{ "id": 8175550, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES KENNETH FRALEY", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Fraley", "decision_date": "2007-04-17", "docket_number": "No. COA06-663", "first_page": "683", "last_page": "691", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "182 N.C. App. 683" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "595 S.E.2d 452", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" }, { "page": "452", "parenthetical": "slip op. 2" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 N.C. App. 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 S.E.2d 408", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "411" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "254 N.C. 204", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625318 ], "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/254/0204-01" ] }, { "cite": "566 S.E.2d 61", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "77" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 642", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 220086 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "666" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0642-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-119", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-113.9", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(l)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "506 S.E.2d 743", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "747", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 N.C. App. 276", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11198900 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "282", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/131/0276-01" ] }, { "cite": "567 S.E.2d 137", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "140" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511311 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "145" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 S.E.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "383" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2515495 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 164", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559773 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 57", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2541929 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 S.E.2d 226", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "229" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.C. App. 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522544 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "502", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/104/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "588 S.E.2d 11", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "15", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 N.C. App. 118", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8955619 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "123", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/161/0118-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 769, "char_count": 19037, "ocr_confidence": 0.751, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.38222550029231e-07, "percentile": 0.8764400936116352 }, "sha256": "46ddab8267528cc13da83eebbc62cc298f8be5b84642468869a08eb521cb5e93", "simhash": "1:af52e86857db3cf8", "word_count": 3187 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:32:14.097428+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge STROUD concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES KENNETH FRALEY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, Judge.\nJames Kenneth Fraley (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals from judgments entered on jury verdicts of guilty on counts related to theft and use of financial cards and forgery of a check. We affirm the convictions but remand for resentencing.\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show that on or around 15 January 2004, an acquaintance of defendant named Mary Johnson (\u201cJohnson\u201d) at defendant\u2019s behest cashed a check that had been stolen from David Bradley. According to Johnson, defendant brought her the check and told her it was from his uncle, but defendant had no identification card and could not cash it. He offered her a portion of the $800.00 for which the. check was written to cash it for him. Defendant filled out a portion of the check in front of Johnson before she took it to the bank, where she cashed it and turned the money over to defendant.\nAt some point in January 2004, two financial cards \u2014 one Visa check card and one MasterCard \u2014 were stolen from Mark Alford (\u201cAlford\u201d). A local Wal-Mart store turned over to police register receipts showing that the stolen Visa was used there on 19 January 2004, at 3:07 p.m., and videotape surveillance showing defendant making a purchase at that time and apparently paying with a credit card. The MasterCard was found on defendant\u2019s person incident to an unrelated search on 22 January 2004, when an officer found defendant and two others with drugs and drug paraphernalia in a motel room and located the card in defendant\u2019s pocket.\nDefendant was arrested at Wal-Mart on 31 January 2004 pursuant to an outstanding warrant. He was detained in a security substation at the store and asked to empty his pockets. When he did so, defendant retained a small mint container with tablets inside. He began to eat them, and when the officer asked him to place the container with the other items from his pockets, he attempted to eat all the tablets at once. The container and tablets were then taken from defendant, and the tablets were later determined to be Xanax. No charges from that incident were included in this case at trial.\nA jury found defendant guilty of two counts of financial card theft and one count each of financial card fraud, forgery, and possession of stolen property on 8 July 2004. Defendant was sentenced at a prior record level of IV to four consecutive sentences of eight to ten months, followed by an additional 120 day term.\nI.\nDefendant first argues that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the container full of Xanax in defendant\u2019s possession upon his arrest, claiming that it is irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. This argument is without merit.\nThe trial court admitted the container over defendant\u2019s objection that, because defendant was not charged with any drug-related crimes, the evidence was irrelevant. The trial judge stated: \u201cI will receive it into evidence and we may address an instruction about that later.\u201d The court did in fact issue an instruction to the jury to disregard the evidence at the close of the trial:\nNow, members of the jury, evidence has been' received tending to show that the defendant may have been in possession of certain controlled substances, specifically Xanax, at the time of his arrest. You are not to consider this evidence in any way in your deliberation in these cases, for this is not one of the things for which the defendant is on trial in these cases.\nThis Court has noted that:\nEvidence is relevant if it tends to make the existence of any fact of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. The test of relevancy is whether the proffered evidence tends to shed any light on the subject of the inquiry or has the sole effect of exciting prejudice or sympathy.\nState v. Jackson, 161 N.C. App. 118, 123, 588 S.E.2d 11, 15 (2003) (citations omitted). There seems no logical connection between the container of drugs and the charges against defendant; indeed, the only possible reason for its introduction could be to show that defendant is the kind of person who commits illegal acts, such as obtaining financial cards by theft and committing forgery \u2014 that is, to excite prejudice against defendant. The trial court seems also to have perceived it as an error, as evidenced by its later instruction to the jury to disregard it.\n\u201cHowever, when the trial court erroneously admits irrelevant evidence, the defendant must show that there is a \u2018reasonable possibility that, had the error in question not been committed, a different result would have been reached\u2019 at trial.\u201d State v. Wallace, 104 N.C. App. 498, 502, 410 S.E.2d 226, 229 (1991) (citation omitted). Defendant has not shown that such a possibility exists.\nDuring his testimony at trial, defendant stated repeatedly that he was a habitual and long-time drug user and sometime seller. To cite only a few examples, all made during direct questioning by his own attorney: In recounting the incident that led to the forgery charges, defendant stated that he was with Johnson and another person when they obtained money via the forgery, and \u201cdid get high\u201d on drugs bought by that third person with the money; further, he stated that he was in possession at the time of methamphetamine, which he gave to Johnson. When describing how he came into possession of the credit card found on him upon arrest, he explained that he was in the motel room \u201cgetting high partying\u201d with several other people. When asked whether he had used a stolen financial card for his purchases at Wal-Mart, defendant stated that he paid for them with \u201c[c]ash money\u201d that he got from \u201c[s]elling drugs.\u201d Defendant also admitted to having been to prison and \u201crehab\u201d for drug use.\nGiven that defendant readily acknowledged his past and continuing involvement with illegal drugs, no \u201c \u2018reasonable possibility\u2019 \u201d exists that, without the admission of the Xanax, defendant would have been found not guilty of these charges. Id. at 502, 410 S.E.2d at 229. If its admission did in fact excite prejudice regarding defendant\u2019s propensity to break the law, any such prejudice is surely minute in comparison to the extensive evidence provided by defendant himself regarding his involvement with drugs and thus as a law-breaker. Defendant has not shown that the admission of the Xanax was unduly prejudicial, and, thus, this assignment of error is overruled.\nII.\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charges of financial card theft and forgery on the grounds of insufficient evidence. We disagree.\n\u201cWhen a defendant moves for dismissal, the trial court is to determine only whether there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense charged and of the defendant being the perpetrator of the offense.\u201d State v. Vause, 328 N.C. 231, 236, 400 S.E.2d 57, 61 (1991). Substantial evidence is \u201csuch relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u201d State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78-79, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980). \u201cIf there is substantial evidence \u2014 whether direct, circumstantial, or both \u2014 to support a finding that the offense charged has been committed and that the defendant committed it, the case is for the jury and the motion to dismiss should be denied.\u201d State v. Locklear, 322 N.C. 349, 358, 368 S.E.2d 377, 383 (1988). This is true \u201ceven if the evidence likewise permits a'reasonable inference of the defendant\u2019s innocence.\u201d State v. Butler, 356 N.C. 141, 145, 567 S.E.2d 137, 140 (2002). \u201cIn ruling on a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence, \u2018the trial court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and give the State every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom.\u2019 \u201d State v. Davidson, 131 N.C. App. 276, 282, 506 S.E.2d 743, 747 (1998) (citation omitted).\nThe charges of financial card theft were brought under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-113.9(a)(l) (2005), which states:\n(a) A person is guilty of financial transaction card theft when the person does any of the following:\n(1) Takes, obtains or withholds a financial .transaction card from the person, possession, custody or control of another without the cardholder\u2019s consent and with the intent to use it; or who, with knowledge that it has been so taken, obtained or withheld, receives the financial transaction card with intent to use it or to sell it, or to transfer it to a person other than the issuer or the cardholder.\nId.\nThe theft charges here relate to the two cards (a Visa and a MasterCard) stolen from Alford, the cards\u2019 rightful owner. As the judge noted in his ruling on the motion to dismiss, the evidence tended to show that the last time Alford was in possession of the cards to his knowledge was on January 17th; that the Visa card was used by someone other than Alford at Wal-mart on the 19th; and that the MasterCard was found in defendant\u2019s possession on the 22nd.\nAs to the Visa, at trial, the State presented a security tape from Wal-Mart showing defendant shopping there, making a purchase at the time of the unauthorized charge on the Visa and apparently paying for it with a credit card. The State also presented register receipts obtained from Wal-Mart showing purchases made with Alford\u2019s Visa card corresponding to the time of defendant\u2019s purchases. The card itself was never located.\nAs to the MasterCard, a police detective found it in defendant\u2019s pocket during a search conducted at a motel room where drug use had been reported. It was produced at trial as State\u2019s Exhibit 1. During his testimony, when asked about the card defendant stated \u201cI Obtained it\u201d and \u201cI planned to use it.\u201d\nFrom this evidence, the jury could have properly concluded that defendant obtained the cards from the control of another without Alford\u2019s consent and intended t\u00f3 use them. Although evidence was not presented that defendant himself stole the cards, evidence was presented that indicated defendant obtained both cards without consent and must have obtained them from either Alford directly or an intermediary. Further, the evidence tends to show he actually used the Visa and he admitted that he planned to use the MasterCard. Thus; the motion to dismiss on these counts was properly denied.\nAs to the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the forgery charge, the relevant statute states: \u201cIt is unlawful for any person to forge or counterfeit any instrument, or possess any counterfeit instrument, with the intent to injure or defraud any person, financial institution, or governmental unit.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-119(a) (2005).\nThe State presented evidence in the form of testimony by Johnson that defendant brought to her house a check made out to her on an account bearing David Bradley\u2019s name. She further testified that defendant told her it belonged to his uncle and asked her to cash it for him, signing the check or entering her name as payee in her presence. Defendant argues that Johnson was not a credible witness because she admitted to using drugs during the time period of the incident and changed her story to the police about how much compensation she received for her actions. However, it is \u201ca longstanding principle in our jurisprudence\u201d that \u201cit is the province of the jury, not the court, to assess and determine witness credibility.\u201d State v. Hyatt, 355 N.C. 642, 666, 566 S.E.2d 61, 77 (2002). If the jury found her story credible, they could have properly concluded that defendant forged the check with the intent to defraud David Bradley. Thus, the motion to dismiss was properly denied.\nIII.\nDefendant\u2019s final argument pertains to the prior record level assigned to him and used in determining his sentence. He stipulated to having a prior record level of IV and was sentenced at that level. Defendant now argues that one of the prior convictions included in that calculation should not have been considered and without its inclusion his prior record level would have been III. As such, defendant argues, the case should be remanded for resentencing. We agree.\nPer N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1340.14(d) (2005), \u201c[f]or purposes of determining the prior record level, if an offender is convicted of more than one offense in a single superior court during one calendar week, only the conviction for the offense with the highest point total is used.\u201d Id. According to the prior record level worksheet, two of defendant\u2019s convictions for obtaining property by false pretenses came on the same day in Henderson County, and thus only one of them should have been used in the calculation. Without the two points added in because of the second conviction, defendant would have been classified as a level III.\nThe State concedes that the calculation was made improperly but argues the error was not prejudicial because, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1340.14(b)(6), the trial court could have imposed an additional point based on the offenses properly considered in calculating his prior record level. That statute states that \u201c[i]f all the elements of the present offense are included in any prior offense for which the offender was convicted,... [add] 1 point.\u201d Id. Defendant\u2019s worksheet reflects four previous convictions for forgery, for which he was also convicted in the case at hand.\nAlthough defendant\u2019s stipulation as to prior record level is sufficient evidence for sentencing at that level (per N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1340.14(d)(l)), the trial court\u2019s assignment of level IV to defendant was an improper conclusion of law, which we review de novo. See Carringer v. Alverson, 254 N.C. 204, 208, 118 S.E.2d 408, 411 (1961). In State v. Toomer, 164 N.C. App. 231, 595 S.E.2d 452 (2004) (unpublished), on almost identical facts, this Court remanded for resentencing, stating that because the trial court had not made findings of fact that one of the offenses for which defendant was being sentenced contained all the elements of the prior offense, and as such \u201c [i]t is not within our province as a reviewing court to make findings or to substitute our judgment for that of the sentencing court.\u201d Id. at 231 (slip op. 2), 595 S.E.2d at 452 (slip op. 2). Thus, we remand the case for resentencing so that defendant\u2019s prior record level can be properly calculated.\nBecause the admission of irrelevant evidence did not prejudice defendant and there was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict him, we overrule defendant\u2019s first two assignments of error. However, because an error was made in calculating his prior record level, we remand for resentencing.\nRemanded for resentencing.\nChief Judge MARTIN and Judge STROUD concur.\n. The record indicates only that the officer arrested defendant pursuant to one or more arrest warrants that had already been issued; it does not make clear what charges the warrants concerned.\n. It appears from the record that upon defendant\u2019s arrest on January 31st, the arresting officer found a third credit card (State\u2019s Exhibit 2A) with Alford\u2019s name on it stuffed in the backseat of his patrol car that defendant had apparently hidden there during his ride to the police station upon his arrest. This was marked State\u2019s Exhibit 2A; its account number ends with 7344. However, defendant was not charged with the theft of that card; the verdict sheet reflects the account number of the card he was charged with stealing, and it matches the card found on defendant in the motel room rather than the one found in the patrol car, ending with 3956.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General M. Lynne Weaver, for the State.", "William D. Aumanfor defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES KENNETH FRALEY\nNo. COA06-663\n(Filed 17 April 2007)\n1. Evidence\u2014 container full of Xanax in defendant\u2019s possession upon his arrest \u2014 failure to show prejudicial error\nThe trial court did not err in a theft and use of financial cards and forgery of a check case by admitting into evidence a container full of Xanax in defendant\u2019s possession upon his arrest, because: (1) the trial court issued an instruction to the jury to disregard the evidence at the close of trial; and (2) given that defendant readily acknowledge his past and continuing involvement with illegal drugs, no reasonable possibility exists that, without the admission of the Xanax, defendant would have been found not guilty of these charges.\n2. Credit Card Crimes\u2014 financial card theft \u2014 motion to dismiss \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of financial card theft under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-113.9(a)(1) based on alleged insufficient evidence, because: (1) the jury could have properly concluded from the evidence that defendant obtained two credit cards from the control of another without the owner\u2019s consent, and intended to use them; (2) although evidence was not presented that defendant himself stole the cards, evidence was presented that indicated defendant obtained both cards without consent and must have obtained them from either the victim directly or an intermediary; and (3) the evidence tended to show that defendant used the Visa and admitted that he planned to use the MasterCard.\n3. Forgery\u2014 check \u2014 motion to dismiss \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of forgery based on alleged insufficient evidence, because: (1) the State presented a witness\u2019s testimony that defendant brought her a check made out to her on an account bearing another individual\u2019s name, that defendant told her it belonged to his uncle and asked her to cash it for him, and that defendant signed the check or entered her name as payee in her presence; and (2) although defendant contends the witness was not credible since she admitted to using drugs during the time period of the incident and changed her story to the police about how much compensation she received from her acts, it is the province of the jury to assess and determine witness credibility.\n4. Sentencing\u2014 prior record level \u2014 miscalculation\nThe trial court erred in a theft and use of financial cards and forgery of a check case by its determination of defendant\u2019s prior record level, and the case is remanded for resentencing, because: (1) N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.14(d) provides that for purposes of determining prior record level, if an offender is convicted of more than one offense in a single superior court during one calendar week, only the conviction for the offense with the highest point total is used; (2) two of defendant\u2019s convictions for obtaining property by false pretenses came on the same day in Henderson County, and thus only one of them should have been used in the calculation; and (3) although defendant\u2019s stipulation as to prior record level is sufficient evidence for sentencing at that level, the trial court\u2019s assignment of level IV to defendant was an improper conclusion of law.\nAppeal by defendant from judgments entered 8 July 2004 by Judge E. Penn Dameron in Henderson County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 February 2007.\nAttorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General M. Lynne Weaver, for the State.\nWilliam D. Aumanfor defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0683-01", "first_page_order": 715, "last_page_order": 723 }