{
  "id": 8203462,
  "name": "IN THE MATTER OF: D.C., C.C.",
  "name_abbreviation": "In re D.C.",
  "decision_date": "2007-06-05",
  "docket_number": "No. COA06-1638",
  "first_page": "344",
  "last_page": "357",
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    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
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    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
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      "cite": "169 N.C. App. 423",
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      "cite": "563 S.E.2d 79",
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          "parenthetical": "explaining that a \"bare recitation\" of statutory grounds for termination, without an accompanying statement of facts sufficient to warrant termination, is insufficient to support a petition for termination of parental rights"
        },
        {
          "page": "82",
          "parenthetical": "\"While there is no requirement that the factual allegations be exhaustive or extensive, they must put a party on notice as to what acts, omissions or conditions are at issue.\""
        }
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    {
      "cite": "150 N.C. App. 380",
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      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
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          "page": "384",
          "parenthetical": "explaining that a \"bare recitation\" of statutory grounds for termination, without an accompanying statement of facts sufficient to warrant termination, is insufficient to support a petition for termination of parental rights"
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          "page": "384"
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      "year": 1994,
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      "cite": "114 N.C. App. 253",
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  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges JACKSON and STEPHENS concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "IN THE MATTER OF: D.C., C.C."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "STROUD, Judge.\nRespondent Jessica C. appeals an adjudication order in which the trial court determined two children, D.C. and C.C., are neglected juveniles as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-101(15). D.C. is a girl who was bom on 8 August 2003 and C.C. is a boy who was born on 20 May 2006. Respondent is the biological mother of both children.\nThe dispositive questions before this Court are whether (1) the trial court erred by adjudicating C.C. to be a neglected juvenile when Pitt County Department of Social Services (DSS) alleged only dependency in its petition, (2) whether the trial court\u2019s findings that D.C. and C.C. are neglected are supported by clear and convincing evidence, (3) whether the trial court erred by failing to order DSS to provide services to respondent, and (4) whether the trial court erred by awarding permanent legal guardianship of D.C. to her maternal aunt following disposition. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.\nI. Background\nOn 14 September 2005, DSS filed a petition alleging that D.C. is a neglected and dependent juvenile as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-101. In support of its petition, DSS also alleged that respondent left D.C. unsupervised, cursed at a social worker in D.C.\u2019s presence, and spent $2,000.00 received in a disability check for care of D.C. in a reckless and wasteful manner. DSS further alleged that there is a history of domestic violence between respondent and D.C.\u2019s putative father, and that respondent left D.C. with the putative father following a violent incident that resulted in respondent being physically injured. Finally, DSS acknowledged in its petition that respondent receives disability payments, suffers from mental retardation, has a history of unstable housing, and has failed to attend a screening for schizophrenia. That same day, the district court entered a non-secure custody order awarding custody of D.C. to DSS. DSS then placed D.C. with D.C.\u2019s maternal aunt and her husband, Angeline and James Phillips.\nOn or about 20 September 2005, DSS filed an amended petition containing additional allegations. In particular, DSS alleged that when D.C. was approximately sixteen months old, respondent left her unsupervised in a motel room where she was later found by a motel employee. The employee entered respondent\u2019s room and discovered D.C. alone after a guest reported that an infant in that room had been crying continuously. Thereafter, the employee contacted the local police department. Respondent did not return until after the police arrived, at which time she stated that she had been gone for only ten or fifteen minutes.\nIn the amended petition, DSS also alleged further details concerning respondent\u2019s use of her disability check, the documented incident of domestic violence between D.C.\u2019s putative father and respondent, and the unstable nature of respondent\u2019s housing. DSS stated that respondent has a home in Chicod, but that she prefers to stay with her sister or in hotel rooms and that her transient lifestyle is a drain on her resources.\nOn or about 26 September 2005, the trial court entered a continued nonsecure custody order. In this order, the court found that respondent has an IQ of 58 and has been diagnosed with severe depression, as well as some additional health problems. At that time, the court appointed a guardian for respondent pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 17.\nOn or about 5 October 2005, 1 December 2005, 14 December 2005, and 22 December 2005, the trial court entered additional orders continuing nonsecure custody. On or about 10 January 2006, the trial court entered an order extending until 9 February 2006 the time to prepare a multidisciplinary evaluation of respondent. By letter dated 23 February 2006 and in lieu of a multidisciplinary evaluation, the court received a copy of the assessment for limited guardianship completed on respondent. On or about 20 January 2006 and 2 May 2006, the district court entered additional orders continuing nonse-cure custody.\nOn 3 November 2005, respondent notified DSS that she was eight weeks pregnant. Respondent gave birth to C.C. on 20 May 2006. Two days later, DSS filed a petition alleging that C.C. is a dependent juvenile as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-101(9). In its petition, DSS incorporated verbatim all the allegations made with respect to respondent\u2019s care of D.C. and also alleged that respondent (1) received sporadic prenatal care for C.C., (2) refused to divulge the identity of C.C.\u2019s father, (3) does not possess a crib, diapers, clothes, or formula for C.C., and (4) is incapable of providing care for a newborn.\nOn 23 May 2006, the district court entered a nonsecure custody order awarding custody of C.C. to DSS, after which DSS placed C.C. in a licensed foster home. On 26 May 2006 and 12 June 2006 the court entered continued nonsecure custody orders with respect to C.C.\nThe trial court heard DSS\u2019s petitions at an adjudication and disposition hearing held on 22 June 2006 and 10 August 2006. On 8 September 2006, the trial court entered an order (nunc pro tunc 10 August 2006) adjudicating both children to be neglected juveniles, ceasing efforts to reunify D.C. and respondent, awarding guardianship of D.C. to James and Angeline Phillips, and relieving DSS and Guardian Ad Litem from further responsibility with respect to D.C.\nII. Juvenile Petition\nRespondent argues that the trial court erred by adjudicating C.C. to be a neglected juvenile because the petition filed by DSS alleged only that C.C. is a dependent juvenile. We agree.\n\u201cThe pleading in an abuse, neglect, or dependency action is the petition.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-401 (2005). \u201cThe court may permit a petition to be amended when the amendment does not change the nature of the conditions upon which the petition is based.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-800 (2005). To date, section 7B-800 has not been interpreted by the appellate courts; however, former section 7A-627, which similarly provided \u201c[t]he judge may permit a petition to be amended when the amendment does not change the nature of the offense or the conditions upon which the petition is based,\u201d has been applied in several appellate decisions. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-627 (1997). Section 7A-627 governed petitions alleging delinquency as well as petitions alleging abuse, neglect, or dependency. It has been repealed and re-codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-800, with respect to abuse, neglect, and dependency and \u00a7 2400, with respect to delinquency.\nIn In re Davis, this Court held that section 7A-627 prevented a child from being adjudicated delinquent for an offense which was neither the crime charged in the juvenile petition nor a lesser included offense of the crime charged. In re Davis, 114 N.C. App. 253, 441 S.E.2d 696 (1994). In Davis, \u201c[t]he trial court essentially amended the juvenile petition by allowing the State to proceed on a theory of burning of personal property,\u201d when the petition alleged only burning a public building. Id. Although the State argued that the juvenile waived his due process right to notice by \u201c \u2018consenting to be tried for a slightly different offense arising out of the same operative facts,\u2019 \u201d this Court rejected the State\u2019s argument \u201cbecause jurisdiction over the subject matter of a proceeding cannot be conferred by consent, waiver, or estoppel.\u201d\nHere, DSS alleged dependency, but proceeded on the theory of neglect at adjudication. As in Davis, the trial court \u201cessentially amended the juvenile petition\u201d by allowing DSS to proceed on a condition not alleged in the petition. Because N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-800 permits amendment only when it \u201cdoes not change the nature of the conditions upon which the petition is based\u201d and because DSS did not allege neglect in its petition, the trial court erred by entering an order adjudicating C.C. to be a neglected juvenile.\nThis application of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-800 is supported by the language of \u00a7\u00a7 7B-802, 805, and 807(a), which limit the matters to be considered, proved, and adjudicated to those conditions alleged in the juvenile petition. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-802 provides that an adjudicatory hearing is \u201cdesigned to adjudicate the existence or nonexistence of any of the conditions alleged in a petition.\u201d (Emphasis added.) N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-805 (2005) provides that the petitioner must prove \u201cthe allegations in a petition alleging, abuse, neglect, or dependency\u201d by \u201cclear and convincing evidence.\u201d (Emphasis added.) And, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-807(a) provides \u201c[i]f the court finds that the allegations alleged in the petition have been proven by clear and convincing evidence, the court shall so state\u201d in a written order. (Emphasis added.)\nWe recognize that \u201callegations in a petition\u201d may include specific factual allegations attached to a form petition for support. Gf. In re Hardesty, 150 N.C. App. 380, 384, 563 S.E.2d 79, 82 (2002) (explaining that a \u201cbare recitation\u201d of statutory grounds for termination, without an accompanying statement of facts sufficient to warrant termination, is insufficient to support a petition for termination of parental rights). Here, DSS incorporated such an attachment to the juvenile petition it filed when C.C. was two days old. The attachment restated verbatim all of the allegations DSS made approximately nine months earlier with respect to respondent\u2019s care of D.C. and added allegations as to C.C. that respondent (1) received sporadic prenatal care for C.C., (2) refused to divulge the identity of C.C.\u2019s father, (3) does not possess a crib, diapers, clothes, or formula for C.C., and (4) is incapable of providing care for a newborn. These minimal allegations were insufficient to put respondent on notice that both dependency and neglect of C.C. would be at issue during the adjudication hearing. See Hardesty, 150 N.C. App. at 384, 563 S.E.2d at 82 (\u201cWhile there is no requirement that the factual allegations be exhaustive or extensive, they must put a party on notice as to what acts, omissions or conditions are at issue.\u201d).\nWe emphasize that this holding is not based on DSS\u2019s mere failure to \u201ccheck the box\u201d for \u201cneglect\u201d on the form petition. While it is certainly the better practice for the petitioner to \u201ccheck\u201d the appropriate box on the petition for each ground for adjudication, if the specific factual allegations of the petition are sufficient to put the respondent on notice as to each alleged ground for adjudication, the petition will be adequate. In this case, the box for \u201cneglect\u201d was not checked, and the factual allegations, while supporting the claim of dependency, did not clearly allege the separate claim of neglect. We also note that the trial court did not adjudicate the child as dependant but only as neglected, and that neglect was the claim which was not alleged, or checked, in the petition.\nFor the reasons stated above, we reverse that portion of the trial court order which adjudicates C.C. to be a neglected juvenile. We remand this matter to District Court, Pitt County for adjudication and disposition hearings on DSS\u2019s petition alleging C.C. to be a dependent juvenile.\nIII. Neglect\nRespondent argues that the trial court\u2019s findings that D.C. and C.C. are neglected are not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Because we reverse that portion of the trial court order adjudicating C.C. to be a neglected juvenile, we do not consider respondent\u2019s argument with respect to C.C.\nIn support of her argument, respondent emphasizes that the trial court orally stated it found neglect based on a single incident, but that the order actually entered contained numerous additional findings. In particular, the court stated, \u201cI\u2019m going to find that by clear and convincing evidence to support the County\u2019s Petition in this case of neglect, but specifically on the issue of the enisode that occurred at the motel. I\u2019m not convinced bv clear and convincing evidence of the other incident. I do have some concerns about that.\u201d We agree with the trial court that \u201cthe episode that occurred at the motel\u201d is supported by clear and convincing evidence and determine that the court\u2019s findings concerning this incident support its conclusion that D.C. is a neglected juvenile as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-101(15). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court order to the extent that it adjudicates D.C. to be a neglected juvenile.\nAs discussed above, petitioner must prove \u201cthe allegations in a petition alleging, abuse, neglect, or dependency\u201d by \u201cclear and convincing evidence.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-805 (2005). \u201cIf the court finds that the allegations alleged in the petition have been proven by clear and convincing evidence, the court shall so state.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-807(a) (2005). On appeal, this Court considers whether the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are supported by clear and convincing evidence and whether the conclusions of law are supported by the findings of fact. In re P.M., 169 N.C. App. 423, 424, 610 S.E.2d 403, 404 (2005).\nWith respect to the \u201cincident at the motel,\u201d DSS presented evidence through the testimony of Timothy Mack, the front desk clerk who found D.C. alone in a room at the Super 8 motel, and Dale Mills, the detective who investigated Mack\u2019s report.. Mack testified that he received a complaint from a guest, who stated that \u201cthere\u2019d been a baby screaming and crying for like ten or fifteen minutes\u201d in room 214 next door. Mack went upstairs and listened at the door of room 214, where he heard the baby crying. He then walked back to the front desk and tried to call room 214, but no one answered. Mack returned to room 214 and knocked on the door. Again, no one answered. Finally, Mack called his manager who told him to enter the room.\nWhen Mack entered room 214 he found D.C. sitting alone on the floor beside the door crying. Mack checked to make sure no one else was in the room and then took D.C. to the front desk, where he called the police. Mack testified that approximately thirty minutes elapsed between the time he received the complaint and the time he called the police. Respondent did not return to the motel before the police arrived.\nMack also testified that he could see the front lobby from his work station and that no one was there at the time of the complaint. He further stated that he could see the Coke machine from room 214 and that no one was there either. Room 214 was registered to respondent.\nDetective Mills testified that he responded to the Super 8 motel at 4:22 a.m. \u201cin reference to an infant child left unattended in a room there.\u201d In the course of his investigation, Detective Mills interviewed respondent. Respondent told Detective Mills that she left D.C. asleep on the hotel bed while she went downstairs to visit with her cousin in the lobby.\nRespondent testified that she left D.C. with the lady in the room next door to hers. She further testified that she did not know the lady\u2019s name at the present time and she was unsure whether she knew the lady\u2019s name at the time she left D.C. in the lady\u2019s care. When asked why she thought she could trust this lady, respondent replied, \u201cbecause someone else told me.\u201d\nBased upon this and other evidence, the trial court found:\n10. On or about December 17, 2004, the respondent mother had left D.C. in a Super 8 Motel room alone for no less than thirty minutes around 4:00 a.m. in the morning. The case was substantiated for neglect and was transferred to Case Management/ Case Planning.\n11. Timothy Mack, the desk clerk at Motel 6 [sic] was at the front desk when he received a telephone call from a guest that a child was constantly crying and had been crying for approximately ten to fifteen minutes.\n12. Timothy Mack went to the room of respondent mother and began knocking on the door and no one answered. Mr. Mack contacted the manager and was informed that he was to let himself in the room. Upon entering the room Mr. Mack found D.C. alone and crying.\n13. The Greenville Police Department was called and a referral was made to Child Protective Services. Shortly after the police arrived [respondent] returned to the motel.\nWe conclude that the findings of fact listed above are supported by clear and convincing evidence. Further, these findings are sufficient to support the trial court\u2019s conclusion that D.C. is a neglected juvenile \u201cin that [D.C. was] exposed to an injurious environment that put [her] in an unacceptable risk of harm and emotional distress.\u201d\nHere, the trial court found that respondent left her sixteen month old daughter alone in a Super 8 motel room for more than thirty minutes at four o\u2019clock in the morning. The trial court\u2019s findings related to this incident, standing alone, are sufficient to support the conclusion that D.C. is a neglected juvenile as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-101(15). For this reason, we do not consider respondent\u2019s argument that the remaining findings are not supported by clear and convincing evidence. This assignment of error is overruled.\nIV. Reasonable Efforts\nRespondent argues that the trial court erred by failing to order DSS to provide services to assist respondent in completing the tasks necessary for reunification. We disagree.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-507(a)(3) provides that a disposition order \u201c[s]hall contain findings as to whether a county department of social services should continue to make reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for placement of the juvenile, unless the court has previously determined or determines . . . that such efforts are not required or shall cease.\u201d \u201cReasonable efforts\u201d means \u201cthe diligent use of preventive or reunification services by a department of social services when a juvenile\u2019s remaining at home or returning home is consistent with achieving a safe permanent home for the juvenile within a reasonable period of time.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-101(18) (2005). Thus, when the court orders DSS to \u201cmake reasonable efforts,\u201d the court orders DSS to diligently \u201cuse . . . preventive or reunification services\u201d by definition.\nHere, the trial court found:\n73. D.C. was removed from her mother\u2019s home September 13, 2005 and she has not made substantial progress since that time towards providing a safe environment that is in the best interests of D.C.\n74. It is in the best interest of D.C. that guardianship be granted to James and Angeline Phillips.\n76. Pitt County DSS made reasonable efforts to prevent and eliminate the need for placement of the juveniles outside the home of respondent mother including daycare for the children and random drug screens for respondent mother.\n78. The best permanent plan for C.C. is reunification with respondent mother and there is a reasonable possibility of reunification with C.C. in that he has not been in custody as long as D.C.\n79. Pitt county DSS shall continue with reasonable efforts towards reuniting the mother with C.C. including, but not limited to mental health referrals if necessary, referrals for anger management, referral for vocational rehabilitation, visitation, and monitoring visitation.\nThe court also made the following conclusions of law:\n6. That petitioner made reasonable efforts to eliminate the need for the placement of D.C. outside the home but that further efforts at reunification are not reasonably likely to succeed and are not in the best interests of the juvenile.\n7. That the permanent plan for C.C. should be reunification with respondent mother and Pitt County DSS should continue with reasonable efforts towards reunification.\nFindings of fact 73, 74, 76 and conclusion of law 6 satisfy the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-507(a) with respect to D.C. Because the court has determined that continued efforts to reunify D.C. with respondent are not likely to succeed and are not in D.C.\u2019s best interests, DSS is relieved of its statutory responsibility to \u201cuse . . . preventive or reunification services\u201d to accomplish that goal.\nFindings of fact 76, 78, 79, and conclusion of law 7 satisfy the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-507(a) with respect to C.C. Because the court has found that DSS should continue to make reasonable efforts to reunify C.C. with respondent, DSS must \u201cuse . . . preventive or reunification services\u201d to accomplish this goal. No further specific findings of fact are required.\nThis assignment of error is overruled.\nV. Guardianship\nRespondent argues that the trial court erred by appointing James and Angeline Phillips as D.C.\u2019s permanent legal guardians in a disposition order. We agree.\nThe court may enter findings ceasing reunification \u201c[i]n any order placing a juvenile in the custody or placement responsibility of a county department of social services\u201d including a disposition order; however, \u201c[a]t any hearing at which the court finds that reasonable efforts to eliminate the need for the juvenile\u2019s placement are not required or shall cease, the court shall direct that a permanency planning hearing as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-907 be held within 30 calendar days after the date of the hearing and, if practicable, shall set the date and time for the permanency planning hearing.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-507 (2005) (emphasis added). \u201cThe purpose of a permanency planning hearing shall be to develop a plan to achieve a safe, permanent home for the juvenile within a reasonable period of time.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-907(a) (2005). Section 7B-907 sets forth specific rules for giving \u201cnotice of the hearing and its purpose to the parent.\u201d \u201cAt the conclusion of the hearing, if the juvenile is not returned home, the court shall consider\u201d six statutorily enumerated criteria and \u201cmake written findings regarding those that are relevant.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-907(b) (emphasis added). \u201c[T]he judge shall [also] make specific findings as to the best plan of care to achieve a safe, permanent home for the juvenile within a reasonable period of time.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-907(c) (emphasis added).\nFollowing a permanency planning hearing, the trial court \u201cmay appoint a guardian of the person for the juvenile pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-600.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-907(c). \u201cIf the court . . . appoints an individual guardian of the person pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-600, the court shall verify that the person receiving custody or being appointed as guardian of the juvenile understands the legal significance of the placement or appointment and will have adequate resources to care appropriately for the juvenile.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-907(f) (emphasis added).\nHere, the trial court adjudicated D.C. to be neglected, entered a disposition ceasing reunification efforts, and awarded permanent legal guardianship of D.C. to James and Angeline Phillips in a single order following hearings on adjudication and disposition. The adjudication and disposition hearings were held more than a year after DSS filed its original petition, following numerous orders continuing non-secure custody without adjudicating the merits of the DSS petition. No permanency planning hearing and no review hearings were held in this matter.\nThe trial court\u2019s findings ceasing reunification efforts and awarding guardianship are set forth in findings of fact 73, 74, 76 and conclusion of law 6. Based on these findings and conclusions of law, the trial court ordered the following disposition:\n5. That is in the best interest of D.C. that guardianship be granted to James and Angeline Phillips.\n6. That James and Angeline Phillips are authorized to consent to and authorize any routine emergency medical, psychological, psychiatric, educational or remedial services for D.C.\n7. That visitation with D.C. shall be at the discretion of Angeline and James Phillips.\n22. That Guardian Ad Litem and the Department of Social Services and the attorneys are relieved of further responsibility in the D.C. matter.\nBecause N.C. Gen: Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 7B-507 and 907 do not permit the trial court to enter a permanent plan for a juvenile during disposition, respondent did not have statutorily required notice that the trial court would consider a permanent plan for D.C., and the trial court did not make findings mandated by sections 7B-907(b), (c), and (f), we reverse that portion of the trial court order awarding guardianship to James and Angeline Phillips. We remand this matter to District Court, Pitt County for a permanency planning hearing and entry of a permanency planning order containing all findings of fact required by section 7B-907.\nVI. Conclusion\nFor the reasons stated above, we reverse those portions of the trial court order which (1) adjudicate C.C. to be a neglected juvenile and (2) award guardianship of D.C. to James and Angeline Phillips. We remand this matter to District Court, Pitt County for (1) adjudication and disposition hearings on DSS\u2019s petition alleging C.C. to be a dependent juvenile and (2) a permanency planning hearing to develop a permanent plan for D.C. With respect to all other matters considered by this Court on appeal, the trial court order is affirmed.\nAFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.\nJudges JACKSON and STEPHENS concur.\n. In the disposition order entered 8 September 2006, nunc pro tunc 10 August 2006, the trial court found respondent\u2019s IQ to be 67.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "STROUD, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Anthony Hal Morris for petitioner-appellee Pitt County Department of Social Services.",
      "Wanda Naylor for Guardian Ad Litem.",
      "Richard E. Jester for respondent-appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF: D.C., C.C.\nNo. COA06-1638\n(Filed 5 June 2007)\n1. Child Abuse and Neglect\u2014 neglect finding improper \u2014 petition alleged only dependency\nThe trial court erred by adjudicating respondent mother\u2019s minor son to be a neglected juvenile when DSS alleged only dependency in its petition, and the case is remanded for adjudication and disposition hearings on DSS\u2019s petition alleging the minor child to be a dependent juvenile, because: (1) the trial court essentially amended the juvenile petition by allowing DSS to proceed on a condition not alleged in the petition; (2) N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-800 permits amendment only when.it does not change the nature of the conditions upon which the petition is based; (3) the minimal allegations were insufficient to put respondent on notice that both dependency and neglect would be at issue during the adjudication hearing; (4) the box for neglect on the petition form was not checked and the factual allegations, while supporting the claim of dependency, did not allege the separate claim of neglect; and (5) the trial court did not adjudicate the child as dependent, but only as neglected.\n2. Child Abuse and Neglect\u2014 neglect \u2014 findings of fact \u2014 clear and convincing evidence\nThe trial court\u2019s findings that the minor daughter was neglected was supported by clear and convincing evidence, because: (1) the episode that occurred where the sixteen-month-old child was found alone in a motel room was supported by clear and convincing evidence supporting the determination of neglect under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-101(15); and (2) the minor child was exposed to an injurious environment that put her at an unacceptable risk of harm and emotional distress.\n3. Child Abuse and Neglect\u2014 neglect \u2014 failure to require services to assist in completing tasks necessary for reunification\nThe trial court did not err in a child neglect and dependency case by failing to order DSS to provide services to assist respondent mother in completing the tasks necessary for reunification as required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-507(a), because: (1) DSS was relieved of its statutory responsibility to use preventative or reunification services to accomplish that goal for the minor daughter when the court determined that continued efforts to reunify the minor child with respondent are not likely to succeed and are not in the child\u2019s best interests; and (2) the court did in fact order that reunification services be provided for reunification with the minor son.\n4. Guardian and Ward\u2014 permanent legal guardianship \u2014 disposition order\nThe trial court erred in a child neglect and dependency case by awarding permanent legal guardianship of respondent mother\u2019s minor daughter to her maternal aunt following disposition, and the case is remanded for a permanency planning hearing and entry of a permanency planning order containing all findings required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 907, because: (1) N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 7B-507 and 907 do not permit the trial court to enter a permanent plan for a juvenile during disposition; (2) respondent did not have the statutorily required notice that the trial court would consider a permanent plan for the minor child; and (3) the trial court did not make findings mandated by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-907(b), (c), and (f).\nAppeal by respondent-mother from order entered 8 September 2006, nunc pro tunc 10 August 2006, by Judge Joseph A. Blick in Pitt County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 30 April 2007.\nAnthony Hal Morris for petitioner-appellee Pitt County Department of Social Services.\nWanda Naylor for Guardian Ad Litem.\nRichard E. Jester for respondent-appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0344-01",
  "first_page_order": 376,
  "last_page_order": 389
}