{ "id": 8201966, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF: J.L., Minor Child", "name_abbreviation": "In re J.L.", "decision_date": "2007-05-01", "docket_number": "No. COA06-1501", "first_page": "126", "last_page": "132", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "183 N.C. App. 126" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27.2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(l)" }, { "page": "(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "610 S.E.2d 403", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "406", "parenthetical": "reversal of trial court where there was no finding that respondent lacked \"an appropriate child care arrangement\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 N.C. App. 423", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8470652 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "428", "parenthetical": "reversal of trial court where there was no finding that respondent lacked \"an appropriate child care arrangement\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/169/0423-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 S.E.2d 246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253", "parenthetical": "limiting review of conclusions of law to whether they are supported by findings of fact" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4679227 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111", "parenthetical": "limiting review of conclusions of law to whether they are supported by findings of fact" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "491 S.E.2d 672", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "676", "parenthetical": "citing In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 111, 316 S.E.2d 246, 253 (1984) (limiting review of conclusions of law to whether they are supported by findings of fact)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 505", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11798267 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "511", "parenthetical": "citing In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 111, 316 S.E.2d 246, 253 (1984) (limiting review of conclusions of law to whether they are supported by findings of fact)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0505-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 553, "char_count": 12637, "ocr_confidence": 0.759, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1643348494509819e-07, "percentile": 0.5847923952323089 }, "sha256": "b001dca939a4901ee7a37960be976210850e0d4b5daafc09d6d27ba6375991db", "simhash": "1:baed550ee25f6e65", "word_count": 2085 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:07:58.512650+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges CALABRIA and ELMORE concur." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF: J.L., Minor Child" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BRYANT, Judge.'\nRespondent father (respondent) appeals adjudication and disposition orders with respect to his minor child, J.L.\nJ.L. was bom in 2005. J.L. was conceived when his mother, C.L., was fifteen and respondent father was twenty-five years old. C.L. had been living with respondent and respondent\u2019s mother since February 2005 because C.L.\u2019s parents had left the state, and their whereabouts were unknown. Respondent and his mother were present at the hospital when J.L. was born, and respondent signed the birth certificate acknowledging that he was J.L.\u2019s father.\nShortly after J.L.\u2019s birth, the New Hanover Department of Social Services, (DSS) received a report regarding J.L. and initiated an investigation as to whether C.L., being a minor herself, was neglected and dependent. During this initial investigation, respondent told a DSS social worker that he wanted J.L. to be placed with him. In addition, both respondent\u2019s mother and respondent\u2019s sister expressed their desire to have J.L. placed with them.\nUpon C.L.\u2019s discharge from the hospital, she was placed in foster care. J.L. remained hospitalized because he required surgery to correct a birth defect in which his intestines were externalized. On 20 September 2005, J.L. was discharged from the hospital and went to live with C.L. in foster care. After a dispute with her foster mother and two attempts to run away, C.L. was placed in a new foster home separate from J.L. On 9 November 2005, C.L. ran away and did not return. Shortly thereafter, J.L. was removed from his foster home due to a report of inappropriate discipline.\nOn 21 November 2005, DSS filed a petition alleging that J.L. was dependent and moved for non-secure custody of J.L. The trial court held a hearing on the petition on 23 November 2005 at which respondent father and his counsel appeared. Following the hearing, the trial court entered an order in which it found that C.L. had run away and could not be found. The trial court found that respondent had requested that J.L. be placed with respondent, J.L.\u2019s paternal aunt or J.L.\u2019s grandmother. In addition, the trial court granted DSS\u2019s request for non-secure custody and gave DSS authority to place J.L. with the paternal aunt or grandmother upon completion of favorable home studies.\nOn 1 and 8 December 2005, the trial court conducted hearings on the issue of DSS\u2019s continued non-secure custody of J.L. In its order from the 8 December hearing, the trial court found that C.L.\u2019s whereabouts were still unknown. The trial court also found that the home study had not been completed on the paternal aunt, but ordered DSS to facilitate visits between J.L. and the paternal aunt and grandmother. The trial court further ordered that respondent was to have \u201cno visitation for [respondent] at this time pending further hearing.\u201d\nFollowing an adjudication hearing on 2 March 2006, the trial court again found that C.L.\u2019s whereabouts remained unknown. However, with respect to respondent father, the trial court made the following findings:\n5. That [respondent] is an adult of twenty seven years of age. That at conception of [J.L.], [C.L.] was fifteen years of age. That for some time prior to [J.L.]\u2019s birth and at his birth, [C.L.] resided with [respondent] in the home of [respondent\u2019s] mother .... That [respondent] signed [J.L.]\u2019s birth certificate as father. That DNA paternity testing is to be conducted next week to determine the paternity of [J.L.].\nThe trial court adjudicated J.L. as dependent and concluded that J.L. had been abandoned by C.L. In addition, the trial court continued non-secure custody with DSS and again ordered that respondent have no visitation with J.L.\nOn 1 through 3 May 2006, the trial court held disposition hearings. During these hearings, DSS foster care worker, Nicole Burroughs, testified that respondent had been paying child support for J.L., was current in that support obligation and had been providing J.L. with health insurance. Following the hearings, the trial court again found that C.L.\u2019s whereabouts were unknown and that J.L. was doing well in his foster placement. The trial court made the following findings with respect to respondent:\n6. That prior Orders of this Court have prohibited visitation or contact by [respondent] with [C.L.] or with [J.L.] as [respondent] committed statutory rape of [C.L.] which resulted in conception. From [J.L.]\u2019s birth, [respondent] and his family have acknowledged obligation to support [J.L.] and have expressed the desire to have custody of [J.L.]. The family has provided bags of clothing and a car seat for [J.L.]. Visitation with [J.L.] by [paternal aunt and grandmother], has been authorized and has taken place in [paternal aunt\u2019s] home. That [paternal aunt and grandmother\u2019s] care of [J.L.] during visitation has been appropriate and [J.L.] has been well cared for during visitation.\n9. That it is appropriate at this time to allow the Department of Social Services to cease efforts at reunification with [respondent], . . .\nBased on its findings, the trial court maintained custody with DSS but ordered DSS to \u201cmake its best efforts to locate [C.L.]\u201d so that she could be placed in foster care with J.L. and have an opportunity to parent J.L. The trial court further ordered the guardian ad litem to continue to investigate the possible placement of J.L. with his paternal aunt. While the trial court also increased the aunt\u2019s visitation with J.L., the trial court also continued its prior order that respondent was to have no visitation.\nRespondent father argues the trial court erred in: (I) adjudicating J.L. to be a dependent child, (II) ordering reunification efforts with J.L. to cease, and (III) ordering that there should be no visitation between respondent father and J.L. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the trial court\u2019s decision and remand for additional findings of fact.\nI\nIn his first assignment of error, respondent asserts that the trial court\u2019s adjudication of J.L. as a dependent juvenile was not supported by the findings of fact. We agree.\n\u201cThe allegations in a petition alleging abuse, neglect, or dependency shall be proved by clear and convincing evidence.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-805 (2005). The adjudicatory order shall be in writing and shall contain appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-807 (2005). When a trial court is required to make findings of fact, it must \u201cfind the facts specially.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 52(a)(1) (2005). This Court\u2019s review of atrial court\u2019s conclusions of law is limited to whether they are supported by the findings of fact. In re Helms, 127 N.C. App. 505, 511, 491 S.E.2d 672, 676 (1997) (citing In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 111, 316 S.E.2d 246, 253 (1984) (limiting review of conclusions of law to whether they are supported by findings of fact)).\nRespondent contends that the trial court\u2019s findings with respect to him are insufficient to support the trial court\u2019s conclusion that J.L. is a dependent juvenile. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-101(9) defines \u201cdependent juvenile\u201d as follows:\nA juvenile in need of assistance or placement because the juvenile has no parent, guardian, or custodian responsible for the juvenile\u2019s care or supervision or whose parent, guardian, or custodian is unable to provide for the care or supervision and lacks an appropriate alternative child care arrangement.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-101(9) (2005). Accordingly, to adjudicate J.L. as dependent, the trial court was required to find that respondent, J.L.\u2019s father, was either unable to care for J.L. himself, or was unable to secure an alternative child care arrangement. See In re P.M., 169 N.C. App. 423, 428, 610 S.E.2d 403, 406 (2005) (reversal of trial court where there was no finding that respondent lacked \u201can appropriate child care arrangement\u201d). However, aside from acknowledging that respondent had signed the birth certificate and that a paternity test was to be conducted, the only findings the trial court made in the adjudication order with respect to respondent involved the respondent\u2019s age at the time of J.L.\u2019s conception and the fact that C.L. had lived with respondent prior to J.L.\u2019s birth.\nThe guardian ad litem contends that such factual findings are sufficient to support a conclusion of dependency because they correspond to the elements of statutory rape under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27.7A(a) (\u201cStatutory rape or sexual offense of person who is 13, 14, or 15 years old\u201d). In other words, the guardian ad litem argues that factual findings suggesting that respondent could be criminally liable for statutory rape pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.7A(a), standing alone, are sufficient to support the trial court\u2019s legal conclusion that respondent is unable to provide appropriate care for J.L. However, such an argument does not comport with the statute.\nFirst-degree rape includes certain forms of forcible rape and statutory rape in which the victim is \u201cunder the age of 13 years and the defendant is at least 12 years old and is at least four years older than the victim.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27.2(a)(l). The North Carolina legislature has specifically determined that \u201c[u]pon conviction, a person convicted under this section [of first-degree rape] has no rights to custody of or rights of inheritance from any child bom as a result of the commission of the rape, nor shall the person have any rights related to the child under Chapter 48 or Subchapter 1 of Chapter 7B of the General Statutes.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27.2(c) (2005). Conversely, North Carolina General Statutes, Section 14-27.7A(a) which describes statutory rape of a person 13, 14, or 15 years old does not contain a subsection affecting rights to custody or inheritance upon conviction. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.7A(a) (2005).\nIn the case subjudice, the facts as found by the trial court are not sufficient to support a finding of dependency as they do not correspond to the crime of first-degree rape. Even if respondent were eventually indicted and convicted of statutory rape under the facts as found by the trial court and pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27.7A(a), such a conviction would not result in respondent losing his parental rights to J.L. under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.2(a)(l). To hold that factual findings suggesting potential criminal liability for statutory rape under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.7A(a) constitute per se inability of a parent to care for a child, is in derogation of the statute and in effect, would deprive a father of the opportunity to have his parental rights adjudicated under the specific standards and protections of the juvenile code.\nTherefore, we conclude that the factual findings as to respondent are insufficient.to support the trial court\u2019s conclusion that J.L. is a dependent child. Consequently, we reverse the trial court\u2019s adjudication order. Because we have concluded that the adjudication order must be reversed, we do not address respondent\u2019s contentions with respect to the subsequent disposition order.\nReversed.\nJudges CALABRIA and ELMORE concur.\n. In order to protect the identity of the juvenile, we use initials throughout this opinion.\n. This statute provides:\nA defendant is guilty of a Class B1 felony if the defendant engages in vaginal intercourse or a sexual act with another person who is 13, 14, or 15 years old and the defendant is at least six years older than the person, except when the defendant is lawfully married to the person.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27.7A(a) (2005).", "type": "majority", "author": "BRYANT, Judge.'" } ], "attorneys": [ "Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC, by Murray C. Greason, III, and Julie B. Bradbum, for Guardian ad Litem.", "Geannine M. Boyette for respondent father." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF: J.L., Minor Child\nNo. COA06-1501\n(Filed 1 May 2007)\nChild Neglect and Abuse\u2014 finding of dependency \u2014 not per se from statutory rape\nThe findings of fact did not support the adjudication of a child as a dependent juvenile where the findings, aside from respondent\u2019s paternity, concerned only respondent\u2019s age at the time of the conception (25) and the fact that the mother (who was 15 and who has since run away) lived with respondent prior to the birth. The facts did not correspond to first-degree rape, which would result in the loss of any rights related to the child; even if respondent is eventually convicted of statutory rape, such a conviction would not result in respondent losing his parental rights under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.2(a)(l).\nAppeal by respondent father from adjudication and disposition orders entered 8 May 2006 and 30 June 2006, respectively, by Judge J.H. Corpening, II, in New Hanover County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 2 April 2007.\nWomble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC, by Murray C. Greason, III, and Julie B. Bradbum, for Guardian ad Litem.\nGeannine M. Boyette for respondent father." }, "file_name": "0126-01", "first_page_order": 158, "last_page_order": 164 }