/0671-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 S.E.2d 771", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "774", "parenthetical": "citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 5A-ll(a)(3) (1978)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "43 N.C. App. 721", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554392 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "727", "parenthetical": "citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 5A-ll(a)(3) (1978)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/43/0721-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 S.E.2d 834", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "stating that generally, the \"willful absence of an attorney from a scheduled trial constitutes contempt of court\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 621", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569867 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "stating that generally, the \"willful absence of an attorney from a scheduled trial constitutes contempt of court\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0621-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 S.E.2d 23", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29", "parenthetical": "stating that generally, the \"willful absence of an attorney from a scheduled trial constitutes contempt of court\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 N.C. App. 123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8547845 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133", "parenthetical": "stating that generally, the \"willful absence of an attorney from a scheduled trial constitutes contempt of court\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/45/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 97", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]he trial judge has the power to hold a party in contempt for willful or grossly negligent failure to comply with schedules and practices of the court resulting in substantial interference with the business of the court\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 N.C. App. 560", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527979 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]he trial judge has the power to hold a party in contempt for willful or grossly negligent failure to comply with schedules and practices of the court resulting in substantial interference with the business of the court\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/101/0560-01" ] }, { "cite": "141 S.E.2d 303", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "305-6", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "306" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "264 N.C. 208", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572185 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/264/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 S.E.2d 289", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 N.C. App. 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12169693 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/85/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 S.E.2d 370", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4750010 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "160" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 S.E.2d 811", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "814", "parenthetical": "quotations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2498848 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215", "parenthetical": "quotations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 S.E.2d 885", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "890" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4777958 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "96" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 S.E.2d 597", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "602", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Mercer, 317 N.C. 87, 96, 343 S.E.2d 885, 890 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 N.C. App. 169", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525123 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Mercer, 317 N.C. 87, 96, 343 S.E.2d 885, 890 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/110/0169-01" ] }, { "cite": "565 S.E.2d 697", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "700" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 N.C. App. 185", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9079755 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/151/0185-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1019, "char_count": 27546, "ocr_confidence": 0.763, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.24323097203498e-07, "percentile": 0.7803707860960234 }, "sha256": "5651bdcc420f74ea323b3839857641482f2a8290b71829650911c8bc539c87de", "simhash": "1:a73854ea352b7cee", "word_count": 4640 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:32:14.097428+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WYNN and HUNTER concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MARK ANTHONY KEY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STEELMAN, Judge.\nThe abandonment of a client outside the courtroom prior to a probation violation hearing by an attorney, together with his subsequent refusal to represent the client constituted willful \u201csubstantial interference\u201d with the business of the court and supported the trial court holding the attorney in contempt of court.\nMark Anthony Key (\u201cKey\u201d) is an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of North Carolina. On 8 August 2005, Key appeared before Judge Abraham Penn Jones in the Superior Court of Wake County, representing Tammy Faircloth (\u201cFaircloth\u201d) on two probation violations. At the time of the hearing, Faircloth was served with a third probation violation, for absconding supervision, and was taken into custody for that violation. Key thought that all three probation violations had been resolved before Judge Jones on 8 August 2005. However, Judge Jones\u2019 written order did not dispose of the absconder violation. The notice of the absconder violation set the matter for hearing on 12 September 2005.\nFaircloth and Key appeared before Judge Stafford G. Bullock on 12 September 2005 on the absconder violation. Key appeared at the hearing as attorney for Faircloth and did not in any manner limit his representation. When Judge Bullock refused to give Key assurances that he would follow a recommendation of the probation officer, Key moved to continue Faircloth\u2019s case. This motion was granted, and the hearing was rescheduled for 10 October 2005. Following the 12 September 2005 hearing, Key advised Faircloth that he was charging her an additional $200 fee for representing her on the absconder violation.\nIn preparation for the 10 October 2005 hearing, Key issued a subpoena for a probation officer from Cumberland County to be present at the hearing. Key signed the subpoena as Faircloth\u2019s attorney. On 10 October 2005, the absconder violation was calendared before Judge Thomas D. Haigwood. Faircloth and Key met in the hall outside of the courtroom. Key demanded his $200 fee. Faircloth did not have the money. Key then released the probation officer from the subpoena, after he had driven from Fayetteville to Raleigh for the hearing, advised him that he had not been fully retained, and would not represent Faircloth. Key left the Wake County Courthouse without advising Faircloth that he would not represent her. Rather, he left it to the probation officer to advise Faircloth. When advised of this, Judge Haigwood instructed the courtroom clerk to call Key and tell him that his presence was required in court to resolve Faircloth\u2019s absconder violation. Key told the clerk that he had a parent-teacher conference that afternoon and was unavailable. Judge Haigwood agreed to continue the matter until 9:30 a.m. on 11 October 2005. When this was communicated to Key, he adamantly stated that he did not represent Faircloth, and \u201cI don\u2019t see where the Judge has the authority to tell me to be there whenever I haven\u2019t been paid or retained in this case.\u201d Key then inquired of the clerk, what would the judge \u201cdo if I don\u2019t show up?\u201d The clerk advised him that the judge would probably issue a show cause order or an order for arrest. Key responded, \u201cWell, he doesn\u2019t have the authority, and I don\u2019t give a s\u2014 what he does.\u201d This terminated the telephone conversation.\nFaircloth\u2019s matter came on before Judge Haigwood on 11 October 2005, with Key present. Judge Haigwood found that Key made a general appearance in the absconder violation case by continuing the case on 12 September 2005 and issuing a subpoena for the scheduled 10 October 2005 hearing. He then continued Faircloth\u2019s case and directed that Key appear before the Senior Resident Superior Court Judge for the Tenth Judicial District to show cause why he should not be subject to disciplinary action and/or punished for contempt. Judge Haigwood placed the case before Judge Donald W. Stephens because of an earlier incident involving Key in September 2005. This hearing was set for 31 October 2005.\nFollowing receipt of this order, Judge Stephens issued an amended show cause order, which set forth in detail the basis for the alleged criminal contempt, and also advised Key that there was probable cause to believe that his conduct may subject him to discipline for violations of the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys. The amended order set the matter for hearing before Judge Stephens on 14 November 2005.\nAs a result of the hearing on 14 November 2005, Judge Stephens found Key guilty of criminal contempt of court and sentenced him to thirty days in the Wake County jail. This sentence was suspended for eighteen months, and Key was placed on probation on condition that he not violate any law of this State, not speak profanely to any court official, and not appear as an attorney in any matter in the District or Superior Courts of Wake County for one year.\nJudge Stephens entered a separate order of attorney discipline for violations of the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct. Key filed separate appeals from the two orders. This appeal pertains only to criminal contempt.\nI: Jurisdiction\nIn his first argument, Key contends that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction to enter the judgment finding him in contempt of court because Faircloth\u2019s absconder violation was resolved before Judge Jones on 8 August 2005, and there was nothing for Judge Haigwood to hear on 10 October 2005. We disagree.\nIf a trial court\u2019s finding is supported by competent evidence in the record, it is binding upon an appellate court, regardless of whether there is evidence in the record to the contrary. State v. Phillips, 151 N.C. App. 185, 188, 565 S.E.2d 697, 700 (2002). In this case, there is ample evidence in the record to support the trial court\u2019s findings as to what transpired on 8 August 2005, 12 September 2005 and 10 October 2005.\nRegardless of whether Key believed that Faircloth\u2019s absconder violation was resolved on 8 October 2005, evidence shows that Key was aware after that date that the matter was not resolved. Judge Jones\u2019 order arising out of the 8 August 2005 hearing did not dispose of the absconder violation. The evidence shows that Key made a general appearance on behalf of Faircloth at the 12 September 2005 hearing before Judge Bullock and sought a continuance. At th\u00e1t hearing, Key certainly knew that the matter was not resolved. Further, in preparation for the 10 October 2005 hearing, Key signed and issued a subpoena for a probation officer from Fayetteville as attorney for Fair cloth. This evidence supports the findings in Judge Stephens\u2019 order that the absconder violation was not resolved before Judge Jones, and was pending before Judge Haigwood on 10 October 2005.\nKey\u2019s argument is essentially that this Court should accept his testimony that the absconder violation was resolved before Judge Jones. Where there is competent evidence supporting the findings of fact of the trial court, this Court cannot reweigh the evidence and make its own findings, but is bound by the trial court\u2019s findings. See Phillips, 151 N.C. App. 185, 565 S.E.2d 697. We find Key\u2019s argument on jurisdiction to be disingenuous at best, and without merit.\nII: Denial of Key\u2019s Motion to Dismiss\nIn his second argument, Key argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the contempt proceedings. We disagree.\nOn a hearing for criminal contempt, the State must prove all of the requisite elements under the applicable statute, beyond a reasonable doubt. In this case, Key was noticed in the show cause order for two specific instances of conduct: (1) \u201cfalsely representing to the court, in violation of G.S. 5A-11(a)(2), that he did not represent the defendant, Tammy Faircloth, in a probation matter\u201d; and (2) \u201cintentionally failing to appear and remain, in violation of G.S. 5A-ll(a)(7), at the date and time set for the aforesaid probation hearing to represent his clientf.]\u201d Judge Stephens\u2019 judgment held defendant in contempt of court based only upon a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 5A-ll(a)(7).\nThis statute defines the following as criminal contempt: \u201c[wjillful or grossly negligent failure to comply with schedules and practices of the court resulting in substantial interference with the business of the court.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 5A-ll(a)(7) (2005). The proper standard of review on a motion to dismiss based on insufficiency of the evidence is the substantial evidence test. \u201cThe substantial evidence test requires a determination that there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, and (2) that defendant is the perpetrator of the offense.\u201d State v. Jones, 110 N.C. App. 169, 177, 429 S.E.2d 597, 602 (1993) (citing State v. Mercer, 317 N.C. 87, 96, 343 S.E.2d 885, 890 (1986)). \u201cSubstantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u201d State v. Lynch, 327 N.C. 210, 215, 393 S.E.2d 811, 814 (1990) (quotations omitted). If there is substantial evidence of each element of the charged offense, the motion should be denied. State v. Bullard, 312 N.C. 129, 160, 322 S.E.2d 370, 387 (1984).\nKey first argues that all of his actions on 10 October 2005 were \u201clegally justifiable and excusable\u201d and that the trial court erred in holding him in contempt. In support of his argument he cites the case of State v. Chriscoe, 85 N.C. App. 155, 354 S.E.2d 289 (1987). .In Chriscoe, this Court overturned the trial court\u2019s finding of contempt. A witness in a criminal case was to be back in court at 9:30 a.m. She was to be picked up by her mother at 8:30 a.m. The witness\u2019 mother overslept, and when she did not arrive, the witness became concerned and went to her mother\u2019s residence to check on her. As a result, the witness arrived at court over one hour late. This Court held that under these facts, the witness\u2019 actions were not willful or grossly negligent under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 5A-11(a)(7). Key contends that as the witness in Chriscoe, he had to attend to a family matter, a conference with his daughter\u2019s teacher, and that this was adequate justification for his not returning to court on 10 October 2005.\nKey misapprehends the basis of the trial court\u2019s finding of criminal contempt. He was not held in contempt for failing to return to court on 10 October 2005, but rather for failing to appear at the hearing on the absconder violation and abandoning his client. Key was present at the courthouse at the time the case was scheduled for hearing and then walked out. The conference with his daughter\u2019s teacher was later in the afternoon and had nothing to do with his abandonment of Faircloth. When Judge Haigwood learned of the conference, Key was directed to appear the next morning.\nKey next argues that because his client had not paid his fee, he was justified in withdrawing from representation of Faircloth in the absconder violation, citing the case of Smith v. Bryant, 264 N.C. 208, 141 S.E.2d 303 (1965). We hold that Key\u2019s reliance upon this opinion is misplaced. Bryant does state the general rule \u201cthat the client\u2019s failure to pay or to secure the payment of proper fees upon reasonable demand will justify the attorney in refusing to proceed with the case.\u201d Id. at 211, 141 S.E.2d at 305-6 (citation omitted). However, Key ignores the remaining language of Justice Sharp\u2019s opinion, which is the most frequently cited portion:\nNevertheless, this does not mean that an attorney of record can walk out of the case by announcing to the court on the day of the trial that he has withdrawn because he has not been paid. An attorney not only is an employee of his client but also is an officer of the court. This dual relation imposes a dual obligation. To the client who refuses to pay a fee the attorney must give specific and reasonable notice so that the client may have adequate time to secure other counsel and so that he may be heard if he disputes the charge of nonpayment. To the court, which cannot cope with the ever-increasing volume of litigation unless lawyers are as concerned as is a conscientious judge to utilize completely the time of the term, the lawyer owes the duty to perfect his withdrawal in time to prevent the necessity of a continuance of the case, (citation omitted).\nId. at 211, 141 S.E.2d at 306.\nIn this case, Key violated the basic precepts set forth in Bryant, 264 N.C. 208, 141 S.E.2d 303. He walked out on his client on the date of the hearing, and he failed to give specific and reasonable notice of his intent to withdraw based upon non-payment of fees. The law concerning the entry and withdrawal of an attorney in a criminal case is specifically set forth in Article 4 of Chapter 15A of the General Statutes. Under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-141(2), an attorney enters a criminal proceeding when he appears without limiting the extent of his representation. Key did just that at the 12 September 2005 hearing. His duties to Faircloth were thus defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-143:\nAn attorney who enters a criminal proceeding without limiting the extent of his representation pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 15A-141(3) undertakes to represent the defendant for whom the entry is made at all subsequent stages of the case until entry of final judgment, at the trial stage.\nId. (2005). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-144 provides that the court may allow an attorney to withdraw from a criminal case for \u201cgood cause.\u201d It is clear that an attorney\u2019s failure to appear in court, thus interfering with the court\u2019s schedule, may be the basis for criminal contempt under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 5A-ll(a)(7). See Lomax v. Shaw, 101 N.C. App. 560, 400 S.E.2d 97 (1991) (stating that \u201c[t]he trial judge has the power to hold a party in contempt for willful or grossly negligent failure to comply with schedules and practices of the court resulting in substantial interference with the business of the court\u201d); see also In re Smith, 45 N.C. App. 123, 133, 263 S.E.2d 23, 29, rev\u2019d on other grounds, 301 N.C. 621, 272 S.E.2d 834 (1980) (stating that generally, the \u201cwillful absence of an attorney from a scheduled trial constitutes contempt of court\u201d). It is also clear that Key\u2019s conduct in this matter interfered with the business of the Superior Court of Wake County. See Bryant, 264 N.C. 208, 141 S.E.2d 303. The only question is whether this interference was substantial. We have reviewed the authorities cited by both appellant and appellee, and find that they provide little illumination on this question.\nSubstantial interference means that degree of interference with the court\u2019s business that is real, and not momentary or illusory. Substantial interference has been described as \u201cwilful disobedience, resistance to, or interference with the court\u2019s lawful process, order, direction or instructions or its execution.\u201d Osmar v. Crosland-Osmar, Inc., 43 N.C. App. 721, 727, 259 S.E.2d 771, 774 (1979) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 5A-ll(a)(3) (1978)).\nJudge Stephens found that: \u201cA probation matter which ultimately took the Court less than five minutes to resolve has been delayed for several days due entirely to Key\u2019s failure to appear as counsel, because, in his mind, he wasn\u2019t fully paid for his services.\u201d Key does not argue that this finding was not supported by the evidence, and it is thus binding on this Court. See N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (2005).\nThus, had Key acted properly in this matter, it could have been disposed of in less than five minutes. However, Key\u2019s actions, which he conceded in his testimony before Judge Stephens to have been wrong, resulted in the trial court expending considerable time and effort in tracking Key down and handling this case. When Faircloth appeared with no attorney before Judge Haigwood, he ascertained why Key had left the courthouse and then instructed the clerk to contact Key. The clerk testified to nine separate telephone calls that she made on the afternoon of 10 October 2005 in an attempt to get Key back to court to dispose of the absconder violation. She then reported her actions to Judge Haigwood who directed that everything be placed in the record. Judge Haigwood then had to continue the matter until the following morning. Mr. Porter, a probation officer from Cumberland County spent the afternoon of 10 October 2005 in the courtroom waiting for Key to return, and then was required to return to Wake County the following morning. At the hearing on 11 October 2005, Key vehemently denied that he had any duty to represent Faircloth, despite the fact that Judge Haigwood ruled that Key had in fact made a general appearance on behalf of Faircloth. Finally, on the morning of 11 October 2005, Judge Haigwood continued Faircloth\u2019s probation violation, stating:\nI think it would be more appropriate for another Judge of the Superior Court to hear this matter so that there won\u2019t be any impression from anyone that whatever decision is made is based on anything that has transpired between Mr. Key and Ms. Clodfelter and myself and this Court.\nKey argues that the court was able to continue to transact other business on 10 and 11 October 2005, and therefore there was no \u201csubstantial interference with the business of the court.\u201d Whether the court was able to transact other business is not the test of substantial interference. Key\u2019s conduct unnecessarily resulted in the court, its staff and its officers expending significant time and effort in an attempt to get Faircloth\u2019s case resolved over a two day period. We hold that this was \u201csubstantial interference\u201d within the intent and meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 5A-ll(a)(7). This argument is without merit.\nIll: Recusal\nIn his third argument, Key contends that Judge Stephens\u2019 amended show cause order demonstrated that he was biased against Key and should have recused himself from hearing the contempt matter, eap mero motu. We' disagree.\nIn the cases of In re Robinson, 37 N.C. App. 671, 247 S.E.2d 241 (1978), and In re Dale, 37 N.C. App. 680, 247 S.E.2d 246 (1978), this Court held that language in a show cause order stating, \u201c[y]ou have negligently and willfully failed to perfect the appeal or to seek appellate review through other possible means,\u201d constituted a prejudgment by the issuing judge of defendant\u2019s conduct. We thus held that the trial judge should have granted defendant\u2019s motions to recuse.\nWe first note that this case is distinguishable from both Robinson and Dale in that Key made no motion to recuse Judge Stephens. This assignment of error has not been properly preserved and is dismissed. See State v. Love, 177 N.C. App. 614, 926-27, 630 S.E.2d 234, 243 (2006); N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1).\nEven assuming that this issue were properly before us, Key\u2019s arguments have no merit. The amended show cause order must be considered in its entirety, not judged upon the single paragraph to which Key directs us. The relevant portions of the amended show cause order are as follows:\nThere is probable cause to believe that Attorney Mark Key is subject to being held in criminal contempt for:\n(1) falsely representing to the Court, in violation of G.S. 5A-ll(a)(2), that he did not represent the defendant, Tammy Faircloth, in a probabi'on matter (04-CRS-108515) scheduled for hearing on October 10, 2005 for which hearing Attorney Key had issued a subpoena to a witness from Fayetteville, North Carolina on which he signed such subpoena as attorney for the defendant; and\n(2) intentionally failing to appear and to remain, in violation of G.S. 5A-ll(a)(7), at the date and time set for the aforesaid probation hearing to represent his client, Tammy Faircloth, until the matter was resolved or until he was released by the Court.\nThere is also probably cause to believe that Attorney Mark Key is subject to attorney discipline for the aforesaid conduct and for the additional attorney misconduct of cursing the courtroom clerk on two occasions, which cursing is more particularly described in the transcript attached to the first show cause order and in the additional transcript attached to this amended order.\nThis conduct is in violation of Rule 3.5(a)(4)(B) of the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys which prohibits lawyers from \u201cengaging in undignified or discourteous conduct \u2022that is degrading to a tribunal.\u201d Mr. Key\u2019s conduct is also in violation of Rule 3.3(a)(1) for making false material statements to the Court and in violation of Rule 1.16 by abandoning his client without reasonable notice to the client and without permission of the Court.\nThe first two paragraphs are prefaced by the words, \u201c[t]here is probable cause to believe . . .\u201d The third paragraph, of which Key complains, is not so prefaced. However, the third paragraph recites no specific instance of conduct. Rather, it commences with \u201c[t]his conduct,\u201d which refers back to the specific conduct described in the first two paragraphs, which contained the probable cause preface.\nRead as a whole, the amended show cause order does not reflect any actual or perceived bias on the part of Judge Stephens. Rather, it reflects a careful and conscientious effort to apprise Key of the specific instances of conduct that were alleged to be the basis of contempt, and the statutes and rules that they may have violated.\nEven assuming this argument is preserved before this Court, it is without merit.\nIV: Sanction\nIn his fourth and final argument, Key argues that the sanction imposed by the court was unreasonable. We disagree.\nKey\u2019s assignment of error cited as the basis of this argument reads as follows: \u201cThe court\u2019s ruling in paragraph 22 on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to support it, the findings of facts does [sic] not support it and it was contrary to law.\u201d While it is highly questionable whether this assignment of error bears any relationship to Key\u2019s argument, we nonetheless address it.\nKey argues that under the case of N.C. State Bar v. Talford, 356 N.C. 626, 576 S.E.2d 305 (2003) the trial court could not impose a sanction of suspension or disbarment without findings of fact \u201ckeyed to: (1) the harm or potential harm created by the attorney\u2019s misconduct, and (2) a demonstrable need to protect the public.\u201d Id. at 637-38, 576 S.E.2d at 313 (emphasis in original).\nKey fundamentally misapprehends the nature of this particular appeal. This is an appeal from a judgment of criminal contempt under Chapter 5A of the General Statutes. While Judge Stephens also entered an order of attorney discipline, that is the subject of a separate appeal, In re Key, 182 N.C. App. 714, 643 S.E.2d 452 (2007). The cited language from Talford is inapplicable to our review of a judgment of criminal contempt.\nUnder N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 5A-12, the court could have sentenced Key to up to thirty days imprisonment and a fine of five hundred dollars ($500.00).\nIt has long been the accepted rule in North Carolina that within the limits of the sentence authorized by law, the character and the extent of the punishment imposed is within the discretion of the trial court and is subject to review only in cases of gross abuse.\nState v. Goode, 16 N.C. App. 188, 189, 191 S.E.2d 241, 241-2 (1972) (citation omitted). Defendant argues in his brief, without any supporting authority, that the sanction imposed was \u201cunreasonable and inappropriate.\u201d However, he makes no argument whatsoever that the suspended sentence imposed constituted an abuse of discretion or gross abuse on the part of the trial court. We further note that Key makes no argument that the special conditions of his probation were not reasonably related to his rehabilitation under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1343(bl)(10).\nAn abuse of discretion is a decision unsupported by reason or one so arbitrary that it could not be the result of a reasoned decision. Briley v. Farabow, 348 N.C. 537, 547, 501 S.E.2d 649, 656 (1998). We discern no abuse of discretion, and clearly no gross abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in sentencing defendant and imposing conditions of probation.\nThis assignment of error is without merit.\nAFFIRMED.\nJudges WYNN and HUNTER concur.\n. Judge Haigwood\u2019s reference is to a prior incident that occurred on 23 September 2005, where Key, in a telephone conversation overheard by Ms. Clodfelter referred to the \u201cstupid m***** f**** in the courtroom.\u201d When admonished by Ms. Clodfelter, Key cursed her with regard to what he would and would not do. This incident resulted in Judge Haigwood having a conference with a court reporter present. To avoid embarrassing Key, this was conducted in chambers.\n. We further note that in criminal cases, a motion to disqualify a judge must be in writing, accompanied by supporting affidavit(s) and filed at least five days before the call of the case for trial. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1223.", "type": "majority", "author": "STEELMAN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Derrick C. Mertz, for the State.", "Mark A. Key, pro se defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MARK ANTHONY KEY\nNo. COA06-499\n(Filed 17 April 2007)\n1. Attorneys\u2014 abandonment of client \u2014 criminal contempt\u2014 jurisdiction\nThe trial court had subject matter and personal jurisdiction to enter a judgment of criminal contempt against an attorney who abandoned his client. Although the attorney contended that the client\u2019s matter had previously been resolved and that there was nothing for the judge to hear at the hearing at which he did not appear, there was ample evidence in the record to support the trial court\u2019s findings as to what transpired. The trial court\u2019s findings are binding on appeal if supported by competent evidence.\n2. Attorneys\u2014 abandonment of client \u2014 criminal contempt\u2014 motion to dismiss denied\nThe trial court did not err by denying a motion to dismiss a contempt proceeding against an attorney who abandoned a client. The attorney was present at the courthouse and left, the family appointment to which he pointed was later in the day and had nothing to do with his abandonment of his client, and he did not give a specific and reasonable notice of his intent to withdraw based upon nonpayment of fees. It is also clear that his conduct interfered with the business of the Superior Court; a matter which could have been disposed of within five minutes resulted in a significant expenditure of time and effort by the court, its staff, and its officers over a two-day period.\n3. Attorneys\u2014 abandonment of client \u2014 criminal contempt\u2014 no bias by judge\nA show cause order in a contempt proceeding against an attorney did not demonstrate bias by the judge and a need for recusal ex mero motu, assuming the issue was properly preserved for appeal. Considered in its entirety, the amended show cause order reflects a careful and conscientious effort to apprise defendant of the specific instances of conduct that were alleged to be the basis of contempt, and the statutes and rules that may have been violated. The order does not reflect actual or perceived bias.\n4. Contempt\u2014 criminal \u2014 sanction of attorney\nA contempt sanction imposed on an attorney for abandoning a client that consisted of a jail sentence suspended upon certain conditions, including not practicing in the courts of that county for one year, was not unreasonable. It was within the limits of the law and defendant did not argue that it constituted an abuse of discretion. The order for attorney discipline which was also entered is the subject of a separate appeal.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 16 November 2005 by Judge Donald W. Stephens in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 December 2006.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Derrick C. Mertz, for the State.\nMark A. Key, pro se defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0624-01", "first_page_order": 656, "last_page_order": 667 }